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Operation L '.DUII! j Interir T~st Report Projrec 2

110837

Victor A, J. Ven Lint
Lev.-rence 3. Eillion, I!aj
John A. Chine nt, l-cj, VS.
Donald C. C-rphell, CD?,

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ABSTRACT

Program 2 had the Department of t Defease responsibility for the proper
proseoutloa of the Suelear Radiation and Effects Program In Operation REDWING*

This report covers the portion of tlie program concerned vith^the distribution

of radioactivity in the cloud resulting frost nuclear explosions and the sub-

sequent fallout of material from the cloud*

Participation involved the following agencies* Evans Signal laboratory;

Naval Radiological Defense laboratory; Scripps Institution of Oceanography;

New York Operations Office, AECj Chemical and Padlological laboratories, ACC;

fr.ut i* x J

and Air Force Special Weapons Center. REDWING large yield events pri-

mary participation vere Cherokee, Zuni, Flathead, Navajo, and Tewa vith second-
ary Ksasurenen' s made on events IaCrosse and !!ohavk.

A wide variety of instrumentation was employed by the various laRor-.tory
{-roups. Rockets and manned aircraft made penetrations into t v . •* clr-d and
stem. Instruments recorded the time of arrival of fallout, collected incremen-
tal and gross sar.ples of fallout, and measured the radioactivity in the air,
on land surfaces, and in the lagoon and ocean waters. Samples were collected
by a nunber of different means, including manned ships in the downwind fallout
area; skiffs deep moored in the open ocean; barge, raft, and laird stations in
the Bikini lagoon. Aircraft and ships were used to survey the open ocean areas,
helicopters with detectors suspended below an^^gj^r

areas. The water in the lagoon was examined* ^ BRUNO ERG

Data consisted of time and rate of arrival of radioactivity; character of
fallout material including particle sixe, composition and activity, total ex-
posure on land; and exposure rates on land; in the air, and in the lagoon and

ocean water. Wind data end the else and shape of the visible cloud and stem

f ■.

vere recorded to assist with the ill out pattern. QjjJ

REST

Launch V* Ground

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• Tim* of mox.rafo of arrival

• Tima of cassation

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Tlea of Arrival
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Stem Region (< 45,000 ft)

Cloud Region (> 45,000ft)
45,000 ft Line

(a) Tir* of arrival detectors on tbs cTtiffa and pontoon rafts.

(b) G.usraa "tir^-lrteneity recorders* aboard TIG 39, SAG 40, 1ST 611 ,
TFHB 13, TFS3 29, and the Site Hov station of Froject 2,63.

fa).-T3>* f iTS4A orpoenw rate recorder® ln«ta3Llod 4aa4^tatijoaia

ZUNI: 3.53 megatons
total yield, 15% fission
(cleaner, lead pusher)

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2.1 Film Bodge
Reading

Figure 3.9 Zuni Ten Hour Exposure Contour! . Exposure la r.

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110837

Operation L -D’lfllll Interin T^st Report Projrar: 2

Victor A. J. Van Lint
La rrence 2, I-illion, I'-aJ
John A. Chlnent, 1-c.J , T7?
Donald C. C— roell/cDl,

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED ^
WITH DELETIONS
BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/OC

1?56

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A'STRACT

Program 2 had the Department o? Defease reeponelbility for the proper
prosecution of the Uuclear Radiation and Effects Program in Operation REDWING.
This report covers the portion of the program concerned vith^the distribution
of radioactivity in the cloud resulting fro a nuclear explosions and the sub-
sequent fallout of material from the cloud.

Participation involved the following agencies* Evans Signal laboratory!
Naval Radiological Defence laboratory! Scripps Institution of Oceanography!

New York Operations Office, AEC! Chemical and Padiological laboratories, ACC{
and Air Force Special Weapons Center. REDWING large yield events Jessing pri-
mary participation were Cherokee, Zuni, Flathead, Ravajo, and Teva with second-
ary i.-.aasurenen’ s made on events IaCrosse and I'ohavk.

A wide variety of instrumentation was employed by the various labor.tory
groups. Pockets and manned aircraft made penetrations into th -> cir d and
stem. Instruments recorded the tine of arrival of fallout, collected incremen-
tal and gross camples of fallout, and neasursd the radioactivity in the air,
on land surfaces, and in the lagoon and ocean waters. Samples were collected
by a number of different means, including manned ships in the downwind fallout
area; skiffs deep moored in the open ocean; barge, raft, and land stations in
the Bikini Lagoon. Aircraft and ships were used to survey the open ocean areas,

helicopters with detectors suspended below

areas. The water in the lagoon was examined. g^ T FRC

Data consisted of time and rate of arrival of radioactivity; character of
fallout material including particle size, composition^ and activity, total ex-
posure on landj and exposure rates on land; in the air, and in the lagoon and
ocean water. Wind data and the size and shaoe of the visible cloud and stem

^ ‘ ft.i JtaAA

ryrr

were recorded to assist with theT^nfiys-s

RESTlfDSi

gill out pattern#

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No fallout was measured from the Cherokee air burst. Preliminary results
show a difference In the nature of fallout material between water eurfaoe
(Flathead and Navajo) and land surface (Zuni and Tewa) bursts. The former
consisted of an aerosol, mud, and a salty slurry and the latter of a fine dry
solid material resembling modified coral. High exposure rates were measured
In the lower layer cf the cloud and little activity was detected In the stem
although large active particles were collected which apparently came fro«
lower stem altitudes. Particle fall, time of arrival, and exposure plots
have been developed from the data. EXPOSURE AND RATE CONTOURS ARE FRCH PRE-
TJTINAP.I DATA ANT MUST RE USED WITH CAUTION. Scsae in-close readings are given
and those near the Mohawk crater extrapolated to H/l hour in many cases exceeded
10,000 r/h r. These values are higher than any previous extrapolated data
based on D-^day measurements.

It is tentatively concluded for the site of shots involved that radio-
active fallout material originates in the lover layer of the nuclear cloud and
fi. tU If

that there is- little activity In the stem.

i s%~t> •<« J

A minimal,, air burst over water doe6 not produce fallout of military

Bfpr fiance. ^ ^ ^ j H'ik C?, * ib+4 f c "t'Sf'rtv " Yx * * ' ‘

foxe exposure rate / from surface burst fallout ^ls probably proportiqnilVto

t>o radiological yield.

Tentatively an-i within the definitions of this report a
yield) surface burst will ppoduoe an area of over 1,500 square miles

to a level which will be lethal to^pxpos9d personnel. The sickness
area will comprise more than 3,500 square riles.

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PREFACE

This report is a summary and consolidation of the preliminary infer*

Ration available on the fallout studies at Operation REDWIR3, Bata is
presented from many of the projects in Program 2 which worked Individ—
nally and in close cooperation to document the fallout* Appendix A
gives some information on the individual projects end the type of data
each obtained. A cumber of projects also gathered data on other prob-
lems such as initial radiation and contamination and decontamination.

The preliminary results of these efforts are not included in this report
since they will be presented in detail in the individual project reports
and are also covered in the Task Unit 3 Summary Report.

Since this report was written within a few weeks after the conclu-
sion of Operation REDWIEG, the data is necessarily preliminary and sub-
ject to possible raj or changes. Muck of the data from detailed labora-
tory analysis of the fallout samples and from careful interpretation of
the records was not available. However, it was felt that the general
fallout picture, including the estimated radiation contours for the in-
dividual events, was of sufficient immediate interest to warrant presen-
tation of the results although they wore subject to change.

This consolidation would not have been possible without the coopera-
tion wnd assistance of the following Project Officers and their projects*

Kr. Peter Brown, Projects 2.1 - 2.2, Evans Signal Laboratory} SAN BRLNO FRC
Mr. Richard R. Soule, Project 2.61, Eaval Radiological Defense .

Laboratory} AVAlLAg^g QQpy

Hr, Feenan 9, Jennings, Project 2,62, Scripts Institution of

Ooeanograpbyf

Dr, Terry Triffet, Project 2,63, Ratal Radiological Defense
< Laboratoryi

Hr, Robert T. Grave son. Project 2,64, Hew Tork Operations Office,
V AECf

Hr, Hsnfred Kcrgenthan, Project 2,65, Airy Chemical Center!
Colonel Ernest A, Pinson, USAF, Project 2,66, Air Force Special
Weapons C enter j

Kr, Hein* Rinnert, Project 2,71, Kaval Radiological Defense
Laboratory; end

Kr, Kichael H, Digger, Project 2,10, Karel Radiological Defense
Laboratory.

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COUTZIiTS

1 E7TRODUCTIOH

lad Surface Bursts,,,.. »•••••,, ,».,,*•«.••«»•.

1.1.1 Definition

1.1.2 Previous Test Results*..

1.1.2. 1 J.JJGI2 Surface Shot

1.1.2.2 I?X Kike Shot *

1.1. 2. 3 CAS?I£ Bravo Shot..

1.1.2.4 CASTIfi Eoon Shot

1.1.3 Techanisn of Fallout ..••••

1.1.4 Objectives

1.1.4. 1 Collection of Fallout Haterial.

1.1. 4.2 Radiation Readings over Land Type Surfaces.,.,.,.,

1.1.4. 3 Distribution of Activity in the Ooean Areas

1.1.4. 4 Distribution of Activity in the Budear Hushrooo.,

1.1.4. 5 Analyses of the Collected Fallout Material

Air Bursts. ..................... ..............................

1.2.1 Definition

1.2.2 Previous Test Results.....

1.2.3 i'cchonisin of Contamination...

1.2.4 Objectives

Veter Surface Worsts..

1.3.1 Definition *

1.3*2 The Role and Military Significance of Eerge Shots.......

1.3.3 Barge Shots at Operation CASTIS.... ........ .............

1.3.4 Objectives.... ....

Other types of Bursts........

Effect of Fractional Radiological Tield.

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2 EXFE:'EE!JTAL design JT. ...... .

Requirements for Data.

Instrurcnt ation.

2.2.1 Collection of Fallout Katerid.

2. 2. 1.1 Total Collectors.

2. 2. 1.2 Incremental Collectors

2.2.2 Radiation Readings Over I*ami Type Surfaces.....-....,,.,

2. 2. 2.1 Total Exposure Detectors..........................

2.2. 2. 2 Gamma Eiposure Rate Ketcrs,.

2. 2. 2. 3 Tim of Arrival Detectors.

2.2.3 Radiation Readings in end Above Ocean and Lagoon Water.,

2. 2.3.1 Survey end Collection Vessels.....................

2.2. 3.2 Surface Exposure Rate Readings

2. 2. 3. 3 Intensity Versus Depth Profile....

2.2. 3.4 Analysis of Water Sruples. ................ ........

2.2.3. 5 Fallout Decay Tanks.

RESTRtf^R^^TA

' v nswimei' mi

2.2,4 Radiation Readings in tha Kucloar Cl .... .. 36

2,3 Operations »••••••••. . 23

2.3.1 Land Stations., 23

2.3.2 Moored Stations........ 43

2.3.3 XAO’s and 1ST ^

2.3.4 P 2 V Aircraft end Helicopters......... /J>

2.3.5 Two DS;s. K/V &RIZ03, end LCD 1136 4 $

; 2,3,6 RrosrsnXontrol Center*.,. SO

2.3.7 Correlation Measure cents yi

CHAPTER 3 RESULTS 53

3.1 The Lord Surface Burst... S3

3.1.1 Zuni 53

3. 1 . 1.1 Introduction 53

3. 1.1.2 Distribution of Activity in tha Stabilized Cloud.... si

3. 1.1.3 Particle Pall Plot., 61

3. 1.1. 4 Characterization of Fallout Material . .... , .—63

3.1.1. 5 L-udEquivalent Distribution of Fallout Material. .... 65

3.1. 1.6 Central Tiro of Arrival Contours.,. 2D

3. 1.1*7 Ten Hoar Exposure Contours 23

3 . 1 . 1.8 Gro33 Decay -Serves .4^ 24

3.1.2 L^Crosse 77

3 . 1 . 2.1 Introduction .. 77

3 . 1 . 2. 2 Particle Fall Plot 27

3. 1.2.3 Characterization of Fallout Material..,...,... 77

3 . 1 . 2. 4 Land Equivalent Distribution of Fallout 27

3.1.2. 5 Central Tire of Arrival Contours 27

3. 1.2 . 6 Gross Decay fi*rvw.£,>y??Cr.^r...... 83

3.1.3 Kohra* £3

3. 1.3.1 Introduction 63

3.1. 3.2 Particle Fall Plot S 3

3. 1.3. 3 Lend Equivalent Distribution of Fallout............. 85

3.1. 3.4 Central Tins of Arrival Contours S5

3.1.4 Town #^^^5

3. 1,4.1. Introduction 65

3 . 1 . 4.2 Distribution of Activity in the Stabilized Cloud.... 89

3. 1.4.3 Particle Fall Plot 69

3.1 .4.4 Characterization of Fallout Materiel. .............. . ftp

3.1.4. 5 Land Equivalent Distribution of Fallout. ftp

3. 1 . 4.6 Central Tice of Arrival Contours......... 9 4

3.1.4. 7 Ton Hour Ezposure Contours ••••*• ........... ........ *— j ^4

3.1.4 . 8 Gross Decay Cus*vw..'f^<-7j , Vi'277..... 9 4

3.2 Air Uum 1 3 97

3 . 2.1 Chsrotee ■ 97

j 3.2. 1,1 Introduction... 97

i | 3. 2. 1.2. Distribution of Activity in the Stabilized Cloud. ... 97

U 3.2. 1.3 Particle Fall Plot igZ

3 . 2. 1.4 Distribution of Fallout... .^102

3 . 2.2 Osage...

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3.3 V&ter Surface Bursts. *

3# 3*1 Tlfttho^d* - rw-

3t3«l«l Introduction.

3. 3.1.2 Particle Fall Plot W

3* 3.1.3 Characterisation of Fallout Material. ............... . '107

3.3.1. 4 lend Equivalent Distribution of Fallout....... ...... ."107

3.3. 1.5 Central fins of Arrival Contours.

3. 3.1. 6 Ten Ilour Exposure Contours........ ^

• 3. 3.1.7 Gross Decay

3.3.2 Havajo jl?

3.3.2. 1 Introduction.. . Tg

3. 3. 2.2 Distribution of Activity in the Stabilised Cloud

end Stes.. H7

3.3. 2.3 Particle Fell Plot TgJ

3. 3. 2. 4 Characterisation of Fallout Material.... **3

3. 3*2* 5 Land Equivalent Distribution of Fallout

3.3.2. 6 Central Tine of Arrival Contours............ **

3. 3.2.7 Ten Hour Exposure Contours.......,,, "125

3.3. 2. 6 Cross Decay Cutv^^ . » S2 ** .

CHAPTER 4 DISCDSSIOH. , . j)r« » om . 131

4.1 Techniques of Mea^urerrrt.. . ~^I

4.1.1 Introduction. 1^

4.1.2 Eelicoptcr Probe Aeriel Survey

4.1.3 Collection of Fallout Smples 132 "

4.1.4 Radiation Readings on Ship’s Deck Surfaces........... 133

4.1.5 Radiation Versus Depth Profiles in the Ocean. ............. . 7133

4.1.6 Radiation Readings in the Surface Ocean Layer . ......... . "134

4.1 3 7 Radiation Readings in Air Over the Ocean...... . "134

4.1.6 Radiation Readings in Air Over Lend. 13$

4.1.9 Droppable Radiation Detector - Telemeter Units . "135

4.2 Limitations of Preliminary Data. "135

4.2.1 Introduction. ,~"13o

4.2.2 Radiation Measurements in the Unclear .... . ~137

4*2.3 Land Surface Readings... 137

4.2.4 Water Survey Readings. .................................... . 13o

4.2.5 Aerial Survey Readings ^

4.2.6 Sample Readings 135

4.3 Distribution of Activity in the Stabilized Cloud ................ 13 i

4.3*1 Introduction. ...............

4.3.2 Rocket Measurements.........

4.3.3 Manned Aircraft Measurements

4.3.4 Fallout Pattern Indications. 141

4.4 Characterization of Fallout Material

4.4.1 Introduction 1 4 2

4.4.2 Land Surface Burst.. 143

5 4.4.3 Air Burst

If 4.4.4 Water Surface Burst. 14 5

4. 5 Eolative Areas of Contamination. •IZzy

4.5.1 Introduction. *4* ?

4. 5.2 Background.

4.5.3 REDWHJ3 Results. . •^» ,csy '- ^ - ,2rv - ,-n "=* XJ * a

4.5*4 Ten Hour Exposure Areas.......

4.5.5 Corpcr Ison.

4,6 Exarples of Fallout Patterns in the Continental United States

4.6.1 Introduction. •••••••••. *...».. .»»•••»..«.

4.6.2 CccpariBon of Vind Profiles.

4.6.3 Washington, U.C, and the East Coast*.

4.6.4 Southern California Area.

ChIpTEE 5 C0RCLUSIDI3 AKD E2COIKlKDAS , IO!T9..., i ....... .....

5*1 Conclusions ••..«...•••. *•.•*.. .*«•

5.2 Recorxendations, ........

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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
APiSKDIX D
ffr&ipi'i z
RSFERSEC2S.

SOirART OF FALLOUT DOCffiCKTAXIOK PROJECTS

COIoTJSCTIOS CF P ARTICLE FALL PLOTS,.,

RDIATICR CONVULSION FACTORS

INTERPRETATION OF EXPOSURE RATS VERSUS AREA PLOT. . . * .

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TABLES

1.1

1.2

1.3

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

4.1

4.2

4.3
Cl
C2
El

FIGURES

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

Sunn ary of Data on Previous Land Surface Shots. ...... ........

Summary of Data on Provlous Water Surface Shots

Fractional Pad lolof leal Tields ok,*

Project 2.65 Particle Size and Per Cent of TotaXj Activity... •
Gross Decay Exponents for Zuni..* ...................... ......

Cross Decay Exponents for Teva.

Cross Decay Exponents for Flathead..

Gross Decay Exponents for Navajo.

Suanary of Previous Shots' Exposure Kate Contour Areas .......

Su-miary of Exposure Pate Contour Areas , Operation REDWIRG....

Summary of Ten Hour Exposure Contour Areas, Operation REDWING

Height Conversion Factors for Carana Exposure.

Conversion of Activity Density to Exposure Rate

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Project 2.61 ASP Pocket on launcher 7.

ASP Rocket Trajectories

Fallout Stations In the Bikini Atoll...........

Representative Land Station of Project 2.65 on Oboe... .......

Skiff Array.

Method Devised by Projeot 2.62 to Deep Moor Skiffs in Cpen
Ocean....................

2.7 CRAKYIILE S. HALL (YAG-39)

2.8 Arrangement of Project 2.65 Probe for lfeasurensnt of Canra

Exposure Rates.

371"^ Aerial View of Site Tare with an Overlay of the Zuni Crater.
3.2 Zunl Cloud at H/7 Minutes in the Plane of the Pocket

Trajectories.....

3*3 Looking Along Plane of E/7 Minute Rockets Toward Zuni Cloud.

3.4 Zuni Cloud at H/15 Minutes in the Plane of the Rocket

Trajectories...............

3.5 Looking Along Plane of H/l5 Minute Rockets Toward Zr.ni Cloud

3.6 Zuni Particle Fall Plot

3.7 Zuni Fallout Radiation Plot........

3.8 Zunl Central Tice of Arrival Plot..

3.9 Zuni Ten Hour Exposure Contours...........

3.10 Calculation of Ten Hour Exposure Values.... •••••••

3.11 laCrosse Particle Fall Plot... ................ ..............

3*12 laCrosse Fallout Radiation Plot............

3.13 IaCrosee Exposure Rates near Crater. ••...••. ................

3.14 laCrosse Central Tice of Arrival Plot

3.15 Mohawk Particle Fall Plot

3.16 Mohawk Fallout Radiation Plot. ........................ ......

3.17 Mohawk Central Time of Arrival Plot

3.18 Aerial View of Reef Between Sites Charlie and Dog.. .........

3.19 Tewa Cloud at E/7 Minutes in the Plane of the Rocket

Trajectories*. ••••••

n 3.20 Looking Along Plane of E/7 Minutes Pockets Toward Tewa Cloud

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3.21 Teva Particle Fall Plot

3.22 Teva Fallout Radiation Plot.

3.23 Teva Central Tine of Arrival Plot..... •••••••••••••••.

3.24 Teva Ten Hour Exposure Contours.

3.25 Cherokee Cloud at ftfil Kinutes in the Plano of the Pocket
Trajectories.

3.26 looking Along Plane of H pi Hintue Rockets Toward Cherokee Cloud...
3.27'Cherokee Cloud at H/15 Minutes in the Plane of the Pocket

Trajectories,

3.28 looking Along Plane of the H/15 Minute Pockets Toward Cherokee

Cloud .••••••••

3.29 Cherokee Particle Fall Plot,

3.30 Ship and Aircraft Paths for Cherokee Fallout Survey. ......

3.31 Bikini lagoon Water Depths Prior to PEDWIKG in the Primary

Barge Shot Locations •••••••••

3.32 Flathead Particle Fall Plot

3*33 Flathead Fallout Padiation Plot.......

3.34 Typical Exposure Pate Versus Depth Profile

3*35 Flathead Central Tine of Arrival Plot...

3*36 Flathead Ten Hour Exposure Contours*,..... ••••••••••••••••••••••••

3.37 Bavajo Stem at H/ 7 Kinutes Shoving Planes Through Three

Pocket Trajectories.

3*38 Bavajo Stem at R^7 Kinutes Shoving Points at Which Pockets

Pierced Center Plane of Stem.. ............................ ........

3.39 Navajo Cloud at H/15 Kinutes in the Plane of the Rocket

Trajectories ...»

3.40 Looking Along Plane of H/15 Minute Pockets Toward Bavajo Cloud....

3.41 Bavajo Particle Fall Plot

3.42 Navajo Fallout Radiation Plot

3.43 Ar^a of radioactive Effluent from Bikini Atoll on Kavajo

Minus 2 and P'inus One Days

3*44 Navajo Central Time of Arrival Plot...

3 *45 Navajo Ten Hour Exposure Contours

4.1 Areas of Exposure Pate Contours an Previous Shots,

4.2 Areas of Exposure Pate Contours on REDWING Shots......

4.3 Areas of Ten Hour Exposure Contours on PETVING Shots. ...... .......

4.4 Washington, D, C. Ten Hour Exposure Contours Estimated from

REDWING Experience ...»•

4.5 Southern California Ten Hour Exposure Contours Estimated from

REDWING Experience

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Ths naterlal 5a this report is orgsnisod ar ou n d ths three baslo types
of shots la Operation H2DVIB3 la which fallout was documented* land sur-
face ^ air, and water eurfaoe bursts* Tbs land surface bursts will be dis-
cussed la detail, and Where possible, the other types of shots will be
discussed by comparison with the land surface burst phenomena.

1.1 LAUD SURFACE BURSTS

1.1.1 Definition . A land surface burst is defined as the explosion
of an atonic weapon at the surface of land or at a height above the sur-
faoe less than the fireball radius at ths tine of break-sway of the shock
front. Baaed on the test results fro® atode weapons to date, the fallout
contamination can be of primary importance for such a burst, extending
the area in which personnel casualties are inflicted far beyond the

regions of blast and thermal effocta, and denying *ccess to some areas

for a long post-shot period. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

y. T 1.2 Previous Test Results . Only four lend surface shots, as
shown in Table 1*1, have been do parent ed for fallout to any appreciable
extent* These ware the surface (*S*) shot In Operation J4SG12, the
KTKZ shot In Operation IVT , end the BRAVO and (OGS shots In Operation
CASTUS. \ SA ^

1.1.2. 1 JABGUB Surface Shot . On the JAIGUS surface shot the distri-

bution of bomb debris was documented In detail, parti calmly close In*

The low yield of

ie It possible to s u rvey the radiation pat-

tern directly with hard and vehicle carried survey Instruments.

• »

Shot

Yield

Data and Location

ReBsrka

References

J ANODE
Surface

19 Nov 51. Tuoca Flat,
Nevada Test Site.

Fallout vas vail doen-
ncntod, particularly
close In.

1 thro 16

ITT MU®
(Shot 1)

1 Nor 52* FLORA,
Snlvetok Atoll.

Fallout van doaomnted
in the upwind and croes-
wind directions.

10, 11, 17,
18, 19

CASTDS BRAVO
(Shotrl)

1 Xar 54. Weet of CHARLES
on reef, Bikini Atoll.

Cloae In fallout vas vail
documented considering
dernge to Instruaeotatlon.
Sonne late suriey data vas
obtained about 150 miles
downwind.

10, 11, 20
thru 27

CASTIZ KOON
(Shot 3)

27 Mar 54* Voat and of
TARE, Bikini Atoll.

Fallout Inetraaantatian
United. Dooanented
about 15 idles downwind.

10, 11, 20
thru 27

best available copy

Kea^urements of tbs quantity of fallout material, tine of errival, and
rata of arrival vara o tainod. Fairly cosplete radiochemical and radio-
physical analyses of the fallout particulate vara cade. Tbs 100 r/tg
contour at 1 hour after detonation extended sore than 4,000 yards doun-
vlnd and had a crossvind extent of 500 yards* The downwind distance ex-
tended veil beyond the region of blast and thermal damage and therefore
the JAKGIZ results shewed appreciable areas with fallout of military sig-
nificance* Considerable fractionation was observed in the fallout from

the JAHGIZ shot and a dependence of tbs radiochemical composition upon
particle else was indicated* The distribution of activity with particle
site and the distribution of activity on and within particles was studied
in detail* Xt was found that almost all the activity was associated with

particles larger then 100 microns in diameter* Ro salts also shoved that
activity was distributed uniformly in son# particles While in othar
particles this was not tree. The activity was almost nearer found to be
concentrated near the outside of the particle* Active particles ranged
from bolng colorless to Jet black, but the activity was usually associ-

ated with the darker colors. AVAILABLE COPY

1*1. 2* 2 The IVT KIK S Shot* The XVT KIKE shot of about

AN BRUNO FRC

^ X ya.1 ***££

documented only in the upwind and crosswind directions* Kecsure&sets of
the crosswind fallout arrival tires were independent of distance from
ground zero «d the duration of the observed fallout was approximately
1 to 2 boors* lo evidence of any particle else fractionation with cross-
wind distance was fbund and there were only meager Indications of parti-
cle else fractionation with time*

1.1.2.3 CASTLB BRAVO Shot . Shot Operation CASTES was a land
surface burst with ft yield of .This shot produced f alloat ct

levels of Military significance over ft trecend ous area* Results of
this shot shoved that weapons of this type and yield earn he expected to

prodaoe levels of residual radiation hazardous to baa® life over sever-
al thousand square slles ( The threshold value ffar radiation levels of
edlitary significance is indeed difficult to specify <jaentitatively
sines it varies widely, depending span the perticalar effect under con-
sideration* However, in this report, radiation levels shove 5 r/ff at
1 hour after detonation are arbitrarily considered to have sdlitary sig-
nificance* (Reference 28*) Gasan levels of adlltaxy significance vers
found to exist at ft downwind distanoe of at least 280 nautical idles.

It was concluded that an area upwards of 20 idles in width and 120 adles
in length downwind would produce casualty effects in the <^e of this
type of surface land detonation with a yield in the cogs* The

data Showed a substantial contribution to the residual activity fron
neutron capture products of including O^Ta and its daughter
Ip^9, and Hp 2 ^* This contribution Influenced narkedly the g&asa

energy distribution and decay rats* Theoretical considerations indicate
that the relative contribution from the Hp 2 ^ builds up to a rmxSmm
four days after the Shot and its effect is to reduce the gross daesy
rate below that of the fission products alone* ^ BRUNO FRC'

1.1*2*! CASTLS KXR Shot . The KOCH Shot at CASTLB had a yield con-
siderably less than the BRAVO Shot* Because of previous dasage to the
in st r uae ntatlcn sad operational difficulties, fallout dscanaatation for
for this Shot was United to total collection type Instruncntatlen*

1.1.3 of falloqt . When a nuclear detonation occurs, the

a. Fission products.

b. lomtroa captors products forsed la the reacting bed) materials.

c. Isatron captors products forced in the neighborhood, such as the

j y

inert boxb materials, enclosing building, end tbs nearby lend at
water.

In pars fission weapons tbs first of thess types predominates over tbs

others. When an epprceiablo part of the fission yield results fro*

eeocndcjy fission of U 2 * 8 , the neutron capture products, particularly

239

Kp , contribute significantly to the activity daring tbs subsequent
days. In any case, the activity induced In the local soil and other
neighboring tutorials is ocepletely cashed whenever it is in the presence
of fission products and activity froa neutron capture products. When e
weapon is detonated so that a portion of the fireball intersects the
ground, cn appreciable amount of ground material becomes incorporated
in the fireball in the gaseous, liquid, and even solid state. This
material beooues 5ntinatel7 nirod vith the fission end activation pro-
ducts. As the fireball cools, this cate rial condenses and a consider-
able fraction of the activity be cores associated with the material
particles. Tbs rapid upward aovuBsnt of ths fireball and ensuing cloud
probably carries this material upward and subsequently outward vith the

T fJ jia expansion of ti* dead. BEST AVAILABLE COPY^ b80N0

Once the turbulent notion in the cloud has abated, the particles
cesrenea to fall at a rate determined by their size end to move bori-
BoutaUy with the local air notion. Thus particles with a diameter
greater than 75 microns will fall to the surface within a day and /: ,

/l /y ,' > JV tA

H VC. A 1 ?-'-* Q ^ /

0^2 / '• 4 ‘ A

Ctndi | Ik aW ^ ■ c ^ : - •

RESTRI

cc; , ' q, !4

contribute to the local fallout eontoora. Scalier particles tale loader
tines to settle sad ere also inflncncod appreciably by vertical air

rot ions. Air turbulence a nd various weather disturbances result in a

pertubatioo of the fallout pattern* BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The problea of detailed fallout prediction then naturally separates

Itself into two parts* The first is the establishment of ea appropriate
model for the initial dead, including tbs distribution of activity as

a function of particle size and position at a time then the turbulent

notions no longer affect tbs particles, that is, when they are coved
only by gravity and the prevailing wind* This initial distribution is
expected to be a function of the total yield and fission yield of tbs

weapon ard its environment, and also to be affected somewhat by the
meteorological conditions, particularly the location of the tropopause*

In addition, there are a number of other considerations such as peculiar
condensation end falling effects, i.e., change in particle size with
tire, which play a role in sny detailed model*

The second part of the analysis involves the prediction of the time
of arrival end location on the ^surface associated with each position
end particle sine in the - plead end hence the construction of intensity
contours. This procedure involves the complete wind structure in the
area of fallout free shot tine until the tine all the fallout of inter*
est has reached the surface. Such a complete analysis as la outline^?* *

above involves the use of detailed weather data and would, in general,
be very time consuming. For tactical military situations and civil
defense applications, the accuracy desired does not demand each a

conplete analysis bat the answers are desired in a abort tine. Thera*
fore, it la convenient to describe the fallout patters in terra of a
few parsaeters such as area, downwind distance, crosswind distance, else
of circle around ground aero, etc.

The sealing relations far these paraooters can then be established

ia teres of weapon and enrironrontal characteristics end a gross estimate
of the neteorologlcal conditions. g£gj

Eapcrinants on fallout sealing nodels have been conducted with high
e -plosive charges ranging fros 150 pounds to 50 tons exploded on a lend
trorfaoe. The JA53I2 surface shot yielded data at 1.2 IT end the ITT
KIKE and CASTLE E1AV0 data represent points at 10-15 a yield factor
of 10* higher than JAS3IE. The Isrge yield data that was obtained was
particularly sparse in both the downwind end cross ind directions.

The simplest scaling lav that has been proposed involves scaling all
contour dinsnaieexs, as well as the ©entour values, by the robe root of
the yield. This procedure conserves the total Enter! el in the weapon
end Irplies the tone fraction of all sine weapons to be locally deposited.

The United reasurerents performed fear CASI1B BLA70, however, indicate
contour dimensions appreciably larger than the values scaled ftroo the
JASuLE surface shot and therefore a procedure of scaling by interpola-
tion between zsasured values is probably each core reliable. Curves

have been developed which ere baaed os all the available data end ere

, v SAN BRUNO URC

Host practical far rapid rough estimates (Reference 2?).

Obviously, insufficient fallout test data has existed to perfara

reliable sealing. Tin co3t profitable plan of attach on ibis problea

is probably to first develop a detailed node! end then infer the scaling
lavs fron it* In this way the effect of other paranetera such as vind
speed end rihear can be better evaluated* Therefore, the prinsry goal of
th| fallout documentation at Operation KSDWini vas to analyse the fallout

■ 4 ’

in every detail as 0015 lately as possible end thereby to contribute to

the development of a detailed Bedel.

1.1.1 Objectives . The general objective of the fallout Prograa In
Operation REDDIES was the complete fallout documentation of shots CH230ES,
ZUHI, FLAXES AD, HA7AJ0, end T3WA with sons incidental participation on
other ebots of generally smaller yield. The following vere the specific
objectives in documenting the fallout*

1.1. / .I .Collection of the Fallout Material . This objsctiuf includes
the collection of the fallout materiel at the following stations*

1, Islands of Bikini Atoll,

2 , Floating collection platforms located in the Bikini Lagoon and

“ tal * I “* best available copy

3. In the ocean voter,

4. At a remote atoll location (longerik).

1 . 1 . A.2 Ryliatiofl Over Land Tree Surfaces . One objective

was to gather radiation readings at the above neaticned locations which
could be reduced to yield the contours that would have existed if the
fallout bed occurs d over an equivalent land area, g^js

1.1. 4. 3 Pis tributlon of Activity in tfre.Oceua Areas . This objective
vss to Bake use of the ocean as a collector of activity and to evaluate
a cethod of inferring lend surface radiation contours from radiation
ssasurcsents in and above the ocean.

jUSiitelteiUffli sLAs&dk rJtt -IV This objec-

tive vu to cbtaXn data on the initial distribution of activity la tha
stabilized deed and to test a nethod of obtaining ouch data with rocket
boras dotcctcr-teleaetsr traits. The intent was to obtain data to coxpart

tls relative activity of the deni end ctea and the distribution of

activity within each of these regions. In addition, it was expected that

w ~ > '

sera additional data on the distribution of activity in the eted end the
exposure rates to personnel would be obtained frees canned aircraft

<P; ; y -J./JC

flights into tbs cloudlet tines of \f2. to 1 hour after detonation. ».

1,1^5 -Aa?tesg—Of lhe. C.oIb gjed FaUcgt_gateri4 . Taricus physi-
cal and chemical analyses on the fallout arterial were planned to give
the following inform ti on*

1. Pfirticle size distribution as a function of tiro of collection
and location.

2. Cross decay of the fallout activity (starting at very early

tines). BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3. Distribution of activity on and vithln particles end as a func-
tion of particle size.

4. Quantity of certain individual nuclides end fractionation.

1.2 AH BOESSS

1.2.1 Pefinltloq . The air burst of en atonic weapon is defined as
one in tho air above land or water at a height greater than the radius

of the fireball* gj^ BRUNO IRC

1.2.2 Previous Test Results, k rusher of tests of weapons of rela-
tively snail yields in Kavada have given results which show that the

fallout of radioactive nateriel frcn vn air burst Is essentially negli-
gible fro* a xilit&ry standpoint. Thess torts were perfbrood with air
drop* and bonbs do torn ted on towers at such height* that the fireball
did not reach the surface of the earth. The largest yield air burst
prior to Operation HSDYIPj was the IFI ERG shot which was detonated at
an altitue of 1,500 feet on 16 Kovssber 1952 , over the ocean p^th of
XT05HS at Snivetok Atoll. The yield vua approodnately Sons

Y 017 rough no apartments on Islands in ^niwetok Atoll Indicated that the

fallout activities were eo srsll that at tines as earl/ ae 6 hours after i

/uXU Co^ld l

ERj shot, the observed iat e a attics at all islands except IflGenC w are

o ott«istatt t-^4th the 15 dry old fallout fron hl\£ shot. On T7Q3B8, vith-p . . ,j . , /.

c>^-F fy ft evd* $ ryfiifa *x It tl ;*

In 4,000 feet of tho-ktrsi Point, thaffe^sv^t-^r was only about 2 per « *

> /-al/f-. t ' ^ rXc /' / v, * « .*/
cent of the activity p’ofhxcSi. at * 1£,000 feet iron ground zero at eca-

parable tines after each shot. It was therefore concluded that th:re

Is little external radiation hazard frox fallout due to an air hurst at

a scaled height as hlrh as that of EHG shot. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

jt.2.3 i' chnn^sR of Center tc-tlcn . Previous weapons tests have con-
sistently shenm that air bursts, whether dr drop or to * jot shots, pro-
duce little f el lout oonteiil nation as compared to the sene yield land
surface burst. The conclusion frost such data Is that the hot flrsio*
products do not have an opportunity to condense onto the g r ou nd parti-
culate natter picked up by the cloud. However, observations of elr ^

bursts of kilo ton veapens have shown that a thin stea consisting
ground material is sucked up into the center of the rising fireball.

There are two possible explanations as to why the radioactive aeterlal

does not deposit on this mteriali (1) by tbs tine tbs ground mterisl
arrives, the fireball say hats oooled sufficiently so that tbs fission
products bare solidified and era no longer av liable for deposition an
other natter. (2) The internal notion of the fireball *sr be such that
the ground mtcriil end the fission products do not coxae in contact.

^or exarpls* tbs observed toroidal notion sight consist of the boob pro-
ducts In s narrow internal ring with the ground Enter id flowing over
the surfaoe.

If either of these reasons explains the lack of contamination for
previously observed air bursts, there is no guarantee that they will,
aleo hold for suit irsgaton. "bursts. The fireball regains hot for a longer
period of tizu end the internal notion could differ in character between
widely different yields. Therefore, in view of the great tactical la-
port once of a lew air burst in offensive Eilitory operations, the doda-
rotation of f?liout fTcn a weapon in the negatoa range datcuited at a
height slightly greater than the fireball radius was essential.

1,2,4 OMoctiwss . The broad objective was aiuply to establish
vhetber cor not there vas radioactive fallout of military significance
fror. a megaton weapon detonated at cinigul air burst conditions over a
lard surface. This objective could be accocplichcd by sirply docunsnt-
ing the fallout completely in accordsnoe with the detailed objectives

for the surface land shot. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1.3 VJS8R SB?j*«3 BXsSIS SAN BKUNO IKC

1.3.1 Definition . A water surface burst is defined as one exploded
at the surface of water or at a height above the surface 1038 than the
fireball radius.

1*1*1 1*a firing

of a trade er weapon mated ca a barge is tro ly a Water surface shot be-
cause it is detcaitcd within a fev feet frc* the surface, The ass of ,
barges in firing nuclear weapons vas introduced at Operation CA3TlS<Vhore
four of the sir 3hots ware located on. barges. Table 1.2 presents the
aunnary data on the 3a shots. The use of this technique has been adopted
principal!/ for operational reasons; nar*ly # the shot site can be pre-
pared easily fbr tbe ne:<t event end the device is rex/ portable in can

Ui*-$

of a c'uarce in pier. 3 . is far as the fallout progran is concerned, the

barge shot La^ a direct significance in teres of tha effects cf a deep

fr& '+sA’ cm

harbor burst and a'/ give inforaatlcn spolicabls tcytha surface of the '

epon ocean. In addition, the basic dyroaics of tho cloud divelopasnt

stodd not be Kodified too Each by the presence of water sol it ca be
expected that a rare ©orplete under standing of the fallout frees a targe
shot, coupled with particle infcroitloa from a feu lend surface bursts,
can inprove the state of hncvlcl-e of the fallout froa lend surface

M»iia. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1.3.3 B?r^% Slots at Operation CA3TIS . The first ehot at CAST2S had
a yield such greater than ejected and this reunited in a oerioaa cur-
tailssnt of the fallout progxsn ca this operation. A large nrauber of
ejcperis-sntal failures and equips nt losses resulted from blast and valor
wave action, delays in shot schodnle3, end operational difficulties
associated with the stapling of fallout over extended ocean areas, g^ rrU^O FR^
Consequently, fallout docuannt&tica of the barge shots was quite Hatt ed.

However, a considerable eaount of data vas obtained froa analysis of the

table 1*2 Swaaar7 of Previous Vatar Surfaco Shots

>r^

j Shot ; Yield D*t© end Location

| Remarks

Roflarenoes

CASKS uorao
(Shot 2)

— , — . — . — — — ■ — ■ —

27 H nr 54* Ban?© in CASKS
BRAVO ctrator oa C’LARLIE
Ilaef, Bikini Atoll.

Good croBuwind fallout
data but limited in the
dovrawind direction.

20 thru 27

CASKS UNION
(Shot 4)

. ....... T -r-T ... -

26 Apr 54. Barge in
Bikini Lngoon,

Fallout docuBuntation
frafpnuntary. Limited
up rlnd and cronovind
data.

20 thru 27

! CASKS YANKEE
(Shot 5)

& 5 May 54. Borgs in

4 Bikini L«goon.

Water wnrvry and sampling
techniques used. Do
Bikini Atoll fallout in-
, ntrurmtatioo duo to low
and drongs.

20 thru 27

CASTLE NECTAR
(Shot 6)

. i

H May 54* Bar** in TVY j

MIKE orator on FLORA, 1

Enlvstok Atoll*

! 1

BxtanoivQ Instrumentation
in Lagoon end northern
ntoll islands. Limited
fallout data. B morally
low levels of activity
exospt fov s«|>lw nssr
ground xsro.

20 thru 27

best available copy

* / '

water a nr pins end fallout rttorial. There vc»e indications that ndk
of the eontnrlnation vaa In the fore of an eorosol and hence differed
from the fallout free a lend surface her at.

1.3.Z, OMfctlves . Igdn, the objective of the fallout Program vaa
the ©oqplate dccccest alien of felloct free, the Verge shots* This vat
done by irplexacating the esse detailed objectives as those for the land
eurff.ee buret. The intent ves to lemt Just how the fallout varied with
the different yield Verge shots end spocifieilly how it differed fro®
the land ear face hurst end air hurst fallout.

1.4 otker ITPE3 o? bjfsis BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Fro® the standpoint of weapons effects, and in accordance with defi-
nitions eentloned earlier, tho explosion of en etcoic weapon et the top
of a tower cay Vo either an rlr burst or a surface burst depending on
whether csr not the fireball cores in contact with the surface, although
the air hurst characteristics any he slightly codified by the presence
of the tower. However, the Fallout Prcgrzsi did not docuncnt completely
any tower shots in Operation R3WHS. The c nLj other types of shots
that bavo not been considered thus far in this report are the underwater
and underground hursts. Operation HSD'FDKi did not include my shots of
those types and therefore no atteept has been Bade to discuss their
fallout phenomenology.

1.5 EFFECT OF IRACTIGHAL RADIOLOGIC AL HELD gA> - brxjnO FRC

Operatic® RSDWISG provided the first opportunity for testing weapons
in vhiA tbs I

this report the fractional radiological yield is defined as the ratio of

the tiarica yi ?14 to tbo total yield. It la to be expected that the
effect of this extra parameter, the fractional radiological yield, on
the fallout vould be as follows* The location of the contour! as veil
a a the weight of nca-radlo&ctive mterlel deposited tfioald be * fcmetlon
of the total yield, but the ganra dose rate associated with ouch contour
should be scaled proportionally to thu fractional radiological yield.

The amount of fission product tutorial deposited Is obviously scaled by
the fractional radiological yield. In general, the definition of the
fractional radiological yield can bo extended to describe induced actlY-
ity in herb neterials or "salting agent**." In the ease of ■salted"

weapons, this quantity could ti«an be greater than unity sinoe extra
activity djlt be addrd. without con’ribiting to the totxJL -yield of the

vevpcn.

®£sr

1.6 fl3K?;Kr Of TT. WLT- C3J3C7IV23

The overall objective of the Fallout Progrss ves to dccosait com-
pletely the fallout fror the shots of interest. Complete colie ctian
of data on the minor ous parameter* was necessary to Irprove scaling
levs, to bet hr mridorstand the necb.ai.isn of fellout, sad fccn.ee Improve

present fallout bc dels.

Ter the high yield ririrrl air burst. CEEROE^ ic particular, the

objective vaa to determine If there was cry fallout of ci lit ary signifi-
cance.

SAN

ytfltnso FR C

In the cans of the wate r shots It ves esq«eetod t-o establish In detail
Just bov fcllout free water eurfs.es bursts differs froa that due to lsnd
surface bursts.

CUAFTE2 2

EXPERT XKTAL DE3IGK

2.1 HE;UIH®3^T3 FOR DATA

Based on the detailed objectives outlined in the previous chapter*
the instruaentatipn for the fallout pro gran vas designed to c&teSn the

row.*

a. CollectiScriSf“ Fallout yaterial

h. A Radiation Headings Over If4Jd A Surfaces

/ / J'-

c. / Inflation Readings In and Above Ocean and lagoon Vater

hi ^ f?w\

d. /, Radiation Readings In the Fuclear Gle^d . ^

2.2 ir3Tr.UJTl.TATIOI7

best available copy

In 602 e instances, core than cno agency had equipment that performed
the name function, e.g. th> tine incremental collection of fallout material.
In such cases the detailed features of the equipment vere different since
the equipment vas 'esigned and built by different agencies. Do attest has
been rade in this report to give a detailed description of the individual
pieces of equipment. For further information the reader is referred to
the individual project reports. Instead, instrumentation vill be dis-

cussed as general types and according to its function.

2.2.1 Collection of Fallout Material .

2.2. 1.1 Total Collectors . Total or gross collectors vere used to

collect the fallout material throughout the duration of fallout. One

total collector used by Froject 2.65 at its distant collector station

SA^N BRt^O FRG

vas sinply a vooder. tray four feet by four feet by lg inches deep. A

total collector used by Project 2,63 vus a tray three feet square by two
leches deep# A variation of this latter type utilised the saste tray

design but added a layer of fiber glass honeycomb end bad a cover which

f ;

was designed to open and close before and after fallout, respectively.
This covering was provided to preserve the samples and prevent any
codification by environmental conditions before and after collection*

A third type of gross collector used by Project 2,65 was conical with
an opening at the top tvo feet in diacetcr and narrowing to a circle
about 5 Inches in ditoeter at the bottoa vhere there vae a stainless
eteql filter, Below the filter there was a era 11 hose leading to a
polyethylene bottle. The cover of the collector was designed to open
upon a timing signal and then close autceariticnlly eleven hours later,

A eirrLl^r type of toV'l collector U3ed by Project 2,63 consisted of a
7 inch diameter funr.el with a cno-half inch diameter tube and a tvo gal-
lon bottle, all of polyethylene, vith a fiber glass honeycomb layer ia
the mouth of the funnel, A final type of a total collector used by this

project consisted of filter paper through which fallout air vas sucked

tr a BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2, 2,1,2 Incremental Collectors , The largest cumber of incremental
type collectors used vere located at the Project 2,65 land stations and

consisted of a covered steel tub AO inches in d iame ter and 24 inches

high, Fittlrg into this tub was a circular disc with 22 triangular _

SAH To® 0 160

sampling trays, each 3 3/f inches by 10 inches by 3/4 inch deep, Ey
cisans of a driving and timing mechanism, one tray at a tine vas exposed
to the open air through a hole, the else of the sampling tray in the top

dover* A door covered the ear pile g hole before the initial and after

#»■

the final sampling, An external tiring signal started the re chants*

and succeeding trays sored into position at set tine intervals, Fa&»
posure durations of 1 usixrate, 5 minutes, and 30 minutes were used for
various collectors. The Project 2,63 type of incremental collector used
essentially a rainfall sampler in v?!dch the collecting trays had been
rod ified , These trays exposed sensitive collecting surfaces about 3
inches in diameter successively for equal time increments. The treys
vere placed in the exposure position by nears of a pair of inter-

connected vertical elevators, Fach tray vas exposed at the top of the
ascending elevator and after exposure ■was pushed horisontally across
to the descending one. For land surface shots, a grease coated cellu-
lose acetate disc >3* used as a collection surface and for vat er shots,

*j ) n -U— - ^

the sane surface vere interspersed vith discs of chloride sensitive

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

An experimental high volume filter unit vas also used by Project SAN BRCNO FRC
2,f3. This device vas, in effect, an incremental air sampler. It vas
designed to obtain gross aerosol samples in significant quantities under
conditions of lev concentration. It consisted of a single blouer and 8
filter heads oriented upv?ard enclosing 3 inch diameter filter packs that
vere changed at specified time intervals.

Project 2*65 used a tap* fallout monitor which tas an intermittent
type of collector employing adhesive tap# for the sampling surffc.ce vhich
was exposed for periods of one minute for the first hour and periods of
one hour for the next 47 hours. The instrument had a second reel of

Saranwrap plastic tape which covered the exposed collecting tape at the

of Its exposure period.

2.2.2 Padlstlon Sendings Over land surfaces .

2.2.2.1 Total Exnoeur^ Detectors , Fils packs, chemical vials, and
direct reading doslssters were used es total exposure detectors, Soc*
of these detectors vere placed at all land as veil as floating stations,
Post of the processing and data reduction was performed by Project 2.1,

2. 2, 2.2 Carra Exposure Pate Tieters, A device know as "Conrad X* was
used by Project 2,2 for the measurement of ganra exposure rates over a
range of 1 r/hr to lcA r/hr vith a tine resolution of 5 Einutes and 0,05
minutes respectively at those exposure rates. It consisted of an un-

saturated ion charter as the sensing device and an Esterline Angus pen
recorder, A second instrument similar to the one above and designed to
operate over a range from 0,2 nr/hr to 3600 r/hr, was used by Project
2.63, Project 2.65 used a probe lowered from a helicopter to measure
gamra exposure rates at 3 feet above the ground. The probe contained a

' SAN BRUNO FRC

1. In this report the word "exposure" will be used to describe the
radiation as measured In roentgens.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

detector element vhich vas the ionisation charter from a Jordan cod el

A0B-10 T-SJ! surrey meter* The output current frets the charier and

associated curcuitry flxr/s through the probe vire to the indicating

setter mounted in the helicopter* The range of this instrument vas from

0,fl nr /hr to IxA r/he 0
1

2, 2, 2, 3 Tine of Arrival Detectors , Project 2.63 usod a tins of e.rriT*
al detector consisting of an ionisation chamber vhich triggered an 6 day
chronori'trio clock vhen an exposure rate of 20 rx/hr for a period of a
half hour vas reached* Subtracting the clock reading rt recovery time
fror; the Inovn tire eince detonation yielded the time of arrival of the

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2*2,3 Radiation P-ovd^n^s In end Above Ocean and lagoon Vater.

2,2,3, 1 Survey arri Collection Vessels * To coot the objective of
collecting fallout rnl establishing contours over the vast ocean fallout
areas, an extensive array of floating and flying instrument platforms
vas needed* The following sxrmry lists those platforms, but the detail-
ed discuss! cm of the instrumentation aboard vill be postponed to Section
2.3*

a. The GhAilTIUJ? S. HALL (YA0-39)| C3GE0E EASTTAS (YA3-40)| end the

U^5 CHOOr COISJIT (I^T-611) vere positioned in the fallout area prior to

the arrival end served es completely instrumented collector stations*

SAN BRUN° 111(3

b, Two large barge*, the 7113-13 end YFl'D-29, and three pontoon
rafts were anchored In Bikini lagoon as fallout collection stations*

e* Fourteen to sixteen skiffs (the number varied with each shot)

were moored in the deep ocean north of Bikini Atoll for fallout colleo-
ti<J. In addition to the array of skiffs moored in the ocean north of
Bikini Atoll, for ZUMjf'one skiff was deep taoorod in the open ocean to

the South of the Atoll and for TEVA, 3 skiffs vare placed to the Vest
of the Atoll*

d. Two destro: er escorts, the USS llCGim (DR- 365 ) an! U -S SIUTEB~

STEin (lJEt- 534), and the oceanographic research vessel K/V ^TII ZGN pen s.
ft forrwl a radiological surrey of the^ocel^areaa^ alter- f aJ 1 rrtt ' had- eca-so d
e* An instrumented landing craft, the 1C 1—1136, performed & surrey
of the Bikini lagoon after fallout froa shots CHEROKEE, mi, FLATHEAD,

and DAI- OTA had

ceased. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

f, P27 aircraft surveyed the ocean areas after fallout had ceased,
measuring the exposure rate in the air above the ocean*

g. On occasion, the K/V KQRTZCN, US’s and F27 aircraft were used to
check background radiation before a shot and the effects of ad^SEISI
water currents or. the fallout ocean area*

2*2*3*2 Surface l^gnaiAr Readings . A probe furnished by Project SAN BRUNO FRC
2*62 was trailed in the vater on a cable froa a boos extending sons
25 feet froa the side of the TAG 1 * and DC*s and from the stern of the
y/V HORIZON, The radiation sensing element vas about three feet under

Xtft i\«.

in t

; 1 C *! *1

CP,

R 1ST A

•vt

the surface of the vater* The probe consisted of gelger tubes and battery
pacts encased la ono-quM-ter Inch vail steel tubing* Two ser.s'ng heads
vers designed fear the probe, one for detecting low level radiation down
to background and the other with less sensitive tubes to be used at
levels as high as 100 rAr* The data from the probe was recorded aboard

the ship on a chart recorder. While surveying, the probe was tewed and
a continuous recording of exposure rate made.

Also nounted at the end of the booe^Jn?lhe two YAS»e was a Project
2,64 scintillation detector which vas used to obtain readings of the
radioactivity as observed looking down frees approximately- 25 feet above
the surface of the water. This in strident utilized a plastic phosphor
and c rered a range fron 0.01 to 1*00 xr/hr. The current output, which

vas proportional to the logarithm of the exposure rate, vas recorded on
an Tsterllne Angus strip chart recorder.

.. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

F27 aircraft vere instrumented by Project 2.64 with a plastic
phosphor detector and associated recording equipment to measure the

exposure rate in the air above the ocean. These readings, vhenproperly
c onverted, correspond to the exposure rate in the surface water layer.

The data vas recorded in uncorrected fora on a chart recorder. It vas

also corrected automatically to a surface reading and recorded on a ^lUJNO FRC

magnetic tape. The sensing unit vas shielded

effect of

ceasured and the readings appropriately corrected.

ie vas

2.2,3,3 Intensity Versus Perth Profile , The probe described in
Section 2. 2,3 *2 vac also need to obtain exposure rate ra depth profiles.

It contained a pressure sensing elerrat to reoord the depth at which
the instrurant operates. The cable which supported the probe was a

three conductor arcored cable, so that the signals froa the radiation
and pressure sensing elements in the probe traveled up through the
conductors and were recorded on an IT recorder aboard ship. The equip-
Kent for raking depth profiles vas designed for a naxinm depth of 400
raters except on the V/V H0KIZ0H where it could attain a mxinna depth
of £00 ret era.

Penetration recorders designed to trigger upon arrival of fallout
surface and to record the g'.sra. exposure as a function of ties there-
after ct 20, 40, 60, CO and 100 reters in depth, vere installed on soio-e

of the deep roor.ed_aM.ffs, BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2,2.3,f> Analysis of Voter Samples , All survey 6’iips vere equipped

to tale surface water samples using polyethylene buckets lowered over

the side. In addition, the \’Jl K0RIZC3T vas equipped to take samples at

depths with standard Hansen bottles. Detailed analyses of these sarplcs

vere then made by Projects 2,62, 2,63, a«i 2,64, SAN BRUNO FRC

/y I *•*•**-

2,2 radiation readings in the T-uelcar -S4e«g, Project 2,61 under-

Yrt K&ACrr*

took to ransure the radiation in the nuclear de*si vith pressure icn

chambers borne b.. single stare rocket propelled atmospheric sounding
■vehicles (ASP). The exposure rate data vas telemetered to essentially
duplicate receiving-recording stations on the t T S5 VEtDSDN (AFD-lCl) and

(Insert #l)

2.2.1. 3 Tallent Decay Taif-s . In order to detorrdno the «£fi#uUv» decay
of the fallout mterial In the ocean water aa manured by the survey probe,
a decay tank 6 feet in diereter and 6 feet deep was placed on the deck of
the TAG 39, The tank was filled with ocean water before the arrival of fall-
out cad a probe was placed in it. The tank then collected fallout end w^s
agitated to caintein a tmlfom distribution. The probe readings gave data
on the biildup and^decay of the ectivity,

A task 5 feet in diopeter and 5 feet deep was used on the dock of the
l'/V Horizon in a similar fashion. However, in this case, the tank was
filled with contaminated oocan water as soon as it was obtainable after tire
11/7 Horizon began making the oceanographic survey, which uv. after the fall-
out in the area had ceased. To prevent the fallout particles fron settling
out or adhering to the sides of the tank, the water was treated with sodiun
silicate end hydrochloric acid to fora a gel as soon as possible after it
was obtained. The "gelling" was not completely successful and the water was
also mixed mechanically. Readings fren the probe in this tank then gave
data on the decay.

SAN BSHWO WC

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Site '..tier# the signals were recorded on magnetic tipe. Figure 2.1
ie a picture of an ASP oo ite launcher, Thie rocket is 6 1/2 inches in
diameter and 147 1/2 inches Ion;, On the shots CTMIOEER, ZbKT, and
rAYAJO, two salvos of six rochets each vere firel froa the launchers

I .

near the center of HW Island, The first salvo was fired condensing at
Y.fl minutes and the secnod salvo was fired at K/l5 minutes, Four rock-
ets vere fired in one salvo at h/7 minutes on shot TFIvA, The rockets
were fired along trajectories which would best give data on the relative
activity in the cloud and stea cad the distribution of activity in each
of these. Trajectory data as shown in Figure 2,2 froa a lir&ted number
of previous firings of the ASF were used to calculate the position of

the rochets in the cloud as a function of tine for the predetermined

elevation and azirath of the launcher, BEST AVAILABLE COPY

In addition. Project 2.66 named aircraft vere flora into the radio-
active clcui as early as r/l5 minutes cn certain shots and obtained
further data on the distribution of activity in the cloud,

2.3 OFT7ATIOKS „ «

2,3,1 land Stations . The^Xand stations at Eikini Atoll are shown
in Figure 2,3. All instrumented islands had both inereiceotal and gross
collectors. Figure 2,4 is a picture of a rep'esentative Project 2,65
land station. From thro* to five days before each shot vere required
for preparing and checking the instrusentation at the stations. The
samples froc the stations were recovered after each shot as soon as
radiation levels permitted, Sone pre3J.rinr.ry analyses of samples vere

. .Vi’ILIANT ...Single grain GCA201A

^perchlorate oxldl2er and LP33 thlakol base,

"0?AL IMTUISE 31,000 pound-seeonds . .

r.'JRNING TIME 5.8 seconds.

WEIGHT ,,..Pre-launoh - 245 pounds.

Burn-out - 100 pounds.

MAXIMUM 7EL0CITT..r' 5,000 feet/seoond. \|'i

.Antenna

* t*

X 0 :

r- - '4<\i ; 2, : •?. l< ■ y

‘ V, ^W\j, ^

r-jc ■ ■tyw n si j w^ ... "" " •

‘ ' a.a'" FSP 03 « 0 tv 2.a A3P wxtortk on Inanchor.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY'

... • •*• . . v

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

figvn 2.| Fallout atatlona la tha Bildai Atoll.

YFNB Locations

Shot

YFNB 13

YFNB 29

CHEROKEE

ZUNI

’ C

FLATHEAD

NAVAJO

TEWA

Pontoon Rofts P, R f S

A Incremental Fallout Collector
0 Total FqIIou 4 Collector
■ T( *ol Exposure Detector
A Exposure Rate Detector
□ Time ot Arrival Detector
• Ground Zero's

n° 30’

rc/ie at Site mr-T and the remind c*r of the carries wore placed aboa ri
the fly-away aijcraft for complete analyses in laboratories in the
United States.

2.3.2 Foorofl Stations Barges, Tafts, and Sldffsj see Figure*

2.3 and 2.5 for locations). Two TFKB bargc3 vers anchored in Bikini
Lgoon at positions which varied with shot location. These barges vers
completely instrumented by Project 2.63 vith e^ulpoent for collecting
fallout material and recording radiation readings in both incremental
and total fora. In addition other projects placed equi]iaent aboard for

correlation, BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FIT- 29 had one ir.strur.ent tower at each end of the barge. The
t overs '- ere separated by a distance of 250 feet which was ©o: siderod ,

to he far enough apart to indicate the extent of variation of the fill-
out within a small region. Three pontoon rafts (each 15 feet by 16
feet) vera placed at positions as shcr-.n in Figure 2,3 for all shots.
Instrumentation for time of fallout arrival, total collection of fall-
out material, and total exposure reading were placed cn these rafts,

Skiffs ware deep roared in the oeoan north of Bikini Atoll as shown
in Figure 2,5, Bach stiff contained the ease general type instrumenta-
tion as was placed on the rafts, However, in a-i d it i on^ penat ration
recorders vert- placed cn sene cliff in stall" t ions. Figure 2,6 shows
the detail of a skiff station. Beginning two to three days after a
shot the US3 SIOUX was used to recover the skiffs, collect the samples
and data, ani re-arn the skiff for the next shot. 'g/tH

)

ir.

~300

30 Dio Float
W/ ?50.r>ound

Lift

Foilout Collector

“ " ■ Radar Torgel
Time of Arrival Detector

% • ;

♦ •* * «* 0 ,

*wi2r

BEST AVA

’i-E copy

-^/y-

Lf>

2.?. 3 TAl'e cri 1ST* The YA3-39, YAO-40 end LST-611 were the mat
eoicplctely instrmented stations in tho fallout prosrajn* The vessels
vere designed so they could be raneuvered into key positions in the
fella* area for ^ach ahiot. They were directed to such positions by

calculations based on known' and predicted virid data* Those vessels -wer*^

equivalent^to land collection stations and wore necessary because of
r

the very llrdted land areas at the PPG. These s irs vere named end
when fallout arrived, the s ail crew went to a shielded rocc in each
ship and controlled the ship from there* The fallout instrumentation
vas designed to be operated froa this control rocra and cuch of the

data vas recorded there. Figure 2,7 shows the details of the instrumen-

tation on the YA-l’s, A. s'Aeliod laboratory tss installed on YA0-40 to
rake very early ■ e? surer:ento on decay, epcctrta, etc, of the fallout

raterial* BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2,3,4 P27 Aircraft and Heli cortcra , ?27 aircraft equipp-d with
scintillator detectors flew at altitudes free 200 feet to 400 feet over
the water areas soon after fallout vas complete. On shot day, aircraft
surveyed the areas near Bikini Atoll after the fallout was dovsn in these
areas. On s? ee® ding days, one or roore planes surveyed tha ocean area
farther out as fallout ceased. Prior to shots KAY A JO and TrA: A, a P2Y
aerial survey was *aie of the area to the vest of Bikini to check the
area of radioactive effluent fron the Bikini lagoon,

gAN BRl^O ™ C

»> - •

.Wind Shield

Forward / / ,* , \ .

— — m S cb AW"
\ vSk 0 ' 0 7C? //
W®J W

Ganm Intensity vs Time Recorder (2*71)
Open-close Total Collector
Hi R h Volume Filter Unit
Alvrays-open Total Collector
Intermittent Collector (2,65)
Incremental Collector
Relay Panel

Timing Equipment (2,65)

Total Collector (2,65)

Dose Rate Recorder (2,2)

Wind Speed and Direction Recorder
Accese and Hoiet Platform

Probe Calibration Tank (TAG 39 only)-

Special Incremental Collector —
(TAG 40 only) \

2,62 Probe Winch and Boo»v 2.64 Honitoi

jBJIWfl

best available copy

STANDARD PLATFORM

Gawm Intensity vs Time . Telerision Camera
(2.71) /

ii’l

ti -

,__J\

eft)-

mi \

Garni® Intensity ▼» Time (2.71)

Drogue Rack (TAG 40 onl

Elevator from bpe ciai^

^ S?ITF,LDED LABORATORY (TAO 40 only)

3. Counting Equipment ^ n '

2. 20 Channel Analyzer and Accessories 1 j

4, 4 *Ion Chamber and Accessories ^ Df 1 °

5, Castle for Sample Stooge m fi

6, Control Panel for Special Incremental s[] CD /DO

Collector J _ i 1 — / — *

Elevator from Special; ^

Incremental Collector wsO ,!lc i Iir\

r*n to onl-l \ \ ' -TOK1DKD SHIP C01ITO0L ROOM

Panel and Recorder Control*
vfor Standard Platform

' RECORDS ROOM

Gamma Intensity vs Time Recorder (\**V

\ 2.62 and 2.64 Probe and Monitor

0 0 \jiead Shield Recorders and Winch Control

Accese Passage '

i’ase Window

Fixture 2.7 V&SSB. CRAIOTIE S. riALL, TAG 39. Fallout eolloction stations !
ore for Project 2.63 union a otherwise noted. Ship operation was under ^
! the direction of Pro.loot 2.10. \jci

Rad'nticm exposure rate Eeasureiocnts on land surfaces were Made lay
using a probe attached to a cable and lowering the probe froa a bell*
copter to tb3 ground. Figure 2.8 shows sore of the details of how these
aeasurenents vere Bade. The halioopter hovered over the Island at
altitudes Area 500 to 1,000 feet end therefore this technique permitted
very early Deasarenents to be Made without excessive radiation dosage
to personnel.

2.3.5 Two DB's. E/7 BBtlZOK. end LCT-1136 . VMle the 140' s and LSI
vere located at key positions in the fallout pattern at the tine of fall-
out, the two IB's, K/Y HCfcIZOd, and I£U-1136 vere not directed into the
pattern until the fallout ves complete. Once the fallout had ceased,
the two US's vere dispatched into the area to rake passes across it cad
establish the boundaries of the fallout pattern as veil as to rake a da*
tailed survey of the pattern vithin these boundaries^ The X/V ROB EOS
was a slower vessel and mde a eonevhat core detailed oceanographic sur-
vey in the fallout area end thus corplerented the core rapid surveys of
the two DE's. The I£U-1136 Bade oceanographic type surveys of Bikini Lagoon

■while the other three vessels oovered the vast areas of the fallout in
the ocean after the five shots of interest to the fallout pro g r a a. All
of the survey vessels cade surface and depth profile reasurerents of
the activity and collected water sasples. Just prior to BA7AJ0, en
oceanographic survey was die to date mine background activity which
right rask the low levels anticipated iron this shot*

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SAN BUENO TUG

Recorder

Ground

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SAS

FRC

r r 1 u c '";4

Figure 2,8 Arrangcrent of Project 2,65 probe for reasureaent of ganna
'doss rates,

-r- . < ; 47

a i*w F X‘Ogr & Wi X WO vwHwlToX viatCf

?.3«& Fr?qr:.r Too £jZ » r -l Gc..t.r *

was located ir the Flag Cor-rar/c 'lions Cotter aboard the Task Tores

&VFN Coiczanl ship, the USS TSTTS. The j~rlmry reason for locating the
Center here vas the availability cf corrrr.Lcoticr s ret ired for contact

79 ecuvxnou am on vne oaexs

IcV 7^ /#. ^«>.^ fUc^^y

instructed^ Vork on these " s .

with the «Mps on d aircraft*

Feteorologicsl data and predictions vare octainod and on the basis
of these a afartte particle fall plot vas oonstre
plots was began on D-l vhen the first shdp was directed into the area
where fallout \*as expected* This plot was revised as later rr-eteoro log-
ical data and predictions were received. A cm start revision of the
plot '.■as necossarv since the 1ST and tue tvo YAC*s bad to leave the
Bikini Lr.goon on D-l in order to arrive at locations in the predicted
fallout area. The tire variation of the vin ! e also resulted in rinor
chang --s in the positions of ths YAl’s ar.d L-PT— 6H being node after shot
tine in order tb?t the aliips ba in the root favorable locations vhen
fallout arrived* Direct ©ornunications between the Frogren Tvo Control
Oerter *nd the project ships p-;rrdtted the desired close control on the

positioning of the ships. AVAILABLE COPY

The F27 aircraft, based at Kvajaleir, began their survey around
Eikini Atoll on shot day. From the Control Center they were given
instructions regarding their flight paths over the area, as far as
possible avoidirg regions where fallout right still be coming down.

FRC

SAJi BUbl' 0

Once the gamer al
aircraft, the two i-C 1

r.rx* cf closo-ln fallout v«o deliiicivei bjr 11. e P27
& td«i tV* -/. T ICIJClCu were direct eJ into uhie mx-aa

to begin an occanojrajdiic survey, and the ICU-U36 began a survey of
3i’tdri lagoon.

By relaying to the o' dps successive courses and points to which to
proceed and receiving reports from the ships on their speed end position
fixes, a detailed plot of the trace of tech ship was min tain el in the
Control Center* A sinilns^ilnt j&s raintained for the flights nude by

EaST available £

copy

the P27 aircraft*

Fallout data fron the various slips and aircraft were reported
directly to the Program Two Control Center* Here the information vas
recorded in data boohs by the various projects and also placed on a
1’cst or Operations I lot. In addition to the da' a cbtainod from the ships

and aircraft, radiation readings on the islands in Bikini Atoll vere

, t' )

obtained from the group performing tie atoll serial survey ?-nd from the * “T '• *
Re.d3r.fe organisation. These data vere also recorded on the Vaster
Opc rations Plot,

The Control Center continued in operation for as long as five or

six days after an event vr.ile the survey ships vere completing their

detailed oceanographic survey of the fallout area,

SAIS

2.3.7 Correlation Ktesuresorrts . The instr u m ent ation was very car©-
fully correlated between the various projects. Project 2.65, which had
fallout collection and radiation reading instrumentation at land sta-
tions, placed the sr.no type of lnstrunentation aboard the two TAC*s and

BIU3IS0 FRC

5i-.il: rl*.

cno of the Till ix-r^ot. 5i-.il: rH* , rroject Z.CC, vrith icslgr.-d the
Ir.ciru-v-niatlon aboi-rd the tv3 TAJ ' u , 1ST, tti Tm buries installed
t c£jor lar»i &*. alien si the northern tip of KC*.’ I Bland for crogg call-
Ira tier. Tile otflion ccneiEtc-i of a tov;cr containing e. c.ajor array of
£ ratrironntf-t ion very elidlcr to the Iriotrur^titcl tovore on the Til’s,
1ST nsA TFJ13 b-.rceB.

* e * T Mhublc copy

SAN BRUNO RR C

CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

3,1 THS LARD SORPACS BURST

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

XJjlUL Introduction . The Zuni Shot vis fired at the rarfaoe e t

Site Tare on SB Rjj 1956, at 055f>W. The yield of tho weapon was xearared

^ n -»• - ~.r

to be approximately ■■ of

pH ^\t ha* therefore been assumed that all radiation readings pre-
s ente d for fallo ut froa this device should be

^ deleter

jZC^re. fyr. i~-* * y^j'vv, /X/ £•«//* u.

The environment of the Zuni weapon is Illustrated in figure 3*1 on

which Is also drawn the outline of the er&ter forced by the detonation.

(/%-

Clearly a large fraction of the crater was In land and reef, although a

y*-'

part of it extended into the deep lagoon vat or. Zunl was considered as
a land surface shot, although tha proximity of the deep lagoon introduced
nlnor nodifications which aay cake it sin liar to a shallow harbor burst.

3. 1.1, a Dis tribution of Activity In the Sta bilised Cloud . Measure-
ments of the radiation field at various positions in the nuclear cloud
were aade at H/7 minutes and H^L5 ninrutea by the Project 2.61 rockets .

The exporure rate data as recorded on sagnetio tape have bean subjected
to preliminary analysis. The preliminary reduction of this data to in-
formation concerning the dlstritation of active aaterial in the cloud

CAN brcno

Is subject to the following limitations j

. . a.

(a) The road -out circuit is not as elaborate and free froa nolo#
interference as that to be used in the final analysis.

RESTR

Figure 3.1 Aerial View of Site Tare With Overlay of the Zunl Crater

(b) The identification of a particular rocket track with a known ex-
posure rats varstu time record la quite certain for soae traces* but not
in tbs case of others* Bo waver, the min conclusions to be drawn fren
the data vill probably be Insensitive to tbe exact Identification of all
the traces*

(o) Tha rocket trajectories are based on tbe data available la the
field and may be Improved ty eufccequent analysis of data frea test fir-
ings*

(d) Tho calibration of tbe ion chamber detectors at high exposure

rates is not linear and suoh readings may have to be altered using better
calibration curves. AVAILABLE COPY

(e) There is sooo unoartainty in tha roro tiae on a nurbor of records
as related to tho launch tiro of tbe rockets.

It is dsrirablo to present the data in such a forn that it demon-
strates the concentration of source activity at various positions in t}*e
cloud* The exposure rate reading*} at a particular location actually
represent the cumulative effect of many soirees distributed over a
volume whose dimensions ere of the order of the attenuation length for
the garsse rays. Tbie attenuation length is inversely proportional to
the density of tbe air cad varies free about 400 feet at sea level to
1,400 fest at an altitude of 40,000 feet, and to 10,000 feet at an alti-
tude of 80,000 feet. Therefore, the observed exposure rates actually
measure average distributions of activity over volumes having the given
dimensions. Since these volrnes, particularly near the botten of the
cloud, represent a snail part of the total cloud volrae, this method of

Measurement of the activity is meaningful. In presenting the data, thi
observed exposure rat# readings wero srnltiplied by tho ratio of the air
density at the data point to the eea level density. The result represent*
the exposure rate that would have been observed had the same density of
souroea been present in air at eea level pressure and temperature, and
therefore is proportional to the activity oonoontration. A crude calcu-
lation predicts that a distribution of 1 curie,^ under those conditions
would produce an exposure rate of about 1,200 r/tir,

8ubject to tho limitations discuseod above, the reduced expo rare rate
readings are presented in Figure* 3.2 and 3.4 for the 7 end 15 minute
salvos respectively. The mushroom outline presented is a cvoBB-section
in the plane of the rochet trajectories which has been constructed oa
the basis of the assvGaption that the cloud and etcs move froa xoro tine
to rocket firing tine under the influence of the Measured H-hour winds.
Figures 3.3 and 3.5 represent views along the rocket trajectories which
indicate where the plane of the trajectories intersected the oloud and
e tea. The aseunod mushroom dissensions are illustrated in the inset in
Figure 3*2 which represents a mushroom uniisturbod by wind notion. The
cloud was constructed by sealing up the d invasions of some photographs
of the Dakota cloud j|^BH guided by visual observations and size
versus yield data frees p regions operations (Reforonoe 10).

Further data is also available free the Project 2.C6 aircraft pene-

trations, but these were taken at appreciably later tines. The observed

exposure rate readinge havo been extrapolated to B/lS Minutes using a ^

-2 O l/ %

t expression as detem ined by previous aircraft penetrations into

1/ The measurements performed at Operation REDWIRG Indicate an exponent

»■

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

• *-J

... ... *

_J- * W 'oS»<

Plone of Rocket Trojectories

to 60

X A. i i

Ground Distance, V I0 3 feet

LTV

Figure 3.3 Poking Along Plane of H/7 Minute Rockets Toward Zuni Cloud

9igVr * 3 ‘* Olood «t R/i* )(<

«l°n* tr,«.^!?*. ln * the ««M TrtjMWlM.

W»ltt of lo3 •>•• otrrootod to mo lotol and aro la

** P **^inp» are denotod vlth mm x.

5B /o o 2 /° 02 ^° 01

0*S LI* 0 1!

* 0 . 5 # I 26

0 95 SSS 51 . ■ ■ -0.9S

^•V* 9 ,.... . ■ ... Q.3I

X*f« Aircraft Penetrations

• \079 (Extrapolated by r 20 Law)

\ 0 . 2 f

r t

Ground

Zero

Range,* I0 3 feet

tbs aushroacs fron eoeevhat lover yield ds to nations. These readings hare
been included in figure 3,1, but mat be considered tentative subject to
uncertainties in the decay factors and the aircraft position relative to

the Main cloud. , . rVl .

i,‘"' * »• * . , ■ ’T ' * * k -

♦ > ' 4 v * «• r *• . . . - , .

;■ ? e 1 a ?l #3_Parttgle_yall_ # (See Appendix B.) Figure 3Jk lepreient*

•r

thi$ particle fall plot for the vlsds Measured at and after shot tine for the
Zuai event. This plot represents the positloa on the surface at which a
particle would arrive if it originated at a given altitude above surf^ps
aero. The plot has been constructed taking into account the tine and
space variation of the wind pattern, but is subject to the following limi-
tations s BEST AVAILABLE COPY

(a) The continuous vertical line source above ground xero vas approxi-
laated by Increments at 5,000 feet levels.

(b) The wind velocity at a 5,000 feet level was assumed to reprosont
the average velocity in the 5,000 feet interval centered at that level.

(c) The particles ware assumed to drift with the local wind and to
fall a* governed by gravity and a typical air density and temperature
versus height structure.

(d) Tha effect of vertical air motions on particle fall rates has
been neglected.

(e ) The space variations of the wind profile were deduced ty cursory
examination of the Enivetok and Rongerik winds and tha synoptio charts
which were constructed twice daily. A more detailed osteorological
analysis of the eir notions would probably Introduce soma alight modlfi-

cations.

,<?

I3°00'

I64°4 O'

oiem

Any correlation of this plot end the actual fallout pattern oust talc

* <■ f>‘

into consideration the large horizontal dimension* of the initial cloud*

Sanely, a particular point on the ground say receive material not only
from the particular size-height numbers associated with that point hot
froon all euoh mmbir pairs which fall within a cloud radius of that point
For ref erenow , the estimated cloud and stem disasters are given as an
insert to Figure 3*6*

One other effect ear also influence the fallout pattern and is not
easily predictable* The effective else of a partial© can change os it
fallal This change is usually effected as condensation or evaporation
of water and can manifest itself in one enso ns c concentrated radioac-
tive region from local rain-out of material which would nomally have
been distributed over a large area.

^.1.1. / . Chnracterlzatlap of fallout Materiel . The following gener-
al conclusions wore drawn fro® tbs preliminary fallout analysis of
Project 2.65*

(a) Two types of particles appeared at Sits Eravo; a white irregular
coral particle ana an almost perfect sphere, the former being nost
abundant* The coral particle consisted of CaCOj with soeae CaO and
fe(CH) 2 , and the spheres wire mostly CaO or CafCEOo with a rarfaoe ooat-

lag of Caco,. BEST AVA) L ABLE COPY

(b) Radioactivity we distributed throughout the volte?® in the aost
active particles and only a few largo particles showed a surface deposit
of active material • The average activity per particle for the spheres
was roughly ten t fines as great as for the ooral particles*

is assumed to include droplets*

1 / In this treatment the word r p$

^c) The cast abuniant particle else at- the else at the varIo*js sta-
tions vers as presented In Table 3.1.

$a. v-ffo

TAZIE 3.1 PROJECT 2.65 P4BTICIE SIZE AHD P3iCEHr CP TOTAi/aCTIVITI

Station

Particle Siso
(nicroos)

Percent of
Total t Activity

Bravo

210-420

420-840

840

Charlie

44-74

210-420

420-840

E 40

loke

44-74

210-420

420-840

8 40

IAG 40

44-74

74-105

105-149

149-210

210-420

Koto* Only fractions contributing 10 percent of more

of the activity have been included in this table.

(d) The apparent rapture to fission ratio as derived by ceasuring
239 99

the Up and V 7 activities varied markedly froo eacple to ssaple.

239

The liquid s ary lea wore deficient la Tip by a factor of 10-100 as com-
pared vith the solid sables. The apprent capture to fission ratio Taried
for different particle aia© fractions between 0.44 and 1.54 for the Site
Bravo sanple and between C.66 and 1.52 for the IAu 40 saryle. The sane
analysis performed on a cloud sample provided by UCRL yielded a ratio of
only 0.121. The ratio reported by DCRL for the cloud samples was 0.36.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

At present it is not possible to evaluate the cause of those variations.

The Protest 2.63 laboratory aboard the TAG 40 studied some individual
particles and arrived at the following preliminary conclusions*

(a) The fallout material was very similar to that resulting free* the
Bravo shot at Operation CAST IE. The most prodeednant particle types were
solid, irregular chunks and snowflake type of agrlneeratee. A very fev
white spherical particles were also present. The material appeared to
oonsiat of Ca(0R)2 for the moat part.

(b) Ch the basis of very preliminary data, the agglomerates appeared
to be more active than the chunks.

laboratory analyses were oceplete. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3. 1.1.5 Wr.on 1 valent Distribution of Fallout Hater! al . The results

of the surveys of the fallout area have bate represented conventionally

as the land equivalent exposure rate readings at a 3 f^^t height at
H/l hour. In other words, the distribution of activity is rvoasurod by
specifying the exposure rate that vouli be observed by a detector at a

height of 3 feet above an infinite plana upon which the material has
fallen and remained in place. This reading is extrapolated by a decay
curve back to H/l hour, even though, in all likelihood, the fallout
material had not arrived at its surface location at this early time.

In any oase, such a plot is a representation of the rurfaoe density of
active material, differing fro a a plot of curies per unit area by *
factor which depends on the gaccna ray energy spectrum. ^

Subject to the measurement of accurate decay curves for ttes i o g^fuifi on

/dt-lull,

fallout tatcrial* ft t“

. a. >JU *9 focc~ ( Z>

relationship has been esoumd

for txpezur* rate readings fron land surface di atriUition of f alloat.

Such a decay curve represents the fission product t”^*^ decay pins an in-
creasing relative contribution free Kp 2 *^, It is therefore expected to

be reasonably accurate for the first 4 to 6 days until the Hp relative

contribution again decreases and a grantor negative exponent beooncs
appropriate.

Exposure rate readings in and above contgcinntod water are doubly
sensitive to charges in the gsjansa energy spectrca through its influence
on the effective source as well as on the spectra® ct the reaJuritg device,
for this reason the decay exponent that was applied to the water readings

was that manured in the decay tank aboard the 1-/Y Horizon, ?or the Shot

1 . 1 }

Ztini fallout this was ueasured to be ir©5.

The data for the fallout radiation plot in Figure ?,7 have teen secured

froG the following sources* BEST AVAILABLE COPY

(a) Project 2,65 holioopter-prcbe aerial survey* This survey directly
reasured the exposure rate at a position 3 feet above the ground of Bone
of the atoll islands. The readings for successive days! sur v e ys were
e:rtrnpolr.ted to E/1 hour and averaged,

(b) PadSafe surveys* Tbs BadSaffc aerial readings were reduced to 3

Z t

Test readings using calculated hei^it conversion coefficients (see

Appendix C) and ea additional factor of 1,5, This factor has been found

. ^

necessary to nomalize the readings to those taken with the project 2,65
survey. The 2,65 instrument actually cade ceasurenents at 3 feet and
had been well calibrated before and after use. The conversion factor
is probably doe to the geoeetry of the RadSafe detector unit in its

tml T*l\mX MUtlw Flirt. H/l W •'tlmlM* Ua4 «*«
la rA». inWPnUttt WUW1MI MTt. fU HXTV CiimON.

rest AVAILABLE COPY

165 ° 40 '

attachment to the helicopter. Other readings on islands wore also avail-
able from recovery party monitor#.

(o) The Project 2.63 standard gsoaetry aonitar readings on the bottles

collecting the total fallout on the pontoon raft, skiff, and island eta-

: * ....

tiona were used to dotemine the re lativa ground readings at these loca-
tions. The readings wore norsvCLised to Aha infinite land exposure rate
. by using the. masurad 3 feet exposure rata at Sites George . and ViHirja
t together with the bottle monitor reading from the station there. This
procedure is subject to setae errors due to the possible variation in the
collection efficiency with position in the fallout zone. For example,
the funnel type collectors are more likely to retain large particulate
than a fine aerosol and bir.ee are likely to be more efficient at the
stations nearer the shot point.

(d) The TAG 39 and TAG 40 "tine- intensity recorder" on the forward
deck provided exposure rate readings which approximate the land equiva-
lent reading, although they ware affected by the efficiency of the deck
as a collecting surface. In general, these readings ware found to be
low compared to measurements in the oc3an water end sonitor readings of

total collector samples. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

-rr-ssjkx /uacU-t\a\

(e) The eiasdard gsgeasay taken under conditions of standard geocetry
of the Project 2.63 open-close collector trays and the total collector
trays also furnished relative readings at the following locations*

Borth Site Sow, BFKB barges, TAG 39, TAG 40, and the I£T 6 11* These
readings were normalised using the reading of tbs ocaan water at the
TAG 40 position. Again these readings are subject to error from a vary-
ing fallout collection efficiency.

r-'V he’ ll

U 1 . - * ■■

(f) The Two TA.G f e, the Project 2.62 K's, and the H/7 Horizon perfornsd
*eaeure»ents of exposure rate as a function of depth in the water. These
readings giro a direct estimate of the total activity present in a verti-
cal column of water and hence of the equivalent land rate. These exposure
rate verms depth profiles wore also intended to provide aa average depth
of alxing eo that the ao re mrscrous surface readings could also he used to
corapate land equivalent exposure rates. Severer, sinoa the "uni shot was
detonated oa landytruch of the activity was associated with sizeable solid
particles and only part of ths activity regained in tbs upper few hundred
asters accessible to the probe. Th-is, these readings are subject to

relatively large errors. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

(g) The numerous surface eapopure rate readings measured by the survey
vessel# and. the TAG ’ s can be reduced to equivalent land radiation readings
if the effective depth of mixing of the radioactive water is known. The
preliminary rodvertion of the radiation depth profile data indicated that
the depth of penetration was about 54 voters at H,4lO hours, increased
linearly to 90 meters at P/30 hours, and regained constant after this
time. The data from the surface readings were therefore reduced using
these depths of penetration at all 'positions in the fallout pattern.
Neglecting space variations in the depth of penetration can produce sane
errors, particularly close in, because tbs larger sized particulate in
the fallout which arrives nearer to the shot point is likely to penetrate
sore rapidly under the influence of gravity than would be axpected from
tha water nixing rate. Therefore, the effective depth of nixing could
easily be Mich greater near ground zero than in the acre reasote regions
of the fallout pattern where smaller particulate is responsible for the
activity.

( —

@yt CTT-tld Cfi. tb £. ■

fha factor reduce, the reading under the surfaoe of tha water

fr *4 Zt 4u ^ £?L+-t +

i #t (■

to the equlTalent land rate &rtr* 1C X d, whero d it the depth of mixing* ^ v, J

^ ? ;> f

This factor can be derived as follows* the activity present In^M? a* &****?•**. i

. -//, /<W. \ • , , ^

of water 1s to be placed on one wr of surface, and a density of 1 curia/**

t r . X/ < &&**-*— j

in yater produces one tenth of tha exposure rate -*»*a Surface distribution

v « *

of 1 curie/* • (See Appendix C,)

4 rough correction vas aade in the survey data for the notion of the
ooeas water subsequent to the deposition cf the fallout* For the purposes
of this preliminary report the currents were approximated by a unifora
drift of 10 nautical miles per day toward 260 degrees asizzuth in the
region north of 12 degrees 00 minutes north latitude, & drift of 10 miles
per day toward 180 degrees azirruth in the region southwest of Bikini
Atoll, and a zero drift southeast of Bikini Atoll* Those notion patterns
vere smoothly connected in intermediate regions* The notion va6 as suuod
to convenes at an average tine arrlrA of H/6 hours*

(h) The Project 2,64 aerial survey readings taken at an altitude of
about 300 feet were reduced to readings in the water by nultiplication
by a factor of 10* This factor included a factor of 3*3 for the finite
acceptance angle of the detector, 1*3 for the effective air attenuation
between the water surface and 300 feet, and 2 to convert the reading over
the water into a reading inside the water (sea Appendix C). Using the
sane normalization factor computed for the Project 2*62 water readings,
these numbers were reduced to equivalent land exposure rates*

i. 3*1. 1.6 Central T^ne of Arrival Contours * The contours in Figure 3*8
represent the calculated times at which a particle originating directly

*ss*°

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

above surface ssro would arrive at a location on the surface* The facrt
at contours ara exhibited which indicate two fallout tlaos associated
with aone points results from ths possibility that particles frco two
regions in the initial cloud can arrive at the point* Slnoe the initial
cloud Is rot a vertical line source but has appreciable horizontal extent,
the actual tine of arrival at a point corresponds to. the ninimsa c antral-
"arrival) f ^r a Likewise, the tine

of cessation corresponds to the mxinJB central tine of arrival for all

-f .

.j^iwte within i-oloud-Tsdiue*

Figure 3*8 also presents ths observed tbse of arrival, tins of peak
rate of arrival of activity, and tine of cessation of fallout observed
for the Zuni event. The data is gathered frea the following sources*

(a) Tire of arrival detectors on ths skiffs and pontoon rafts.

(b) Gama "tirse-lrrfcanFity recorders* aboard TIG 39, TAG 40, 1ST 611,
XF2© 13, YFf© 29, and the Site How station of Project 2.63.

(d V-Thc g^rsaa e x posur e rate recorders Installed at -soae-lasd • stations

ty ^ BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3«- «1**7 Ten Hour Exposure Contours . For applications to practical
military situations, the H/l hour land equivalent exposure rate is not
particularly appropriate. The tine a of arrival of the fallout may vary
greatly along a particular radiation contour and hence ths total dosage
to personnel la those areas will very. Figure 3.9 presents contours of

the total exposure received at locations In the fallout sons from the

164 ° 40 '

centrj t tiro of arrival of fallout until 10 hour* later* The figure has

boon f hnstructed using tbs experimental fallout radiation distribution
from Figure 3.7 and the calculated central tine of arrival contour* of
figure 3*8. the assumption has been made that tbs activity decays
according to a t"* # ® decay relationship. In interpreting this plot in
terms of exposure to personnel experiencing the fallout tire asouaptian
is made that the exposure is the same ^ that ^vould have been exporionood
if all the material had arrived at the central time of arrival of fall-
out. This assumption is equivalent to an assumption of equal ora as

demonstrated in Figure 3.10. BEST AVAILABLE COPT

The total exposure data of the Project 2.1 film badges and dosimeters
were corrected for the difference between recovery time and 10 hours
after the central tire of arrival and have boon presented as data points
on Figure 3.9.

3.14 ■& Cross Deca y

The decay characteristics of the fall-

out samples will be, in general, determined by the combination of the

fission product and neutron activation product decays. The predominant

capture product activity at the times the samples were observed was from

Iip 2 ^ (2.3 day half life) which occurs in abundance whenever the fission

yield of the weapon results mostly frca fast neutron fission of TF^*

The assumption of a t“^*° decay for analysis of the Zuni fallout radia-

tion date was chosen to represent the combination of the fission procn
and Rp 2 "^ activity during the period of tire surveys (1 to V/i,). later,

sore precise analyses will undoubtedly be based on the actual obsar^ 3 d^k

decay.

V . i P

v . . ^ a

.1 . >. l . s ■

1 : ■ ■■’ ’>£ V

X , i -4. y

* * ’ V '

hf+llTour
Exposure -•
Rote

V * i*v * V ,%, » '•* ■« #••

^ - #«. - 4 •* m

Assumed
Equol Areos

t t

One Time of
Hour Arrivol

Central
Time of
Arrivol

Time of
Cessation

Central Time of
Arrival + 10 Hours

Figure 3.10 Calculation of Ten Hour Exposure Values. Ten hour exposure as used
in this report is area under curve from central time of arrival to
central time of arrival plus 10 hours.

T.a capture to fission ratio reported by FCRL far the Ztml event

vas approximately 0.36.

FrellBlnary observations by JVoJects 2.63 and 2.65 on the caeca photon
decay, gscna exposure rate dscay, beta disintegrations per minute decay,
as# the g3E?a exposure rate decay observed by reanxrementr on radiation ... ... ....
fields freer contaminated islands are surraarlxed la Table 3.2. The pre-
lln.lna.ry results frcaa Projects 2,62 on the decay oonstant applicable to
the garsna expot ure rata seasured la contaminated water has ale© been In-
cluded In Table 3.2.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TAB IE 3.2 CRCES DSC AT EXPORTS FCF ZUSI

A(t 2 ) r

Tina Range (hours)

5-20 ,

20-50 .

50-200 j

Gagne FhotcnsP

C.6

0.6

1.2

Gaxira Exposure Rate

0.9

1.0

Beta dis/aln §

0.6-C.9

0.7-1 *4

0. 8-1.0

Field Ganaa Exposure
rate

0.9

M 3

Gemma Exposure in
Water

2535

•TAG 40 Sacplcs only.

#?asples subject to nuch variation, Rushers quoted
are ranges of observed decay e^» onents.

3.1»2 IaCrosse*

3. 1.2.1 Introduction . The LaCrossa Shot vae fired on an artificial

island on the reef off Site Yvonne, Eniwetok Atoll, os 5 May 1956, at
062 5M. The yield of the weapon was measured to be 38.5 KT, The environ-
stent of the shot point consisted of shallow vater and reef* Therefore,
the burst was essentially of the land surface type* In the vicinity of
the burst point was located large quantities of iron pipe used in the

diagnostic instrumentation* BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3»1*2.2, Particle Fall Plot . The particle fall plot illustrated in
Figure g.ll has been constructed for only the larger particle sizes,
since only the atoll area fallout was documented, and hence does not
need to include space or time variation of the wind structure. The
other comments made in Section 3-1. 1.3 about the limitations and interpre-
tation of this plot are applicable here also*

3«1.2. 3 Characterization of Fallout Material . Project 2.65 only
participated on a limited basis in the fallout collection frcra the
LaCrorse Fhot* The best sample vas secured frcea a truck canvas on Site
Cane. Two types of particles were observed, one of which appeared to
resemble natural white coral and the other which vas partially or totally
black and contained varying amounts of iron* The radioactivity appeared
to be uniformly distributed throughout the volume of both types of
particles* Eighty-seven percent of the activity was associated with
particles in the 210-420 micron sieved size fraction ^Figure 3.11). Pro-
ject 2.65 observed indications of fractionation of relative to Vty^ •

The Ya^ activity was assumed to measure the fission product activity and 1

a capture to fission ratio vas calculated for each sample. The apparent

ratio esoBisiS to vary fros sample to sample with possibly a decrease with

increasing particle size, varying frera approximately 0.28 in the smallest

sises (75 micron) to 0,20 in the largest (200 micron). These numbers are

appreciably larger than those from the cloud sample analysis performed

by LASL vhich yielded a capture to fission ratio of 0.086. Therefore,

239

there vas apparently an over abundance of Np in these samples as com-
pared vith the Ho^.

3. 1,2. 4 Land Equivalent Distribution of Fallffcrfr . Radiation data at
sites on the islands vers available from tvo sources* The Project 2.65
helicopter-probe surrey and RadSafe readings. The probe readings hare been
corrected to E/l hour by using a t“ * decay expression. In addition to
this factor, the RadSafe readings were converted from readings at 25 foot
and 50 foot altitudes to 3 foot readings by multiplying by 2.5 and 3.2
respectively. Vhere many readings were taken over the 8 are island, the
D-day RadSafe reading and the three successive day probe readings vera
averaged. In these cases the consistency of the readings vas within a
factor of tvo. Th9 resulting radiation pattern is characterised by the
data points in Figure 3.12. Unfortunately, the data do not cover enough
area to allow contours to be drawn, so only a few general conclusions
will be derived from this event. The radiation levels near the crater

are indicated in Figure 3.13. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3. 1.2. 5 Central Time of Arrival Contours . Figure 3,14 presents the
predicted central tire of arrival contours for the IaCrosse fhet. Ho
time of arrival detectors were operating during the fallout from this

I62°00

GENE 50 —
DAISY 140-

N AUTICAL MILES

® 3920
© 2300

328 '75 30.6

FiEure 3.13 LaCrosae Exposure Ttatoa Near Crator. Equivalent land roadinpe on the
reef and on Yvonne converted to r/hr at H/l.

62 ° 00

©Tent, tot these contour* cm be used to eorpare total exposure aeasnre-
k£cts with exposure rate xeasurcuents, end henoe are presented hare far

convenience only;
2JJU6 Cross

Project 2.65 tttsnred eeparetoly the

gcicar and beta -decay carves of the LaCrosse fallout singles over .the

y *

period £ro« 30 hoars to 530 hours. The decay exponent of the gaxca ex-
posure rate vas observed to be 1.3 end of the beta Intensity (counts
per *&inste) 1.2. The gasna exposure rate readings in the field bad a
decay exponent of 1.4*

3.1. 3.1 T T]trotttatlon . The Kohavk device was detonated on a 300
feet tower at Site Ruby on 3 July 1956, at 0606T. The yield of the

weapon vas nruurod to be

of vhlchl

Since the fireball radius vas gro iter the locr^ cant r.i

nation produced by tbe Koh'iik Shot should be at least . .t

producud by the sane yield surface burst. To correct for i over Ini /at

end the

best available

COPY

.£r^m- a 2 participation In the Kohavk event vas United to the
Project 2.65 helicopter probe aerial survey.

3.1 . 3. 2 Particle Fall Plot . Since only the close-in fallout was
f’oeunented, the particle fall plot has been constructed for the larger
particles only and was not corrected for any space and tine variations
of the wind profile. Figure 3. 15 repre suets tbe particle fall plot far

tbe Kohawk Shot tire winds and is, of course, subject to the Unitatlons

of accuracy end interpretation

3. 1.3.3 L?jxlBculvrJtent Distributio n of Fallout. Throe foot bigh exposure
rate reading* were available frcn the Project 2.65 curve/ as veil as the
RadSefe survey of the oontanlnated islands. Both sets of readings were ex-
trapolated to H/l hour by using a decay equation. The RadSafe read-

ings at 25 feet and 50 feet altitude were converted to 3 feet readings by
multiplying by 2.5 and 3.2, respectively. The resultant exposure rates ere
plotted as data points on a nap in Figure 3.16. The observed field gsnoa
exposure rate decay exponent was 1.1. It is interesting to note that read-
ings dolt tbs crater, extrapolated to B/l hour, in many cases exceeded
10,000 r/hr. These values are higher than any previous extrapolated values
based on D-day rersurenents.

1.3. 4 Central Tine of <yr !v^ CQa t crtrs . The constructed oentral tine
of arrival contours ere presented in Figure 3.17. There was no drta tsken
relative tc such neasurenents end these contours ere present'd for oo.ivcn-
ience in Graving conclusions about total exposure only.

3.1.4 Te~ra.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

l. The Teva device va3 detonated on a barge in

shallov water ever the lagoon reef between Sites Charlie and Dog, Bikini
it'll, at C546K, 21 July 1956. The yield of the device was neasured to
be'^MfS vMch

The e..vironnent prior to firing leva is illr*. s', rated in Figure 3*18*
Aerial photographs show that a crater of about 3,200 feet in diene ter
vas produced in the reef. Considering the shallowness of tbs water over

the reef (0-60 feet), the explosive size of the weapon, end the crater
size, Teva is considered as a land surface Bhct. With careful analysis
it cay be found that the lagoon water introduced differences in the
effects anticipated from a land surf&oe burst. Rovovor, it is exacted

that these differences will be snail*

« X

<>; a

fH* S

i t 4. 8 .

DATA

'#1,'::. tKiSGt

I62°00

iet *30'

\f00'

I>40 i

1 1 •30*

1 1 * 20 *

its ** 1

o^ 0

/°3

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Figure 3,18 Aerial View of Reef Between Sites Charlie and Dog with an Overlay
of the Teva Crater*

ImIxLI Distr ibution of Activity In. tbs Stabilised Clcnd. Limited
radiation neasurenents were made in the nuclear eloal with four (4) rocket*
fired at about H/7 minutes. Subject to the limitations given in Section f)

3. 1.1. 2, the reduced radiation rate readings/rre presented in figure 3.19,

A view showing the location of the plane of the rockets in the cloud in
presented in figure 3.20, The dimensions which were used were obtained
from photographs of the Navajo mushroom taken at H/8 minutes.

3.I.4. 3 Pe^t j cle Fall Plot . Figure 3.21 represents the particle fall
plot for the winds measured at and after shot tire for the Teva event#

The comments and limitations previously given in Sscticn 3. 1.1. 3 are
equally applicable to this plot.

In general, the fall-
out material closely resembled that from the Zuni Shot as well as that
from CA37 r J5 Bravo, Particle size end chemical analyses will be per forced

almas t exclusively in continental laboratories end t’iorefore such data

, . * • ( ,

was not available at the tins of writing of this report,

3d. 4. 5 Land Bcmivdent_Di^tribratlon of Fellput The fall-

out documentation projects in Program 2 participated fully in the Tew*
event asd the radiation data fron the collection of material ami surveys
is summarised in Figure 3.22, The data are fron the sane sources and
vere treated in the sane manner as discussed in Section 3, 1,1,5, The
radiation versus depth profiles indicated an effective depth of penetra-
tion of activity in the oesaa water varying linearly fron 20 eg tors at
10 hoars to 62 meters at 33 hours and remaining constant beyond this
tiro. The decay exponent measured in the decay tank on the K/Y HORIZON

tfl®.

best available copy

{

Height^,* I0 3 feet

Figure 3.19 Teva Cloud at Vf7 Minutes in the Plano of the Rocket Trajectories
a Readings along trajectories are corrected to sea level and are in
W units of 103 r/hr* Peak readings are denoted with an x*

/ 0.44
* 0.43

* 0.04

TEWA Cloud Based on NAVAJO.iT IQ3 ft

^>^.40

60 f 80

100

120

140

150 i

Launch

Ground Zero

: V I

* ** 1

Range^-*t 10 3 feet

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Ground Distonce^af. I0 3 feet

n™g Plane of H ft Mlmitoo Roeketi Toward Tom Clwd

^BEST AVAILABLE COPY v

Figure 3.21 Tetm Particle Fdl ^lek.

16 3° 4 O'

i /** erO rs o'

Ill

BEST AVAILABL E COPY

p K ^

was 1.34« These depth of pciK«apP9r&d ceftajf wjonant values were used

la redndng the water survey end the P27 aircraft survey readings to the

land equivalent exposure rates as presented in the contours of Figure 3.22.

The uncertainties in this procedure caused by the particulate nature of the

fallout froxa a lend surface burst have already been discussed in Section 3. 1.1. 5.

.Central -Tine of ftrrivsl Contours . The central tire of arrival

contours shown in Figure 3.23 were constructed as discussed in Section

3. 1.1* 6 and the sane sources provided the data points*

2jXj. iu2 Ton Hour Broosuye Contourg . The ten hour exposure contours

and Project 2.1 data points are presented in Figure 3.24. The discussion

of Section 3. 1.1.7 is applicable to this figure.

3.1.A.8 Oro^s Decay ' The characteristic beta end g arena decay

e>:ponont3 observed after the Teva shot are suraarized in Table 3.3. These

239

should be interpreted in view of a reported Bp capture to fission ratio
of about 0.5. It should bo enphasised that these are all preliminary
values biso-d on only part of the data and do not completely reproduce the
shape of the decay curve,

TABLE 3.3 2L03S DECAI EZP0K2ITS FOR T2BL
j ~j Tire (Bouts) j 5-20 20-50 ( 50-200

■ — r~— - — — — — — 11 — — ~ |— — 1 ■■ |

i ( Ganna Photons* i 0.7 0.7 ! -

i 43 I

j g j Ganna Exposure Rate
c i

^ i Beta dis/fein 0,

« |

. Field Gama Exposure Rate

<§ | Gama Exposure Rate in Water
BOTE: *TAG 40 samples only.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

5-20

20-50 |

{

0.7

0*8-l#0

(

0.9

0.9 j

1.1 !

1.34 1

ATA

1C V-'M'f Ml

Stem Region ( <50, OOOft)

Cloud Region 050, OOOfO

50,000-ft Line

. !

I65°00'

X X

V \

\ V

\\K

•

. .

•

\?Yj£

1 ~

1 2° 40'

1 2 ° 20 '

I 2 ° 00 '

* Tim* of arrival

• Tim* of mox. rot* of orrlvol

’ te ~ =r ' ——^ ^3 • Tim* of cootation

- o*,

+°;s

xo.r^) X .!i ll°40 ,<

• 1.4 \{ •«

^est available copy

ll°20'

/>!

I64°00'

3.2 AIR BURS 13

3*2«LPtgrpfrre»

3. 2,1.1 -Introduction . The Cberokoe devioo was dropped from an air-
craft on 21 Kay 1956, and detonated at a height of about 4,500 feet at
app^oadmstely 3*7 miles northeast' of Site Charlie. DELETED

pOjrrEi*

DELETED! The intended burst point far the

weapon was directly above Site Charlie so that the fallout data was to be
applicable to a minimal air burst over land. In actual fact, the weapon
detonated above the deep ocean and therefore the results of the experiments
rust be interpreted in that light.

3» 2^1.2 Distribution of Activity in the Stabilized Cloafl . Two ealvos

of six rockets each were fired at the Cherokee cloud at IT/7 minutes and

r/l 5 minutes respectively. Sines the rockets were aired fcccrcling to the

ii. ;-nded zero point and hence were in a plane ebout 3.7 riles awey from

the actual zero point, the lc-.er trajectories C*<1 not intercept the snail

E-tor. of the nuclear mushroom* However, tlej 1-rge dire n^ic-ns of the cloud

provided sufficient opportunity far a number of good data < races. The

r o: 'Its are plotted in Figure 3.25 and Figure 3*27 for the 7 minute and

15 minute salvos respectively, according to the method described in
3.1.1.2

Section and using the some cloud dimensions which were developed

for Zuni end a sorewhat smaller eteo diameter* The location of the plane
of the rocket trajectories through the mshroon is Illustrated in Figures
3.26 and 3.28.

esviso

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BEST AVAILABLE COPT

CHEROKEE Cloud..
* I0 3 ft

’«•« /5.S
/l0.6

/2 66
7.20

1.05 93Z-5i2ij.is

VlS « 4 3^70 ,W

0.47

\o.l9

r%uro 3.25 Chorokoo Cloud at tl/7 liinuteo In the Plano of the Rocket
Trajectories. Readings along trajectories are corrected to sea level
and are In units of Kk r/hr. Peak readings are denoted with an x.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

v «-*Vv

■ , I '

/ 0.2 4

0.52

.93

Aircroft Penetrotios
(Extropoloted by t~ 20 Low)

Ground

71 £uro 3*27 Cborokoo Cloud at fl/L5 Minutoo In tho P lana of tho Rocket
Trajectories, Readings along trajootorios are corrected to sea level -
and are In units of 10? r/hr. Peak readings are denoted with an x.

-lot

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

120

40 20

♦ *

Intended GZ G Z

Ground Distance^ I0 3 feet

Figure 3.28 Looking Along Plane of the H/L5 Minute Hooka ta Toward
Cloud.

•» ■

The Project 2.66 rJLrcrcft perfvrmd sons penetrations at approximately
E/I hxpr* into tb» la -or portions of the Cherokee cl end and the reeding*,
extrtpol'-ted back to E/15 rd irate a by using 2 for the dcecy eapenont, are
also presented in Figure 3.27. Tiruai observations from the aircraft in-
dicated that the rod-brovn color, characteristic of oxides of nitrogen
vhich cm usually associated with intense radiation in nuclear clouds, vs*
present chore the flight altitudes# Therefore, the radiation fields de-
tected by the aircraft were undoubtedly Each ssxllor than those present at

higher altitudes* BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2. 1.3, f art lple Ffil Plot . Figure 3.29 reprosaats the particle fall
plot for the winds censured at shot ties at Bikini -toll for t2» Cheix>kee
event. *»o space end tiro vardatiov-O of the vriral profile have been included
in this plot fox* tvo reasons; (l) the Ynrictioes .o:*e not largo, a: id (2)
no ?p.reciible fallout ves asperieaoed, to detailed correlation with
position in the cloud could not be achieved. ?! o interpretation of such
& particle fall plot has been uazr»arincd in Section 3. 1.1.3.

3. 2.1*4 Me .txj.btti-rn Figure 3.30 portrays the paths

follovad by the tarfn.ee vessel s end the aircraft through the predicted
fallout area daring the Cherokee fallout surrey. The surrey readings
were essentially background levels throughout the svxvsj. The upper
lirdt of the land e^iiralent erpeoure rate readings in the surveyed area

••1 o

vas less than 0.5 r/br when cutrapclatcd to E/1 boar by a t * decay

equation. A ccrpmiscr. of Figure 3.33 with Figure 3.29 indicates that
it is unlikely that any major fallout areas were ids sod by the survey
vehicles end therefore it is clear that this particular type of event

162 ° 20 '

T\°4Q

■ " 1 P2V AIR SURVE'

M/V HORIZON

USS SILVER STEIN

USS MCGINTY

ewiwETort

SAN BRUNO FRC

12 *

II*

docs not produce an appreciable d.'.aity cf fsllout contudratlon.

2 j£»<L$£12L» The Osa^e device was detonated et a height of 630 feet
«7or fUto Tfonao at Ul/fl on 16 June 1956, The yield vaa noasured to he

I ^ The only cvailehle date on radiation IotbIs is frou R&dSafe sur»
Toy3 sines no Progrn* 5 f ulloat projects participated. The hour ex-
posure* rate at ground zero vns runsnred to be shout 16 r/hr, *11 ether
SDusarerents could net be distinguished froa tbs residual radiation fro*
previous detonations.

3.3 WATER SCRP-G2 FIRSTS

3,3Ajk&afl-

B£ ST A u

AM-ABLE

Copy

3. 3.1.1 Intixylnction , Tbs Flot'ocad. Shot was fired on a barge located
off Site Deg (sec Figure 3,31) at 062& on 12 Tone 1956. The yield was
nensjured to bej

Tlfi only lurge

tusne3 of isr.t&Tial in the shot barge were ct*. si (sheet ZCC U ..s) aid coral
(ebeut 230 torus). It would not ho surprising if a saarll lot rrasuraLle
eisoimt of these s^terials was found in the fallout collectors since a

calculation a^-scslng that there is no fractionation, n&Eely thst the
fie cion product activity is proportional to the total ness of barge
r-terial deposited, predicts that about 3 eg each of Iron end ooral should
be de^osiiod per erasure fcot of surfaoe at a location where the exposure
rate extrapolated to T.fi I lour is ICO r/lr,

Ls shown in Figure 3.31, the Flathead Shot barge vs8 anchored in .

' SAN BRUNO FRC

appronixute ly 114 ffeet of vit r. Therefore, the shot actually approrf.-
ssated a surface water burst in a usep harbor. In addition to furnishing
full out data on these particular shot conditions, it is to be hoped that

a Bcro ccryleto un’crstanoir.g cf t !;3 red: .nisns involved coi "be gleaned

froa |he data co that it cm be applied to other twret conditions.

1. 3.1.2 Pg-Ttlcle r-n Plot. , Tto Flathead partiolc fall plot la
Ulustn ted in Figure 3.32, The unusual tppeurxce of the upper lieiglst

* i

lines* vhteb ecna badfc tovard ground sero for tho traillar po* tides, la
a re fleet ion of the severe tics changes of the vied profile . The fallout
tires were characterized by a repidly dunging vied situation. during wMck
cyclonic or «rticybj.cnic centers coved through the fallout area at cost
altitudes.

7cr *: reviev cf the 1 lr.lt atlosa and the interpret alien of this plot,
the dir- ear sloe In Section 3.1.1. 3 should be ocnsolted.

Ik l xXilS^ Z£ 2^i^i£Z. zLZzZl JateriL'I. Tbs fillc-.it r^-Uriel
diCforol in up .v> erunce greatly fren tint of the lend surface bursts. At
the doc: -in stations, least of tbs activity vas associated vita & B aad.*
This ratariol vas ccllectei vith difficulty, regain'd >}jlt*3 vst for a
period of a day, cud vrz suteeriectly r eery ad fror the collecting sur-
faces vith oven r.e-re difficulty. It ms fared to consist of fi:ia coral
prrticlca, 3s£l, end rise able asscunts cf TeCj.

The mere distent fallout consisted nairly cf ?. s-lty slurry. The
effective droplet di ureter st the TAG 40 position vas 100-200 ni crons,
end theso cenci rt-^d cf SD-90 percent JTaCl. The activity vas, in general,
associated vith *, vrTy snail (5-10 r-icrcn) particle inside Ale droplet.

T.l.1.1 L«r£ ^ -raimler.t Plstritatifc nf <yrfr The data

for the fall art radiation plot cf figure 3.33 hove bean derived free tbs
Sana sources S3 those err an: ratal in Section 3. 1.1. 5. fa.evor, the fact BRUNO FRC

best available copy

omaaMyg

• Aerial Survey
x Skiff and Raft
o Ship Survey

• YAG's, L ST and Barges
+ Land Readings -

X Ground Zero o

I2°20‘

1 2 ° 00 '

1 1 ° 40 '

II* 20'

109a,

/ I2°4C

jAk BRUiNG ERG

z L_

I2°2C

16 5 ° 40 '

I64M0'

that t’.J 3 activity frcn t!d_s water stirfaco burst vas gunertlly associated
vitb |iquid or very snrll psrlicalite enclosed by lipoid droplet* irj>lie«
tbit the vit or eurvry readings era bo used vith Ecre confidence. Ta thl»

<r*se, most of the activity vo 'Id be distributed in depth by tbs airing ef
the ooisn vth~r tad act ly the direct ln-luenoi of gravity ca particulate
Bit tor. Since there probably vsS no activity oao ociatod with c iso able
colli T>?v'tlcl^'P > » thsaeovgo ^Vt«:*-n€iivdiy thai-uaa^sposiiid x*viV& , ... , . . ,,
oco ir. surface vac uccosrible to the proba readings. An exuqpla of the
’ readings on a typical probe cast Is illustrated in Figure 3.34*

The problem of background radiation levels can not be considered in
this report. Suffico it to say that lew background readings evtrepolatc d
for rscuned decay during tie long periods of he turvoy, con hive eppre-
ciable influence ou the raeasurei contour values. The date, es presently
reduced bate not been corrected for such effects. Au illustratioa of
this problec is furnished by & surrey that v&s porierEod subsequent to
the Flathead event, but just prior to Tavajo* It Indicated that & region
vest of Bikini Atoll and curving tovsrd the couth vaa cantaninateu by vetcr
vhich probably origin 2 . ted near the 2uni cud Flathead craters (6oe Figure
3.43). It is therefore quits likely that* flag ar-likc region of oontani-
nali r a iilicntsd in fiis area by the Flathead friloafc servers was not
caused by fallout, but vns due to ooctesiaated effluent front the Bikini

BEST available copy

The observations hr Protect 2. 62 probe caste, vhich snasared vortical

' Ww(«i£r/

raiiction profiles ninilar to that illustrated ia Figure 3.34, v w * thet £AIS T BRUNO FRC
the effective depth of penetration for the Flathead fallout was abort

Water Depth t meters

Figure 3.34 Typical Exposure Rate versus Depth Profile. This vas r
northeast of Flathead ground zero at 0430 on 14 June 1?

36 *eters «t 10 boors after tbs detonation. Increased linearly to 60 caters
at 34^bcnrs, and thenceforth renainod essentially oonstant. Tbs decay ex*

ponent measured by the probe In the decay tank abated the Horizon was

t.or

£3$. These ©baervod value » of the depth of penetration end decay exponent
vers used la the redaction of the Project 2*62 water survey and Project
2.64 aerial survey data. Tbs water notion corrections discos sod In Section

3.1.1. 5 were also applied to this data.

3. 3.1.5 Central Tine of Arrival Contours . The calculated central tins
of arrival contours s well as the observed data points^ are presented la
Figure 3.35. The Interpretation of this data baa boon discussed In Section
3 . 1 . 1 . 6 .

3.?.1.6 Ten Ecfut. Exposure Contours . The ten boar exposure contours
for Fl>.*bead constructed as discussed in Section 3. 1.1. 7 are presented in
F1jut8 3.36. The oorrected exposure data points are also indicated in this

figure.

?. 3.1.7 r ro?3 Decsr ^tf^as /^Tha Kp^^ capture to fission ratio re-
ported for the Flathead event was 0.31. The daesy exponents rcosr.tr ed

itr.d r . -*oob conditions ere suaaarizod in Table 3.4.

».» .2 c taIo . best available copy

3. ?. 2.1 Introductio n. Tin Hsrajo device wc 3 fired on a barge st ored
off Site Dog (Figure 3.31) in water about 215 feet deepest 0556** on 11
July 1956. The yield of weapon was oeacured to be]

This dsvioe was the
of the REWIK devices and therefore provided an excellent opportunity
to doconcnt the fallout fairly near the shot po'nt without exposing the

SAN SR UNO ERC

Figure 3*35 Flathead Central Time of Arrival Plot* Times In hours

H. ' r >*'

4 ***:
c

1 (0
i <

i BRUNO ERC

SAN BRUNO FRi

’ ' figure 3*36 Flathead Ten Hour Exposure Contours."' , •-
CV *-£- **• f. FK&JMU&W 060* U3£ VJITU

* /\ m i -r“ > . J

Decay Exponent

DELETED

operational personnel to excessive radiation*

eonpsrt radiation readings tnm Bavajo with those/

deleted

— p~»LM .

The wind pet&eam* which existed at and after shot tine vas characterised by
very weak winds at all altitudes up to 55,000 feet, and banco each of the
fallout pattern vas ocrwerrt rated quite alone to Bikini Atoll* nevertheless,

^«**t *V 'Icr'&i ■

the observed radiation let fieri t fun were not excessive* However, if the
H&vajo weapon's yield had been predominantly froa fission reactions, the
exposure rates in the Dog-Seorge cor^lcx would have been his/her than 1000
r/hr at hour and operational difficulties would have resulted for all
agencies aoeding access to those cites,

ft - A * *. V "/*•

The Kc device also provided the opportunity to aoasure the effect-

jtiBBcach

cl end life colic clad

ivcr.oss of "s'lting* b/ a tracer exp rirk-nt. Abort ch oi

l.vf-e inserted enidet tbs tbcrnonaclear fuel ead Ufa collected
fallout ?^t3rial vas ansl^d for tire activetion products reciting froa
njutron capture reactions, Fovover, this detailed radlodhcrdcal analysis
vas performed In the boro laboratories of Projects 2,63 end 2,65 and
tj gsri w v the results were not available at the tiro of writixg of this

report, BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The ccntrlbuticn to the fallout radiation fron activity induced in
the sunxnmdiry Betcrlal of the shot point could also be determined,

DELETED'

chance of detecting induced activity in the presence of the

fission product activity vas increased.. In particular, activity ft^PEBNOERC

2A °

Ha produced in the salt water was espocted to be observ d even thouth

naif lifB is only 15 hours* Again this f&btaeis was perfbrned in th»
hors laboratories end the r* salts vers naft orsHaM^ for this report*

Tbs Sovajo shot barge indudod about 250 tons of iron and 200 tons ©f
oora^bat this Bate rial vu spread over a nxh larger area by thej
compared with Flathead* Since

the association of exposure rate and naes of material

is tbs sane (i.e., about 3 ne each of iron and ooral per square foot where
H/L exposure rate is 100 r/hr) f bat the levels of the radiation fields
from ffavajo were sat A lover than those from Flathead*

?-?- 2 - 2 Pjgtlibayga pf f,n fry Stabilised gfl

Since the previous shots, Cherokee end Ztxni, had yielded reasonably good
data on the distribution of activity In the nuclear dead, bat no data on
the etc’*., it was decided to allocate the entire six roc&ots of the E/7
ttimte s .Ito to the Kr.vsjo stan. The rockets were all aired at an eleva-
tion corresponding to a penetration height of about 26,000 foot and were
spread In aslmth to cover all ^possible directions of notion of the stem
to be expected ftren the local wind conditions*

Figure 3*37 presents tbs cross sections of the stem in the plans of
the trajectories of r exists 21, 3 1, end 4&* Figure 3*38 is a view of the
sten lookirg along the trajectories indicating the points at which the
rockets pierced the center plane of the stem at 26,000 feet* Only two
of the rockets indicated radiation} Eurhers 21 and 3** Those exposure brujuq jtrq
rat'~« were lass than 50 r/hr 9 and could not he accurately measured with
the equipment available in the field* Bechet 21 received a total exposure
of about 0*08 r betveen 13 and 28 seconds after lea rich tine, and rocket
3 1 received a total exposure of about £,24 T between 11 end 41 seconds

\jtr lsonch tin#, InspecticEof the^posltloalr^^nfcrnatioo inFj

(* Aw^A>,^ y

taA3 *2&3 & * n indicate a the following tentative conclusions!

a, Tba exposure rata is tie 8 ten is anal Tar than that in tba cloud by at

c r

least a factor of 40*

b, Tbe position of tba sten chocks with that predicted as fining the vind

V . .

displaces it fires soro tine,

c, The radiological disaster of the sics is no larger than the visual

dianoter, end the indications are that the largest exposure rates are licit-

ed to a snail fraction of ths stem vclnne.

The TI/15 salvo vas allocated to roasuring the exposure rate in the nuclear .
cloud, hut in addition was designed to yield data cn the reproducibility of
the detector readings. Only three trajectories wore chosen and two rocketa
wore f?r-?d along each trajectory, Ccrparison of the readings fron tbe one
pair of rockets cf which both yielded prelininary data indicated that the
readings were reproducible within about 20;*. The final reduction of the
data will probably show the reproducibility to be better than this miabor.

The data for the three trajectories is presented in Figure 3,3? and the
location of the plane of these trajectories through the cloud is illustrated

in Figure 3.40. ®^ST AVAILABLE COPY

The Project 2,66 canned aircraft penetrations of the ster of tbe Havajo
cushroon were perforced as soon as the Project 2,61 rockets were exit of the
air. The results of those penetrations, extrapolated back to H/15 ednutes
using a docoy relationship, are also presented in Figure 3.39. BRUNO FRC

» The tnshroon size vMch vas used in Figures 3.39 and 3.40 was taken fron
a H/8 cirrute photograph, While tic re is sene cloud expansion froa the tire

SAN BRUNO ERG

Figure 3.39 Navajo Cloud at H/15 Minutes in the Plane of the Rooket

V/\

‘'N

Trajectories. Readings along trajectories are oorreoted to
soa level and are in units of 10^ r/hr. Peak readings are
denoted by an x.

Tijar o 3./0

'’■•3 ^ of IT/15 K^vito Roc&ats Touurd Huvajo Cloud.

of the photograph to the time of the second silvo, this will not materially
.^ffoct the general location of the rocket trajectories relative to the dcrud.
The fact that the assured Eavajo cloud la slightly scalier than the lover
yield Cberokee-Zuni cloud la associated with the different methods used to
derive the dimension. Thia inconsistency trust he resolved by tore complete
analysis of photographic data*

v* *1 . * ** * * tv* • •• / * . # ' t « r-r * •

?. 3,2.3 Particle Fall Plot . The particle fall plot for the winds meas-
ured at and after shot tine for the Eavajo event is presented, in Figure 3. /I*
This plot, which was constructed considering tine end apace verieticna of
the wind profile. Is characterized by the sane weak winds that produced the
erall Flathead particle fall plot* Of course, the fact that the Eavajo cloud
was much higher, and hence was influenced more by the high altitude strong
easterly winds, caused the actual fallout pattern to extend over a larger
area than the Flathead pattern*

For a discussion of the interpretation and lirltatlons of t' is plot,
Section 3.1 *1*3 should be consulted*

3 . 3 . 2 ./, Characterization of Fallout Fat -rial * The Navajo cloce-in fall-
cut material, aa well as that observed at the I AG- 40 , resembled the sslt
laden slurry observed at the XA*— 40 after Flathead* £7 the tine the samples
from t'e lend stations were recovered, £C- 9 C$ of the particulate was fine
salt crystals . There was sore CaCOj among the remining material* Eo iron

vas detected. BEST AVAILABLE COPY sasbihjtojbc

3. 3.2. 5 Land Equivalent Distribution of Fallout The consoli-

dated radiatif n survey data are presented in Figure 3,42* The data have
been derived fren the same scurces, ard reduced b 7 the sane methods, as t’ ese

I64°40*

I65°00'

I (els'

uarfCissed la Section 3*1.1. 5, although the validity of the water survey data
Is erfcanced by tbs water surface location of the burst, as discussed la
Section 3.3.1.4a

The results of a pre-shot survey on Hava. Jo sdrns two days ere Indicated

* Je.--

In Figure 3.43. The radioactive "slick* v v lch la indicated west of Bikini

Atoll is probably due to water frea the Zoni and Flat ha ad craters. ®lnoe
the readings ere appreciable, and will not decay rapidly due to the long tire
oince these shots, care rust bs taken In interpreting data in this region
fron subsequent f alloat survey a.

The enpsr 5 r .e nts lly measured effective depth of penetration which was used
to reduoo the Favajo survey data varied linearly fron 20 Betara at 10 hours
after slot tij&e to £5 meters at 31 hours, and thenceforth regained constant
at the value of 65 raters. The decay exponent which was applied to roduce
the data to T./l hour vas 1.3? as determined by measurements In the decay

tank aboard the V./V Kf RliOS, BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3. 3. 2. 6 Central Tire? cf ‘rrival Cnntcnrs . The central tine of arrival
contours for the Sava Jo wind situation have been plotted In Figure 3.44. •

The data points derived from the sources discussed In Section 3. 1.1.6 hams
also been indicated.

3. 3. 2. 7 Ten Tour Exposure Contours . The Hava. Jo ten hour exposure contours,

calculated according to tho natbod cf Section 3. 1.1.7, ere presented in

fifnrre 3*45* Tho corrected data points measured by Project 2,1 are also

SAN BRUNO ITtC

Indicated In the figure. Jr

239

_ 3. 3.2. 8 r ross Pecvr The observed Up ^ capture to fission ratio

for Sava jo vas 0.36. The observed gross do cay exponents under various
conditions of tseasurerent are summarized in Table 3.5.

1 y

V;.

.. .....

^ .. ;■ 11^'V-. . .

• | ^ i»»n > v>* -%• *»**■.> [ t <r ; { ■

' * * ’^i&exzq-

«K

.Encloses 0.4 mr/hr* *
at 3 ft . ’• ■ -

Incloses 0.1 mr/hr ot 3ft

•A/.;::

>>W 1 J»w

L — ii j]

.-5

Stf

V P.._ .

Ship Survey 092000 M to IOIOOOM
Aircraft Survey 091 800 M

J.- ” .

t*.* * 3 ^

uV|

3ft

I . V ,(

^ **}
.itr

* i* ^ IS

0 •

II* 40* <

■;-M.

• '• fcf-i
. ■. V'.

r. 3 f

. . f/..v

ii° 20’ j..-r

> • ■ >

fell* k .*«'
'V^rVv

** "V-T

V >

ru* oo M

l5fci£M

'4 . <*

-7

, i - r*r: - .

-t?wT:

Ff^jitrc 3./J icro'y of Hao 1 oictivo Effluent From Eilzlni Atoll on ITava j o

rinuc Two one! irinuG Che Daya. gggj AVAILABLE COPY

<•-** r: 1 ■’ '••• " • IpPH

' 7 " • |ry V p **'

P&HVv- " ‘

•> l < 50,000 ft)
<n (>50,000«)
Line

Stem Region (<50,0

Cloud Region (>50,C

50,000 ft Line

Decay Exponent

TAB 125 3,5 GROSS DECAI EXPCBSKrS FOR NAVAJO
| Tine Range (Hours) 5-20 20-50 50-200

■ Gama Photons* 1*1 0*8 1,1

I** ~~ " '

Gamma Exposu re Rat e

• Feta diB^^Etn

‘ Field Gaana E xposure Rate
Carrn Exposure in Water

* I AC -40 Samples Chly

§ KeaTy rains on D and E/l for Navajo apparently removed
a large fraction of the contamination frca the surface*

lO 1.4

1.2

1.39

best available copy

SAIN BRUNO FRC

CHAPTER 4
DISCU3SI0I

4,1 TECHNIQUES OF 1SASUR5KSNT

4.1.1 Introduction. During Operation RHJ3WIH3 a mrfccr of widely

different techniques were used to perform measurements on the fallout

f^eld. Sons of these techniques were particularly designed to provide

accurate analytical measurements. In core eased the techniques employed
are adaptable to the problem of a rapid survey of the radiological situa-
tion after the burst of a nuclear weapon in a military situation. The
purpose of the following discusrion is to describe briefly each general
technique and to rak e a necessarily preliminary and incomplete evaluation
of its role in the field tests and its possible application to military

situations. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

4.1. 2 Fell conic r-Probe Aerial Surrey . This technique involves a ra-
diation sensing probe suspended below a helicopter by a long cable. It
is particularly useful in acquiring accurate readings at a controlled dis-
tance above a land surface. In general, the readings correspond to measure-
ments by a rorvey instrument which has been band-carried to the location,
except that the dosage to the personnel has been greatly reduced by placing
them above end away from the field in the helicopter.

Over smooth terrain the readings probably give an accurate measure of
the density of active sources on the ground. However, th9 effective source
H a circle of rcdlc 350 to 500 foot, aM any terrain irresolarltlo.
would shield part of the source frees the instrument would cause the readings
to be low. The meter readings would still represent the dosage of personal

#°

r\ vr

f' ^ I.

131

n'ls

1 ©cited at that position, bat would cot be a measure of the surface density
of radioactive sources (curie/a^)*

l^io applicability of the technique to military situations la Halted
to obtaining readings at a fev critical locations la a fallout pattern* 1
Basil cleared area is required and the present design of probs la sot useful
ojar water* The accuracy of the measurement is greater than needed fbr a
complete survey and the tire Involved for the survey of an extensive fallout
area is too long*

£ f 1.3 Collection of Fallout .Sarnies , The direct collection of fallout
83rples is an essential part of the analytical pro gran at weapons effedts
tests. However, the question to be considered now is whether it is good
technique for evaluating the surface density of active material.

The laboratory measurements on fallout 8 ample s to determine their abso-
lute activity can be made vary accurately with fixed geometry counting tech-
niques. The main limitation is in the actual collection of the sample. The
requirements for the collector ere that it produce negligible disturbance in
the air flow pattern and that it retain any material impinging upon it.

These requirements mat be met over ell angles of incidence, corresponding
to various particle sizes, end for particle types varying from a fine aero-
sol to a dry dust. Further experimentation is needed to develop such ideal

collector.. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Clearly the collection of material is not a practical ratter under
opmretional military situations, since the collectors can not be placed
before the event and there is a long tire deity involved with recovery of
samples and transportation to an uncontsminated laboratory.

131

CD 14 S’; 4

LA.L Redleftfron -Readings on Shl^s Peck Surfaces . Ths deck surface of

the Ui'i represented a souroo field large enough that only a snail oorreo-
tlon vas needed to convert andsa* rate reading above the deck to an infinite
field reading, Hovover, prelininsry data indicate that the fine cerosol

t^pe of material does not readily collect on the deck surfaces and large dry
material nay be blown off. Therefore, such deck readings nay tend to be lev
and rust be correlated with other sources of data,

A. 1*5 Radiation Versus Depth .Profiles in the Ocean . When the nature of
the burst is such that most of the fallout activity will be dissolved in the
surface layer of ocean v a ter, the radiation versus depth profile is a very
useful technique for caking an absolute activity measurement, The observa-
tions during Operation CASHS and the present experiments indicate that most
of the activity re rains above the thercocllna (60 - 150 meters depth) for
periods of cany days and therefore is accessible to direct ceasurenont using
simply constructed probes. These readings ere calibrated in teres of
curies/m^ by analyzing water samples In a laboratory.

The limitations of this type of censure rent for land surface (island)
bursts, in which much of the activity is associated with sice able particu-
late, are still undetermined. From the measurements performed at Operation
RdDVXHJ it appears that at least half of the total deposited active material
remains in ths sot face layer, bat this fraction say vary greatly with posi-
tion, For example, the close-in high exposure rate areas may have cost of

the material, which is associated with the larger particles, disappearing

a-Co<- Irtd

below the tharnoclica. Since these areas only r opro e oat a

/ x Hi v. i‘

the total wee? on,’ this would not affect the conclusion above.

SAN

small portion of

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On# feature of the Beesurenonts tbit noods continuous csrefol chock is

tbe problen of probe eontaninatiott. Since the radiation lev's la in the
water ere invariably quite low, it is important to take sure
amount ©f activity deposited on tbe &f/e ct answer*

„ g^atatlaa <« tb > Snrfaoe'CceM] Liv-r . Vrelattrely

rapid aurroy of ocean fallout areas wa be made using a probe towed behind
a ship which bb a sure s the radiation field just below the water surface*
Interpretation of these readings in tones of total fallout mtorial in-
volves the assunption of an average depth of nixing > guided by the results
of the radiation versus depth profiles. This technique must therefore be
applied with care, particularly in regions of recent fallout end regions
where fallout was in the fora of large particulate.

£. 1.7 Radiation Readlnre in Air-Over the Ooeaq . Radiation readings
taken in an airplane flying above contaminated ocean water, when corrected
for the absorption of the air, Erasure the concentration of ectivity in
the surface layer of water and, therefore, are subject to the limitations
discussed in Section 4.1.6. In addition, the readings at practical flight
eltitudcs ( >300 feet), represents averaging over an area whose radios is
cf the order of 1,000 feet, and therefore this rsthod must be used with
core in areas of high gradients in the radiation field. However, the sur-
vey con be performed faster than that performed by a surface vessel and
therefore can outline the fallout pattern in a short tine.

In performing these aerial surveys it is important that tbs aircraft
arrive over the fallout area after the radioactive material has ceased to
cone down* A relatively small encunt of contamination alighting on the

SAN

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/sy

n s

aircraft can easily cask the radiation free the water surface, becmsc
the water greatly dilutes the radioactive sources*

/.l. 8 Radiation Readln?s in Air Oyer fond . During Operation R3DWHB
the technique of taking radiation readings In an airplane flying over

land was not used extensively because of the snail amount of land area

1 •

present* This method has been used for tests at the Hevada Test Site*

The principal limitation ofthis technique is in the region of high
fields, and associated large gradients* Since the readings do represent
averages over sizeable areas the features of the pattern will be smeared
out over distances of the order of 1,000 feet* Furthermore, over irregu-
lar terrain the airplane nay be forced to fly higher than 300 feet end
beneo average over a slightly larger area*

Contamination of the aircraft must again be avoided, although the
problem is not as critical as it Is on a survey over water* On the other
band, the higher readings from the land increase the problem of dosage

to the aircraft crew* BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The aerial survey system is applicable to practical military situa-
tions 3 In co it does roughly outline the areas denied to personnel opera-
tions in a fairly short time* Eouever, care must still be taken because
local hot spots in the field may be smoothed cot by the s ur ve y, which
could nevertheless inflict serious dosages on personnel*

Readings taken by helicopters hovering at lew altitudes above land
surfaces feave been used principally in the RadSafe surveys during g^ bruThO FRC
Operation KSDVUJj* Apart from the slight decrease in dosage to personnel
compered with ground operations, this method has additional merit when
used over rough terrain* If it is desired to evaluate the density of

active sour cos, rather than the dosage to personnel at a particular loca-

tion,, a retor held at a moderate altitude Is less likely to he shielded froa
part of the source field than one hold at 3 feet over the ground. Before
such methods are used for accurate work, however, It vill he necessary to
perforn careful altitude absorption calibration experiments.

t , ' '

^ilil Droppable Radiation Detector -Telen? tor Units . A technique which
has b en tested unsuccessfully at Operation TEAPOT and Operation HEDVIHG,
hut which has prorise if further developed is one involving the use of a
radiation detector and te lens tor unit which cm be dropped onto a contami-
nated area. Tie radiation readings are then received at the drop eir craft
which can retire far enough away to be out of the Intensive radiation.

This technique Is particularly applicable to measuring the intense
fields nerj* the crater fron a nuclear burst. It Is United to a number
of data points equal to the nnrbor of detsctor-telenater units available.

The fact that the equipment can continue to send information over a long
period of tine makes it particularly useful for field tests since it
supplies decay as well as instantaneous exposure rate data#

At R3DWIB5, this technique was known cs the *Beeeh Ball Project* and
was undertaken as an effort Incidental to that of a major project aid
lack of results shcnM not be used as the basis for prejudice against

this B * ST AVAILABLE COPY

4.2 tDITAII 0:3 OF KSUKIMBI Oil* SA _ N BRUNO IRC

/.2.1 Introduction . This presentation of preliminary data end the

ensuing discussion were completed only a few weeks after the last event
In Operation RED .-/KG. Therefore, it is to be reemphasised that the data
are subject to large changes and their interpretation cay also be altered

when the. Anal reduction of the date la coi^^te. However, the rc suite

of the fallout program are of military irpartanco Irocdlately, and it ie

to he hoped that the errors introduced Iff presenting preliminary end
possibly incorrect data will be more than compensated by the advantage*

of having a preliminary picture available et an early tine. It is the

\ 1 ,

purpose of the following discussion to evnlua to the sources of additional
data and the tost probable recalibrations which will be provided by the
data in tbs Program 2 projects' final reports. The fact that the data is *
preliminary end some changes can bo anticipated with tine should not be
construed to roan that a fairly good picture of the fallout problem in
operational situations is not available et this tine.

L .2.2 Radiation i'eagurenonta in the Ku clear -£!«•*£■ . As discussed in
Section 3.1. 1.2, the preliminary data on exposure rate versus position in

(-‘rv —

the nuclear ©lead is subject to large chmge3 - primarily from the follow-
ing sources* (1) The identification of a radiation record with a particu-
lar rocket may be changed. If this be cons a necessary, a major change in
the positions of the readings will result. (2) A redeterrinatlon of the
zero tire on the traces is likely to shift the radiation readings along
the trajectory. (3) He calibration of similar detectors, particularly in
high radiation fields, will probably indicate a nonlinearity in the re-
sponse curve, which may change the values of the higher readings. (4) The
trajectory data will probably be changed slightly.

^.2.3 Land Surface Readings . The land surface readings ere probably
subject to the least change compared to the remainder of the data* The ^ ■gjCCNO
principal changes will core about in the use of experimental decay corves,
or at least theoretical decoy curves boned on the manured capture to

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C : 3j ip : ^

* V

fission ratio, rather than the simplified f^^cnd t - ^*^ ro la t ions hips.

1^2. L Veter Survey Readings . The water surrey readings will be sub-
ject to major re calibrations based on on analysis of the observed depths
of penetration as a function of tine after arrival end position in the

t .

fallout pattern and on absolute counting of the water samples* The aver-

i .

age depths of penetration used In this report represent at best a method
of presenting the data in a relative fashion Indicating the rough nagnl-
tude of the contamination* When such a re calibration is performed the
calculation of the total material observed, and hence the fraction of the
weapon locally deposited, cm be performed in a significant fashion* At
present such a calculation serves only to demonstrate that the readings
are of the correct order cf magnitude, and even a comparison of the weapon
fractions between different events is doubtful.

Preliminary mo usurers nts on Teva fallout made at R-DL has demonstrated
a large variation of solubility rate and ganua spectra with time of con-
tact with water (reference 30 ) * Complete analysis of varioos factors,
including variation of particle size with distance from g r ou n d zero end
dependence of settling rate on particle size and solubility, in required
to establish a fully reliable set of contours*

4 . 2 . 5 Aerial Survey Readings . The aerial survey readings are subject
to the same re calibrations discussed in Section 4*2*4 and in addition rust
be ro corrected for the air absorption. Absorption experiments performed

at Operation FJ5D7HD and come theoretical calculations should provide the

c\N BRUNO PB- C

basis for this re calibration* ^

Z.2.6 Sarnie Readings. The relative radiation levels derived from

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ample roadinja ara probably subject to the largest changes. Aside ftoo

the problem of collection efficiency, the values toed In this preliminary
report represent cruda monitor readings of the eagles measured In stand-
ard geometry situations, but under conditions of appreciable background
radiation. Only the careful analysis end counting, done later in the
continental laboratories, can correctly determine the relative fields end
can, in addition, fhrnish the absolute surface density of active mater i ala.
4.3 blSTuIBUTIOK OF ACTIVITY IB TK2 STABILIZED CLOT)

4.3.1 Introduction. There is no strong reason to expect the distribu-
tion of activity in the stabilized cloud to be a function of the geological
environment of the burst point, and no experimental evidence to indicate
any such phenomenon. Therefore, the observations on all the documented
shots will be discussed together, keeping in mind that for comparison
purposes the readings should he divided by the fractional radiological
yield to be reduced to the cordon basis of a 100 percent flsrion veapon.

4.3.2 Rocket Keasurerpnts . The rocket exposure rate teasir* rents

indicate that the active material is aot distributed uniformly through the
cloud. As a matter of fact, if the material were distributed proportion-
ally to the cir density, the re slings should be constant in the cloud and
th*s is not the case. The individual exposure rate traces generally indi-
cate a rapid peaking end subsequent decline while the rocket is still with-
in the visible cloud. Therefore, as demonstrated particularly in Figures
3.2 j, £s3a, *3 =s22r, and most of the activity is probably in a thin

layer, which is prd&eSsty located just above the base of the visible xsiafe-

SAS BKLTSO FRC

best available copy

Ate kadial variation is also interesting, There la sees evidence
for ^slight decrease In concentration at tbs center (above the eten) ,
a peaking at a distance of about one -third of tho visible cloud radius,
and a subsequent decrease to the outer regions where the concentration
appears to be about one quarter of its peak value* Crudely spoating,

V ,

tbs active material appears to bo concentrated as a n washer* with sore
material of lesser activity spread Into tho rest of the visible cloud.

The United observations in the stem indicate peak activity concen-
trations leas than those directly above in tho dead by a factor of ten
or core* The radiological stem has dimensions no larger than the visible
stem* Therefore, in view of the relative volumes, sn inappreciable
amount of material exists in tho stem at the altitudes observed*

A. 3.3 itanood Aircraft Veasurencntg * The actual exposure ratos
measured by the aircraft penetrations were in general lower than those •
calculated from the rocket data at the ermo altitudes* The reason for
this discrepancy is not yet clear* Of course, no aircraft penetrations
wore performed as early as the rocket flights on these events, hut previous
experience with the penetrations does indicate the decay extrapola-

tion of the aircraft data to be en overestimate, if anything.

The observations of the eir craft in the stem support the conclusion
that the concentration of activity is small compared to that in tho c wfc-
r ooa i' top . These flights, as well as the rocket data, only draw this con-
clusion for the tipper parts of the stem at the times involved* They shed^
no .light on the question of heavy particulate which eight have fallen be-
fore tho observations were made, cr for the part of the stem be lew 25,000

***• BEST AVAILABLE COPY

A.3»A _7.allout .Pattern Irrigations . At present no complete analysis of

the fallout radiation pattern in terns of the p article fall plot and the
finite cloud dine ns ion have boon performed, However, some preliminary con-
clusions can be drawn from the data* It ebould be noted that tbs H/L hour

exposure rate at a particular point should be determined roughly by tbs

, %
t

activity in the initial cloud associated with the height and particle size
intervals which encompass the point on the particle fall plot, divided by
the area between the corresponding height and particle size lines on the
plot* Therefore, whenever the height lines cone dose together there
should be an enhancement of the radiation field doe to the wind structure
and not because of any properties of the initial cloud* A limit to the
above statement is iqplied by the finite horizontal dimensions of the cloud,
which spread the activity over a minimum area even if there So no shear

in the wind structure* BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The following features of the fallout radiation pattern appear from a
cursory inspection combined with the particle fall plots

a* The outer boundary of significant fallout seems to be at approxi-
mately the 60 micron line* Eovover, the area tip to the^micron line is
subject to such low activity concentrations arriving at late times that
it is not of concern in military operations*

b* The effective cloud diameter for the larger particles must be
smaller than the visual cloud diameter to explain the rapid decrease of
contamination on islands in the upwind and crosswind directions. A* care-

ful activity versus particle size analysis for the land station samples

SAN BRUNO IRC

will be needed to establish this effect quantitatively.

o. Large particles fir an ths lower stem region tny produce very in-
tense Eradiation areas a few piles downwind firon the shot point* The Zuni
Shot gave no indications of this effect, hit all the barge shots produced
heavy contamination on Sites Able and Charlie* This contamination oould
‘ not be erossvind deposition from the cloud, because Site Bov. which vas

iOr

almost an equal distance in an opposite direction Seen Bavajo and Flathead,
as veil as the XFUB barge Which vas closer, did not sbov these high read-
ings.

d* The most significant fallout oozes from the base of the nuclear
cloud. The “hot line 1 ’ in the pattern invariably fell in the direction
corresponding to 50-60 thousand foot lines* The concentration of altitude
lines due to the wind reversal at these altitudes is not enough to explain
the magnitude of the effect* Furthernore, the regions that received fall-
out from higher parts of the cloud vere contaminated to a small extent.

For exarple, on event Teva a part of the 75-80 thousand foot fallout actu-
ally fell on Enivetok Atoll, hut did not produoe enough contamination to

warrant evacuation. BEST A VAS L ABLE COPY

4.4 CHARACTERIZATION OF FALhCfffT KAHRIAL

4.4.1 Introduction . Only fragmentary information on activity versus
particle site distributions vas available at the early date of this report.

Kcst of the data on the particle sizes at various positions in the initial

cloud will cone from analysis of the intermittent fallout collector sarples

In Which the particle size and tine of arrival can he correlated to a FRC

unique position in the cloud. Since this information met oone from mare

detailed analysis, only preliminary data as gathered froa the correlation

between the fallout radiation plot end the particle fall plot can be dis-
cussed here.

The ohomical and radiophynical analyses of the fallout material are
also natters for continental laboratory Vjrk* However, the resulting data
will d3al mainly with fractionation and henoe with theories of fomation
of tho active material* At present, it is not possible to include these
theories into fallout model calculations in any significant fashion*

Fractionation nay affect the radiation dosage through its codification of
the gaisa energy spectrum and the decay curve, but such effects ere not
veil onough known to be incorporated now*

The physical cppeer&noe and chemical nature of the fallout has been
roughly evaluated at the land stations and in the TAG 40 laboratory. Fur-
ther data on other samples are being produced in the h'ne laboratories.

For example* as stated in pnrapraph 4*2*4, Bone inforoition bos already
been developed on the ch exact ~ris tics of particle solubility in a Zone
of Interior laboratory,

4*4.2 L-nd Surface Burst . Tie data on the pcrticulate matter far land
surface barrt3 presented in this report is applicable only to lend consist-
ing of coral with nearby salt water* Therefore, some of the conclusions may
have to be modified when discussing bursts over other, more usual, types of

ground, BEST AVAILABLE COPY

A oixscry inspection of tho psrticle fall plots end fallout rediation
plots for Zuni and Teva indicates that the cost intense regions ere associ-
ated with particles in tbs 100-200 rdcrcn sice range. The LaCrosse plots brUNO FR.C
indicate that the activity on the surface appears to increase when going

00148 -;!}

fron 350 toward 200 micron particles, although the flocanoctation did not
extend* to the sizes below 250 microns, Since the intense pattern to the
ve3t of leva appears to be short, any Important lover stem activity is
probably associated with very large particles#

Xn general, the fallout material fron the land surface bursts vas
quite dry, even though there vas an appreciable amount of vator in the
enviroment of the shot point# The bheaical nature of the material vas
in general modification of ooral, namely CeCO^ t Ca(0B)2, and sore CaO.

Usually other materials present near the shot point also appeared in the
fallout, e,j., the iron in the LaCrosse event#

Z f Z.3 Air Burst . The Cherokee Shot at Operation E3DWIB 1 represented
an air burst over voter# The extensive survey of the downwind areas sub-
sequent to this detonation established that the fallout radiation levels
wore not of military importance for this type of burst# Clearly the fission
product material must have become associated vith particulate so snail that
the local fallout vas negligible. In this case the problem has become one
of the uorld-vide contamination type and therefore is beyond the scope of

this report# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The requirement still remains to evaluate the contamination from a
megaton yield weapon detonated under minimal sir burst conditions over land#

To date it has been established that air bursts of kilo ton yield weapons
above land and megaton yield weapons over water do not produce significant
local contamination. Hcwever, the probability that an air burst of a nega-

uTVONQ frc

ton yield weapon over land produces contamination is MJaa^e after the SAIN *>* 1
Cherokee test as it vas before# The reason is that the mechanisns discussed
in Section 1.2.3 by which such a burst oould produce local contamination

A not apply to a burst Above water, If aurfaoa mtorlsl (sea, water)

from Cbfcrotoe bad csujbt up with the fireball in time to bars the fission

products deposited on it, the voter would have undoubtedly evaporated.

Re condensation of tbe water, if it occur ed at all, would probably be In

the fora of very snail droplets which would not be locally deposited.

. . *
Therefore, it cay be unlikely that hursts of a megaton yield weapon

over land produce significant local coot aninat ion, hut it Is possible and
the Cherokee test does not negate such a possibility.

t J-.L Kater Surfac* Burst . The effective pertiole size for voter
surface bursts appear to be much the ears as for land surface bursts,

.Again the intense regions of the fallout pattern soon to be associated
with 100-200 micron materiel. Furthermore, tbe eton region to the vest
seems to havs the Sane character as for lend surface bursts*

One extra phenomenon which cun easily occur in this type of shot is
a tiuo disnge of the effective size of a particle (droplet). As water
evaporates or condenses on tbe drop it could fall according to various
different sizes as it' cones down. In addition, ice partioles which re-
sult from frozen drops will have different fall characteristics than the
dr op a, Sublimation of ice partioles will el so introduce variations.

Phenomena of this nature could introduce majeor modifications into the
particle fall plot, which present knowledge has no v^y to predict.

The u a t u gj s rajf -fehy material from water surfaoa shots scens to be pre-
dominantly salt. Tub very high concentration of salt may Imply a large _

SAN BRUNO IRC

degree of evaporation has taken place d’.iring the particle's travel earth-
ward. The actual activity seers to be associated with a very small
nucleus amidst this slurry type salty droplet.

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In general it eppoars that tho prediction of fallout from water sur-
face bursts cm be node using similar perenoters to these for lard but-

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face bursts.

f '^v

4.5 RELATIVE AREAS CF CONTAMINATION

Z.5.1 Introduction . The characteristic dimension a of a fallout pattern.*

e.g.. downwind distance. cro38wind distance, etc. will depend quite markedly

on the existing wind profile. Tor example, a w'nd profile having vory little

directional shear and strong velocities would be expected to produce a long,

cigar shaped^, pattern whereas the high shear situation which is common in the

Pacific Proving Ground produces a wider and shorter pattern. If the^e is

any hope of characterizing the fallout region by any parameters character-
ed ft*

istic of the weapon^ and relatively independent of the wind conditions, thtr
parameter/ he the areas enclosed hy the various radia-
tion contours. In particular, the internal of the E/l hour exposure Tates

y Itr**** y ’ v

over tea areamssat he characteristic of the detonation only, a it repro- -

fahs T ' ‘fyfo a „ *

sents the^radiological yield Which has been deposited l*'--*- C/^-Le

Z.^.2 r achrround . The only^v^nts previous to Operation FSTWIIJC on which

sufficient fallout information was available to infer areas of contours were

the j ANGIE surface shot and some of the Operation CASTLE events. Of the

latter ones, the CASTLE Eravo surface shot contours have only been predicted

from an analysis of the winds with some normalization from sparse data points.

The water survey data from Shots Yankee and hector, Operation CASTLE, yielded

contour area data for vater surface (barge) shots. For reference, these data

have been summarized in Table 4.1

SAN BRUNO ERG

TABt* *.l SOW-iRI Of RKEVIOSS SHOTS' EIKG'JK RATS COHTCTO AREAS

(

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BOTE* *Referenoe 10*
#Referenca 11.

SAN BRUNO PRC

/ST

Go; i ° ’> 4

r r% -•

The above contour areas, except the JANGLE eurface data, vere multiplied
by a factor of 4/3 and presented on the plot of Figure 4*1 of area versus one
hour exposure rate. The factor was desired to normalise all data to a hypo-
thetical 100 percent radiological yield weapon. TCie predicted contour areas

for 50 KT, 500 FT, and 5 MT bursts from Feference 29 have also been indicated

on Figure 4.1.

An estimate of the radiological yield accounted for by the fallout data
can be derived by a rough numerical integration of the exposure rate over the
area. (See Appendix D).

4.5.3 REDWING Results . The data on the areas of the contours drawn froa
the preliminary data of this report have been presented in Table 4.2. These
data from the two land surface shots, Zuni and Tewa, and the two water surface
shots, Flathead and Navajo, have also been presented in Figure 4.2. For the
figure, the radiation levels vere in all cases]

jpns

weapon. A C0NT0URS ^EXTRAPOLATED FRTi PRELIMINARY P AT A AND MUST RE ISED WITH

CAUTION ^ c £. ytrv C-/ o/- dL+Jt

/<?, -yhit Set*/ -/a/? *

IjfjL Ten Hour Exposure Areas . The ten hour exposure areas are not of

direct significance to fallout models, but are of primary concern in the
military effects of fallout. The relative areas of the various contours have
been listed in Table 4.3 for the four P.31WING shots on which the Program 2
projects gathered complete fallout data. The data have also been plotted in
Figure 4.3» where the exposure values have been normalized to a 10QT radio-
logical yield weapon. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

4. *>.5 Comparison . In general the differences of the contour areas between
the are

v v ■** n

SAN BRUNO FRC

nificant in view of the approximate

HUS'!

ary data reduction.

DATA

0 J1 U Q •) f;

Area , sq mi

— V ’ * C ■ -T - - # • ---.-7WV ;:-ir ^

• 4

TABLE 4.2 BUKHARI 0? EXPOSURE RAJS OORTOUR AREAS, OFIRATIOH REDWII&*

EEUS1®

i ROE i § Very doubtful - represents rough estimate of
boundary of fall cut pattern.

* COT X R ARIAS IIXE1APOUTED FROM FRCLEIKARX DATA
AID !DST El F3"D WITH CAUTION.

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SAN BRUNO EEC

IABI$ 4.3 SUMMARY OF TSH BXJR EXPOSURE 00KT0UR AREAS, OffiRAXIOM REDWING*

NO IE i •CONTOUR AREAS SXTRAPOUT D FROM rRELMKARX DATA AND
MUST BE USED WITH CAUTION.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

In particular the curve for Jlavajo is probably too high, becaure the

and the resultant low activities in the outer regions of the

fallout area, caused the background radiation levels from previous shots to
have an appreciable effect* Since in the prerent data reduction the pre-shot
background radiation was not subtracted, the contour areas as presented are .
probably too large.

Comparison betveen the values predicted on Page 97 "Capabilities of Atamio
Weapons," Reference 29 and those measured in these experiments is more uncer-
tain than a comparison betveen events, because any errors in the al
conversion factors nay efflntribr rtt r~uppreola^ ly» In general, the met

contour areas are larger than the predicted values. However, an error in
the conversion from radiation measurements in the water to the calculated
value over an equivalent land surface could have this effect. laboratory work
be'ng perfomed at present ^aa well as more complete data reduction^ should
rerolve the questions about conversion factors.

Ho comparison betveen experiment and prediction of croesvind distance,
downwind distance, and ground zero circle diameter can be made at this tine.
Some of these distances are quite sensitive to the actual wind conditions.
Since the wind profile which usually existed on shot days at the Pacific

Proving Cround^f jg not typical of the continental winds, there would be no
significance to such . ccnpariscn.BEST AVAILABLE COPY

4.6 EXAMPLES CP FALLOUT PAT ERHF IH THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES SAN BRUNO FRC
4.6.1 Introduction . To perform an acciirate prediction of the fallout
pattern from a burst at a particular location, a complete analysis of the
REDWING rata in terms of a fallout prediction model should be performed, which

would then be applied to the calculation of the fallout from the as sinned wind
profile* However, the accuracy of the preliminary data does not Justify such
a detailed analysis In the limited time available for the preparation of this
report. Therefore the patterns have been constructed from the following
assumptions!

a* The assumed weapon was a 5 WT total yield land
surface burst.

b. The ten hour exposure contours had the same areas as those observed
for Teva.

c. The location of the ten hour exposure contours was chosen to represent
an estimate of the relative positions in the fallout pattern* The contours
around ground zero were slifbtly distorted and reproduced with the same
area. The outer boundary of the pattern was determined by the particle fall
plot expanded by a cloud diameter of 30 miles in the small particle size areas,
and by about 5 miles around ground zero. The center of the downwind maximum,
which clearly occurred for both Zuni and Towa, was chosen at the 50,000 foot,

100 micron point in ths particle fall plot. The effect of the strong non-
shear wind pattern on the continent is to displace this maximum about ISO-

200 miles downwind, although during the tests it was approximately 50-100
miles from ground zero. A detailed model calculation will he needed to verify
this position. Actually the entire area between ground zero and this maxinun
will probably receive a lethal dose for personnel exposed for 10 hours to the

fanout. BEST AVAiLABLE COPY

SAN BRUNO FRC

/.f.2 Conrarlson of Wind Profiles . The wind profile which was incorporated

into the particle fall, time of arrival, and fallout plots given in Chapter 3

was generally as follows! wsterly winds (Trades! up to 20-25,000 feet

with speeds of 10 to 20 knots. South westerly winds (Vos ter lies) to 50-

55,000 feet with speeds of 20-30 knots, and then turning through the south
to the uppnr Easterlies with speeds Increasing from 15 to 80 knots with
altitude* The two major shear areas (20-25,000 feet and 50-55,000 feet)
appear to be typical of mid -Pacific torrid latitudes. Ob the other hand,
the I'd lied States and most of Europe lie In temperate latitudes which are
characterized by winds generally from the west which have little direction-
al shear. Consequently there will be a different shape to the fallout
pattern under these conditions. For illustration, representative winter
winds have been selected to distribute the fallout from hypothetical

1 surface bursts at Washington, P. C. and *"anta Monica, California.

/.6.3 Washington. P. C, and the Fast Coast . Figure 4.4 is taken with
ground zero at the Pentagon Puildlng. The fallout patterrr^encompasces a
good portion of the District of Columbia, Arlington County, Virginia and a
few small cities such a6 Alexandria, Va., Annapolis, Ml., Cover, Del., and
Atlantic City, W.J. , .covering an area of 7,000 square miles (of land and
Delaware and Chesapeake Pays) and a population of 1,900,000. Of these people
900,000 will receive fallout which will be lethal tolall exposed personnel
(ten hour exposure of 500 r). In close, (6-10 mile radius) of course^ there
is a compounding of blast, thermal, and radiological effects which will produce
casualties, and only the area outside of this region should be considered in
evaluating casualties frcn fallout alone. BBUNO ERC

Ij/ contour dimensions extrapolated fp.cm frelikikart data and mist m USED

WITH 'XTPEME CAUTION. _

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

NEW "YORK

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SCALE OF MILE*

0 10 20 SO 40 BO «0 TO

OCt AM'TY

ffcr. i.A Washington, D. «. Ton lWttoo#. Catgir. Pro

RKDVTUO Sxpftriftno#* A w T fae# n*~~

4 t mmmvrnmA with ft rwpwmnXtCQjrn winter wind ■tructur*. Contour
v»loftft *It*h IB T. EXTR1U>0LI^1«LIHWAR1 DATA. USE WITH

*- ? r

An examination of Figure l *4 will show that over 50? of the potential

casualty producing region falls in the TJorth Atlantio Ocean. Therefor® it
is certainly possible to construct examples in which the entire fallout

region will encompass populated areas.

It is interesting to speculate on the patterajhy lese representative
winds, for example with the pattern moved yfi counterclockwise so that the
250 r ten hour exposure 0 on tour extends well past Philadelphia, Pa., Rev
York City, and through Connecticut,

j /

The pattern Q®*as=5te§3 has the following areasr*'

a. A lethal area 200 miles long, 10 miles vide which has a total
area of 1700 square miles.

b. A Bickness area 350 miles long, 15 miles wide which has a total
area of 3P00 square miles.

e. An area of biological concern 500 miles long, 30 miles wide,
which has a total area of 12,030 square mile3.

If the weapon chosen for illustration was of the same total yield tut
had a small fission J^eldlBM^Hthen the pattern would have!

a. A lethal area 25 miles long, 5 miles wide which has a total
area of 90 square miles. This area only protrudes slightly beyond the

area of major bomb damage. BEST available copy

b. A sickness area 42 miles long (probably in two parts), 14 miles
wide, which has a total area of 450 square miles.

SAT* BRUNO I» c

1./ Ten hour exposure values are chosen as follows! Lethal - 500 r, sickness -
250 r, biological concern - 50 r. These terms refer to the effect on

e. An area of biological concern 350 miles long, 15 miles vide.

vhi^h has a total area of 3,800 square miles*

Z.fe.4 Southern California Area . Figure 4.5 has been drawn with the ground

£*ro at Santa Monica, California. The pattern takes in nearly all of the
1 1 ‘ -

Metropolitan Los Angeles area and a number of smaller cities to the East South
^ast. A lethal dosage to exposed personnel would have been delivered to an
area inhabited by approximately 4^ million people. In this example, the

downwind maximum area fortunately coincides with a desert area Forth of the

Salton Sea and will contribute very little to the casualties. The areas
involved are comparable to those discussed in Section 4.8.3. Again the winds
have essentially no directional shear and therefore the pattern appears as
a very long, narrow area of contamination.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

**'

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Fifw 4.5 Boutharn California
WSTWIWD Raparlanea

*mr* Estimated fro*

anrfaca burnt is anmnad

rfcruotum* Contour mluae plv«n
r4. OSS WITH CAUTIOI.

CHAPJSH 5

COHCLUSIOIJS AJJD REC0J3CEDATI0B3

5 ♦! C0HCUJSI0H3

-'r Tbs foliating general conclusions are considered applicable to the

Hi ,

experiments reported in this preliminary reportl

W, .

1* The fallout program successfully accomplished its mission of
documenting the activity levels in the nuclear mshroom and the fallout
pattern and collecting fallout materials*

2* The data gathered in the field and subsequent laboratory analyses
vill supply the material for extensive calculations of fall cr ’t prediction
models.

3# The concentration of activity in the stabilised nuclear cloud
appears to be more dense in a layer near the bottom of the cloud than it
is in the upper areas. The most intense contours from a 5 K1 surface
buret apparently originate from approximately 100 micron diameter parti-
cles at 50,000 feet elevation^ ’■'fti < rc«<v e H Oj£
ta tc & /_ c(oud.

4. The concentration of activity near 30,000 feet in the stem of the
mushroom from a 5 IT burst is less than 3 percent of the concentration in

the cloud, BEST AVA 8 LABLE COPY SAS BRUNO FRO

5. The techniques used for land, aerial, end oceanographic survey vere
successful. Some of these techniques can be applied to military situations.

6. laboratory analysis of water samples and careful analysis of pene-
tration of activity in the ocean will probably provide the basis for an
accurate fission and activation product materiel balance. An estimate of
the amount of active material remaining in the upper etro sphere can be
mads subsequently.

7. Within the accuracy of this preliminary data, the fallout exposure

*+-*• &>y-UT +: >.

rate produced! byyr weapon of a fci^asn yield^ls proportional to the fractional
radiological yieldf,

8. The effectiveness of the various fallout survey techniques was
greatly enhanced by the coordination provided by the Porgram 2 Control Center.

9*. The preliminary data indicates that a VHHQHflHIH B urf &c *
burst would deliver lethal dosages to exposed personnel over an area in excess
of 1500 square miles.

10. Exposure rateB in excess of 10,000 r/hr at H/l hour were present
in the vicinity of the crater of the Mohawk event.

11. A minimal air burst over water produces no fallout of military
significance.

5.2 RECCrJKEHDATIOKS

The only recommendation made on the basis of this preliminary data is to
U"E CQJJTODF INFORMATION WITH CAUTION.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SAN BRUN° FRC

APKJT.ilX A

y ~ Js S CisT- ZJ^t, C (;.*+£ ■*-'s r A> 7~/C ”V~ /• 7\V C -7./

PROJECT 2.X

• Title* Gmem. Exposure 7ersus Diatci^e, HR /Z / & m

PjQJSCT 2.2

\ . Title! G&maa Exposure Rate Tersua Tine, 138 {2lL *

Project Officer! Kr. Peter Brown.

Agency* Srana Signal Laboratory (3SL).

These projects placed film packs and doaiEstars throughout Bikini
Atoll and aboard a narber of the float stations. Sons of the stations
vare also instrurented with an ion chamber and recording dcvico to doca-
rent the radiation exposure rate as a function of tine. The initial radi-
ation measurements also made by these projects have cot been considered in
this report.

PP.OJPC? 2 61

BEST AVAIL ABLE COPY

Title* Rocket Determination of the Activity E is tribatica Within the
Stabilised Cloud, HR A?/£ ! 1

Project Officer! Kr. Richard R. Soule.

Agency! C.S. Havsl Radiological Defense Laboratory (Etf>L)*

l.jC-i KRUNO FRC

Ion chamber detectors end telemeter transmitters were noon ted in the

beads of kwh rocket propelled Atmospheric Sounding Projectiles (ASP).

Tb ss ‘3 rockets were than flown through the nuclear cloud (end stem) frcaa
shots CHSROESR, SRUI, SATAJO, and TSTJA end the telemetered exposure rate data
was received and recorded at duplicate stations aboard the BSS ETiDSOH
(AH) 101) end HAS Island in Bikini Atoll.

PROJECT 2.62

^Title* Pelloat Contocrs by Cctfinographic AxrJLyois, HR /

Project Officer t ft*. Pocnaa D. Jennings.
f P Agency* Scripts Institution of Oceanography (SIO).

^ ? , The lagoon end ocean felloat areas *>ere eurreycl ualng cn LCO, two
destroyer escorts, cud the occejcgropHie snrvey vessel Y.ff EORIZOff.

The su r v eys Included rudiEtlon Intensity real! ngs la the vn'-cr os cr the

surface and Intensity vnms depth profiles. The effect of voter cur-
rents end the location of tin th&rooclloe va 3 deternfnei using data
fron a prcXFgRORRl eeesme T-pi!.ic surrey. Tills project .also vas respon-
sible for the scoring sod servicing of the skiff err ’7 vhlch v?s located
in the deep ccesn north of DiMnl. The eldffs vere Inctmrcntcd fear
fallout collection, tiro of arrival, total exposure, and r~te cf pene-
tration of the activity in the vatcr reesurerorts, S'jiifjrnt fer the

uoasurenert of depth of penrtrstian of activity in ocean water woe also

placed aboard the TAG y) and TAG 40 »

project 2.63 best available copy

Title* Character ir.?tinn of Fallout* ITR C^12.*

Project Officer* Dr. Terry Trlffet.

Agency* E. S. Ecvsl Radiological Defense Laboratory (JBDL).

SAN BRl'NO FRC

This project provided the majority of collectors and detectors
pieced aboard the floating collection stations. Complete inotnrneata-

tion, including iacreacastal sad total collectors, exposure rate record-
ers, .’nd total exposure Instruments, vers placed aboard the '.two TAG* 3 ,
am L3T, two TFT3 boxges mered in BlUri Lagcoc, and at the northern

(

end of H:v Island In Bikini Atoll, In addition. The YA3-40 had a
shielded laboratory In vhich radiation rate, alcroscopie, and epectro-
netrii nensursnants could be performed on the fallout samples as they
arrived. Total collectors, total exposure instruments, and tine of

/ T 3

arrival detectors vere placed aboard the deep moored skiffs provided by

* ^ ;

' Project 2*62, three pontoon rafts in Bikini Lagoon, and at Sites GE0R5E,
VILLI A?-', and CHARLIE In Bikini Atoll.

PROJECT 2.64

Title! Fallout location and Delineation By Aerial Survey, ITS

Project Officer* 1'r, Robert T, Cravesoa

Agency* Hev York Operations Office, U. S. Atomic Energy Carrdssion

(ktoo/aec) best available copy

P2V aircraft vere instrumented to measure garsr.a exposure rate and

flcnn over the ocean fallout areas to perform as rapid ar.d complete
a survey as possible. Calibration flights vith a spectrometer in a
helicopter and radiochemical analysis of vater samples vere performed
to reduce the data to' absolute intensities. Instrumentation for cross
correlation vas placed on the YA3-39 and YA3-40.
pnrjrCT 2.65

Titles land Fallout Studies, ITR A?/? . cjyp; pyriNO FRC

Project Officer* tr, Vsnfred Forgenthaiu

Agency* Chemical Varfars laboratories, A ray Chemical Center (CVl/ACC).

This project provided the primary land fallout collecting stations
and instrumented a number of islands in Bi kin i AtoU vith total and in-
cremental collectors. A small number of stations vere instrumented for

one * snail* shot at Enivetok, Ons renota oo Hector was located at

Ron^prik Atoll, 130 Bliss southeast of Bikini* The aenplea from the as
collectors vere subjected to radiophysical end radiochemical analyses
to detemine specific activity, particle sizes, distribution of activity

on and within the particles, chemical fractionation, etc. Seme instru-

i Vf..

mentatianves placed on a nurber of the floating stations fbr eorreln-

•€ M/>a<

tioa purposes. This project also Bade genna dose rate measurements on

Islands In both the Bikini and Enivetok Atolls by scans of a detector

which was lowered to the ground from a helicopter.

PROJECT 2.66

Titles Early Cloud Penetration, IFR /-?■? Q.

Project Officer* Colonel Ernest A* Pinson, BSAF.

Agency* Air Force Special uesposs Center, Air Research and
Development Corsaad (SWC/ARDC).

357-B aircraft, eorpletely ins trum ented exposure rate and total
exposure were flown for brief periods within the unclear clouds to ob-
tain personnel exposure and aircraft contamination data.

PROJECT 2.71 BEST AVAILABLE COPY
Title* Ship Shielding Studies, HR
Project Officer* Hr. Heins R Insert.

Agency* H. 8. Saval Radiological Defense Laboratory (HHDL) r

SAN FR

This project, while basically intended for ship shielding studies,
provided gasrn «oce rate infomation in conjunction with Project 2.63
on the ships in the region of fallout.

APiEIDH B

_ ('

C0HS3EUCTI0H OF PARTICLE 7 LL PLOTS

The construction of a particle fall plot begins vith the assurptioa of
a vertical line souroe of particles ate to ground zero# For the purposes of
the frograa 2 operational plots and those presented in thdsy constructions

•ft m

* ] 1 r '

were made for four particle sizes only* 75* ICO* 200* and 350 microns#

The wind velocity observed at a 5*000 feet interval was assured to re pro-
sent the average wind throughout the 5*000 feet leyer cantered at that
height. Therefore the wind velocity, multiplied by the tire a particular
particle tabes to fall through a 5*000 feet layer* gives the horizontal dis-
placement of the particle# The particle fall tines were calculated fron
eerodynardc equations* choosing a representative air density end viscosity
profile for the Marshall Islands atmosphere.

In constructing a pattern which neglects space and tire variation of
the wind profile, the static hodegreph is Best convenient. It can be drawn
simply by placing the displacement vectors end to end coman cing with the
Iciest altitude. The resultant line represents the locus along which the
given size particles fron ell altitudes arrive. The same procedure is re-
peated far each of the particle sizes. The locus of all p rticlos fron a
given altitude can then be sketched through the ind i v i du al points.

A tiro v aryi ng, analysis necessitates more labor. Since the winds at a
particular altitude change as particles frees different altitudes above g^ FRC

arrive* the sirple bodograph cannot be used. Th3 procedure of constructing
the actual projected trajectories must bo followed. This procedure involves
constructing a complete trajectory for each pcrticle size from each altitude .

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Th© sp boo variation can also be Included In this analysis.

Thg particle fall plots in this report hero boon constructed Including
tine and space variations whenever these had appreciable effects on the .
pattern.

For the purposes of fallout prediction, particularly as applied to the

problem of positioning Ships from the JYogrcm 2 Control Center (boo Section
2.3.6), the predicted winds were necessarily utilisod. Since the predicted
tire variation is even core uncertain than the predicted zero tine wind pro-
file, the forcer wan not included in the initiel analysis. Shot tiro and
later wind observations wore used in a tine varying analysis to reposition
fallout collecting ships until they received fallout and to direct the notion
of survey vehicles so as to avoid receiving direct fallout.

The position!^ of the fallout collecting ships t?se dote mined by assuo-
ing that the majority of the activity was in the lover third of the initial
cloud. The licit of interest is given by the 75 micron particles since
those fall at late tir es over vary large areas and have only a snail fraction
of the total activity associated with then. The tines of arrival end cessa-
tion of fallout vero calculated from the constructed pattern ead the particle
fall tine data, assuring the effective radiological cloud to have the di ces-
sions of the visible cloud except vfocn considering the larger particles. One
thousand micron dianeter particles wore assured to be present in only the
inner 10 percent end 500 rdcron particles in 50 percent of the cloud. This
assumption modified the close-in fallout to correspond to actual observations
at previous operations.

DtST AVdH ADi e /'Am#

SAI'i BUUjSO FRC

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

It vaS not neocssary In any of this vork to associate a specific activity

concentration vith each region of the cloud end particle else and hence to

deternine the actual radiation pattern# It is an aim of this report to pro-
*

sent data out of which such associations osn be node.

best

(

appeidh c

( RADIATICH COLTDRSIOH FACTORS

f r

For the purposes of the calculations la this report, certain conversion

i m

.factors vo re needed to reduce radiation data to a perron basis. The factors :

related to the conversion of garrn esposure rates hetvoen different dis-
tances fron the source have been calculated In Reference 31 and are eumar-
ized in Table Cl. The factors relating the observed exposure rates to the
density of active scurocs have also been derived In Referenoa 31 and ere
sunscrised In Table C2,

best AVAILABLE COPY

san BRUNO roc

TABIE Cl HEIGHT COITCERSIOH FACTORS FOR GA321A EXfOSUTS

Height Above Surface In Foot

i — -- - - -

10 i

100 !

250

500

1000

Factor to convert
reading above land
to height of 3 ft

1.4

1.7

2.2

3.1

5.2

Factor to convert
reading above water
to height of 3 ft j

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.5

2.2

6.2

Hotel For RadSafe aerial readings en additional factor of 1*5 was
found to be necessary to nornalise readings to Project 2,65
helicopter probe readings.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABD3 C2 C01.TGK5I0N OF ACTI7ITT DEESES TO EXPOSURE RATS

Volnro density of activity in water. 1 curio/te^

Exposure rate reading In water. ............. .0,6 r/hr

Exposure rate reading 3 ft above water. ..... .0.3 r/ktc

Voltne density of activity in air at STP, ...... 1 cjxixs/r?

Exposure rate reading in air. ...1200 r/hr

Surface density of activity On lend 1 c urte/s?

Exposure rate at 3 ft above land..... 6 r/hr

SAN BRUNO FRC

Appcnjn d

, INTERPRETATION OF EXPOSURE RATE VERSUS AREA PLOT

(

A plot of converted H/l hour exposure rates versus are* of contour e»
ooa tour on log-log paper is a particularly useful tool for analysing the
fraction of the weapon's fission products which has been deposited in the
local fallout pattern* It appears that such a plot can usually be fitted
by a straight line of slope -1 over a portion of the data, with the ex-
treme points falling below this line* In particular the predicted values
frcn Reference 29 fall on such a line for store than a factor of 100 in
area or exposure rate* This line on log-log paper represents a recipro-
cal relation between exposure rate and area* It has a particular sig-
nificance in terns of the integral of the exposure rate over the area*

For this reciprocal relationship the value contributed to the integral
by any particular range of exposure rates is the same as that contributed
by another range having the sere ratio of upper to lover values. There-
fore, cost of the material deposited will be associated with the part of
the curve that fits the line of slope -1, and a scalier portion with the
points that fall below this line* A crude estimate of the radiological
yield observed can thus be calculated by multiplying the area s 1 inter-
cept by the natural logarithm of the ratio of the upper and lower area
values for which the straight line makes a reasonable fit to the data*

For example, in Figure 4*1 the $ MT predicted .line ,Tnaa an intercept of

an intercept of

approximately 7:X 105 r/hr at an area of 1 square mile* The straight
line fits the prediction over areas covering a factor of 500* Therefore,
the integrated material corresponds t?EST AVAILABLE
7.5 X 105 log* 500 r 4.7 X 10* mi 2 r/hr,

Assuming a conversion factor of 1200 mi 2 r/hr per KT^^0^S^rtsa5| *
assumes 300 megacuries at K/l per KT), the

3.9 MT or 73 percent of the total yield. EKEF.6Y ACmJ$o4

3.9 W or 78 percent of the total yield* Lnz-

APPENDIX X

• ' \

\ -•>

t *> '

FRACTION OP SHOT ACTIVITT IN FALLOUT
For the purpose of checking «. number of parameters, the quantity of

radioactive material In the fallout areas were calculated and compared'

with the activity resulting from the fission yield of the bomb* The
normalisation factor used was 4000 n& 2 r/hr per KT of fission yield*.
This factor was derived by examining a draft of the Operation CASTLE
Project 2,7 report (Reference 32)*

The total activity encompassed by the CASTLE Shot 5 contours was
normalized to 1056 of the weapon's fission yield which was determined to
be Inside these contours by an absolute beta counting technique. The
percent of the total activity for REDWING shots is presented in Table
El* The percentage of activity values as given, must be accepted with
reservation since the errors and uncertainties in the decay exponents
and normalization factors can easily amount to factor's of 2*

best

MAILABLE COPY

SAN BRUNO FRC

TABUS EL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

\14

SAN BRUNO IRC

V ' 3

1* Ballou, IJB. end Brcaney, L*R*; Batare end Distribution of BepidaaX
Contarination II, Project 2.6c-2, Operation JfSOlE, VT-397, Jane 1952*

V* »

tl.i. Etval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, California,

S3CHJST, RESTRICTED DATA,

2. Hawaii, C.R.j Batura end Distribution of Residnal Contn&lmtion
I, Project 2.6>1, Operation JAHC-IB, WT-336, June 1952, Rational
Institutes ©f Health, Bethesda, Ksrylaad, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

3* Hobbies, Charles; Airborne Particle Studies, Project 2.5a-l,

Operation J-iniE, VIT-394, July 1952, Amy Chanical Center, Karylnud,
SECRET, RSSEUCZib DATA.

4. Sumary Report, Veapono Effects Tests, Operation J 'ivjDE, WT-414,
Sovczicr 1952, /rwi Force 3 Special Vespora Project, Vasbinpton, D,C. ,

ssokdt, ewoa w». BEST AVAILABLE COPY

5. Poppoff, I. G.,; Fallout Studies, Project 2.5«-2, Operation
J AEGIS, WT-315, B. S. llrTSl Radiclogicsl Defense Laboratory, Sen
Francisco, CrJLifcrnia, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

6. Lunrino, H.K. end Pcppoff, I.G. j Ccgtcxd.Es.tlca Patterns at
Operation J«GIS, D3*RDL-399, April 1953, D.S. Eaval Radiological

Defense Leborcicry, San Francisco, California, SLCRKT, RESTRICTED

»«*. , , / j //? y /-

/ / /) (//%••/** cv'-scf t c*/ tC'~\

7. ,■ ■- -7' v ' " j 4irr»rSBd£aiog^gsnrregeet8^

sk- /cl o' rO /. — /l /

Project 2.15-1, VT-»3?S, Operation JflKtB^

CSJ-C t-/ , i j-'ii (.*,

8. Fcrbcs, K.E.; Total Ganna Ra diet! on Dcssge, Project 2.3-1, Kf-331,

Operation JA5iIZ f Evans Signal Lsboratory, Fort Konaouth, Rev Jersey,

SAN BRUNO FRC

SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

9. Ccslrell, L.j Crzuu lindiutica an ft liincticn of Tira and Distsnca,
Project 2.1a, VT- 32?, Cpaxaticai JAJG.S, rational 3uresn of Standards,
i’dshiu^ton, D.C., S-CSfT, ISf-I&ICffiB DATA.

M.>'

■I ID, Ai't;d Fcrcc3 Special Vyajona Froject, Fallout Syu^osius, Jntruury

#|r

1955, An-.d Fesreja Specid Frojuct, tfasiiicjton, D.C., SBCfdT,

l£3EiICT£> DATA.

11. Greenfield, 3.!:., et el; Tx-ouspurt and 2 early Deposition of
Ariionciivo Debris Fran Atonic Da^plosions, 7.-2.Cj$-JZC t July 1754, The
Fund Corporation, fun to Verier, California, SSCfZT, ESSTP.ICTfD DATA.

11. lyiojiar, D.!..; Runioactivo Fallout Prar Aterde Eoa£b3, 5o7urf>er
1953, fir leseurd. and lev-lop: uni Cca-xnl, Dultlr._rc, l_ryl_ni, S3CTXT,
FuSTr'ICItj DATA.

13. >Djt..\? 11, R.j £ diocheuicul Studies of Bur-^e Far tides, Project
2.5&-3, VT-333, Operation JA!*5IS, Ate/ reeled Center, I’esllnjtcn, D.C.,

r-CHIT, M3’;.UCT.JD data. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

14. : -lec3, C.T., et all Fte Suture of Individual uadi on olive Particles
I. Surf-ce end In 'erjround HD Particles fren Cptucuion, JAIEIS, USiiTDL-

T '

37 /., o.f . !V. r 'l Kniiclofical Defense laboratory. Son Francisco, CiliforniA,
SFC?TT,^Cn:ICTSS) Si? A. \

15. C&dle, R. D.; The Effects of 5oll, field. Sealed Depthx an

Contra’inaticr. free Atonic Barbs, URI Project CD- 64 I, -une 23, l£?3, SAN BRUNO FRC

e 1 ♦

Stanford Research Institution, Palo Alto, California, S 3 CF 2 T, ? 33 £uICTSD

DATA.

16. Tcnp!dns, R. C. and Ersy, P. V.; ra^iocbcnicnl Studies in Sica
Graced Fallout and Filter Sirples Cron Operation J..3G12, CRUR-17C,

August 7, 1952, Arty Cbsnieal Center, Karyland, SSCR3T, RESTRICTED DATA.

17* Bouton, Edwin B» t et alj Fallout and Cloud Particle Studies,

Project 5.4b# VT-617, Operation ITT, June 1953, Arty Chemical Center,

Maryland, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

18* Beldt, V.B., Jr*, et alj Mature, Intensity, and Distribution ct

■ £

Fallout from Mils Shot, Project 5.4a, VT-615, Operation IV T, April 1953,

4 '

C a 8* Marsl Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, California,

s;chei, ESIMCEB sm. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

19* Kallk, John S.) Ganna Radiation Versus Tine, Projects 5*1 end

5.2, VT-634, Operation IVT, February 1954, Los Alsnos Scientific
Laboratory, Los Alamos, Bev Kesdco, SOCKET, RESTRICTED DATA.

20. Tonkins, E.R. end Vemcr, L3*J Cbodcsl, Physical, end
Radiochemical Characteristics of the Contaminant, Project 2.6a, WT-917,
Operation CASTIZ, D.S. Eaval R a diologlcal Defense Laboratory, &si
Francisco, California, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

21. Tompkins, R. C. said Krey, Philip W. ; Radiochemical Analysis of
Fallout, Project 2.6b, Operation CASTLE, September 1954, Amy Chemical
Center, Karylnd, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

22. Stetson, R. T., et elj Distribution end Intensity of Fallout,

Project 2.5a, ‘*’7-915, January 1956, U.S, Kavnl Radiological Defense
Laboratory, Son Francisco, California, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

23. Armed For cos Special Weapons Project, Surrzxy Report of the

evS ^°

Coaoander, Task Unit 13, Operation CASTIZ, June 1954, Armed Forces ^
Special Weapons Project, Washington, D. C., SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

24* Brom, Peter and £***», Gereldj Ganna Rate Versos Time, Project

2.2, TIR-913, Operation CASTIZ, Kay 1954, Signal Corps Engineering
Laboratories, Fort Monmouth, Tew Jersey, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

25. Thaapoey, Robert, et alf Total C: 3 =a Expcoure rcssurotmnt, Project

Fort Hcaaouth, Dew Jersey, SECRET, RESTRICTED DAT A,

26, Vilsey, E.F., ct al| Fallout Studies, Pro Jo c$ 2. 5b, ITR-916,

(^ration CAST!*, Arty Cherdcal Center, llarylead, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA,
'* 27, Folsom, T,, ct el| Stu^r of Rediaticn Fallout by Oceanographic
Kethod, Project 2.7, HR-935, Scrlppa Institution of Oceuaqprnpby, La
Jolla, California, SECRET, RESTRICTED Dm.

28, Stetson, R. L«, et el| Distribution end Intensity of Fallout,
Project 2.5a, Operation CASTIB, WT-915, Page 21, TJ.S, IT aval Radiologioal
Defense Lshoratcsy, San Francisco, Ccltfbmla, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA,

29. Arsed forces Special Weapons Project, CcpaMlltl s of Atordo
Weapons, Cctobor 1953, Page 96 ff, Art^sd Pcroes SpodGl Weapons Project,
Washington, D. C., SSCRST, RESTRICTED DATA,

30. DSI?J)L letter, 3-930-0335 ERTsas, of 2 August 1956, to Director,
Program 2, C0.I FIDi NT IAL •

31. Van Lint, V.A.J., C-arma Rays fron Plane and Voluna Source Distri-
butions, Operation REDWIK9, ITR-1345, Program 2, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED

DATA.

~7~ a*. * J Av'ew» / t/Vn

£' »jT- t K £~r, T& \ C 70 J> TA*

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FRC

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Previous Reference

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For Cross References see inside of Cover

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i ;

0 J.F.G./55/26

Information for the Public on Hydrogen 7/a rf a re

1. We have already appreciated that information concerning
hydrogen warfare must be handed to the public with forethought
and care. We have also appreciated that the public must
eventually have the full information concerning its hazards and
the means of protection from them.

2. At present, time is on our side; but not very much.

Despite the information already given to the American public,
the British public has remained calm, perhaps under the
steadying influence of the White Paper; there has been
remarkably little wash from its wake. The recent debate on
genetics, however, may stir up controversy and a demand for
fuller inf orruation.

3* A potential enemy could use the frightening nature and
enormous power of this weapon to great effect on an uninformed
and ignorant public. The modern edition of sabre rattling has
already certainly been used once in the overt contradiction
between the U.S.B.R. and the U.S.A. as to which has the greater
stock of nuclear weapons. A Scandinavian gentleman was ordered
out of the country yesterday for exhibiting horror pictures of
the atomic bursts on Japan; three Japanese ladies are touring
ihe Midlands describing these horrors. One wonders how much
covert activity on this subject is being used on our people by
the Russians,

U. The previous Government created a Governmental Organisation
for the stimulation, planning and co-ordination of anti-
communist activity. An Anti-Communist (Ministerial) Committee
was formed with A.C. Official Committees for overseas and home.
Under the present Government the A.C. (Ministerial) Committee
has never sat; the A.C. (Overseas) Official Committee has been
kept just alive; the A.C. (Home) Official Committee had not met
for a year before its meeting last autumn when it decided to
double its frequency of sitting.

Quite separate from, and not apparently linked with, this
psychological warfare organisation is a sub-Committee of the
Civil Defence Joint Planning Staff under Horae Office Chairmanship
Its Terms of Reference are to consider the psychological and
sociological aspects of weapons of mass destruction on the public
The sub-Committee has not met for over a year.

5. There is little doubt that the menace of hydrogen warfare
will be a major factor in the war of nerves, and one easily
exploited by the Communists. The morale of our people, and
their will to face the threat, may well be undermined unless
special steps are taken to prevent it.

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(513) Dd.ni922/Wt343t>9 2U,0M 1/54 JCiS tiptiua

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f ORMAN BROC

Ai ^TjvCU. ** V®~* a*/-

, , — p» k,

I gubmit herewith a draft paper from the Home Defence

Hi " k

V j^|Q^ Committee ‘sumnarising the main points which emerged from their

C^S^A ^consideration of the Report on the Defence Implications of Pall -out

from a Hydrogen Bomb.

VlA’ {&. i.

* . I / If momentum is to be maintained in the subsequent

f**H- 3 — ^

^planning operations by Departments, it is important that the

3bM~- C5 .*/>

' ^ ! report and the attached draft paper should be considered by the

Defence Committee as quickly as possible after the Minister of
Defence has held his restricted meeting of Ministers. It would be
very helpful, therefore, if arrangements could be made for both
documents to be circulated for discussion by the Defence Committee
before the Easter Recess.

Although it may not be possible to clear the attached
draft with the other members of the Home Defence Committee before
the Minister of Defence's meeting on Thursday takes place, you may
wish to send an advance copy to the Minister of Defence for the
information of that meeting.

22nd March 1955

(7/. STRATH)

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TTTK DBPiglCS I> f PMOATIONS OP PALL-OUT VRPM A
HYDROUS nas

Note by the Homo Da fane a Committee

Vo have considered the report prepared at the request of
Ministers by a group of off icials ^I.D.C. (55)37 on the defence implications
of fall-out from a hydrogen bomb. It has also boon examined by the Heads
of Departments concerned. Both we and they endorse in substance t&e J/j"
conclusions and recommendations; the main comments made upon it are
briefly recorded below.

2. Strategic Assumptions

(a) the Chiefs of Staff consider that any future war in which the United
Kingdom itself was attacked would involve the use of the hydrogen bomb. It
follows, therefore, that such home defence preparations as are relevant

to war fought with conventional or atomic weapons only should be
discontinued. This would secure bom financial saving to offset the heavy
cost of precautions against a hydrogen bomb attack.

(b) Ve a anno t tell with any certainty how much warning the United Kingdom
would get before an attack. Ve consider, however, that, solely for
planning purposes, Departmsnta should continue to assume that the Government
would be able to detect a deterioration in the international situation some
six months before war came and would know say seven days in advance that an
attack on this country way Inevitable. These assumptions are neoessary to
enable oertaln plana to be prepared, for example on evacuation, which depend
for their validity on a period of warning. But Departments should be
reminded that there con be no assurance that either assumption would be re alia
(a) Vhether or not the enemy was able to repeat his initial assault, the
devastation would be on suoh & scale that the United Kingdom could not be
used as a main supply base for such operations as continued after the opening
phase. Flans for the building up of industrial war potential in this country
on the basis that it could bs used to support long drawn out hostilities after
global war had broken out are, therefore, no longer realistic.

3. Publicity

The Government, we suggest, should not seek to impress the public

with the dangers of thermo-nuclear war until they can tell them at the

/same time

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same tine what measure s of protection can be taken. Further information
on the effect a of hydrogen bombing, beyond that already given in the
Statement on Defence, should, however, be released aa necessary where it la

essential for the adequate preparation of defence plans.

4. evacuation and ihelter

(a) We feel that the Government’s eventual plans on the- evacuation and
shelter would command wider public support if presented with the authority
of an independent Committee, ae was done before the last war when the
Anderson Committee reported on evacuation in 1938. But we do not advocate
the establishment of such a body until the Government' ■ plans have been more
fully elaborated.

(b) The Royal air Force are planning to dieperae their strategic bomber
foroe over some seventy airfields in this country and it is Intended to give
widespread publicity to this dispersal. It will not therefore be neoessary,
as suggested in paragraph 81 (ii) of the report, in preparing the evacuation
scheme to regard the areas of the main bomber bases as unsuitable for the
reception of evacuees beoause they are likely enemy targets.

5. Machinery of Oontrol

accepted that the central machinery of Government might be put out of action
for a period. Preparations should therefore be made for regional headquarter
to operate independently of the centre during that time. Plane must also be
made to restore central Government at the earliest possible moment.

6. Oil

survival period and the need to provide in peacetime a sufficient stockpile,
suitably dispersed, to oover the country’s needs for some months after an
attack. Many of the measures neeessaxy to national survival as seen in the
report, suoh as the movement of aivil defence and military forces and the
distribution of food, would be impossible without adequuto supplies of oil.

7. Expenditure on Defence

All defence preparations, whether the responsibility of 3srvloe
or Civil Departments, should in future be considered as interdependent parts

Under the conditions envisaged in the report the risk must be

We wish to emphasise the importance of oil aa a key factor In the

/of one

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V *

£ of one whole. The eua of financial and other resouroee available for
defence should therefore be apportioned between the various measures as
integral parts of a co-Ordlnated programme designed to hold a balance
between active and passive defence as the circumstances of the time require.
8. Conclusion

to be revised along the lines reoommended In the report as amplified by the
points made In this note. This would give pepartments a basis on which to
produce specif io plana which would be submitted for detailed approval as
necessary.

22nd March 1955

We recommend that authority should be given for defence preparations

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j \ [' V'. TsK'U

1 ♦ !T.?: ture *rP Attach . Can Departments be directed to pi *m

on the assumption that, in a war involving attack on U .K., thermo-
nuclear capons are oertain to be used? In other words , can they
exclude the possibility of an attack with conventional or atonic
weapons only?

2. vfarning Period * Gan we continue to assume, for planning
purposes, (i) that the Goverrm^nt will mark a deterioration in the
international situation six months before the outbreak of war; and
(ii) that a further Alert mil be given 7 days before we are attacked?

3* Pxuendjture . Our new defence plans should not assume a
mounting level of expenditure on defence,

iu, Research # Irrespective of agreements for the exchange of
technical information on atomic energy, we should press the United
States to pive us the results of research into protective measures -
e#g # , effects of radio-activity 4 on agriculture , types of shelter etc,

5, Evacuation ard Shelter # It will be easier to win public
acceptance of the Government f s eventual plans if these are presented
with the authority of an independent Hamit tee - c.f# Anderson Committee
of 1939,

'6* Publicity . In general, the development of publicity should rro
hand in hand with the development of plans* We should not seek to
impress the public with the dangers of thermo-nuclear war until we can
tell them at the same time what measures of protection can be taken.

7. Aftermath . Would it be possible for the Chiefs of Staff to
give some further guidance about the likely development of war - or
peace - after the initial assault? Is it assumed that, if U.K.
survives , it will be able to make any contribution towards continuance
of the war? Is it assumed that war will continue? Are we really
to prepare for a struggle which will be settled, one way or the other,
in a matter of days?

- 1 -

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SIR kI^HAHD POWELL

Ministry of Defence

Strath Group Report

The printed draft of the Strath Group Report will,
ae arranged, be circulated tomorrow. Hr. Strath has
a alced me to draw your attention to some additional
sentences which he has inserted in the first paragraph
of Section XIII (The Armed Forces and Defence Production)
to deal with the role of reserves in global war.

There is one other point I might mention. In
considering plans for the evacuation of the revised
priority classes, you asked whether : ’adole scents below
the age of eighteen” should refer only to those who are
still at school. I gather from the Home office that
existing plans In fact cover those below the age of
el^iteen whether they are still at school or not. We
have therefore made no addition to the draft passage
which sets out the composition of the revised priority
classes.

(P.L. BROCK)

3rd March. 1955

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«u. ouoo

SfsT^-

Copy to: Mr. Hanna

•ilfc Troll : Mr. Anthony Greenvwod: To ask the

Prime Minister, If he will arrange for the
publication of a White Paper setting out
such information as H_r Majesty's Govern-
ment possesses about the erf acts of
hydrogen bomb and other forms of nuclear

si ii are.

I suggest the following answer. I have discussed
it with Mr. Strath and with Mr. Dean of the Foreign Office.
H T am not in a position to add usefully to

the information given in the statement on Defence

for 1965 and in the recent report oy the United
States Atomic energy Commission, copies of which I
am having placed in the library of the House.

As the Statement on Defence indicates. Her Majesty's
Government will make further statements from time
to time as their views develop. I shall be
dealing with the subject of thermonuclear warfare
In the Defence Debate next week."

f *

If the term "nuclear warfare" were interpreted in its
widest sense, a White Paper of the kind for which
Mr. Greenwood asks would have to begin with the reports on
the atomic bomolng of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and
contain all the information on atomic weapone and their use

- 1 -

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iich ha strict seen released, principally by the United
states Government.

un a narrower interpretation, which wouxd coniine
the White Paper to information on thermonuclear weapons,
the only authentic information in the possession of
Her Uajesty's Government is that which has oeen officially
released by the U.S. Government. (Such "under-the-counter"
information as we have received has been in the main no
more than an anticipation of these official releases, and
cou^a a-t io ujy event he - qu-tec publicly). The
princip seats are those released by the U.S. Atomic

energy Co^issi n about the explosions at aniwetok on
31st October 1952 and at Bikini on 1st March 1954, and
the report on the effects of high-yield nuclear explosions
which use ed on 15th February. 1955.

In a debate on Civil Defence in the House of
Commons on 5th July 1354, the then Home Secretary
repeated muon of the information about the Bikini explosion
which had seen released by the U.S. Atomic iinergy Commission
There have been other general references from time to
time in debates or in answers to questions. There would
be little point in collecting all these together and
putting them into a White Paper.

The only information which H.H. Government has
itself puolisned on these subjects is contained in the
Statements on ; efence for 1954 and 1955. The new
Statement, which will be debated next week in the House
of Commons, is by far the more Important, and contains
the first considered expression of opinion by H.tf.G.
on thermonuclear weapons and their effects.

23rd February, 1955

Dictated by Sir R. Powell __

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IT AIN TO MAKE THE
HYDROGEN BOMB

iAI30A?-

WAR RISK REDUCED '
BY WEAPON

DEFENCE STATEMENT ON “DUTY
TO PROCEED”

CONTRIBUTION TO WAR DETERRENT

Britain is to begin producing the hydrogen bomb. In the
annual Statement on Defence, presented to Parliament
yesterday, the Government announce that, after fully con-
sidering all the implications, they think it their duty to
take this step as a deterrent to war*

In a review of the country’s other defence needs, the state-
ment makes these points : —

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, — Stocks are steadily growing. Work to
increase their variety and power is going on.

NAVY'S ROLE. — A start is to* be made on building a new class
of guided weapon ship, to replace older cruisers. Heavy carriers also
will augment the allied striking fleet. A better equipped Active Fleet
and a smaller but better prepared Reserve Fleet are planned*

V-BOMBER FORCE, — The primary task of the R.A.F. is to build
this force to the highest possible state of preparedness*

STRATEGIC RESERVE. — Reduced commitments oversea make it
possible to rebuild a strategic reserve of land forces at home*

MOBILE DEFENCE CORPS.— To defend the home base, this corps
will be formed as part of the Army and R.A.F* reserve forces.

CIVIL DEFENCE*— The advent of the hydrogen bomb calls for a
new approach. The Mobile Defence Corps, trained in fire-fighting and
rescue work, will be a vital link between the local civil defence and the
armed forces.

The statement says that we must not flinch from the
necessity to use nuclear weapons, but adds that realization of
the magnitude of disaster which war would bring may generate
a will to peace*

GOVERNMENT’S VIEW

The paper suggests that realization of the
magnitude of disaster which war would
bring “ may bring home to people m ail
lands the consequences of war and generate
a compelling will to peace, strong enough to
enforce itself on the most arbitrary of rulers.
That is the first implication of the nuclear
weapon. It is one not of despair but of

h °The Government's considered view is that
the powerful deterrent of the nuclear weapon
in the hands of the free world— which has a
marked superiority both in the weapon itself
and in the means of delivering n — has
*■ significantly reduced the risk of war on a
major scale/* Emphasis ts laid on the
Government's intention to continue to strive
for a practical scheme of disarmament as
a contribution to the avoidance of war.

Their ultimate aim is abolition of the use.
possession, and manufacture not only of all
nuclear weapons but also of other weapons
of mass destruction, together with simul-
taneous major reductions of conventional
armaments and armed forces to agreed levels
which would redress the present Communist
super ioritv.

NEW PROBLEMS
IN POLICY

COURAGE NEEDED
FOR SOLUTION

By Our Political Correspondent

The Government have decided that
this country must begin the development
and production of the hydrogen bomb.
This momentous decision was made
known in the annual Statement on
Defence, presented to Parliament
yesterday.

The opening paragraph of the White
Paper emphasizes that the emergence of
the thermo-nuclear bomb overshadowed
all else in 1954 and that this has posed
new and revolutionary problems in
defence policy that require courage and
imagination for their solution. Refer-
ence is made to the American experi-
mental explosions of thermo-nuclear
weapons and the paper says that “ there
are no technical or scientific limitations
on the production of nuclear weapons
Still more devastating.” )

" The United States Government” it
continues, " have announced that they
are proceeding with the full-scale pro-
duction of thermo-nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Government are clearly
following the same policy; though we
cannot tell when they will have thermo-
nuclear weapons available for opera-
tional use.

"The United Kingdom also has the
ability to produce such weapons. After
fully considering all the implications of
this step the Government have thought
it their duty lo proceed with their
development and production.”

“ THE ONLY MEANS”

Reference is made to the unprecedented
destruction; both human and material, which
the use of thermo-nuclear weapons would
cause in war T but the paper emphasizes that
the use of nuclear weapons is the only
means by which Lhe massive preponderance
of the Communist world in conventional
land forces can be countered ii the event of

“ We must therefore contribute to the
deterrent and to our own defence by building
up our own stock of nuclear weapons of all
types and by developing the most up to date
means of delivery,' 1 the paper goes on. "We
must, moreover, in making our plans for
dealing with aggression against our alliance,
not flinch from the necessity to use these
weapons, For in the knowledge of our
resolve lies the best hope, and it is a real
hope, that it may never be put to the test.”

£43 M. U.S. AID

The iota! expenditure to be incurred on
defence in 1955-56 is estimated at 11.537m.
This will be reduced by 143m. in American
aid to a net figure of £l,494m. chargeable
to the Budget— which is £60m, less than
the original estimate of net expenditure^!
defence in the present financial year. y 10
original net defence budget of 11, 554m. for
1954,55 however, " will be considerably
underspent, mainly because of development
difficulties associated with the newer equip-
ments and also because of. unavoidable
delays in works services/*

Fite proposed expenditure on the three
Services next year shows that while £3m.
more will be spent on the R.A.F. the Army
will receive £77m. less and the Navy 12dm.
less than in the present year. The following
table shows how* the gross expenditure on
defence— not allowing for receipts from
American aid — will be apportioned in
1955-56, and she comparable estimates for
die present financial year: —

NOT ALLOWING FOR RECEIPTS FROM
AMERICAN AID
(£ million)

Admiralty
War Oifice ..

Am Ministry
Ministry of Supply ,
Ministry of Defence

Estimate,

1954-55

Estimate,

1955-56

367 '0

3470

56 10

4840

537 0

5404

151 0

147 5

23-9

18-3

1,639-9

1,537-2

A further reduction is estimated in the

number or male regular recruits during the
years 1954-55 and 1955-56. The figure for

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2 1 FEBJ955

^e^REo'V

BRITAIN TO MAKE
THE H-BOMB

Deterrent Now— but Ultimate
Aim is Disarmament

MOBILE DEFENCE CORPS

FROM OUR POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

Britain is to develop and produce
thermo-nuclear weapons, which
include the hydrogen bomb. The
Government declares in the H State-
ment on Defence, 1955,” which was
published last night, that its
immediate duty' and policy are to
build up our own forces, in conjunc-
tion with those of our allies, into the
most powerful deterrent we can,
achieve, and by this means to work
for peace through strength, “ Thus we
shall hope to obtain real disarmament
and relaxation of tension," it adds,

“ But we must also so equip and
train our forces, and so organise the
country, as to enable us to survive
and to defeat the enemy if all our
efforts for peace should fail”

The Government tries in this White
Paper to tell the public, in one para
graph, what the effects of an attack
by thermo-nuclear weapons would be.
The conclusion is that it would be a
struggle for survival of the grimmest
kind. If all the world realised this,
a compelling will to peace might be
generated M strong enough to enforce
itself on the most arbitrary of rulers/ 1
" That is the first implication of the
nuclear weapon. It is not one of despair
but of hope. In the hands of the tree
wo rlrt which at present has a marked
superiority both in the weapon itself and
in the means of delivering it, and which
has no thought of aggression, it is a most
powerful deterrent.' In the Government's
view this deterrent has significantly
reduced the risk of war on a major
scale.”

The search for a practical scheme of
disarmament will continue. The
Government's ultimate aim is : '* Aboli-
tion of the use, possession, and manu-
facture not only of all nuclear weapons,
but also of other weapons of mass
destruction, together with simultaneous
major reductions of conventional
armaments and armed forces to agreed
levels which would redress the present
Communist superiority/ 7

Need for Safeguards

The time-table would have to be
agreed, and the provision of machinery
to supervise and enforce agreed
prohibitions and reductions would be
essential. If the free world were to
disarm without such safeguards, the
White Paper says, it would incur a
double risk : the threat of conventional
forces which it could not hope to match ;
and the danger that such forces might
be supported by nuclear weapons made
secretly because there had been no
adequate control.

Preparations for defence against the
risk of thermonuclear war will not
apparently produce any startling
changes in 1955-6, except the decision
to start building up a mobile defence
corps for home duties which, within the
next three or four years, should com-
prise 48 reserve battalions of at least
six hundred men each. But there is to
be no reduction in the period of whole-
time National Service ; no great change
in the conventional forces which the
Government considers to be necessary
to hold the eastern frontier of " free
Europe,” to deal with sporadic outbreaks
in the cold war, to assist Colonial
governments if in need, and to provide
a strategic reserve at home.

Nor has the Government yet settled
its shelter and evacuation policies,
because it has not finished studying the
effects of the radio-active contamination
which might be caused by the 11 fall-out 1
from a hydrogen-bomb burst at ground
level :

" Within a few miles of the point of burst
it would be quite impracticable to provide
protection against the violent explosive
Dower of a hydrogen bomb. But beyond
the area of devastation by blast and heat a
considerable degree of protection against
the effects of 11 fall-out' during the period
of intense radiation could be secured by
shelter which need not be of very elaborate
construction— for example, by a trench
with overhead earth cover."

£70 Millions for C.D.

The Estimates for 1955-6 do not there-
fore Include a large sum for shelters.
The total provision for Civil Defence
(excluding anything spent on the mobile
defence corps) is just short of £70 mil-
lions. The total Estimates for the armed
forces which the British taxpayer will
have to find in 1955-6 will be
£ 1 ,494,200,000— which is just about the

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same as he will have had to find by the
end of 1054-5, American aid will
increase the total to be spent in the
coming year by £43 millions.

The R*A,F. is to get the bulk of the
mQney—£540 millions* compared with
£537 millions in 1954-5* The RJV.F, is
now the largest spender. Last year it
was the Army, with £561 millions, but
in the coming year the Army will take
£484 millions. The Navy’s share is to
fall from £367 millions to £347 millions*
The reason for this shift in the balance'
is the Government's decision to pilt
increasing emphasis on the country's
deterrent force* which 41 must rest
primarily on the strategic air power of
the West, armed with its nuclear
weapons*"

The primary task of the RAF. is to
build up the V- bomber force* with its
nuclear potential* to the highest possible
state of efficiency and preparedness. The
first squadrons of V-bombers will be
introduced during this year* The Navy
also makes its contribution of heavy
carriers to the Allied striking fleet whose i
great mobility and offensive power* to
be augmented by guided missiles and
by other modern equipment, will add
powerfully to our ability to hit the
enemy either independently or in
support of Allied land forces and land-
based air forces."

First Exchanges Critical
The Reserve Fleet is being reorganised
so that those ships which are, or can be
made, ready for almost immediate ser-
vice in an emergency will either be
maintained or refitted at the shortest!
possible notice. The White Paper
emphasises that the first few exchanges
in nuclear war would be critical, and
that* therefore* the highest state of
readiness in all three services is essen-
tial, The Government sums up its plans
for the three services in these words :

" We are planning for a better equipped
and maintained active Fleet, and a
reduced but much more highly prepared
Reserve Fleet, a smaller, better disposed,
more mobile army ; and a more power-
ml air force, including in particular an
effective strategic bomber force*"

The speed of attack in nuclear war
wou*d inevitably have the result that
many service units at home could not
be directly employed in operations at
the moment of attack. Such units would
have to be used largely to aid the
civilian population* The Government
argues that the Civil Defence forces as
at present organised in localities would
have to meet the first call* But they
would need to be supported by all the
formed and disciplined bodies of the
armed forces available in this island.
Hence, ail members of the armed forces,
including the Home Guard, will in
future receive training in elementary
civil defence duties as part of their i
normal military training*

To link the local Civil Defence forces
with the services a mobile defence
corps* trained and equipped for fire-
fighting, rescue, and ambulance duties*
is to be formed. In an emergency the
battalions of this corps, which will be
distributed over the country, would be
mobilised like any other unit of the
reserve forces* Men for the corps will
be selected from the Army and R.A*F,*
and will receive a month’s whole-time
training during their active service,
Spec|al training depots will be opened
to train about 10,000 men a year* The
first men will get their training towards
the end of this year When the men
have finished their active service thev
will be posted to reserve battalions as
near as possible to their homes. They
will do their fifteen days' annual train-
ing with their battalions*

To Help Fire Service

The scheme # announced last year# to
train R*A.F* reservists of Class H in
civil defence duties is to be modified.
They are now to be trained as firemen*
so that in time of war the fire service
(under central control) could expand
rapidly. One training depot will be
ready this summer with accommodation
for about ten thousand reservists a year
for their first period of basic training*
A second depot will be needed for more
advanced instruction.

The Post Office Is planning to install
a special network of communications*
by cable and radio, to maintain long-
distance contact in the event of attack*
Plans have been drawn up to provide
shipping facilities at the smaller ports
and harbours in case the large docks are
put out of action. Reserves of essential
foods and materials are to be built up
in the coming year*

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whi { 1234 - Ext. 322

llth February 1955

TO? SECRET

Thank you for your letter of loth February about
experimenting with shelters and rescue rooms in the course of
future atomic bomb tests.

It seems to me to be very sensible that work of this
sort should be incorporated in the test schedules as it is the
only means by which we can acquire satisfactory knowledge about
a vital aspect of our defence arrangements. I shall see that
a place is found for this in the draft report.

I shall also have a word with the authorities who
have a direct responsibility for determining the range of
experiments carried out during atomic tests.

Incidentally I noticed In the Bress the other day
that the Americans are proposing to try out some spe cial types
of shelter during their next trials. When we succeed in
removing the difficulties which at present stand in the way of
exchanges of atomic information between the United Kingdom and
the U.3.A. , I hope that we may be able to draw on their
experience in matters of this sort.

STRATH

(w, strath)

General Sir Sidney Kirkman, G.C.B, , K.B.E., M.C.

Home Office

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Rome Office,
horse retry Rouse,

Dean Ryle Street, S.W.1.

PERSONAL
TOP SECRET

10th February, 1955

I had. a meeting this morning on the exercise which I
am holding at Sunningd&le on the 23rd and 24-th of this month.
We were discussing the problem of shelters and I mentioned
the point in the minutes of the last meeting of your Group,
that the Home Office should experiment with different kinds
of refuge rooms. Though much can be done from basic
scientific knowledge and possibly also at places like
Harwell, the real answer as to the effectiveness of various
types of shelter or rescue room can but be an experiment
when an atomic (not necessarily hydrogen) bomb is detonated,

I was told that on such occasions in the past the emphasis
has always been on experimenting on the design of weapon
and that any civil defence information required has rather
been pushed into the background* If this is so, it might
be well that we should stress in our report that opportunity
should be provided for civil defence to carry out such
experiments as are generally practicable.

I will try and check up on this information before
our next meeting. I imagine you would not require a paper
from me on the subject.

W. Strath Esq., C.B.

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FALLOUT DIAGRAM

FCLA»Hi95ii

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TOP SECRET

" e.R.

PUHCTIOHS R3QUI SB IP PALL-OUT OCCURS

1. Governmental , regional and area control.

2. Intimation of "H 11 bursts. Radio broadcast. Ground zero.

Met. conditions. Probable areas of fall-out. Broadcast instructions

Battery receiving sets.

jj . Reconnaissance of extent and pattern of fall-out.

Helicopter and light aircraft teams. Mobile ground teams. Control.
Collation and tfe^eimation of information.

4 - Human rescue organisation. Mobility. Communications.

Radiation measurement.

5. Transport and control of injured and infected.

6. Reception and examination of infected.

7. Treatment and hospitalisation.

<513) j6d.D922/Wt34360 20,000 1/54 JC&S Up6ii9

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E.R.

Evacuation from heavily contaminated areas. Oare of
ho less.

Fire-fighting organisation.

10 .

Demolition and salvage.

11. Decontamination organisation.

12. Emergency distribution of food and water.

13 -

Revival of essential

services.

Water supply

Food distribution

Heating

Light

Communications

Imports

(5 13) Dd.D922/Wt343fia 1/54 JC&S Gpttoa f

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■k

Revival of damaged T .var making capability

15. La?i and order.

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IM'-M

TOP SECRET

mlMT

•/

MR. STRATH *3 GROUP
The Plan of Campaign
Pacta about effects

Obviously we must fill any gaps hero as quickly as
possible so that our deductions can proceed from a sound
foundation. We do not yet know how far the papers from
Br. Mar ley will complete the information called for by
Conclusion (4) of the last meeting. I suggest that we run
through outstanding points on to Section 2 of the last
minutes at the close of the next meeting. Subject to what
Dr. Harley’s papers contain it looks as if there may still
be outstanding (i) a study of the implications of fall out
for water supplies, (ii) an appreciation of the medical
implications of fall out including the measures which should
be taken to organise our research, etc., (ill) the meteorological
appreciation.

Strategic Background

I have sent you separate notes about this commenting cm
the J.I.C. paper (s, 0.(55) *)•

Agenda for the follo wing meeting

I think the prime requirements arei-

(a) Stopping of any gaps still remaining in our factual
information and in the strategic background.

(b) A study by the Home Office of the implications of
fell out end the strategic guidance for:-*

(i) Fire-fighting and rescue work by all echelons

of the Civil Defence Services. *

J ' ' /

(ii) Evacuation policy.

(ill) Shelter policy.

I think General Kirk/'is preoccupied more with operational
plans than onr/policy guidance in these fields. We need
a document drawing out the broad policy deductions for
these three subjects which would be suitable as recom-
mendations to Ministers and thereafter as the basis for
planning guidance to Departments.

the scale outlined by J.I.C. in S. 0.(55) 1 supplemented
by any further information gleaned as to the significa-
nce of the supplementary effects of other weapons
besides H Bombs.

If we ere to report by the end of January this study will
probably have to be more general and considerably shorter
than the study previously done on the baBis of a 200 A Bomb
attack. It may" also have to consider the alternative
effects of an attack with or without extensive fall out
effects.

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(d) A study of the problems of organisation and
control to be faced in the light of the study
of (c) and bearing In mind the assumed objective
of the enemy as defined In paragraph 8 of
S.G. (55) 1 - especially paragraph 8(b),

Uth January.

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top seorut

MR. g^CCK

(Copies to: Brigadier Godwin

W.P.S. Principals)

Notes on 3.G. (c4) 5

You asked me for a few comments on the above paper. These
are set out below and include points raised by toy colleagues.

(1) This paper is based on United Kingdom information

only. Is this because no other sources of
information are available, i.e. United States of
America, or because we consider our own information
more reliable?

(2) Any action taken after an explosion, to be effective,

must depend on accurate information being available
at some central point on the ever changing contours
of contamination.

( 3 ) If the population is to take the best possible action

it would seem that it is essential that : -

(a) That they have a clear and complete

understanding of thp problem before
the outbreak of war.

(b) That they have a means of receiving

instructions.

precautionary measures that are possible.

The guestion of the amount of information given out
requires an assessment of:-

(a) The moral obligation of a Government to

spell out the whole story.

(b) Necessity of wide-spread knowledge if

plans are to be effective.

dsteitnining people’s actions should Yjar
break out. This again depends on the
confidence which the Government has
engendered due to the measures it has
carried out.

(4) It would be desirable if we got our ideas straight on

exactly what are to be the tasks of mobile columns,
not only in relation to conventional rescue work,
but in relation to the fall-out problem. We must
have a clear idea of the basic purpose of the
whole operation (presumably saving life) before we
embark on developing operational techniques, e.g.
helicopters and radar sets, and all our plans should
be set in the context of the overall conditions
prevailing rather than in individual facets of the
total problem.

(513) Dd.D922/\Vt343«9 2U,UU0 1/54 JC&S Gp*W9

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E.R.

(g) It is of interest to note that after the allied air

attacks on Hamburg in July/August 1943, the Germans
operated mobile columns of Service personnel, some
15,000 all told, on unskilled Civil Defence work
(see United States Strategic Bombing Survey 1945).
In Hamburg the area of damage was approximately
30 square miles. This corresponds to a circular
area of damage with a circumference of 19 miles.

At the present we envisage that round a hydrogen
bomb explosion there will be a 45 mile sector of
the circumference round this e xpl - ooio n where mobile
columns could operate. On the same basis as
y German experience at Hamburg, this Yjould imply the
use of some 30 ,000-45 ,000 troops.

5th January. 1955

_ * _ *

(513) Dd,D922/Wt 34309 20,000 1/54 JC&S GptSuO

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-1

aa* bicck

2SE& s* Uolomo*

The forts ami socle o f at took, to ah loll the United Kingdom
would he exposed In the event of general war*

General ear most unlikely In the foreseeable future*

:ven unintentional ear ie unlikely*

Planned attack on the United kingdom ia not expected before
about I960*

To knock out airfields fron which nuclear attaoke oould be
launched u oinst the Bov let Union*

To destroy the organisation of Government apd control*

To render the United Kingdom useieee as a base for any fora
of military operations*

They will not hesitate to destroy great parts of the United
Kingdom, and their alas Bill remain oonetftnt.

H*boobs by aircraft not possible before 193 &*

H-boabo by submarine possible before 1936*

H-boaba by ballistic rooks t long term and unpredictable*

Airfields

.sops

A-bomb from aircraft at optimum
height.

Seat of dove rumen t n

London Tha H»bo b from P.0 ,000 feet.

The country as a base 10 at 10 megaton HHbombs from

grejnd level in nest coast
locations*

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. .iroln,:

Hi&b level air delivery dO ©touted to 1 hour*
x*o» level air delivery > a:.nute» minlaon*
jutauarino delivery none no*. 3s®e later#

Have they the capability HOW of delivering sufficient
A-bouba by air:-

(a) to itnooic out airfields fret* which nuclear attache
could be launched* and the seat of Govornaonts

(t>) to tcnoolc out London by a concentration of A— borabo*

Have they the capability HOJ of placing and f irl^^, .

10 M-bcub» ot ground level in west oooet locations by chip or
by oubtusplne* If so will there by any BBrulng/

k£b Jantiare. 1955.

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1 1

3 1955

PLANNING FOR
DEFENCE

implications of the

HYDROGEN BOMB

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES
Sir— The further one thinks into the
problem created by the hydrogen bomb,
and its implications, the more question-
able it becomes whether present defence
planning is realistic. At the same time
the eff ort brings a deepening sympathy for
the planners because of the immense di fa-
culty of bridging the gulf between custo-
mary ideas of warfare and the super-
revolutionary effects of atomic power-

It is very hard to relate warfare as known in
the past to warfare where atomic bombs,
missiles, and shells can be employed in
hundreds or thousands, and where thermo-
nuclear (hydrogen) bombs each measured in
millions of tons of high explosive are also
available in quantity, (The original Hiroshima
bomb was equivalent to a mere 20,000 tons
of T.N.T.) Once such weapons are used it Is
scarcely conceivable that the war could con-
tinue, even in a 11 br ok en -backed ” form.
The conduct of war is “ organized action/’ and
this collapses where chaos reigns.

In the case of this country, where the vital
targets are closely grouped, it has been esti-
mated that as few as five thermo-nudear
bombs might suffice, and that 10 would almost
certainly suffice to blot out all its main centres
of Indus try^comprising half the population.
Still fewer would suffice to paralyse the vital
centres of France, Belgium, and Holland.
Moreover, paralysis, and collapse, can be pro-
duced by moral effect even where destruction
does not take place. *

To prevent such a catastrophe, air defence
would have to attain nearly 100 per cent,
effectiveness of interception at the outset, and
that is almost inconceivable. The most opti-
mistic estimate from any authoritative quarter
is that 44 one out of every four Soviet
bombers ” might be intercepted. In any case
there is no means in existence or in prospect
of intercepting atomic missiles. By 1945 the
Germans had successfully test-fired a V2-iype
rocket with a range of about 400 miles, and
had worked out plans to extend it—just before
their research station at Feenemunde was cap-
tured by the Russians, The range of the VI
type, then only 150 miles, has already been
trebled and its accuracy improved, London is
450 miles from the Russian positions in
Germany, Pads less than 400 miles, w-hUc
Brussels, Antwerp, and Amsterdam are barely
250 miles distant.

Hence, the only real defence is the deterrent
power of retort. This is, however, a very
potent safeguard against an attack of similar
kind— or any that presents a vital threat. It
would be the blindest of gambles for either
side to base a war plan on destroying the
other's power to retaliate. The Communist
rulers have never inclined to dangerously
blind gambles; indeed, they have shown them-
selves cautious in calculation to an ice-cold
point. The idea of a sudden *'*' knock-out "
makes no sense where there arc many airfields
from which the 11 hydrogen bombers " might
take off— it would be like staking one’s fife
on picking out the proverbial M needle in a
haystack.’ 1 That conclusion applies both
ways.

Unfortunately a grave risk remains that an
atomic war might develop unintentionally.
The authorities agree In saying it would be
14 mutual suicide," yet present defence plan-
f ning runs contrary to that conclusion. The
preparation and training of the western forces
are now to be based on the use of u tactical n
atomic weapons, with the idea of counter
balancing the potential attacker's greater
number of men. The idea has attractions on
the surface, but on closer examination the
advantages fade.

It is hard to draw, and even harder to
maintain, a dividing line between 14 tactical “
and 44 strategical ” action with such weapons,
so It is extremely doubtful if they could be
used without precipitating all-out war, with
;cn bombs. In such a war there would

be little value in the armies (with tactical air
forces) which the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is building up for the defence of
western Europe, These could not maintain a
defence once their homeland sources of supply
were wrecked— and if their homelands were
annihilated ihrir purpose would have
vanished.

son

for

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cor

for

is 1

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fac

24
fc
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ar
D
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fc

n,t

A massive attack by “ conventional
t forces only has become very unlikely. For it
i will be obvious to a calculating aggressor that
the less we are able to check it with similar
forces the more likely we should be driven to
retort with hydrogen bombs. The value of
armies lies in providing a non-suicidal defence
against attack. To arm them with atomic
weapons is to destroy the case for maintaining
them. In that form they would increase the
risks of spreading a local conflict into a
universal conflagration without diminishing
the fatal prospect.

The soldiers responsible for defence plan-
ning naturally desire the maximum possible
insurance, and it is not their responsibility to
judge whether the apparent addition offered
by nuclear weapons is outweighed by the in-
creased risk of homeland chaos and collapse.
In accepting the argument for such added in-
surance the statesmen may hopefully imagine
that they can restrain its use until the need is
clear. This is a frail hope.

The supreme fact of the hydrogen bomb era
is that war has become palpably suicidal. Here
is the real deterrent to the kind of attack that
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers,
Europe, is planning to meet, and it embraces
all contingencies except guerrilla-type action
combined with political subversion, or local
advances in remote non-vita! areas. To con-
centrate on preparing for the improbable is a
waste of our economic resources— dancing to
the Communists 1 tune in the self-exhausting
way they wish us to do.

For the lesser, more likely, contingencies
we need an extensive gendarmerie backed by
14 fire-brigade " forces of high efficiency and
mobility, in constant readiness. Short-service
conscripts arc not suited to such tasks. By
reorientating our defence preparations on the
basis of the probable, great savings could be
achieved.

The maintenance of the hydrogen bomb
deterrent to a 44 Great War " has to be the pri-
mary charge on the defence budget. It calls
for a strategic air force of superlative technical
quality and performance, but not of 1939-45
War quantity — especially as its essential pur-
pose is to prevent war, rather than to pursue
the now obsolete and nonsensical concept of
44 winning a war,” There is scope for big
savings in ordinary bombing forces, and in
navies. Moreover, as no air defence is capable
of preventing a catastrophic penetration by
14 hydrogen bombers," or bombardment by
atomic missiles, it is hard to see 1 any adequate
reason for large expenditure on air defence,

A realistic appreciation of the military
factors could change the whole economic out-
look for the better, w r hile also providing greater
security, by “ putting first things first,”

Yours, &c.,

, B- H. LIDDELL HART,
Wolverton Park, Buckinghamshire.

HHDDon

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Mr. Strath
Dr. Harley
Mr. Stoek

.-'■•is. v.

Mr. Strath outlined the plans which would shortly
be submitted to Ministers for training personnel of the
Army and Air Force in Civil Defence and for building up a
number of regional mobile columns manned with B.A.F. and
Army personnel, and apecially trained for rescue and fire-
fighting duties in support of civilian Civil Defence
Services. Before the latter project was submitted for the
approval of Ministers, it was important to establish that
the functions envisaged for the new military mobile columns
were fully compatible with the cd nditions which would exist
in the event of a ground burst thermo-nuclear explosion,
in so fnr as it could be gauged from the scientific
knowledge now available to us about Fall-out.

Discussion brought out the following points: -

(a) It would not he safe to assume that the enemy
would necessarily employ hiB thermo-nuclear weapons with
the object of maximising the Fall-out effect. He might opt
to achieve the maximum damage by blast and heat by air burst
explosions, which would not create serious problems from
Fall-out. The radius of damage by heat and damage from air
hurst would he greater than from a ground hurst, but the
mobile columns would be able to deploy their resources for
rescue and fire-fighting round the perimeter of the damaged
area from the outset, and their operations would not he
handicapped by radio-activity.

(b) Assuming, howevey, that ground burst nuclear
exolosions would occur, the inner gone of damage by heat and
blast would have a perimeter of the order of sixty miles

in length. Except on the hypothesis of calm air at all
levels, which was most unlikely, about three-quarters of the
aeriraeter - i.e. a front of forty-five miles or so - would
be approachable by the mobile columns in conditions similar
to those under (a) . In this zone radio-aotlvity would not
be the factor limiting at3tt®^bperations .

(o) The plume of Fall-out stretching downwind from
a fifteen mile segment of the sixty-mile perimeter would
deposit radio-active material in elongated contours which
for the most part would run parallel in the downwind
direction. Thus, the intensity of radio-active
contamination would vary relatively little at any given
distance from the edge of the plume towards the median
line of the plume f though the conditions facing the Givil
Defence oolumns would be complicated by damage from heat and
blast in these sectors nearer the epicentre of the explosion.

(d) Assuming that the Fall-out plume would have an
average width of about fifteen miles over a considerable
distance from the point of explosion, it was calculated
that it should be possible for personnel of the mobile

i •

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columns to operate for four or five hours at a at ret oh at
the edge of the plume and near Its neck during the second
day after the explosion. Each individual after his four
or five hours stretch would have to retire for several days
to reouperate in an area unaffected by Fall-out. The
corresponding time limit on the seoond day for personnel
operating within three to five miles of the centre of the
fifteen-mile wide plume would he about two hours. At the
centre of the plume the time limit on the second day would
be half an hourj exposure i here for two hours would be
lethal.

(e) It aeems likely that mobile columns would find
considerable difficulty in tackling their task from the
flanks of the plume In close proximity to the perimeter of
blast and heat damage, since fires would be raging in this
sector and would tend to spread downwind along the line of
the plume.

(f) A high degree of skill would be required of
the personnel in mobile columns tackling the area of the
plume. Their efficiency would be governed very largely by
the extent to which they were able to take advantage of
the considerable variations in radio-activity which would
bxlst in consequence of the screening effects of buildings,
etc. Operations would have to be conducted from under
cover and much woul depend on effective communications.
Detailed knowledge of conditions in the plume area would be
an essential prerequisite to the deployment of mobile
columns on rescue and fire-fighting* work; but it should be
possible to obtain a rapid and effective assessment of the
situation in the Fall-out area by Inspection from the air,
e.g. by helicopter. It might be that" first-hand info rmat lor
of conditions in the zone of the plume could be conveyed to
the Command posts in shelter on the ground from a
television camera in a helicopter.

(g) The conditions of devastation in proximity to
the neok of the plume would be such that the oasualty rate
was likely to be influenced considerably by psychological
factors. Rescue operations might well have to take one of
two forms - either deployment in limited ana carefully
selected areas soon after the explosion, or slower
deployment on a mere methodical basis.

(h) The screening effect of buildings, eto. and
the probability that wind variations would tend to spread
the area of Fall-out together mean that the theoretical
safety limit of working time within the plume area could
be expected to be lee 3 restrictive than was implied by the
calculations recently submitted to Ministers.

2hth December, 195lf

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

April 5, 1954

(Extract from the official report, volume 528, number 89)

“ That this House recognising that the hydrogen bomb with its immense
range and power as disclosed by recent experiments constitutes a grave threat
to civilisation and that any recourse to war may lead to its use, would welcome
an immediate initiative by Her Majesty’s Government to bring about a meet-
ing between the Prime Minister and the heads of the Administrations of the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for
the purpose of considering anew the problem of the reduction and control
of armaments and of devising positive policies and means for removing from
all the peoples of the world the fear which now oppresses them and for the
strengthening of collective peace through the United Nations Organisation.

The Prime Minister:

$ * * * *

“ We do not dissent in principle from the Motion which the Opposition have
placed upon the Paper and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman oil having
procured agreement to it. We shall not divide against this Motion provided it is
clearly understood that the word ‘immediate’ does not commit us to action at
an unsuitable time or lead only to courting a polite deadlock or even provoking
a refusal.”

* * * * *

Mr. Morrison:

sK # * * *

“ The Prime Minister has manifested some doubt about the word ‘ immediate
It is possible to exaggerate the word and to say that it might mean the next five
minutes \ But I say this to the Prime Minister, because although I am very glad
he has said that the Conservative Party does not propose to divide on the
Motion— and I am glad that that should be so— I hope there is no misunderstanding

of the word ‘ immediate ’. t _ , , , ,

When we say 4 immediate ’ we mean that the Government should take
immediate steps to set diplomatic action in motion, in the best and most effective
wav, between the three Powers concerned, with a view to the heads of Governments
meeting for the purpose of discussing this whole problem and in due course the

46543

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related problems of disarmament in general. Therefore, when the House passes,
as I hope it will, unanimously tonight, this Motion, it is our hope that there may
be an immediate initiative on the part of the Government. That is what we mean
in the Motion which we submit to the House.”

*****

Mr. Eden:

“Then,. I would say that, thirdly, there is any and every opportunity that
presents itself either at the United Nations or in any other way, for talks between
Ministers at any level, and, finally, the meeting at the highest level of all. All
or any of those means we are prepared to employ, and ready to employ, and it
is in that sense that we accept this Motion. We shall employ all and every one of
them, but, as a Government, we think that we are entitled to say how, when and
where to put the emphasis at any given time.

There is one other warning which I must give to the House — and it is
important. One cannot divorce these technical problems entirely from the general
international scene. We shall not be able to make progress, even at the highest
level, unless some progress is taking place in the general international picture. It
may be that Berlin did, to some extent — I think it did— make it easier for later
discussions to take place. It was not that we reached agreement but, as a result of
the atmosphere at Berlin, there was, perhaps a greater willingness to discuss
than before.

It may be that Geneva can help that still further. I hope so. That will be
the aim and object with which we shall go to the task. If so, those events, or some
other combination of events, may facilitate a meeting at any time at the highest
level. The moment we think there is the least chance of such a meeting being
fruitful we shall not hesitate to go for it. Why should we not? After all. my
right hon. Friend suggested it. 1 am not criticising the right hon. Gentleman the
Leader of the Opposition, but during the six years when his party were in power
there were no meetings at the highest level.”

The Resolution was carried without a division.

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HOME OFFICE

secret

SCIENTIFIC ADVISERS’ BRANCH

The Circulation of this paper has been
strictly limited. p| r §4*^ CD/SA 54

Tt is issued for the personal use of r

Copy No. ^

Some Aspects of Shelter and Evacuation Policy
to meet H-Bomb threat

1 Introduction

At the present time, with such air raid shelters as are at present in
existence and allowing for the planned evacuation of the priority classes,
the deaths from a single hydrogen bomb (assumed to have a power a thousand
times that of the Nagasaki atomic bomb) on London would be nearly 2^ million,
and from five bombs, one each on London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester
and Glasgow over 6 million. The first object of Civil Defence must be to
prepare a scheme to reduce this figure. No attempt is made in this note to
plan such a scheme, but the effect on casualties pf certain arbitrary shelter
and evacuation measures is discussed in order to indicate the order of
magnitude of the reduction which a properly worked out scheme might be expected
to achieve.

2 Method of Estimating Deaths

The deaths from a nominal atomic bomb among a population of standard
density (43.56 per acre) an in houses have been estimated (CDJFS(EA)(48)l4
(Revised)) as 31,000. This is equivalent to everyone within 0,6 miles of the
bomb being killed and no one being killed outside this radius. If the
generally accepted sealing laws for blast heat and gamma radiation are
i assumed to apply to hydrogen bombs, then it will be sufficiently accurate for
present purposes if we assume that for them everyone is killed within a
radius of 0.6 and no one is killed outside this radius. (Where P is the
lower factor of the bomb expressed as a multiple of the lower of the nominal
bomb). This assumption ignores the possibility that under certain circumstances
there could be a large number of additional casualties due to fall out or
radio-active crater debris.

From this and from the known night-time population distribution of our
major cities (CD/SA 33), it is a simple matter to calculate the deaths from
a bomb of any power on the centre of any particular city.

It must, however, be emphasised that the figures given in this note are
deaths only. For the nominal atomic bomb it has usually been assumed that
the injured are about equal in number to the killed. For the five hydrogen
bombs considered in this note it is fairly certain that the killed would out-
number the injured due to the high population densities in the central (killed)
areas as compared with the outer (injured) annuli. However, for the present,
no attempt has been made to estimate the number of injured, but in considering
the figures given in this note the existence of additional very large numbers
of injured must be borne in mind,

3 Deaths with no shelter or evacuation

Table 1 shows the deaths that would result from a bomb with a power of
10GN, 50GN and 10QQN on the centre of each of our five largest cities with
no shelter or evacuation.

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Table 1

Deaths _ with no evacuation and no shelter

City

Power of bombs 1

100N

50GN

100GN

London

830, 000

.2,420,000

3,540,000

Birmingham

500 , 000

1,070,000

1,360,000

Glasgow

780,000

1,180,000

1,330,000

Liverpool

590,000

1,080, 000

1,280,000 i

Manchester

360,000

1,070,000

1,350,000

Total

3,260,000

6, 820, 000

8,660,000

It will be seen that deaths from the five 10GQN bombs total over
8,6 million,

4 Effect of Shelter on deaths

Detailed designs of shelters required to give protection at specified
distances from hydrogen bombs of various size, particularly if burst at ground
level, have not been worked out. However it is of some interest to see what
reduction in deaths would result from shelters of specified performance, even
though it is uncertain just what strength and thickness would be required to
give that performance. The simplest way of specifying shelter performance is
by means of the "Safety Rating" concept developed in CD/3A 48. The safety
rating of a shelter was there defined as the saving in life, expressed as a
percentage of the deaths v/ithout shelter, resulting from the use of the shelter
in an area of uniform population density. This shelter with a safety rating
of 80 would save of the lives that would have been lost if everyone had
been in a house. Put in another way, shelter with a safety rating of 80
would reduce the area within which deaths occurred to one fifth of that for
people in houses, and therefore the radius of death to A , For a bomb with
a power factor of F the equivalent radius of death if Everyone is in a shelter
with a safety rating of 80 will therefore be 0.6 Similarly for shelter with

a safety rating of 90 the radius will be 0,6 3/f.

/fe

Although, as stated above, the design details of shelters to give these
safety ratings have not been determined, it seems probable that' surface or
trench shelters of rather less than Grade A strength (say 1000 Ib/sq.ft.)
would be required to give a safety rating of 80, and that a strength of about
2000 lb/sq, ft, would be required for a safety rating of 90, For small street
surface shelters the extra cost of an increase in strength of this sort 13 very
small (e.g. the structural cost of a 12"/1000 lb/sq.ft, design is given in
CD/SA 48 as £15,2 per person, based on seated capacity) and of a 12"/1400 lb/3q. ft.
design as £15.5 per person) and detailed studies may well show that shelters
with a higher safety rating than 90 are a practical proposition.

From the formulae for equivalent radii of death given above, and from the
population distribution given in CD/SA 33 we can calculate the expected deaths
in these two types of shelter under the same conditions of attack as were
given in Table 1 for a population all in houses. The results are given in
Tables 2 and J>.

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Table 2

‘ «

Deaths with no evacuation but with everyone ■
in a shelter with a Safety Ratine: of 80

City

Power of bomb

100H

50CN

100GN

London

135,000

474,000

785,000

Birmingham

129,000

353,000

484, 000

Glasgow

223,000

576,000

760,000

Liverpool

159,000

401,000

565,000

• Manchester

117,000

386,000

540,000

Total

763,000

2,190,.000

3,134,000

Table 3

Deaths with no evacuation but vdth everyone
in a shelter with a Safety Rating of 90

Ci+.y

Power of bomb

1Q0N

50GN

1QOGN

London

59, 000

216,000

36 7,000

Birmingham

64,000

1 91 , 000

296,000

Glasgow

115,000 ■

327,000

489,000

Xnverpool

78,000

238,000

340,000

Manchester

49, 000

186,000

315,000

Total

365,000

1,158,000

1,807,000

It will be seen by comparing Tables 2 and 3 vdth Table 1 that the reduction
in deaths achieved by these shelters decreases vdth increasing bomb size;
thus shelter vdth a safety rating of 80 reduces deaths by 77% against the
100N bomb, but only by 64% against the 100QN bomb. Similarly the 90% shelter
reduces deaths by 89% against the 1 00N bomb but only by 79% against the 1 00QN
bomb. The reason why these shelters fall increasingly short of their nominal
safety rating against bigger and bigger bombs is, because of the lower
population density in the outer annuli. For the same reason as the bomb size
increases, so does the proportion of the shelter provided which is wasted
since the occupants are killed whether they are in shelter or not. This
raises the question as to whether, against -very large bombs, it is worth while
providing shelter In the area immediately round the probable aiming point.

The value of any shelter is clearly directly proportional to its chance of
saving the occupants from death or injury; if no bomb falls near a particular
shelter it is wasted on that occasion because the occupants would have been
safe without shelter, and if the bomb falls so close that the occupants are
killed anyway, it is for good and all wasted. Thus there exists round any

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bomb, for any particular type of shelter, an annulus where people in houses
would have been killed or injured, but where shelter would have protected
them. In practice, qf cou rse, this, annulus mil not have sharply defined
boundaries. Some people .closer, to. the 'boob would; bo saved by shelter and some
outside the annulus would have become casualties without shelter, but are
saved by it. For the purpose of this preliminary study however, we shall not
be too far out if we regard this annulus as having sharply defined boundaries
and we shall assume- that everyone within it is saved by the shelter.

If we knew exactly what size the bomb was going to be and where it was
going to fall shelter policy would therefore be a very simple matter; we
should evacuate tile people from a circular area round the bomb where it was
impossible to provi.de shelters sufficiently strong to protect them, and we
should provide shelters in, and- only in, the annulus where people would be
killed or injured in houses but where shelters would protect them. Shelters
in this annulus would have a 11 value" of 10 Qfi, i.e. they would be certain to
save their occupants from death or injury. With the nominal atomic bomb the
uncertainty of what aiming point or points the. enemy will choose 1 and the
expected vagaries of bomb fall about this aiming point, make it not very
useful to try to fit our shelter provision to -the probable location of this
annulus. This is illustrated in Fig.1 which shows the percentage of the
shelter provided which actually saves life for shelter with a safety rating
of 80 at different distances from the aiming point for four different values
of the probable aiming error (l 3 ) . It will "be seen that over the most likely
range of P (0.25 miles - 1 mile), this percentage never exceeds 50^. Corres-
ponding curves for the 1 OQN and 1 00 ON bombs arc given in Figs. 2 and 3, and
the much higher value of shelter (in the right place) for similar aiming
errors should be noted.

The considerations discussed above strongly suggest that the right policy
against the hydrogen bomb would be to evacuate the central areas of our
larger cities and t provide shelter where it is most useful, i.e. in the
annulus surrounding the central evacuation area.. The optimum size of this
central evacuation area clearly depends on the size of bomb likely to be used,
and on the standard of protection provided in the shelter annulus; Figs. 2
and 3 suggest that it should have a radius of about miles for the 1 OQM
bomb and about 3 miles for the lOGON bomb if shelter with a safety rating of
CO is provided in the surrounding annulus. As a result of further studies, and
of further information about the hydrogen bomb, it may be possible to determine
the largest size of bomb likely to be used. If this maximum size of bomb can
be determined it will be comparatively simple to determine the optimum size of
the central evacuation area for. various standards of protection in the ,
surrounding shelter annulus; from this study and from an estimate of the
relative "cost" of shelter and evacuation it should be possible to detertnine
the best overall policy.

In the meantime, however, it is of some interest to examine the effect
on casualties of an arbitrary evacuation area of radius 5 miles in the case
of London and 3 miles in the case of Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool and
Manchester, in conjunction with shelter having a safety rating of 80 and 90
in the surrounding annulus. In each case the evacuees from the central area'
are assumed to be accommodated in the surrounding annulus, arbitrarily taken
as between 5 and 15 miles in the case of Inndon and between 3 uud 7 miles in
the case of the other four cities. The factors by which this evacuation would
increase the population density in the ' reception' annulus are as follows ;
London 1.5, Birmingham 1.6, Glasgow 2.5, Liverpool 1.9 and Manchester 1.7.

The deaths resulting from an attack with 1 00 ON bombs after this scheme had
been implemented are shewn in Tables 4 and 5.

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Table 4

Deaths from 1Q00W bombs after evacuation of 5 mile radius circle
for London and 3 mile radius for other cities. Evacuees assumed
accommodated in surrounding annulus where they and the original
inhabitants are provided with shelter having a' safety rating
of 80.

City

position of bomb

Central

. 2 miles
from centre

In position
to cause
maximum deaths

London

5 18,000

Birmingham

159,000

256,000

Glasgow

171,000

247,000

Liverpool

1 74, 000

247,000

Manchester

1 64, 000

257, 000

Total

668,000

1,525,000

Table 5

Deaths from 10QGN bombs after evacuation of 5 mile radius circle
for London and 3 mile radius for other cities. Evacuees assumed
accommodated in surrounding annulus where they and the original
inhabitants are provided with shelter ’with a safety rating of 90.

City

Position of bomb

Central

2 miles
from centre

In position
to cause
maxLmum deaths

London

261 , 000

Birmingham

56, 000

155,000

Glasgow

64, 000

152,000

Liverpool

67,000

152,000

Minchester

62,000

151,000

Total

249, ooo

071,000

It will be seen fi-om Tables 4 and 5 that, with this scheme of total
evacuation of a central area and shelter in the surrounding annulus, a central
bomb causes no deaths at all. Clearly, however, the enemy would be aware of
our provisions and might well choose to drop his bombs where they would cause
maximum casualties. On average, and without allowing for local concentrations
which would be bound to occur in the ’’reception annulus", this would be at
about 7 miles from the centre in the case of London and about 4 miles for the
other cities. The average deaths from bombs in these worst positions are
therefore given in Tables 4 and 5. Collaring these figures with those to
Table 1 it will be seen that evacuation plus shelter with a safety rating of
80 has reduced deaths by 82 %, and plus shelter with a safety rating of 90 by ^ 0 %.

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Conclusion

Without shelter or evacuation, the deaths from an attack with only five
hydrogen "bombs might total over million. The primary object of Civil
Defence must be to reduce this figure. Neither evacuation alone nor shelter
alone could reduce these deaths to a manageable proportion, but with a
suitable combination of the two, consisting of the total evacuation of the
population of the central areas into the surrounding annuli where shelter
would be provided, it should be possible to reduce the maximum deaths from

this particular attack to something of the order of one million.

April, 1954.

E.L.W.

0SA.A1/4/32.

1990/54

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♦

TH U MAN C HESTER QUA " .- PIAN
18th February., 1954

DEVASTATION OP HYDROGEN WEAPON
Island Obliterated In U. S. Test

Chicago. February 17

The chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy
Committee, Mr. Sterling Cole, hinted to-day that the
United States might have hydrogen weapons even more putent
than the experimental one which tore a crater a mile wide
and 175 feet deep in the floor of the Pacific Ocean in
1952 ,

He said that the United States had "in being" an
entire family of atomic weapons, some of them 25 times more
powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945*

Mr.. Cole gave details of the 1952 experiment in a
speech at a commercial lunch here. He said:

"The thermo-nuclear test of 1952 completely obliterated
the test island in the Eniwetok Atoll. It tore a cavity
in the floor of the ocean - a crater measuring a full mile
in diameter and 175 feet in depth at its lowest point.

Within this crater, one could place 11+0 structures the
size of our nation's Capitol.

If it occurred in a modern city, I am told that the
heat and blast generated in the 1952 hydrogen test would
cause absolute destruction over an area extending three
miles in all directions from the point where the hydrogen
device exploded.

This is an area of complete devastation - using the
word 'complete' in its most precise meaning - six miles in
diameter. The area of severe- to -moderate damage would
stretch in all directions to seven miles from ground zoro.

Finally, the area of light damage would reach to ten
miles from the point of detonation. In other words, an
area covering 300 square miles would be blanketed by this
hydrogen ex plosion. "

Because of what he called "the appalling meaning of
the hydrogen bomb." Mr* Cole said that "it is not enough
to notify an enemy that the attempted destruction of our
own cities would be automatically answered by the destruction
of his."

" Atom-Rattling "

Mr. Cole said that security prevented him from
commenting on where "our hydrogen weapons programme now
stands and from outlining the directions in which it is

moving, but I o an assur© you that it is moving* Ho
felt that "it is more sinful to conceal the power of the
atom than to reveal it." He referred indirectly to a

-1

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recent remark by the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Charles Wilson,
who told a news conference that he wished that there was less
"atom-rattling. "

Russia's capacity to deliver a crippling atomic or
hydrogen weapon attack on the United States at present might
be debatable, but "beyond any question" the Russians would
be able to do so in "one or two or three years from now. "

He was confident that the United States could strike back,
but that would only be a half-measure. "We must make it
clear that our continental defence system could cripple
and repel any air fleet directed against us."

At present it was possible that nine of ten enemy
planes could reach their targets — "and this is an age
when only one hydrogen weapon would be needed to destroy
the vitals of any American city." Mr* Cole called for
increased defences, including the use of "small-size
atomic weapons specifically adapted to anti-aircraft
defence. " He added:

"It is entirely within our capacity to guard all
vulnerable approaches to the North American continent
with interceptor-squadrons and guided missiles armed with
atomic warheads, and to have these warheads in such
profusion that an enemy seeking to penetrate our defences
would confront a barrier of atomic firepower."

British United Press, Reuter, and
Associated Press.

- 2 -

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SECRET

HEAT AND POV/ER FROM NEC LEAK ENERGY
Summary ox 1 Conclusions

1, The chief application of recent nuclear discoveries
will in all probability take the forra of central generation
of electricity and steam from heat released "by stationary
"atomic piles". (S 2)

2, A fission chain reaction "based, on uranium or thorium
is the only likely method of releasing nuclear binding
energies. (g 3)

3. The rare uranium isotope U233 is the only material
known to occur in nature with fission characteristics which
will produce a self- supp or t ing chain reaction. ( § 4 )

h. Present practice involves slowing down the fast^
neutrons emitted at fission to thermal volpeitites, by
including a "moderator" in the "atomic pile". (S 4)

5. Natural uranium and thorium exposed to thermal, neutrons
emitted in the course of a fission chain reaction, produce
even more fissile materials, known as plutonium and 11233
respectively. (g£5 4 and 5)

6. Fission of U233 surrounded by thorium breeds more
fresh U233 than the amount consumed, enabling the stock oi
fissile material to be increased and the natural thorium to
be wholly consumed. ( § 5)

7, Fast neutron fission in uranium and thorium promise
further 'but less certain possibilities of breeding fissile
material -and wholly consuming the natural metals. (jjjj 6)

8, Compared with a potential world output of 3,000' tons
a year, 10C$> consumption of 19 tons of thorium per annum
would release enough heat to replace all existing sources of
energy in Great Britain. (| ?)

9. Several thousand tons of thorium are however required
as an initial working stock. (§ 7)

10. Assured world suyilieo of uranium may, on the other
hand, not yield more than 8.3 tons of plutonium (-6.8 tons
of U233) altogether. (SS 8 and 9)

11. Although only equivalent to world energy requirements
for a fortnight, this email supply of fissile material is
ample to initiate breed in : in thorium for large-scale
supplies. (S 9)

12. This places great importance upon the rate at -which

U 233 can breed; it is calculated to be capable of doubling
every 2 to h years.. (g 10)

13. Ouch a rapid breeding rate makes the acquisition of
small early supplies of plutonium (or U235) very much more
important than big later supplies. (§ 11)

- 1 -

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J ^

1U. At that breeding rate. Great Britain could Replace A

all existing energy supplies and increase them 3 by 13.91
to 1970 , if 1000 kilos of fissile material ' were provided over
a five year period commencing in 1950 .

l l 5 Such a rapid hull 1— up v, r ould only he achieved in practice
if the highly specialised pgrsoniiel and capacity required were
planned f ar ahead on t ' le most c oropr eheiisi /o s c a ^ c . I s l - 1

16. Military poouirements for a large stock and continuing
supply of f i soil o t na torial o for at ora i c ox p 1 o e x v o s , f ar i r on _
competing with the claims of useful energy production, can m
fact only he realised as part of a comprehensive nuclear
energy system. (S 13)

17. Power piles designed to ensure the speediest build-up

of fissile material will he less economic than -those suitable
when peak output has been reached. ( g 14)

IS. Atomic pil s for generating power will have short lives,
proportional to their total output, owing to 'the effects
radio-activity. Thi mans that all atomic costs _ will ^in
effect ho current costs j so no largo initial capital outlay
will he involved in the establishment of an atomic system,
apart from the cost of changing the channels through which energy
is distributed and used. (g 15 ) •

19 . Very rough calculations suggest that the generation share
of nuclear energy coats per unit might he two- thirds that of a
coal-fired system at current prices, which would reduce uooal
delivered unit costs about- one -quart op. (g 13).

20. The chief effect upon energy costs would be through the
stimulus which raid ar energy supplies would give to the adoption
of a compr Chens ive elec tricity /district-steam system, _ which
together with the direct gain of cheaper generation might
reduce present average unit costs of all forms of energy by
throe-fifths (from -g to pcnco/KWH) . (§§ 18 and 1 9, and

Appendix B).

21 . The c o ns c quant s t itnulu s t b modernisation in industry, and
the related up-grading of the average skill of workmen, would .
contribute most markedly to the increase of national productivity
and living standards. (gg £0 and 21 ) .

r >2 The coal industry would he converted from a grave source
of* weakness into a small and efficient source of exports and
r aw mater ial for synthetic products. ( § 22 ) .

cheat) power would encourage many new extractive and
manipulative processes, which’ will make this country less
dependent on foreign, supp lies, and ab 1 c 1 0 c omp e t e more off oc n-
vely abroad as well as to live better at home. (g

24. Great economics in transport and improvements in location
of* industry would be secured by a nuclear energy system; and
the elimination of smoke ’would represent a substantial further
IMS cconony. (gg 3, ana 25%

eg An author it. at lyg assessment of the technical possibilities
and economic im plications of nude ir energy should ho put in
hand on a continuing basis without delay. (gg 26 and 27 }.

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chain reaction is the rare uranium isotope U235 f which is 1 part^
in 140 of natural uranium. However, in the course of this ™
U233 reaction, the predominant uranium isotope U238 is converted
into the new element plutonium when it absorbs slow neutrons,
and plutonium has a neutron emission behaviour even better than
that of U235« Nearly 4 atoms of plutonium are produced, for
every 3 of IT 23 5 fissioned , and being a chemically distinct
element it is much more readily separated from U238 than is U235.
Separation cf pure fissile material (plutonium or U235) is
necessary to make atomic bombs, and it greatly facilitates the
establishment of chain reaction systems to produce useful power.

The object of the present type of primary atomic pile constructed
of ^natural uranium is simply to produce plutonium in place of
U235, primarily in order to avoid the very elaborate and costly
isotope separation of the latter on a very large scale* These
primary piles have not been designed to operate at a temperature
high enough to produce useful energy. War-time practice used
up only 2 % of the U235 put into the pile (l/7000th of the
uranium), and now only 5 4 can be consumed in a single cycle.

But the substantial stocks depleted to this small extent can be
much more fully exploited by recycling methods now in course of
development.

Natural thorium cannot initiate a self-supporting chain
reaction, But if it is exposed to surplus neutrons emitted by
U235 on plutonium chain reactions, their capture after being
slowed down converts the thorium into another highly fissile
isotope of uranium, U233« In natural uranium piles U233 can
only be produced at a rate of 10-154 of the amount of U235
fissioned* But in piles constructed with uranium in. which the
U235 content has been enriched by partial isotope separation,
much higher rates can be achieved. And in a pile constructed
with pure plutonium, a rate as high as 804 is possible; this
arrangement is known as a converter pile. When enough U233 is
brought together to establish a chain reaction, it releases more
neutrons per fission (apart from captures in the fissile material
not producing fission ^ than U235 or plutonium, and can produce
between 1*10 and 1.. 25 new atoms of U233 from thorium for each atom
fissioned, allowing for the proportion of neutrons likely to be
lost in the process. So the stock of U233 can be made to grow
cr breed, and the natural thorium from Which it breeds can be
wholly consume d* It is this process which provides the most

certain key to lar ;;u -scale power production by nuclear energy,

6, An alternative chain reaction system is possible, in which
fission would be produced 'without slowing down the neutrons.

This might permit a large proportion of natural uranium (or
thorium) to be consumed, because fast neutron fission would emit
a sufficient surplus of neutrons to produce breeding of plutonium
from U238 in the sane way as with U233 from thorium. This
process represents an important possibility; but, unlike the
slow fission breeding of U233, it is by no means yet a firm
prospect. Past fission may offer very high breeding rates
(1,3 new atoms for each atom of U235 consumed, and 1,6 with
plutonium); but heat extraction rates are likely to be much
lower than with slow fission of U233, which probably means a
slower accumulation of fissile material. Another related
possibility is fast neutron chain reactions in pure plutonium
or U233, By producing concentrations larger than the critical
size for very short periods,

Paw Material Supplies

7, In order to give some indication of quantitative orders
of magnitude, the weight of thorium which would have to be
consumed to replace existing sources of energy may be

-4-

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•Roc online nda t i o n

27 „ An authoritative study of the technical, prospect^ cost
and economic implications of a comprehensive steam and
electricity system "based on nuclear energy should he
undo r t alee n w i t hpu t do lay, on a conti nu i ng "basis. such,
a study mi g h t "be initi a ted "by gi vi ng the ^resent i rierrio r a ndum
a wide official circulation in a suitably revised perm.

Cabinet Office, 0. W.l.

f~~TH SEPTEMBER, 194-6

APEEKBIX A

ftri-TE OP ACCTTi'lI L^TIOI! OF U2 -5 BY BR EEDING II’ THORIUM

1. One atora of U233 emits 2.60 neutrons at fission,
or 1,6 extra neutrons after allowing for replacement
of the neutron whiiich caused the fission. Between. 0.1 o ^
and 0 o 30 of these extra neutrons are absorbed in U233 Without
producing fission -and 0.17 to 0.20 are lost to the structure
of the pile or escape. So between 1,10 and 1.25 neutrons
remain to produce new atoms of U233 in thorium. . -‘■he stock
of U233 ie~ therefore increased 1 0—25^ each time it is
consumed.

2 > p heat- release rate of 10 MW per kilo of L2pp in the
oile is exoectcd to be possible in a helium-cooled oeryllia-
mode rated sandwich- ty pie pile. Consumption of one kilo
of IJ 233 releases 20,000 MWH of heat. The time for complete
consumption is therefore £000 hours .

x Something approaching half of the U233 stock may be .
tied uu in c homi cal ae .•oration it any t ime , a nd an operating
load factor of say 80jfmust 'no .allowed for W33 w the gle
to cover periodic interruptions. The U233 will therefore
only be actually cooking 40?. of the time, so it All t_,ko
?000 ■’ 0,40 = 5000 hours for complete consumption. In
o?S°r V vorto, there will te 1 ^turM.y?rs yfcjM.

U with 10-2% increase or. 1.75 turnovers, the stock will

l&ltS ortyTand 41 58, they

STe expressed as in 2 to 4 years.

5 . The actual value will dependlurgsly upon the exact

ssa £ asrs.’K isTOWM®*’*

in par act ice.

- 12 -

il.. —i

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lO,li)oknutTjg Stmt,
WBhiitfall.

MOST SECRET

MR. AB^BTROMG

I attach a copy of the draft
letter to Preside at Truman about the
Atomic Bomb in its latest form. The
Prime Minister wishes this to be
circulated first to the Ministers who
attended the Meeting on August 29 for
their comments on the. general line of
approach. Will you please arrange this?

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fri'/NSX

Ever since the U.S.A. demonstrated to the world the
terrible effectiveness of the atomic bomb I have been

increasingly aware of the fact that the world is now facing
entirely new conditions. Kever before has there been a
weapon which can suddenly and without warning be employed
to destroy utterly the nerve centre of a great nation. The
destruction wrought by the Germans through their air fleet
on Warsaw and Rotterdam was startling enough, but subsequent
attempts to do the same to London were defeated though
without much to spare. Our own attacks on Berlin and the
Ruhr resulted in the virtual destruction of great centres of
industry. In Europe the accumulated material wealth of
decades has been dissipated in a year or two, but all this
is not different in kind from what was done in previous wars
in Europe during the Dark Ages and the Thirty Years war, in
America by your own civil war. Despite these losses civile
saticn continued and the general framework of human society

and. . .

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- 2 -

,d of relations between peoples remained. The emergence
of this new weapon has meant not a quanta tive but a quali-
tative change in the nature of warfare.

Before its advent military experts still thought and
planned on assumptions not essentially different from those
of their predecessors. It is true that the conservative
(with a small c.') mentality tended to maintain some oi these
although they were already out of date. For instance we
found at Potsdam that we had to discuss a decision taken at
the Crimea Conference as to the boundaries of Poland. These
were delimited by rivers although the idea of a river as a
strategic frontier has been out of date ever since the
advent of air warfare. Nevertheless it was before the
coming of the atomic bomb not unreasonable to think in terms
cf strategic areas and bases although here again it has
seemed to me that too little account has been taken of the

air weapon.

Now, however, there is in existence a weapon of small
bulk capable of being conveyed on to a distant target with

inevitable catastrophic results. te can set no bounds to

the* * *

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- 5 -

the possibilities of airplanes flying through the strato-
sphere dropping atomic bombs on great cities. There are
possible developments of the rocket for a similar purpose.

1 understand that the power of the bombs delivered on
Nagasaki may be multiplied many times as the invention
develops. I have heard no suggestion of any possible means
of defence. The only deterrent is the possibility of the
victim of such an attack being able to retort on the victor.
In many discussions on bombing in the days before the war it
was demonstrated that the only answer to the bomber was the
bomber. The war proved this to be correct. This obvious
fact did not prevent bombing but resulted in the destruction
of many great centres of civilisation. Similarly if man-
kind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the
political relationships of States sooner or later these
bombs will be used for mutual annixdlation.

The present position is that whilst the fundamental

scientific discoveries which made possible the production of

the atomic bomb are now common knowledge, the experience of

the actual processes of manufacture and knowledge of the

solutions which were found to the many technical problems

which. . .

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tmich arose, are confined to our two countries and the
actual capacity for production exists only in the United
States. But the very speed and completeness of your
achievement seems to indicate that any other country
possessing the necessary scientific and industrial resources
could also produce atomic bombs within a few years if it
decided now to make the effort. Again, our two Governments
have gone a long way in securing control of all the main
known sources of uranium and thorium, the two materials at
present believed to be of importance for the process. But
new sources are continually coming to light and it would not
be surprising if it were found that large deposits existed
in parts of the world outside our direct or indirect control
Nor may it be altogether easy to defend the measures which
we have already taken in this matter when they become known
and are considered in the light of such principles as that
of the freedom of access to raw materials.

It would thus appear that the lead which has been
gained as a result of the past effort put forth in the
United States may only be temjoraiy and that we have not

much ...

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much time in which to decide what use is to be made of that
lead. It is true that other countries, even if they
succeed in producing atomic bombs, may not, at any rate at
first, be able to produce them on the same scale. I am
told, however, that, in future, it may be possible for the
process to be developed at a far smaller cost in industrial
resources than has inevitably been demanded by your pioneer
enterprise, carried through in time of war when speed was
the first essential; and in any case, with a weapon of such
tremendous destructive power, it is perhaps doubtful whether
the advantage would lie with the possessor of the greatest
number of bombs rather than with the most unscrupulous.

A further consideration which I have had in mind is
that the successful manufacture of bombs from plutonium
shows that the harnessing of atomic energy as a source of
power cannot be achieved without the simultaneous production
of material capable of being used in a bomb. This means
that the possible industrial uses of atomic energy cannot be
considered separately from its military and security
implications.

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It is clear to me, therefore, that, as never before,
the responsible statesmen of the great Powers ere faced with
decisions vital not merely to the increase of human happiness
but to the very survival of civilisation. Until decisions
are taken on this vital matter, it is impossible for any of
us to plan for the future. Take the case of this country.
Curing the war we had to shift our industry to the less
exposed parts of our island. We had to provide underground
shelters for our people. Now we have to restart our
industries end rebuild our wrecked homes. Am I to plan for
a peaceful or a warlike world? If the latter I ought to
direct all our people to live like troglodytes underground
as being the only hope of survival. I have to consider
the defence forces required in the future in the light of
San Francisco, but San Francisco did not envisage the atomic
bomb. Its conceptions of security are based on appreciatio
of a situation existing in June of this year. We considered
regional security and a policing of the world by the Powers
with the greatest resources in the interests of all so that
there should be available the forces to prevent aggression.

I ...

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- 7 -

I have only mentioned Great Britain as an example;
for every Head of Government must, in varying degree, find
himself confronted with the same problems.

In these circumstances while realising to the full
the importance of devising means to prevent as far as
possible the power to produce this new weapon getting into
other hands, my mind is increasingly directed to considering
the kind of relationship between nations which the existence
of such an instrument of destruction demands. In your
country and ours resort is not bEd to violence not just
because we have efficient police forces but because the vast

majority of our citizens are law abiding and conditions are

such that men are not driven to have recourse to desperate
measures. Our constitutions allow of peaceful change.

fie have it seems to me if we are to rid ourselves of
this menace to make very far reaching changes in the relation
ship between States. fie have in fact in the light of this
revolutionary development to make a fresh review of world
policy and a new valuation of what are called national
interests. We are ourselves attempting to undertake such a

review ...

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- 8 -

revie*. What was done on American initiative at San
Francisco was first step at erecting the framework of a new
\ c or Id society, bat it v,as necessarily tentative, having regard
only to the requirements imposed by the technical advances
in methods of warfare then known. Sow it seems to us that
the building, the frame work of which was erected at San
Francisco, must be carried much further if it is to be an
effective shelter for humanity. We have to Eecure that
these new developments are turned to the benefit rather than
to the destruction of mankind. We must bend our utmost
energies to secure that better ordering of human affairs
which so great s revolution at once renders necessary end
should make possible.

To proceed on these lines would Inevitably involve
risks whatever guarantees might be sought and given in
advance. To the countries possessing the temporary
advantage it would, therefore, constitute, in some degree,
an act of faith, justified only if the risks of not so
proceeding are in fact greater. I realise fully that for
you, who have expended such vast resources on the project.

such . . .

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- 9 -

h £n act of faith would be even more difficult than for us,

I am therefore most anxious, before we proceed much further
with our own deliberations, to know how your mind is moving;
and it is primarily for this reason that I have set before you
at such length my tentative vie»s before they have really begun
to crystallise.

Mr. Byrnes may, I hope, be able to tell us something
of your plans when we welcome him in London tut, later on,

I think it may be essential that you and I should discuss this
momentous problem together so that we may agree what the next
step should be and be in a position to take it before the fears
and suspicions which may be developing elsewhere have got such
a firm hold as to make even more difficult any solution we may
decide to aim at.

The President of the United States of America.

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» V I t - i 'i

I have set oat below some reflections about the
significance of the atomic bomb on which I should very
each line to have your views.

'veryone will agr c that this discovery raises
major questions of world policy which ore not only of the
most far reaching importance in thetas© Ives, but or© also
fundamental, in the sense that upon the answer to them
will depend unnuoerable decisions in every sphere of civil
and oilitary planning. It wi*l be recognised that the
emergency of this weapon radically altera the whole
foundation of our defence policy. £ ueations of bases,
and frontiers, of air raid precautions and t.e strategic
distribution of industry must all be looite - at in a new
light. In the field of foreign affaix*s, too, v o are
discussing every day questions i.iany of which have largely
loot their meaning, or at any rate hove a-cued an
entirely different complexion, as a result of this
discovery.

It io therefore of great importance that, on tii©
one hand, our military staff 6 should begin to consider aa
soon as possible what this new influence jeans in terms of
our future plane for defence and world te curi ty • To do

this it will be necea ary to arrive at some agreed
interpretation of the present ©fleets and future
potentialities of the bomb as a weapon, and X hop© that
our scientific and military experts will co-operate
together In wording out tuc answers.

But behind these purely jaiiitary aspects there
lies the wider question of international policy upon
which everything else depends. Uuci. thought has, I jr-now,

- 1 -

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been given on your aide to these qua tlona ae It has on
ours, and in your statements over the radio and to
Congress after the bomb had been dropped you expressed
your determination that this immense new force in world
affaire oho old be controlled* and should be devoted to
the service and not to the destruction of mankind* 1
welcomed that statement and offered the full co-operation
of Hie Qjasty'o Government to that end*

e have been giving come thought to the vaatter here
and are anxious to ..now how your Ideas are level oping*

It seems to us that the fundamental issue concerns the
beet use which can be and© of the position of advantage
at present held by those governments who have shared in
the enterprise* fre start from the a- sumption 1th which
we take it you would agree, that we could not hope, even
if wo wished, to maintain indefinitely the sole control
of this weapon. It must be expected that wbutever we
do other countries will develop the technique, perhaps
within a few years, and will learn how to produce bomba
even though they may not for some time be able to produce
them on so large a scale* America may, through her
early start and her great resources, be able to maintain
the load both in the production of the present weajjon and
possibly also in the development of new types* But
there is al ays the possibility of new discoveries which
will reduce the present advantage*

Then there is the question of raw materials* Our
two Governments have gone a long way In securing effective
control of all the important sources of uranium and
thorium, the two materials which *we at present believe to
be of inp ortanco for the process* But we do not mnow
what other oources may exist in the world* Only the
other day our geologists told ua of extensive uepoaita ^
Sweden* Now it ©seas there may be important quontltiQ B

- 2 -

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In South Africa* It would certainly not be surprising

if large deposits were fouu . to exist in parts of the

w >rld outside our control* We .ay well find alco that

the steps we have tsuen and are still ta.ing to secure

control of all the important eourcea may be criticised*

S'e are at this moment asking Sweden to take a difficult

decision in promising to sell to us and to us only any

uranium which she may produce* .

Then again X am told that in the future it may be

possible for countries to develop this process at a far

smaller coot In industrial resources than has been

inevitably demanded by your pioneer enterprise, carried
through in time of war when speed was the first essential*
The 'successful manufacture also of bombs from
jg iu to iilum shows that the possible Industrial use of
atomic energy as a source of power cannot be separated
from its military use, and this may ultimately have a
considerable bearing on our problems.

The position seems to be, therefore, that while at
present we hold a position of advantage, we must expect

that other countries will try to overtake ua in the
future. In the meantime they may as- ae cither to impart
the oecrtta to theta or to supply them with materials.

You will have heard that the Huesians have already made

enquiries of the Canadian Government about a possible
purchase of a small quantity of uranium* It seems
Important to consider how these and similar requests
should be met* I share your view that we can only
disclose to other govern rarnto more than has already been
published to the world. If that disclosure can be made
a part of some effective arrangement for bringing this
weapon under proper control* But I am sure you would

agree that we should lose no time in considering wtjat
form such a system might ta-C, in order that, if such &

-3.

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thing can bo devised, we r^ay not necessarily arouse
suspicion and fear amongst others that we intend to heap
this weapon to ourselves end use It as a threat a ainst
them.

I feel sure that we neither of ua underrate the
difficulties* I must confess that X find it fiord at
present to see whet sort of agreement could be proposed
which would effectively prevent the development of this
weapon by those who have the necessary resources. ould
any system of international inspection be practicable'/
Should we ever be able to penetrate the curtain which
conceals the vast area of Russia? If not. Is not ;ome
wider approach necessary baaed on the wor~ ao hopefully
begun at Son Francisco whlc. . mast be extended and carried
farther? Ur are v/e to rely on the hope that if we are
more strongly armed in this way than others, so that an
atomic bomb on one of our great cities con he answered
by instant and overwhelming retaliation, these terrible
weapons may never have to be uaed at all'* That would
indeed be a precarious foundation on which to ha.e to
build our plans for the future.

These are come of the guestions to which we have
till to fin. an answer, but to watch an answer is
urgently ne ded. I hope that . r. Byrnes may be ready to
d locus a them with us when he comes to London and may be
able to tell ue In what direction your mini is .oving.
Later on 1 think it may be essential that you and I
should discuss them together so that we *oy be ready to
tali them over with Uarahal Stalin.

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This position faces every Head of State in Europe
and in the whole world. At the present time the secret
of the manufacture is held by our two countries and the
machinery for production by your country.

Here would follow the account of the steps taken to
deal with raw materials, etc.

It would then be added that, so far as our scientists
can see, other nations will be able to learn the secret.

We have therefore only a short period of a few years
in which we can take steps to control the position.

We do not believe that the matter can be dealt with
by inspection in a world of potentially warlike states.
Machinery by which the matter must be dealt with and
controlled is therefore world organisation.

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r tOP SECRET 1

If EfUW CABINET OFFICES.

CL0Si.U

File Number

3S. -Jj

PRRT £

L ♦

r n cwff. ~ 4 <-

Dale of Registration. IMOiTta. ’

■for -wREL

(This Frills SECRET and must not go outside the Office.)

Previous Reference

PflflT t .

1 H 1C R M 0 ' N U Ck£RR_ We flPONS.

Policy Snd> Research

For Cross References see inside
of Cover,

Referred to

Date

ia|*jsV.

2-5/i/n'

Zi/i/yr

$!%'<■

(lr|/*Y

X&f:

7Tt~~

</tf

Referred to

Date

Referred to

Date

PjL£0S£

✓ To

CENTRAL
WAR PLANS
SECRETARY

DATE

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FILE NO ,
59

59/A

59/B

59/1

59/5

59/16

12 / 4/90

1 5/34/66
1 9/1 0/205
19/10/205/1
19/10/262
19/10/262/1

19/10/263

2/5/14

4/5/60

2/1/5

2/1/8

SUBJECT

x he rmo— nuclear weapons. Policy and research.

Hydrogen bomb. Codeword For:

Thermo-nuclear weapons. Miscellaneous Hansard
and Press cuttings.

Atomic Energy: Industrial uses.

Atomic Energy. Collaboration with the United
States on research and development.

Atomic weapons. Storage of:

Armed Forces. Problems of: in the initial

phase of a war.

Location of the seat of Government in war.

Defence plans of the Service Departments.

Review of Defence Expenditure.

Defence plans of the Civil Departments,

Defence plans of the Civil Departments.

(British Broadcasting Corporation).

Stockpiling preparations for war.

Civil Defence Services: Organisation.

Central War Plans Secretariat, Functions,

Civil Defence, Evacuation policy.

Civil Defence. Production of civilian

respirators.

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CONTENTS

Page

I. Introduction - 1

II. Summary. 4

The hypothetical attack 4

Casualties and damage to dwellings 5

Biological effects _ 5

Environmental contamination . 7

Additional data on radioactive fallout 8

Survival measures 8

Strategic implications 9

III. The attack pattern and basic assumptions 9

IV. Basic effects of weapons employed 10

Partition of energy in a nuclear explosion 10

Differences in airbursts and surface bursts 11

Nuclear weapons effects on materials and structures 12

Nuclear weapons effects on man 13

Summary of nuclear weapons effects 15

V. Radioactive fallout patterns, physical damage and casualties in the

United States 15

Fallout patterns 15

Damage sustained by dwellings - 16

Casualties 17

VI. Characteristics of radioactive fallout 21

Worldwide fallout 21

Production of radioactive debris 22

Distribution of worldwide fallout 22

Cesium 137 and carbon 14 24

Basic properties of radioactive fallout 24

General description of the mechanisms of formation 24

Properties of fallout material from a land-surface detona-
tion 25

Arrival and deposition characteristics - 27

Deviations with other detonation conditions 28

Dose rate to total dose relations 28

Factors modifying behavior of radioactive deposits - 30

Effect of wind and weather 30

The effect of terrain and builtupness on the radiation 33

VII. Biological effects 34

Introduction........ ... 1 34

Blast effects 35

Thermal effects .... 36

Acute effects of nuclear radiation 37

Effects of protracted radiation 38

Skin burns from fallout 39

Inhalation hazard from fallout 39

Ingestion hazard from fallout ... 39

Genetio effects 40

VIII. Environmental contamination 40

Effect on animals 40

Effect on food supplies 42

Long-term environmental effects of nuclear war 43

IX. Survival measures............ 44

Introduction.... ....... ... ... 44

Problems related to a national system 45

Addendum: A digest of testimony on strategic considerations 49

Appendix: Glossary of terms...... ..... - 55

ERRATUM

On page 8, beginning at the 12th line from the bottom, the paragraph
should read:

“Probably the most significant finding presented to the subcommit-
tee was that civil defense preparedness could reduce the fatalities of
the assumed attack on the United States from approximately 25
percent of the population to about 3 percent. The provision of shield-
ing against radiation effects would at the same time protect against
blast and thermal effects for the vast majority of the population.”

44001*— 50

4 BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR

The resources of the Atomic Energy Commission, its personnel and
unclassified publications, were made available by Chairman McCone
and were of great value to the subcommittee.

The subcommittee also utilized a mass of unclassified data furnished
by other governmental and private sources on the effects of radiation.
A special mention of appreciation is due Dr. Paul Tompkins and his
associates of the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory. Much
of the basic data presented at the hearings was derived from the work
of the USNRDL, and Dr. Tompkins and his staff consulted freely
with the subcommittee throughout the hearings and during the prep-
aration of this report.

The witnesses presenting testimony were selected on the basis of
their competence and experience in the different fields of nuclear
phenomena, with particular emphasis on nuclear weapons effects.

In the biomedical field the subcommittee received testimony from
those scientists and technical personnel having the broadest experience
in laboratory work on test animals and in the treatment of human
beings exposed to radiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and in the
accidental contamination of the Marshall Islands.

For the consideration of structural damage from blast and fire and
of other weapons effects, outstanding authorities presented their find-
ings and the latest available scientific data.

The weather patterns and other meteorological data for the date of
the hypothetical attack were established by experts of the U.S.
Weather Bureau, supported by their worldwide organization.

The reader is encouraged to examine the full testimony and support-
ing data of each witness in the printed record of the hearings. In this
report the subcommittee has endeavored to present a faithful and
concise summary of the data and to highlight the key issues for the
convenience of the public and the Congress. Naturally, these data
and issues are more completely set forth in the verbatim hearing
record.

II. Summary

THE HYPOTHETICAL ATTACK

The hypothetical attack set forth by the subcommittee assumed
that 263 nuclear weapons in 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10 megaton sizes with a
total yield of 1,446 megatons 8 were detonated on 224 targets within
the United States. An additional 2,500 megatons were assumed to
have been detonated elsewhere in the Northern Hemisphere in attacks
on overseas U.S. bases and in retaliation against the aggressor home-
land. All weapons were arbitrarily designated as having a yield of
50 percent fission and 50 percent fusion. A weapon with 50 percent
fission yield is one in which 50 percent of the total energy (yield) is
derived from the fission process. Nuclear fission refers to the splitting
of heavy atoms such as uranium and is the primary source of con-
tamination of radioactive fallout particles.

* A 1-megaton bomb has the same explosive energy release as 1 million tons of TNT. The Hiroshima
bomb yield was estimated at 20,000 tons of TNT, or 20 kilotons.

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 5

CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE TO DWELLINGS

The expert testimony and supporting scientific data presented at
the subcommittee hearings indicate that under present conditions such
an attack would have cost the lives of approximately 50 million
Americans, with some 20 million others sustaining serious injuries.
More than one-fourth (11.8 million) of the dwellings in the United
States would have been destroyed and nearly 10 million others would
have been damaged. Some 13 million additional homes would have
been severely contaminated by radioactive fallout. Altogether,
approximately 50 percent of existing dwellings in the United States
would have been destroyed or rendered unuseable for a period of
several months.

Although the weapon detonations used in this exercise were desig-
nated as surface bursts, which would maximize the local radioactive
fallout hazard, nearly 75 percent of the deaths would have resulted
from the blast and thermal effects, combined with immediate radiation
effects. Only 25 percent of all fatalities would have resulted from
fallout. At the same time, more than half of the surviving injured
would have radiation injuries.

Most of the damage sustained by dwellings would have resulted from
the blast and thermal effects.

BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS

The three casualty-producing phenomena of nuclear weapons —
blast, thermal, and radiation — occur in varying combinations, depend-
ing on proximity to the point of detonation. At close range one would
encounter all three, including fallout radiation as well as immediate
radiation from the fireball.

1. Blast effects

Blast produces primary effects resulting from the blast wave itself
(lung damage, rupture of eardrums) : secondary effects, resulting from
flying fragments (loose debris, building materials) propelled with

f reat force by the blast wave; and tertiary effects, resulting from the
ody itself being thrown violently by the blast wave. In addition,
miscellaneous injuries will result from conditions created by the blast
on surrounding objects (e.g., broken gas mains, downed power lines).

Approximately 95 percent of the blast casualties produced by a
10-megaton weapon will result from the secondary ana tertiary blast
effects. For this size weapon the secondary effects are important to a
distance of 11 miles; the tertiary effects can occur to distances of from
7 to 16 miles.

2. Thermal effects

Thermal effects consist of fires caused by direct ignition of com-
bustible materials, skin bums on exposed portions of the body, and
temporary or permanent blindness from the intense light of the fireball.

In the hypothetical attack situation posed by the subcommittee,
thermal effects, including the hazard of mass fires (“fire storms”),
could extend over large areas, in some cases up to distances of 20 to
25 miles from the point of detonation.

6 BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR

8. Eadiation effects

The most severe form of radiation injury, under conditions of nu-
clear war, would be that resulting from severe exposure to the primary
radiation “flash” (close to ground zero) or that attending whole body
exposure to close-in fallout during the first day or so. However,
severe irradiation could occur as a result of prolonged exposure to
local fallout even after the first day unless survivors were provided
with adequate shelter protection. Direct contamination of the skin
with fallout debris could produce painful “beta bums” due to the ac-
tion of beta rays irradiating the skin and outer layers of the body
surface. In addition, there is an internal hazard of radioactive ma-
terial which gains entry into the body through inhalation, ingestion,
or through open wounds.

(1) Acute effects. — Instantaneous radiation doses of 5,000 roentgens
or greater immediately produce symptoms of shock; death occurs with-
in hours.

Radiation doses of 1,000 to 5,000 roentgens produce nausea and
vomiting, fever and general fatigue within a few hours. Temporary
recovery is followed within 1 or 2 weeks by reappearance of symptoms
and probable death.

Exposure to doses of 200 to 1,000 roentgens causes nausea and
vomiting within a few hours and in the period of from 2 to 4 weeks
after exposure major changes will occur in the composition of the
blood, rendering the body particularly susceptible to infections during
this time. Approximately one-half of those exposed at the level of
450 to 700 roentgens would be expected to recover if not subjected
to additional physical stress or radiation. The other one-half would
die within 2 to 4 months. Probability of recovery increases greatly
at levels below 450 roentgens.

Radiation doses of 200 roentgens or less will produce only mild
symptoms of nausea and vomiting. Changes in the blood may occur
later, but individuals so exposed usually will not require hospitaliza-
tion.

(2) Effects of 'protracted radiation. — Higher radiation doses can be
tolerated bjr the body without developing symptoms of acute radia-
tion illness if exposure is spread over a longer period of time. Ap-
proximately 90 percent biological recovery can occur with continued
or repeated exposures, but the remaining 10 percent nonrepayable
injury may produce late effects, such as cancer, over a period 20 years
or more.

When only a part of the body is exposed, the ability to recover is
greatly increased. For example, the exposure of a person’s legs alone
to 500 roentgens of radiation would not result in a lethal dose.

The probability of increasing the incidence of leukemia and other
types of cancer is considered proportional to the average total radia-
tion dose sustained by the surviving population. Potential deaths
from this cause are estimated as about 2 percent of the deaths attrib-
utable to acute radiation injury. These deaths will be spread out over
a period of decades since it is a characteristic of radiation-induced
cancer to be long delayed after incidence of injury.

(3) Skin bums from fallout. — Skin burns can be caused by beta
rays from the fallout particles coming in direct contact with the skin.
However, very large doses of beta radiation are required to produce
severe burns, and the particles may be removed from the skin by good

8 BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR

fallout decontamination would be required to reduce the strontium 90
content of the soil to a level acceptable for production of some food
crops and milk.

8. Long-term environmental effects

Although much remains to be learned about the long-range impact
of a nuclear war on “the balance of nature,” the concensus of the
testimony was that, despite the severe shock, life would continue and
full ecological recovery would eventually occur.

ADDITIONAL DATA ON RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT

Several additional factors presented to the subcommittee with
respect to radioactive fallout are considered highly important.

(1) The worldwide strontium 90 fallout resulting from the assumed
attack would not pose a major survival problem in countries not
attacked. The level of strontium 90 deposited from long-term fallout
would be higher than the maximum permissible concentration rec-
ommended for the population as a whole on a peacetime standard,
but lower than the recommended maximum permissible occupational
dose under controlled conditions.

(2) The actual release of gamma radiation energy from fission prod-
ucts differs significantly from that represented by the standard for-
mula (t -1 - 2 ride) contained in the official Government publication,
“The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.” New calculations indicate that
early dose rates will be of greater intensity than previously believed
and that over a long period of time the rate of decline will be more
rapid. While the problem of immediate survival in a nuclear war is
thus increased, the problem of long-term recovery is reduced.

(3) Local fallout is significantly affected by wind and weather.
Actual fallout contours will differ markedly from the idealized cigar-
shaped patterns normally used as a basis of estimating fallout effects.
Moreover, peak fallout intensities will almost never occur at or near
the point of weapon detonation. For example, the maximum fallout
intensity for a weapon of a 5- to 10-megaton yield may appear at a
distance as great as 60 to 70 miles from the point of detonation.

SURVIVAL MEASURES

Probably the most significant finding presented to the subcom-
mittee was that civil defense preparedness could reduce the casualties
of the assumed attack on the United States from approximately 30
percent of the population to about 3 percent. The provision of shield-
ing against radiation effects would at the same time protect against
blast and thermal effects for the vast majority of the population.

The cost of providing high-performance shelter protection for 200
million people was estimated at between $5 billion and $20 billion.

The main conclusion presented to the subcommittee was that the
country must have a national radiological defense system if the Nation
is to withstand and recover from an attack of the scale which is pos-
sible in an all-out nuclear war.

10 BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR

Table III — 2. — Targets of the attack

Type of target

Number

Number of
weapons

Weight

(megatons)

Air Force installations . .

111

045

Critical target areas n m r , _

110

567

AE^ installations — _

168

Army installations _ _

Navy installations .......... ... .

Marine Corps installations .

Total -

224

263

1,446

All weapons were arbitrarily designated as 50 percent fission and
50 percent fusion weapons detonated at ground level, that is, with
the fireball touching the earth’s surface. Each weapon was assumed
to have been detonated at or near its specified target by using a
standard statistical method for random bombing errors.

The total of 1,446 megatons was considered the yield of the weapons
detonated, not the gross attack which the aggressor force might have
launched initially, and no attempt was made to “war game” the
overall problem of weapon delivery, interception, and retaliation.

For purposes of computing worldwide fallout and its effects for a
period of 5 years after the attack, again without war gaming, it was
assumed that 2,500 megatons of weapons were detonated on areas of
the Northern Hemisphere outside the continental United States, rep-
resenting the net result of attacks on U.S. overseas bases and U.S.
retaliatory strikes against the aggressor homeland.

The general distribution of targets in the United States is illustrated
on the map in figure III — 1.

The time of the hypothetical attack was set at 12 noon Greenwich
time (7 a.m. eastern standard time) on a typical October day, which
assumes completed harvest and storage of food crops in the aggressor
homeland. The actual weather conditions used in plotting fallout
patterns and determining the effects of meteorological factors were
those recorded for October 17, 1958, a typical fall day. It was nec-
essary to select a particular day in the past in order to provide the
weather data for accurate calculations.

IV. Basic Effects of Weapons Employed

As indicated above, the weapons employed in the hypothetical
attack assumptions consisted of 50 percent fission and 50 percent
fusion weapons ranging in size from 1 to 10 megatons, all detonated
at ground level. The following data concerning the basic effects of
these weapons were presented at the subcommittee hearings. Later
sections of this report will discuss the biological and environmental
effects of these weapons in greater detail.

1. Partition of energy in a nuclear explosion

About 35 percent of the total energy of a nuclear explosion is given
off as radiant thermal energy or heat, in much the same way as the
sun radiates heat. Another 50 percent of the bomb energy is contained
in the blast wave that travels several times the speed of sound. About

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 15

SUMMARY OF EFFECTS FOR 1-MEGATON AND 10-MEGATON NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

Blast, which is primarily a damaging agent to inanimate objects
such as buildings, produces flying debris which is a hazard to man.
The cratering effects result in the destruction of even deep underground
structures.

Thermal radiation damages both humans and combustible struc-
tures and materials.

Nuclear radiation, including both the initial and residual fallout are
primarily hazards to man and animals.

The distances and areas covered by various effects are contained in
the following table:

Table IV-1. — Summary of effects of the assumed nuclear weapons 1 to 10 megatons

1 megaton

10 megatons

A. Inanimate objects:

1. Crater (dry soil)

Radius, 650 feet; depth, 140

Radius, 1,250 feet; depth, 240

2. Brick apartment houses col-

feet.

Radius, 3 miles

feet.

Radius, 7 miles.

lapse.

3. Ignition of light kindling ma-

Radius, 9 miles

Radius, 25 miles.

terials.

B. Man:

1. Blast injury (flying debris)

Radius, 3 miles; area, 28

Radius, 7 miles; area, 150

2. 2d degree burns on bare skin...

square miles.

Radius, 9 miles; area, 250

square miles.

Radius, 25 miles; area, 2,000

3. Initial nuclear radiation (700

square miles.

Radius, 1.5 miles; area, 7

square miles.

Radius, 2 miles; area, 12.5

rem).

square miles.

4. Fallout, 15-knot winds (450

40 miles downwind; 5 miles

160 miles downwind; 25 miles

rem in 48 hours, no shield-

crosswind; area, 200 square

crosswind; area, 2,500 square

ing).

miles.

V. Kadioactive Fallout Patterns, Physical Damage and
Casualties in the United States

Based on the specific attack assumptions developed by the sub-
committee, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization prepared a
damage assessment with respect to blast, thermal, and fallout effects
on dwellings and people during the period of 90 days following the
attack.

While the primary effects of nuclear explosions may claim the
greatest number of victims, the threat of persisting radioactivity
poses the greatest hazard to survivors. It was for this reason that
the subcommittee devoted much of its investigation to the problem
of radioactive fallout.

fallout patterns

The fallout situation plotted by the OCDM is depicted on the maps
reproduced in figures V-l, 2, 3, 4 and 5 showing conditions at the post-
attack time periods of 1 hour, 7 hours, 2 days, 2 weeks, and 3 months.

These maps show the progression of fallout across the United
States during the first 2 days postattack and then indicate its sub-
sequent retreat as radiation decay begins to predominate over further
deposition of fallout. At 1 hour post-attack less than 10 percent of
the country is affected by fallout but the dose rates are very high,
exceeding 3,000 roentgens per hour in some areas. By 7 hours,

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 51

force that can absorb an enemy blow and still strike back with ade-
quate strength and, second, certain minimum nonmilitary protection
for the civilian population.

TYPES OF DETERRENCE

It was also stated that even if the “balance of terror” theory were
correct, the United States would still be faced with important stra-
tegic problems. As the witness pointed out, in 1914 and 1939, it
was the British and the French who declared war on the Germans
and not vice versa. It is difficult for Americans to realize that,
under certain circumstances, neither the Soviets nor the Europeans
might believe that the United States would come to the aid of Europe.
In making this point, the witness asked the subcommittee to ponder
a hypothetical situation in which American defenses were so weak
and Soviet retaliatory forces so strong that if the United States
responded to a Soviet ground attack on Europe the Soviet counter-
retaliation would kill all 177 million Americans. Under such condi-
tions, the witness said, it would not be surprising if neither the Euro-
peans nor the Soviets found the U.S. promise to come to the aid of
Europe credible. But if it is true that the Soviets and the Europeans
would not believe that we would honor our commitments to our allies
if it meant 177 million American deaths, what level of casualties do
they believe we would accept? It was stated that, to the extent that
the Soviets believe we can keep our casualties to a level we would find
acceptable, whatever that level may be, they will be deterred not only
from attacking the United States directly, but also from very provoca-
tive aggressions, such as a ground attack on Europe. But, it was
said, to the extent that they do not believe we can keep casualties to
an acceptable level, the Soviets may feel safe in undertaking these
extremely provocative military adventures.

In discussing this aspect of the strategic problem facing the United
States, the witness distinguished between what he called Type I de-
terrence and Type II deterrence. Type I deterrence, which the British
call “passive deterrence” on the assumption that it requires no act of
will to initiate a response, is the deterrence of a direct attack. If the
United States were directly attacked, its response would be automatic.
Type II deterrence, which the British have called “active deterrence”
is defined as the forces necessary to deter an enemy from engaging
in military adventures short of a direct attack on the United States
itself. There is a question as to how effective nuclear retaliatory forces
would be as a Type II, “active” deterrent. In pondering this ques-
tion, it must be assumed that before launching on such an extremely
provocative adventure, the enemy would have alerted his own retalia-
tory forces and instituted protective measures for his population. By
such precautionary measures, the Soviets, according to the witness,
might limit casualties to 10 percent of its population and one-third of
its wealth. This is just about what they suffered in World War II,
from which they had recovered by 1951. If the Soviets believed that
they could limit destruction to this extent and were also convinced
that the United States had failed to take the measures that would
similarly limit destruction in the United States, they might well feel
free to launch an aggressive attack.

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 53

Put another way, the subcommittee was told, a very moderate
shelter program, which would combine protection against fallout and
some blast resistance, could reduce the expected casualties to ap-
proximately one-third of those who would die if there were no pro-
tection at all. A more extensive program, designed to protect per-
sons in our urban areas, could reduce the overall fatalities of this
attack from 25 percent of the population to approximately 3 percent.

Such measures were believed not to be terribly expensive. The sub-
committee was told that the program of fallout shelters, which would
go far toward saving the lives of the 60 percent of all Americans who do
not live in or near target areas, is one which depends on simple tools
and simple techniques. The lives of millions could be saved or lost by a
simple choice. Thus, one eminent witness pointed out that on the
basis of the 1954 thermonuclear detonation at Bikini, where the area
of blast and thermal effects was perhaps 300 square miles (a circle
with a radius of 9% miles), the total area of likely radiation casualties
was approximately 7,000 square miles. . Clearly, the subcommittee
was told, it is the people in the intermediate 6,700 square miles about
whom something could be done: “We can save them easily; we can
lose them easily.”

The burden of the testimony received on this point was that if such
protective measures were taken, the impact of America’s ability to
survive a nuclear war would be so great that the likelihood of such a
war would be vastly reduced. So long as the Soviets have the ad-
vantage of forewarning and can reduce their already low vulnerability
through a comprehensive civil defense program, the United States will
be at a marked disadvantage. Its firm foreign policy will be open to
doubt and disbelief, and to possible blackmail.

Thus, it was suggested that our lack of a civil defense program could
lead the Soviets to take a provocative step which we could not ignore,
and a nuclear war would have started with no protection for the Ameri-
can people. Or, as a final paradox, the subcommittee was told, in a
world of great tension the Soviets may be unable to believe that we
would allow an aggressor to strike us first, which the theory of “mas-
sive retaliation” implies. The acceptance of such a military disad-
vantage as a basis for our national policy may seem foolish to them.
They may therefore discount the sincerity of our position and expect
instead that the United States actually intends to strike the first blow.
A war which neither side wanted could thus break out because of our
defensive weakness.

MAKESHIFT SHELTERS

Technische Anleitung fur die Herrichtung
von Behelfs schutzraumen (TA BSR 1977)

[Technical Instructions for the fitting-
out of makeshift shelters (TA BSR 1977) ]

SWISS FEDERAL AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Psychological behaviour

The psychological behaviour of man in crises and war is
characterized:

1. In peacetime

— by repressing fear of a possible war (or catastrophe),

— by grossly underestimating his ability to resist and
survive,

— by ignorance of and missing confidence in modern
protection systems against modern weapon effects,

— by taking insufficient precautions against wars and/or
catastrophes.

2. In the pre-attack phase

— first pre-attack phase

by a reluctance of leadership to order the commis-
sioning and occupation of shelters,

— by a reasonable behaviour of the population, pro-
vided there has been sufficient prior information on
possible events,

— by rather unreasonable behaviour (but not panic) in
case of inadequate information,

— by the readiness to occupy the shelters and stay
there, if the population feels the danger and if the
shelters are well built, equipped, and managed.

Swiss blast and fallout radiation shielding methods

(Swiss Federal Authority Office of Civil Defence, Makeshift Shelters, TA BSR 1977.)

Sealing up window openings
with solid materials

Adjoining room! area

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(i bracing members)^

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NORTHERN

EDITION

mmmuoc^gsMM

Friday, September 30, 1938

The Daily Express declares that Britain will not be involved In
a European war this year, or next year either

Commission
to decide
plebiscites

Mussolini
draws up
frontier

LATE NEWS

Phone: Manchester Central 2112.

AGREEMENT SIGNED
AT 12-30 a.m. TODAY

German troops march in
tomorrow: then occupation
gradually until October 10

FRONTIER GUARANTEED

By SELKIRK PANTON

MUNICH, Friday morning.

A PACT OF PEACE WAS SIGNED IN MUNICH AT 12.S0 THIS MORNINC.

ONLY 23 HOURS BEFORE THE WAR ULTIMATUM WAS TO HAVE EXPIRED, MR
CHAMBERLAIN, DALADIER, HITLER, AND MUSSOLINI REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE
CZECHOSLOVAK PROBLEM.

Under its terms, Hitler will march his troops into Czechoslovakia tomorrow, but not
as far as he meant to under the terms of the German Memorandum to Czecho-Slovakia of
last weekend.

The official communique says that the heads of
the four Governments agree that the evacuation
shall begin tomorrow, and that German troops
shall begin to occupy Sudetenland progressively
from tomorrow, completing the occupation on
October 10.

Britain and France undertake to guarantee the
new frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia, and Germany
and Italy will join in this guarantee when all the
questions have been settled.

“EVERYTHING IS SIGNED”

Poland will join the guarantee when the Polish and
Hungarian demands concerning their minorities have
been grartted. If that has not been done within three
months a new meeting of the four statesmen will be called.

An International Commission will decide the terri-
tories in which plebiscites are to be held.

Mr Neville Chamberlain, at 1.36 this morning, came
into the Hotel Regina in Munich and said : —

“ Everything is signed. We are going back today.”

He is leaving for London at noon.

He was received by a loud burst of cheering which is
still going on as I telephone. The hotel lounge is crowded
with both foreigners and Nazis, the Nazis saluting with
the Nazi salute and “Heiling,” the foreigners cheering
and clapping.

DANGER OF WAR PAST

Mr Chamberlain thanked the crowd. It is obvious that
the Prime Minister feels that all danger to peace is now
past.

The plebiscite will be held at the end of November.

Mr Chamberlain came home, but not to bed. At this
moment he is continuing his discussions, this time with the
Czechs.

Britain, France, and Italy have succeeded in helping
Hitler to keep his word to the German people by allowing
him to march into Czecho-Slovakia on October 1.

It is said that, as a gesture, the German troops who
march in will wear forage caps instead of steel helmets,
and will march in quietly.

A German spokesman said that a revised line of

Mr Neville Chamberlain and 1

THEIR FIRST meeting : _

Signor Mussolini at t he huhrerhaus, Munich.

HE MAY
BE
SIR

NEVILLE

Daily Express Staff Reporter

M R NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN
is likely to be offered a
Knighthood of the Garter— the
highest honour the King can
bestow.

This would be in recognition of
his services to the cause of peace.

Mr Chamberlain’s half-brother,
Sir Austen, was made a K.G. for his
work in bringing abtfut the Locarno
Treaty.

The honour carries with It the
title “Sir.”

Although Mr Chamberlain would
probably prefer to remain “plain
Mr,” as his brother wished to do, it
has been ruled that the title must
go with the honour.

This is what
they signed

London rejoices

PREMIERS

WIFE

MOBBED

Crowds of women rejoicing at the
news from Munich cheered Mrs
Neville Chamberlain for several
minutes last night as she left St
Michael'; “ - -

Church, Chester Square,
London, where the Archbishop of
Canterbury had addressed a broad-
cast service.

As Mrs Chamberlain appeared at
one of the doors after the service a
great crowd were waiting to cheer
her. By the time her car had
arrived they had grown to several

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But an income payable in the event
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Special
5 a.m.
Edition

FOUNDED BY LORD BEAVERBROOK

No. 11,970

Friday, September 30, 1938

One Penny

The Daily Express declares that Britain will not be Involved In
a European war this year, or next year either

Mussolini
draws up
frontier

PEACE

ICommissionl
to decide
plebiscites

FRONTIER GUARANTEED

A PACT OF PEACE WAS
M ONLY 23 HOURS BEFORE THE WAR UL

CHAMBERLAIN, DALADIER, HITLER, AND MUSSOLINI REACHED AGREEMENT ....
CZECHOSLOVAK PROBLEM.

Under its terms, Hitler will march his troops into Czecho-Slovakia tomorrow, but not

THEIR FIRST meeting : Mr Neville Chamberlain and •
Signor Mussolini at t he Fuhrerhaus, Munich.

LATE NEWS

Phone: Manchester Central 2112.

AGREEMENT SIGNED
AT 12-30 a.m. TODAY

German troops march in
tomorrow: then occupation
gradually until October 10

as far as he meant to under the terms of the German Memorandum to Czecho-Slovakia of
last weekend.

The official communique says that the heads of I
the four Governments agree that the evacuation
shall begin tomorrow, and that German troops
shall begin to occupy Sudetenland progressively
from tomorrow, completing the occupation on
October 10.

Britain and France undertake to guarantee the
new frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia, and Germany
and Italy will join in this guarantee when all the
questions have been settled.

“EVERYTHING IS SIGNED”

An International Commission will decide the terri-
tories in which plebiscites are to be held.

Mr Neville Chamberlain, at 1.36 this morning, came
into the Hotel Regina in Munich and said : —

“ Everything is signed. We are going back today.”

He is leaving for London at noon.

DANGER OF WAR PAST

Mr Chamberlain thanked the crowd. It is obvious that
the Prime Minister feels that all danger to peace is now
past.

The plebiscite will be held at the end of November.

Mr Chamberlain came home, but not to bed. At this
moment he is continuing his discussions, this time with the
Czechs.

Britain, France, and Italy have succeeded in helping
Hitler to keep his word to the German people by allowing
him to march into Czecho-Slovakia on October 1.

It is said that, as a gesture, the German troops who
march in will wear forage caps instead of steel helmets,
and will march in quietly.

A German spokesman said that a revised line of

demarcation between Germans and Czechs — a new
frontier for tomorrow — was drawn up by Mussolini
himself.

Mussolini left Munich for Rome at 1.55 a.m.,
accompanied by Count Ciano. Hitler and Goering
accompanied him to the station and shook him by the
hand. Daladier also left by train.

But the German people, who have for weeks feared
war, are not celebrating tonight a German victory, but
that peace has been preserved. They are thanking the
British Prime Minister for that.

General comment in his hotel this morning was : “ He
is a real peacemaker. We have much to thank him for.”

This is what
they signed

The following text of the official communique was
issued by the German News Agency early today: —

Agreement between Germany, Great Britain,
France, and Italy concluded in Munich on September 29,
1938.

“ The conversations which the chiefs of the
Governments of Germany, Italy, France, and Great
Britain began on Thursday noon have found their
conclusion in the late evening.

“The agreements which were reached, which are
laid down in the following documents, have been
immediately transmitted to the Czech Government.

START TOMORROW

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy
have agreed, taking into consideration the settlement
already agreed upon in principle concerning the cession
of the Sudeten German districts, on the following condi-
tions and procedure and the measures to be taken, and
declare themselves individually held responsible by this
agreement for guaranteeing the steps necessary for its
fulfilment: —

2 The evacuation begins on October 1.

2 The United Kingdom of Great Britain, France, and
• Italy agree that the evacuation of The region shall be
completed by October 10 without destruction of any of
the existing installations, and that the Czecho-Slovak

J*» PAGE TWO, COLUMN TWO

HE MAY
BE
SIR

NEVILLE

Daily Express Staff Reporter

M R NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN
is likely to be offered a
Knighthood of the Garter— the
highest honour the King can
bestow.

This would be in recognition of
his services to the cause of peace.

Mr Chamberlain’s half-brother,
Sir Austen, was made a K.G. for his
work in bringing abefut the Locarno
Treaty.

The honour carries with it the
title “Sir.”

Although Mr Chamberlain would
probably prefer to remain “plain
Mr,” as his brother wished to do, it
has been ruled that the title must
go with the honour.

London rejoices

PREMIER’S

WIFE

MOBBED

Crowds of women rejoicing at the
news from Munich cheered Mrs
Neville Chamberlain for several
minutes last night as she left St
Michael’s Church, Chester Square,
London, where the Archbishop of
Canterbury had addressed a broad-
cast service.

As Mrs Chamberlain appeared at
one of the doors after the service a
great crowd were waiting to cheer
her. By the time her car had
arrived they had grown to several
thousands.

As she stepped into the car they
surged round cheering continuously.

Women with tears in their eyes
grasped her hand and congratulated
her on the good news.

Before the car could move away
women clambered on the running-
boards. As they pressed forward to 1
grasp her by the hand Mrs Cham- \
berlain, almost overcome by emotion, .
repeated: “Thank you. Oh, thankil
you.”

ARE

YOU

REALLY

GOOD

FATHER

You are fond of your family. You
provide them with a good home,
education — in fact with every-
thing they need.

But an income payable in the event
of your early death is something
you have possibly regarded as
beyond your means to provide.

Here is a plan
which can help you

If you are under 45 you can
arrange, by means of the

that, should you die within the
next 20 years, your family will

receive :—

£200 in cash immediately,

£0 a week during the re*
mainder of the 20 years, and

£ 1,800 cash when the pay-
ments cease. If death occurs after
20 years,

£ 2,000 would be payable
immediately.

FILL IN AND FORWARD THIS COUPON

TO THE PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE CO •

HOLBORN BARS • LONDON • EC1

I desire particulars of your “lJCrttaflC” Policy.

Date of birth

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ftoday, D AILY EXPRESS September so, tsbs

CRISIS NEWS

FRIDAY. DA

Legion await order
to police areas

T^HE British Legion are .

ready to send 8,000 ex- !
service men to act as a
civilian police force in
Czechoslovakia as soon as !
they learn that this service
offered to Hitler by Major-
Greneral Sir Frederick
Maurice, president of the
Legion, has been accepted.

An official of the British
Legion stated at 1.30 a.m.
today: —

“ It is within the realm of
practical politics that we may
be called in to police the districts
subject of the dispute, but so far
our offer has not been officially
accepted.”

After Sir Frederick Maurice’s in-
terview with Hitler it was stated
that the Fuhrer’s reception of the
offer was “ rather cool.”

PLAN DISCUSSED

His reference to it in his speech
at Berlin gave rise to hope, how-
ever, that he had come to consider
it more favourably, and discussions
were continued ait British Legion
headquarters of a plan for putting
the scheme into operation.

It is proposed that the ex-service
men who are to police Sudetenland
shall have no uniforms, and carry
no firearms.

An official stated that the number
of officers required would be “cer-
tainly not in excess of 10,000.” The
legion are ready to send such a
force abroad at very short notice.

“ We are only waiting for the word
‘Go,’” he added.

It is assumed that in the new
circumstances of the Munich con-
ference all four Powers concerned
will have to approve the scheme.

War Loan leaps
£115,000,000

And pound goes up

Prices continued to recover
sharply all day yesterday on the
London Stock Exchange. Most spec-
tacular rise was that of 5£ points,
which put £115,000,000 on to the
market value of War Loan.

Controllers of the British
Exchange Equalisation Fund, who
have kept ceaseless watch on the
pound during the week in order to
prevent a catastrophic fall, sat back
in their chairs, did nothing all day.

Withdut any official support the
pound moved ud.

HP"* From Page One

TEXT OF PEACE
TERMS — Official

Government bear the responsibility for seeing that the
evacuation is carried out without damaging the aforesaid
installations.

3 Conditions governing
• the evacuation will be
laid down in detail by an
international commission
composed of representa-
tives of Germany, the U.K.,

France, Italy, and Czecho-
slovakia.

h The occupation by stages of
the predominantly Sudeten
German territory by German
troops will begin on October 1.

The four territories marked on
the attached map will be
occupied by German troops in
the following order: —

The territory marked No. 1 on
the First and Second of October,
the territory marked No. 2 on the
Second and Third of October,
the territory marked No. 3 on
the Third, Fourth, and Fifth of
October, the territory marked
No. 4 on the Sixth and Seventh
of October.

The remaining territory
of preponderantly German
character will be ascertained by
the aforesaid international com-
mission forthwith, and be occu-
pied py German troops by
October 10.

Ef The International Commis-
sion referred to in Para-
graph Three will determine the
territories in which a plebiscite
is to be held.

These territories will be occu-
pied by international bodies
until the plebiscite has been
completed.

The same Commission will fix
the conditions with which the
plebiscite is to be held, taking as
a basis the conditions of the Saar
plebiscite. The Commission
will also fix a date not later than
the end of November on Which
the plebiscite will be held.

The final determination of
the frontiers will be carried
out by the International Com-
mission. This commission will

also be entitled to recommend to
the four Powers — Germany, the
United Kingdom, France, and
Italy — in certain exceptional

cases minor modifications of the
strictly ethnographical deter-
mination of the zones which are
to be transferred without plebis-
cite.

7 There will be a right of option
« into and out of the transferred
territories, the option to be exercised
within six months from the date of
this agreement.

A German Czecho-Slovak commis-
sion shall determine details of the
option, consider ways of facilitating
the transfer of population, and settle
question of principle arising out of
the said transfer.

8 The Czecho-Slovak Govern-
ment will within a period of
four weeks from the date of this
■f agreement release from their
military and police forces any
Sudeten Germans who may wish to
be released, and the Czecho-Slovak
Government will within the same
period release Sudeten German
prisoners who are serving terms of
imprisonment for political offences.
Annexe to the agreement: —

His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom and the French
Government have entered into the
above agreement on the basis that
they stand by the offer contained in
Paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French
proposals of September 19 relating
to an international guarantee of the
new boundaries or the Czecho-
slovak State against unprovoked
aggression.

When the questions of the Polish
and Hungarian minorities in
Czecho-Slovakia have been settled,
Germany and Italy for their part
will give a guarantee to Czecho-
slovakia.

Second Annexe:—

The heads of the Governments of
the Four Powers declare that the
problems of the Polish and Hun-
garian minorities in Czecho-
slovakia, if not settled within three
months by agreement between the
respective Governments, shall form
the subject of another meeting of
the heads of the Governments of the
Four Powers here present.
Supplementary declaration : —

All questions which may arise out
of the transfer of the territory shall
be considered as coming within the
terms of reference to the Interna-
| tional Commission.

page 5

frt&ay, DAILY EXPRESS September so, tbbb

Friday, DAILY EXPREJ

Cities can follow
London’s two plans
for evacuation

Daily Express Staff Reporter
"I" 1 HE Government scheme for the evacuation of people
■ not taking part in the maintenance of national
services in London and large cities in the event of war
was announced last night. —

Any one who cannot make
private arrangements to go into
the country will have the chance
to be taken to billets in private
houses some 50 miles from
“ danger areas.”

Details of the plan apply to
London, but indicate the lines to be
followed by other centres.

There are two separate schemes.

1 A general evacuation in the
• event of emergency.

2 A special scheme for the
• evacuation of children by
school groups.

The arrangements come into
operation only when announced by
the Government.

Here are the plans: —

Evacuation

When the Government give the
order those who wish to get out
should go to any of the stations
announced as evacuation centres
and not to any other station.

They should take their gas-masks
and only small hand luggage. They
should wear their warmest clothes
and should take some food for the
journey and a rug or blankets. No
domestic animals can be taken.

At these “pick-up” stations
refugees (as they are called in the
Home Office circular) will be given a
special free railway ticket. They
will then be taken by train to a
suitable destination between 30 and
50 miles from the centre of London.

Every one will be given at his
destination a special franked post
card so that he can write to his
relatives giving his address.

Those coming off the trains will
be met and billeted either at the
places where they arrive, or in
near-by towns or villages. Trans-
port will be free.

At first the Government will pay
for the billets, but later it is expected
that those who can afford will
contribute

Food

At the railhead each refugee will
draw a free raition of food for 40
hours, including canned milk. After
that, refugees will be expected to
buy their own food.

Financial help

need
i nean

Refugees in immediate need of
money can apply to the nearest

office of the Ministry of Labour and
will have to present their billeting
form.

The Government will pay to each
householder taking a refugee 5s a
week for adults and 3s for children
under 14. The householder will
obtain this payment on presenta-
tion to Post Offices of the billeting
form which will be served on him.

Similar arrangements are being
made for some of the big cities.
In Scotland modifications will be
made to meet local conditions.

For children

Schoolchildren who cannot go to
relatives or friends can be sent
away in the care of their teachers.

Arrangements have already been
made at some schools. They will
be extended if necessary.

Children will go to school as usual.
They will be taken to the station by
teachers or other adults connected
with the school. They will be given
free tickets and taken by special
trains to stations about 30 to 50
miles from London. Homes will be
found in private houses.

Householders will be expected to
give them board and lodging and to
look after them.

The Government will pay the
householder 10/6 a week if one
child is taken, and 8/6 for each
additional child.

As far as possible groups from
each school will be found homes
near each other, and school teachers
and others who have volunteered to
help in looking after them will be in
constant touch.

Parents who wish their children
to go should note these instruc-
tions: —

1. The children should be sent to
school as usual.

2. They should be dressed in their
warmest clothes.

3. They should bef given an over-
coat or macintosh, hand luggage, a
blanket, if possible food for the
journey, and an apple or orange, but
no drinks in glass bottles.

4. They should take gas masks.

Ordinary railway arrangements at

these stations will be seriously inter-
rupted during these hours— which
will be roughly from ten o’clock in
the morning to four o’clock in the
afternoon.

CZECHS

Wall Street

goes ahead

co>

. V ■- • .<■ ■■ ■ UHi'i All

***' ' ’ ** •cJT.V - R3S - - -• PS By

Daily Express Staff Reporter

NEW YORK, Thursday. — En-
couraged zy news from Munich,
New York’s stock market advanced
steadily today, prices rising one to
four points.

There was a slight setback at
noon, but this was overcome when
reports were received that the
Powers had agreed over Sudeten-
land.

Sales totalled 1 LOO0.OO0 shares.

T was learned i
the Czech G

7 .’ t ' K

ua vru„ •. ->) ...

concessions.

A communique sto
Czechs were prepari
Germany territor;
more than 50 pi
German inhabitant*
for itself orjiy fronl
kind as to make the
Slovak. Statercapable
and defend. r&l

The “Big
Four” get
together

BILLETS WILL BE FREE

page 5 : top centre photo of Prime Minister
Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler & Mussolini

FRIDAY, DAILY EXPRESS

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page 5 : top right rmPAYy DAILY EXPRESS

SEPTEMBER 30, 1938

ESS, SEPTEMBER 30, 1938 CRISIS NEWS 5

To Britain’s defence,
£40,000,000 this weeK

A.R.P. COST
IS MORE
THAN
THE NAVY

AKE MORE
NCESSIONS

icd in Czech circles in London last night that
h Government have agreed to make further

ie stated that the
epared to cede to
ritory counting

0 per cent, of
tants, and asked
frontiers of such

1 the new Czecho-
pable.oU existence

Gold leaves France

Gold to the value of £2,300,000
was sent from Paris to London last
night. The bullion, weighing about
10 tons, arrived at Folkestone by
cross-Channel steamer, and was
sent to Lonj^on in,, ve$ls attached to
the boat won

AT THE FUHRERHAUS,
Munich, yesterday: Mr Neville
Chamberlain, M Daladier
(France’s Premier), Herr
Hitler, and Signor Mussolini.

“Save petrol”

The Government appealed to all
car owners last night to save petrol.

Petrol companies have undertaken
that prices will be unchanged for
the next 14 days, but it may be
necessary to make variations in the
marketed grades. If this is done
prices will be adjusted accordingly.

It is officially stated that there
are “ very substantial ” stocks of
petrol in the country for all
{Purposes.

Daily Express Staff Reporter
PAUSE a minute to count
the cost of Britain’s
national defensive
measures of the last week.

The bill when it comes to
be paid will be huge. At a
rough calculation a cheque for
£40,000,000 will barely meet it.

Where has the money gone?

The figures I give are only
general estimates. They are based
on the knowledge of experts and
known figures budgeted for in
advance of the day when war might
come.

To mobilise and maintain the
Navy on a wartime footing will
mean probably a bill of £10,000,900.

This year the A.R.P. Department
were scheduled to spend £8.000,000.
Local authorities were to have laid
out probably another £5,000,000.

Gas masks alone have absorbed
£6,000,000. They cost the Govern-
ment half-a-crown each.

The A.R.P. Department’s Bill for
sand will total £2,750,000.

The rest has gone in fire-fighting
appliances, labour for trench dig-
ging, reinforcing buildings, other
raw materials.

£1 A WORKER

A business expert estimated for
me the approximate cost to the
commercial world to make their
premises and staffs safe.

He put the figure at £10,000,000.
He said that the precautions worked
out at about £ 1 per worker.

There is, too, the cost of calling
up the Auxiliary Air Force, manning
the anti-aircraft units, organising
the women territorials. Put it at
£3,000,000. It may be more.

Lastly, the cost to individuals —
transport, A.R.P. measures for the
home, equipment: Half a crown a
head — £5,000,000 for the population,
leaving out the young children— is
probably a conservative average.

A £40,000,000 bill in a week to
defend ourselves may sound a great
sum. But think of this:—

The Allied Powers’ war bill for
1914-18 was £26,000,000,000.

Had to leave his job

Commander J. M. Bell had
hurriedly to leave Brighton tennis
tournament, where he is secretary,
for service in the Navy,

• ,••••-

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FRIDAY, DAILY EXPRESS SEPTEMBER go, 1938
page 6 : bottom right advert

6 GENERAL NEWS a NAMES MAKE NEWS

LINE YOUR A.R.P.

SHELTER with
REINFORCED ZYLEX

7Jd. per yard, 15/6 per roll of 24 yds., 36 Ins. wide

CHEAP • WATERPROOF • UNTEARABLE
Saves costly timber. Ensures dry comfort*

FROM ALL BUILDERS' MERCHANTS.

The RUBEROID CO., LTD., 296/302, High Holborn,
London, W.C.I. Tel. : Hoi. 9501 (5 lines;.

Branches ?

Birmingham: 66 £, Corporation St. Edinburgh: Caroline Park, West

Manchester: 708, Chester Road, Shore Road, Granton.

Stretford Dublin: I, Aston Place.

Newcastle-on-Tyne: Station Rd. .Walker. Belfast: 57/59, Great Patrick Street.

Corrugated

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page 7

Friday. DAILY EXPRESS, September so, 1938

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiif.ifiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimiimiiiiiiiiiLiiiiiiiiiitiiiiiiitiiiiiiiiimiimiiiiiiiiiiiuitiiiiiiiiiiiimiiiiiig

| A S you read this message from Daily Express Staff Reporter Sidney Smith you take §

| up position on the French side of the Franco-German frontier in Alsace-Lorraine, |

| get a close view of troop activity — and inactivity — of soldiers sitting ten yards apart, §
| some facing east, some facing west, waiting. |

IiiiiiiiiiiiiiMiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiil

LINERS

AWAIT

• CARRY Ol

BUTTON-EYE CAMERA order

FOUND ON SPY

Frontier watch drama

By SIDNEY SMITH,

Daily Express Staff Reporter
FORBACH (Franco-German frontier), Thursday.
r FHE British flag hangs with two French flags over the
door of the Forbach frontier post at Breme d’Or,
300 yards away from points where German troops have
begun digging new frontier line trenches at Sarrebruck
Woods.

It has been hanging there since
the British Premier went to
Germany.

At the French frontier post, where
no more than four cars pass to or
from Germany each day, at present
all is quiet and otherwise normal.

The French officials sit and watch
German troops, all fully armed,
occupying the German post 50 yards
away, with three times its normal
number of officials.

Every half an hour an S.S. motor-
cycle dispatch rider races by into
Sarrebruck, apparently with reports
on French frontier activity.

Every hour German mounted
patrols gallop along the inter-
national frontier paths. The woods
and fields on the German side are
being patrolled, especially at night,
by armed guards with police dogs.

beyond him sat another soldier
facing the east.

So they are placed at 10-yard
intervals, sometimes for hundreds of
yards along the edge of the frontier.
At another point I saw a shelter of
brushwood and tree branches.
“That was only built last night,”
the French police officer told me.
“We believe it is a field radio post.
Here, take a look through these
glasses at that German in uniform
down there on the Sarrebruck road.”

No speaking

Chicken for dinner

From the French frontier post a
plainclothes policeman, with his
regulation field glasses, took me for
a walk along the frontier line, over
wooded hills and' across fields, in
which, on both sides of the frontier,
German and French peasants were
hurriedly gathering in all their
vegetable crops.

As we passed up the line behind
German Customs buildings, my
guide told me: “Don’t worry, but
you have already been photo-
graphed. Every one who goes within
view of them on this side is photo-
graphed from a room in the German
Customs building.”

On a side of a thick wooded hill,
where only a hedge divides the
frontier, my police officer friend
asked me to look through a gap.
Ten yards away, half-hidden in the
hedge, a German soldier sat
immobile facing the west. Ten yards

I did. The German was doing
exactly the same. We were looking
each other in the eye at a mile
distant through field glasses. Once
we passed within a few feet of a
German customs patrol. The two
German officers passed without a
word.

“They never speak to us, hardly
ever glance at us. They are not
allowed to fraternise,” the French
officer explained.

The frontier line is the Maginot
Line, which lies some miles back,
under the tree-covered hills. But
in Forbach tremendous counter-
espionage activity is taking place.
An average of one German a gent a

Daily Express Staff Repo\

G ERMAN ships all over
world, recalled to their 1
ports on Wednesday,
expecting throughout yeste
the order to “ carry on.”
Those due to sail and detain
port, which include the liner 1
burg, and those which have a!
returned to port, including
Atlantic liner Europa, which
into Bremerhaven following
recall order, were standing
throughout yesterday with full £
up and all passengers aboard.

The German liner Lichte
from Bremen, which put to sea
just as she was entering Port
harbour on Wednesday and i
“ for an unknown destina
returned to Port Said yesterda;

It is believed that she is to
ceed on her journey east.

TRAGEDIES

“Yesterday a youth of 19 was
arreste d. He 'had in Ms possession
4a hu hiature camera of German
make which"" fitted behind a" large

imitation button on his overcoat,
lie had“Taken photographs of all
m obilisat ion, A.I0^7^~§hd other
notices' puTllp fiTTrbnt of the For-

bach Town Hall.

He had been paid 8QT francs,
ne arly £ 5. for that assignments “
Today there is a new feeling of
optimism all along the frontier as
news is awaited from the Four-
Power meeting .at Munich. But the
military and civil upheaval is not
yet being retarded for a moment.

Women in Paris offer their
services for A.R.P. work. There
has been no slackening in the
preparations to strengthen the
capital’s defences against air
attack.

DAYS OF

TENSION

AFTER listening to Hitler’s
speech in German on
Monday night, William Neatham
Rumbell, 27-year-old sales clerk,

CANCELLED

The Cunard-White Star Con
have announced the cancellati
the sailing of the Aquitania
Southampton to New Yori
October 5.

The cancellation, I was info
yesterday, has nothing to do
the international situation.

At the London offices of the
pany, noTeason for the cancell
was given beyond that it was d
“ circumstances beyond our con

The cancellation, howevei
definite, and would not be aff
by a settlement of the Czi
German crisis.

The United States
announced that the liner Was!
ton would sail from Southan
at noon tomorrow instead of Oc
7, as originally scheduled.

This alteration was made be
the ship, bound for Hamburj
Le Havre and South am
finished her journey at South
ton.

A Reuter message from Oi
kale, a small Turkish port or
south shore of the Dardan
stated that three Italian fi:
trawlers returning to Italy
instructed yesterday to wai
Canakkale pending developmei

P.M.G. appeals tc
cut phone c;

— £ rt a.

— — - j.

The Postmaster-General, thaj
the public for the imme
response to his appeal to cut
phone talks, says that require!
of the defence services are mi
enormous demands upon telepb
He says it has been necessa
reserve many trunk lines entire

page 9

Friday, DAILY EXPRESS, September 30, 1938

CRISIS i

eeless”
ieties ?

nach ?•

when

ihirties,
s r.erve-
E-s^ential
lets . . .
"GANESE!
i n srve-
: to men ,
Cassells
: strain-
Cassells
of pain
idy beat

because
Cassells
patently
K‘omen !
fer from

STION,

us IN-

COOWN

: without
Sackville
2339.

Security.

CAPITALS REJOICE
AT PEACE NEWS

Dancing in
the streets

Daily Express Correspondent
BRUSSELS, Thursday.

D emonstrations of joy

took place tonight in the
streets of Brussels when special
editions of the newspapers
announced that an agreement
had been reached at Munich.

Thousands of excited people
danced in the streets, women
wept, while men shouted them-
selves hoarse.

Britain is highly praised. Many
people here have suggested that if
any one is deserving of the Nobel
Peace Prize Mr Chamberlain is.

Political circles in Brussels are
convinced that new conversations
will follow the Munich Conference
for a possible settlement of all
European quarrels.

It is also thought that soon an
agreement will be negotiated for a
general disarmament.

It is stated here that M Van
Zeeland, former Belgian Premier,
will be called in to put into applica-
tion the economic report he has
drawn up for Britain and France,
and which, I understand, was prac-
tically approved by Mr Roosevelt
and by Berlin and Rome.

This report contained several prac-
tical recommendations for the
economic reconstruction of the
world.

U.S. JOY

NEW YORK, Thursday.— Head-
lines announcing the historical
Four-Power Agreement met banker
and bricklayer, rich man and poor
man returning home from work
after a week’s anxiety this evening.

There were nb demonstrations,
but it was clear that the whole
nation sighed with relief, and that
two men are credited with staving
off world disaster — Chamberlain and
Roosevelt.

Pope appeals
for peace
prayers

JTiHE Pope broadcast this
JL world appeal for peace
prayers last night from his
villa at Castel Gandolfo, on
the shores of Lake Albano:

“While millions of men still
live in dread because of the
imminent danger of war, and
because of the threat of
unexampled slaughter and
ruin, we gather into our
fraternal heart the trepida-
tion of our children. We
invite bishops, clergy, religious
and faithful to unite them-
selves with us in the most
undaunted and insistent

prayer for the preservation of
justice, charity, and peace.

“To this unarmed but
invisible power of prayer let
the people have recourse once
again that God, in whose hand
rests the destiny of the world,
may sustain, especially at this
moment, in those who govern,
confidence in the pacific ways
of patient negotiating and
lasting agreement, and that
He may inspire in all senti-
ments and actions correspond-
ing to their respected words of
peace, which shall be suited to
foster peace and establish it
upon a secure basis of law and
of the Gospel teachings.

“ Grateful beyond words for
the prayers which have been
and are being poured out for
us by the faithful of the whole
Catholic world, with all our
hearts we offer for the salva-
tion and peace of the world
this life which, in virtue of
those prayers, the Lord has
spared and even renewed.”

Bomber’s

Peace for
Spain talk
in London

Daily Express Staff Reporter
GENEVA, Thursday.
ENOR PABLODE AZCARATE,
Spanish Ambassador in
London, had an important con-
versation tonight with Mr R.
Butler, British Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, concerning
peace possibilities for Spain.

The talk followed the adoption by
the League’s political committee of
a proposal that the League should
send a commission to Spain to verify
the withdrawal of foreign com-
batants. Senor Negrin, Spanish
Premier, recently decided to with-
draw all volunteers from Govern-
ment Spain.

I understand that Mr Butler and
Senor Azcarate discussed what
measures the London Non-Interven-
tion Committee might take to bring
about withdrawal of foreigners in
General Franco’s Army.

In Geneva political circles it is
thought that as a result of the
Munich Conference Mussolini may
agree to call out the Italians.

Wasp stung driver,
caused his crash

George Taylor, of Latchford,
Warrington, Lancs, saved his life
yesterday by jumping over the bar
from his seat in a public house
when a Warrington Corporation bus
crashed into the wall and window of
the inn.

The crash was caused by the bus
driver, Ralph Hewitt, of Walton,
Warrington, being stung above the
eye by a wasp. No one was hurt.

ITALY HAPPY

ROME, Thursday. — Newspapers
tonight issued one extra edition
after another with the latest news
from Munich,

Enormous crowds gathered to
snatch editions as they : arrived.
Rome’s bars and cafes were filled
with people celebrating the passing
of the threat of war.

Signor Gayda says in the Giomale
d’ltalia: “Mussolini’s figure now
towers in the world’s history as the
saviour of peace.” — British United
Press.

crash

kills three

Daily Express Staff Reporter

T HREE R.A.F. men were killed
yesterday when a bomber
crashed and burst into flames in.
a ploughed field on a hillside at
Kedington, near Haverhill,
Suffolk.

Farm workers saw the airplane

rtrttvtft X# n Inn. «+' nlnuX

10 LEADER PAGE

Daily Express, 30 September 1938 Editorial:

MANCHESTER THEATRES

MANCHESTER Repertory Theatre.

Tonight at 7.30. Matinee Wed., 2.30.

“ RICHARD OP BORDEAUX.”

By Gordon Daviot.

Prices 3/6 to 6d. All seats bookable.

Box Office 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. Tel. 2284 Rush.
Free Car Park.. Licensed Cafe-Bar.

OPERA HOUSE. Evenings at 7.30.

v Mats, (reduced prices). Tomorrow at 2.
CARL BRISSON in
ALOMA and nutane,

A Musical Romance of the South Seas.
Gabrielle Brune, Donald Mather, Lucille
Benstead.

Box Office 10—8. Bla. 1T87.

PRINCES Theatre. Nightly at 7.45.

Matinee Wed. & Sat. at 2.30. Cen. 2207.
The Vital Play of the Moment!

To Secure Peace by Mutual Understanding.

SIR JOHN MARTIN-HARVEY in
“THE BURGOMASTER OF STILEMONDE.

Next Week: JEAN FORBES-ROBERTSON in

“SHADOW IN THE FIRELIGHT.”

PALACE THEATRE. Central 0184.

•** Evenings 7.30. Matinees Wed. & Sa.t. 2.15.
TOM ARNOLD presents the Musical Triumph

“BALALAIK A.”

His Majesty’s Theatre, London, Production,
whh Clifford Mollison and Charles Fletcher.

Booking also for October 10.

Drury Lane’s Spectacular Musical Production

“THE SUN NEVER SET S.”

'.dear Wallace. London •Cast of 100 Artists.

EXHIBITION

NOW OPEN DAILY. 11 a.m. to 10 p.m.
Until Saturday, October 8th.

“Evening Chronicle” North National

RADIO EXHIBITION

CITY HALL. DEANSGATE, MANCHESTER.

Huge Comprehensive Display
of “Up to the Minute” “PUSH-BUTTON”
RADIO RECEIVERS.
MAGNIFICENT R.A.F. EXHIBIT.
Admission to Exhibition, including Tax,
1/- up to 5 p.m., 6d. after 5. Saturdays
All Day 1/-. Children under 12 3d.

VARIETY THEATRE “ RADIO REVELS.”

5 Shows Daily at 3.30, 6.50, and 8.50,
featurin': famous Broadcasting Stars.

Appearing Both Weeks:

“ THE BOUQUETS ” CONCERT PARTY

(from the Spa Theatre. Scarborough)

*nd GEOFFREY WARNER. Also this week only
NOSMO KING & HUBERT,

JUDY SHIRLEY, JACK WATSON.

Next Week only: EVE BECKE,
FORSYTHE. SEAMON & FARRELL.
Admission to Variety Theatre:
Evenings 1/6, 1/- and 6d. Matinees

6d.

BLACKPOOL THEATRES

6.0 HIPPODROME. 8.45.

BLACKPOOL.

MAT. WED., 2.15. SUNDAYS, 8 p.m.

JACK TAYLOR presents

SANDY POWELL, DOUGLAS WAKEFIELD,
and NORMAN EVANS
in

“KING REVEL/*

Box Office: Tel. 2233.

LONDON ENTERTAINMENTS

THEATRES

A DELPHI. BOBBY GET YOUR GUN. Post-

poned until Fri., Oct. 7th, at 8 p.m.
ALDWYCH Evgs., 8.30 Lilian Braithwaite.
COMEDIENNE, by I. Novello. W., Th., Sat.. 2.30.
AMBASSADORS. Tern. 1171. Evgs. 8.30. Mats.
Weds., Fridays, 2.o0. “ SPRING MEETING.”

APOLLO. 8.50. Tu.,Th. 2.50. IDIOT’S DELIGHT.
LEE TRACY, TAMARA GEVA (Last 2 Weeks.)
COMEDY. Whi. 257 8. 8.30. Tues., Fri.. 2.30.
Elsie Randolph, Henry Kendall, Hugh Wakefield,
ROOM TOR TWO. “Very, very funny.” N. Chro.
CRITERION. 8.40. FRENCH WITHOUT TEARS.
(2nd year.) Tues., Sat.. 2.50. (Whi. 3844.)
DRURY LANE Tern. 7171 8.15. Wd.. Sat., 2.30.
IVOR NOVELLO, DOROTHY DICKSON.
GWEN FFRANGCON-DAVIES in HENRY V.

Reduced Prices tor Bookable Seats at Mats.
DUCHESS. Tern. 8243. Evngs 8.30. Mats. Wed.,
Sat 2 50. Sybil Thorndike, Emlyn Williams
in THE CORN IS GREEN, by Emlyn Williams.
DUKE OF YORK’S. Tern. 5122. Evgs., 8 30.
Mats Thurs. <5s Sat,, 2.30. SEYMOUR HICKS
in THE LAST TRUMP, by JAMES BRIDIE.
GAIETY. Tem. 6991. 8.15. Thur. & Sat., 2.30.

LESLIE HENSON in RUNNING RIOT.
Fred Emney, Louise Browne. Richd. Hearne.
“A year from now will still be, a riot.” — D. Skch.
GLOBE. Ger. 1592. 8.30 sharp. Weds., Sat..

2 50 St John Ervine’s “ ROBERT’S WIFE.
GOLDERS GREEN. (Spe. 6111.) Vic Wells &
Symphony Orch Mon. Next. 8.15: CARMEN.

TELEPHONES.— —Manchester : Central 2112.

London: Central 8000.

Liverpool: Royal 82. Newcastle: 27021.

Sheffield: 20418. Leeds: 21236 and 23291.
Belfast: 24678. Dublin: 44296.

SEPTEMBER 30. 1938.

PEACE

B E glad, in your hearts. Give
thanks to your God. The
wings of peace settle about us
and the peoples of Europe. The
prayers of the troubled hearts
are answered.

People of Britain, your children
are safe. Your husbands and
your sons will not march to
battle.

A war which would have been
the most criminal, the most
futile, the most destructive that
ever insulted the purposes of the
Almighty and the intelligence of
men has been averted.

It was the war that nobody
wanted. Not the German people.
Not the French people. Nobody,
above all, in Britain, which had
no concern whatever with the
issues at stake.

No war for us

Oh, farewell pride, pomp,
and circumstance of glorious
war .

F AREWELL, a long farewell,
we trust. For its pride does
not fill our hearts. Its pomp
has vanished. And its glory is
ashes. Farewell to its gnawing
anxieties, its endless blind
horror, its fantastic folly.

Through the black days this
newspaper clung to belief that
peace would prevail, that
commonsense would triumph.

Over and over again we said
it: “ There will be no European
war involving Britain this year,
or next year either/*

Now, in the moment when our
persistent faith is justified, it is
no time to estimate who has
emerged the victor from the
long controversy. Peace is a
victory for all mankind, as war
would have been a universal
disaster.

To him the laurels

I F we must have a victor, let
us choose Chamberlain. For
the Prime Minister’s conquests
are mighty and enduring —
millions of happy homes and
hearts relieved of their burden.
To him the laurels.

And now let us go back to
our own affairs.

We have had enough of those
menaces, conjured up from the
Continent to confuse us.

These

E VERY man I met
yesterday has been
like a man who was
colour blind for a week
and could suddenly see
again the difference
between the blue of a
smoke haze, the green of a
fir copse. So much they
had stared at and not
noticed suddenly came
alive again. More alive.

PER

VARIETY THEATRES

COLISEUM Terr . 3161. 6.25 & 9.0. Sal.. 2.o0.
BEBE DANIELS & BEL LYON, Flotsam <fc Jet-
sam, Joe Termini. Albert Sandier Trio. Edwin

Styles, Miss Paris oi 1938. Beryl Orde, etc.
HACKNEY EMPIRE. Amh. 4451. 6.40 & 8.55.

DANTE, Master of Mystery in. “ Sim-Sala-Bim

2'- >o : 5d. Children (except Saf.fi/-to 5d:

From 1914 — and on

I N 1914 Germany menaced us

on the seas, threatening to
interfere /with our ocean high-

ways/ v That < was the story. ?;r >o.

First man I met has a home
cine-projector and an early
Charlie Chaplin film. He spent
Wednesday night running it
through and through and chuck-

liTicr tit Fharlio’o smV>flpf i oo

page 10: full editorial column and full letters

Friday, DAILY EXPRESS September so; tss8

section

From 1914 — and on

'N 1914 Germany menaced us
on the seas, threatening to
interfere /With our ocean high-

leader page

LETTERS

Opinion

I HAVE read the Daily Express
for over 25 years, and would
like to congratulate you most
heartily on the calm and reasoned
manner in which you have pre-
sented the news during the present
crisis and for the restraint you
have shown when commenting on
a problem still “sub judice.”—
R. H. R. Mitford, Westbury Road,
New Malden, Surrey.

* * *

P e a c e

P LEASE allow me to thank you
for the dignity and optimism
with which you have cheered your
readers through these dark days.

Your two million odd readers are
grateful. Like Mr Chamberlain you
have striven after the only thing
that matters to humanity— Peace.
— Henry Barratt, Grosvenor Road,
Sale, Cheshire.

* * *

Fed

A FTER seeing St John Cooper’s
home page cat drawing of a

centipede I looked up a reference
book to see out of curiosity whether
centipedes really have 100 feet.

Most of them haven’t. Most of
the illustrations showed beasts
with 30 feet. The letter press told
me that they breathe through little
tubes in the side of their bodies,
have poison claws, and sometimes
kill small slugs by shaking them
from side to side as a terrier shakes
a rat.

I also learned that there are
luminous centipedes, too. Oviedo,
companion of Columbus, first
noticed them while working on a
gold smelting works in San
Domingo. — John Patterson, Dorset
Road, London, S.W.8.

* *

o r r i e s

but

I QUITE agree that economic con-
ditions compel many young
couples to defer marriage.

Married people with large
families have endless worries.

, . 1 nevertheless, proud to say
w?,., 1 ha I e seven fine, healthy
children. — D. M., Carlisle/

Pail]f®iqn*06

TELEPHONES.— -Manchester: Central 2112.

London: Central 8000.

Liverpool: Royal 82. Newcastle: 27021.

Sheffield: 20418. Leeds: 21236 and 2o29l..
Belfast: 24678. Dublin: 44296.

SEPTEMBER 30. 1938.

PEACE

E glad in your hearts. Give
thanks to your God. The
wings of peace settle about us
and the peoples of Europe. The
prayers of the troubled hearts
are answered.

People of Britain, your children
are safe. Your husbands and
your sons will not march to
battle.

A war which would have been
the most criminal, the most
futile, the most destructive that
ever insulted the purposes of the
Almighty and the intelligence of
men has been averted.

It was the war that nobody
wanted. Not the German people.
Not the French people. Nobody,
above all, in Britain, which had
no concern whatever with the
issues at stake.

No war for us

Oh, farewell pride, pomp,
and circumstance of glorious
war .

Through the black days this
newspaper clung to belief that
peace would prevail, that
commonsense would triumph.

Over and over again we said
it: “ There will be no European
war involving Britain this year,
or next year either.”

To him the laurels

F we must have a victor, let
us choose Chamberlain. For
the Prime Minister’s conquests
are mighty and enduring —
millions of happy homes and
hearts relieved of their burden.
To him the laurels.

And now let us go back to
our own affairs.

We have had enough of those
menaces, conjured up from the
Continent to confuse us.

ways. That ^ was the story. oqo
-1^0 ‘Boish^tshT war 1 the'
menace. It was imperative, so
we were told, that we should
fight Bolshevism lest it destroy
us. We must exterminate that
monstrous power.

Such was the cry of those who
urged us on to a holy war against
the infidels, arguing that we
must crush them, root them up,
drive them out of their hiding
places.

Today’s bogey

N OW, in 1938, there is a new
menace, some undefined
threat in Europe. Against this
threat we must take up our arms
in defence of our lives and
liberties. There is the cry today.

All these frightening pictures
are vague in outline. The
meanings of these manifestations
are hard in truth for the human
mind to conceive.

Our biggest menace

B UT one menace is concrete
enough. The greatest of all
menaces to our society, our
stability, the happiness of our
people. The menace of unem-
ployment.

It was with us in 1914. It
returned, more severe in form, in
1920, and in 1938 it is a real
burden upon our shoulders.

Can't we get on with that
menace for a time?

Comfort

/T’HERE is one thing about it.
1 Although it is a menace it
also represents to us a potential j
source of strength. The hands 1
that are not working. The
muscles that are not in use. The
brains that are idle.

The best possible use to
which we can put our workless
thousands is in preparing our
defences.

We can do it. We have the
gold. We have the engineering
skill. We have the land— count-
less acres of land which can be
brought into fuller production,
supplying food for the people.

We have the raw materials, all
we need, at home or in the
territories of the Empire.

And we have the men.

Get busy

W ITH these resources, these
vast reserves of power, we
can, and we should, make ready
to defend ourselves, developing a
full and complete structure for
the protection of our shores, the
defence of our cities, the safe-
guarding of the seas.

We can weld the men, the
money, and the materials into an
overwhelming array of weapons,
a mighty curtain of defence
between the Empire and any who
might think of challenging its
peace.

When that is done, our Prime
Minister can say r like Herr Hitler:

,4 - . ^ ... -f ,, l

‘Our foniflnjHMM
effective for deftifo^J

Friday. DAILY EXPRESS, September 3o, 1938
ARP= Air Raid Precautions

14 CITY NEWS

Evidence of demand for sandbagged shelters :

A.R.P. DEMANDS
FORCE UP SAND
PRICES SHARPLY

SUPPLIERS and manufacturers of A.R.P. materials were yesterday
U S iven a respite from new orders which may enable them to catch
up with tfte overwhelming demands which have swamped them in
the past week.

Builders’ merchants, for example, who supply sand, reported
that customers who had placed big orders the day before were
ringing up yesterday to say that their order had been miscalculated
and should only have been for a third of the size.

Even so, such firms as Wiggins

and Company (Hammersmith), 1 “ —

Thames Grit and Aggregates, and
the Eastwoods group have huge
order books.

It has been found impossible to

meet the demand with “ screened ”
sand, such as is normally used in
the building trade. In consequence,
sand is being rushed “ unscreened ”
straight from pit to customer.

Some customers are even prepared
to accept mould or top soil dressing
to fill their sandbags.

Demand has forced up prices
sharply. Sand is now selling
‘unscreened” at about 8/6 a cubic
yard, compared with less than
a-third of that figure a few weeks
ago.

CAUSING BOOM

Shortage of supplies of bags is
causing something like a beom for
such companies as Jute Industries.
Shortage is so acute that emergency
sandbags are being made off paper.

Danger of these, however, is that
the paper is likely to rot, and the
sand may run out and block drains.

London merchants have, there-
fore, been sending urgent demands
to Dundee and elsewhere for fresh
supplies.

Urgent demands for supplies of
corrugated steel sheets are also
reaching manufacturers such as
Guest, Keen and Baldwins, John
Uysaght, John Summers, and Col-
villes.

The corrugated sheet sections of
these companies are working near
to capacity and special arrange-
ments have now come into force
whereby the British Iron and Steel
Federation are facilitating deliveries
by supplementing the ordinary trade
channels.

APPLY DIRECT

Local authorities have been told
to apply direct to the federation if
they find any difficulty in getting
supplies. The federation can then
place the orders with the most suit-
able works.

Prices for sheets are fixed, and
consumers are being advised that it
is quite unnecessary to pay
premiums for quick delivery to
merchants or others.

Even with these arrangements,
however, a shortage appears to have
developed in some parts of London.
The sheets are needed not only for
air-raid shelters but also for cover-
ing gla^s skylights on roofs where
sandbags are being placed.

In the rush to complete prepara-
tions boards were substituted for the
sheets The Munich respite, how-
ever, is giving supplier and consumer
time to make good deficiencies.

Wall Street
strong

NEW YORK, Thursday. — The growing
prospects for peace In Europe, larger pur-
chases from abroad, and more extensive
SKtHl5?H« n + y th « public were the chief
on^Wall 1 Street 0 & finn upwarc * m <> v ement
At the same time it was understood that
a considerable volume of potential buving
15 be i n & , held back pending the final
Munich ° f the Four " Power Conference at
In a hy case the undertone was strong
and final list recorded
general advances of anything to 3doi
Sales totalled 1.230,000- shares. 3 °

Thf advance broadened out in more
active trading towards the end following
a report that the Four Power ConferSice
had agreed on Essential points, and the
close was strong.— Reuter.

Stocks. Today,

Prev.

Stocks.

Today

[Call Money ..Steady -Steady ! General Foods
i Gen. Mot New

Cx. Ldn. Cbl. 4. 78 4.73 Gen Refract

MSSsHl®* 4721532 g'S SlSS*;:

Do.60dyCoo». 14.7715,9 4.72i5 M Gillette Raz!.

| Glidden Co.!!
Goodrich B.F
Goody’r T.&R
Houdaille-H..
lingers. Rand
Iut. Harvester
Do. Nickel..'
Do. Paper C.

; Do. Ti. & Tg.
Johns M'uvile
Kelsev H. ‘A'.
Kennecott Crj
1 Kroger Groc..
l^unbert Co..
Lehman Corn
[ LI hby-O Glass
Liggett AM..
jLoewes luc...
IliOrrllard Co..

I Mack Trucks.
iMontg. Ward
Nash Kelv. ..
|Natl. Biscuit.
Do. Cash Reg
Do. Dairy. „|
Do. Distillers)

Do. Lead

Do. Pow.AI,.
Do. Steel....
N. Amer. Co..

OtisSteel

Owens Bottle.
Pacific G.& E.
Packd. Motors
Param't. Piet.
Patino Mines.
Penney, J. C..

Industrials

AirReauetioni
Allied Chein..|
AlliedStore8..|
AlltsChalrn's.l
Amer. Can....)
Do. Car. & F. j
L>o. Loeomo.
Do. Metal Co.
Do. Pow.AI..,
Do. Radiator)
Do. Roll. Mis
Do. Sm.AUef
Do. Sugar Ref
Do. Tel&Tcl.

Do. Tob

AnacondaC..
Annour A Co.,
Atlantic Refi.
Bald win Loco)
Beudix Aviat)
Bethlehem
Boeing Air.... ,
Bobu Almnln)
Briggs Manu.

8ia

2118

571a

People’s Gas. .
Phelps Dodge
Phillips Petro

Reynolds Tob
St.Jos’h. Load
Sear Roebuck
Shell Union..
Simmons C'o..
Soc. Vac. Co..
>tandardBra.
Stan. Gas A E.
StanOilof Cal
St. Oil of Ind.
St. Oil of N. J.
Swift* Co. ..
Texas Snlph..
Tide Ass. Oil.
TimkenD.Axl
Timken R. B.

345 8

4534

3114

18ia

8 b
2Ha
223a

26b

93*
58 b
483a
8b
8b
16
103 4
423a
16
125a
25
50b
90b
49b
18b
23b

453 4

2334

25!

123a

23b

233 4

63a
57 14
183a
9 b
69

i»btl

4 5 8

Ida
10
78b
30
36 b
38
53b
28b
29b
10b
113 8
b b a

14b
17b
41
42b
68b
143 4
29
13b
6 b
3b
29b
28b
523a
17b
36b
l«b 1
] 334
4bb

I Prey

33b

29b

25b

273a

57b

46b

93b

4Cb

15b

12b

49b

473«

13b

223e
44
8 b
22b

l?b

22b

5 b
55b

173 8

65b

25b

93„
76
28b
34 b
37b
50 b

28
95 8

6 b
13b
16b
40b
41
66b
14ia
27b
13

29b

27b

50b

17b

3538

12b

13b

44b

ley]
ids,
h a
ials
ible
the

;m-

the

rk>

lts.

•ds,

nee

less

ind

ny-

the

late

leer

rear

zing

true

A
a IB

GAS PROTECT

Complete outfit containing all materials tor

protecting one room in home or office against
poison gas penetration as advised by Govern-
ment Regulations. The materials in the outfit
are specially made for the purpose, and are
all gas-proof. Pull illustrated instructions with
each outfit. Supplied in tin containers will

r last many years.

PRICE, INCLUDING CARRIAGE,

45 /-

Cash with order or sent
r on

JUNE LANG

FLOTSAM of the crisis, told by Paul Holt:
Cinemactress June Lang, whom you remember
best as nurse to the Dionne Quins, came to
London a few days ago to star in a Twentieth
Century Fox film to be made at Elstree, saw
a gun emplacement on the Embankment,
sandbags at the House, trenches in the park.
Decided she didn’t like any part of it, caught
the Queen Mary home.

t! II ! !< M ra

PAGE 18

FRIDAY. SEPTEMBER 30. 1938

PEACE MEETIN

]\|R CHAMBERLAIN and Signor Mussolini

time at the Fuhrerhaus, Munich. On one side,
are ( left to right) Field Marshal Goering, Herr Hitler, Dr Paul
Schmidt (interpreter), and Count Ciano> the Duce's Foreign
Minister son-in-law. On the other is M Fran^ois-Poncet, French
Ambassador to Germany. Between Mr Chamberlain and the

Duce is M Daladier, French Premier. . . After three meetings
it was reported that agreement had been reached by the big four
on the main essentials of a plan to solve the Czecho-SIovak

problem.

CHILDREN from a London nursery school move trainwards at
Euston. Thousands of children were evacuated yesterday.

CIVIL DEFENCE

A PRACTICAL MANUAL PRESENTING WITH
WORKING DRAWINGS THE METHODS RE-
QUIRED FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION
AGAINST AERIAL ATTACK

C. W. GLOVER

Capt. Late R.A., M.Inst.C.E., M.I.Struct.E., M.Inst.R.A., F.P.W.I.
Lecturer on Civil Defence, Regent Street Polytechnic

EXTRACTS

Note: on page 11, Glover
estimates that the "first line
strengths" for air power in
March 1937 were Germany = 3,500
and British Home Defence = 1,750

aircraft.

LONDON

CHAPMAN & HALL LTD.

II HENRIETTA STREET, W.C.2

I93 8

PREFACE

The ineradicable instinct of self-preservation in man prompts
him to clutch at any straw in a vital emergency.

Experience in war has shown that even the resourceful
serving soldier all too often exhibits peculiar ideas of what
constitutes adequate protection and shelters constructed
without the exercise of the fundamental principles of structural
stability have proved themselves to be the greater danger.

Yet the mere act of occupying them has contributed in no
small measure to the maintenance of mental equilibrium in
the stress of many a bombardment.

In the presentation of this volume, attempts have been made
to analyse the problems confronting modern society for the
adequate protection of the civil population, and it is confidently
hoped that its appearance will not be taken as an acceptance
of the inevitability of war, but rather as a means of focussing
national attention to the moral necessity for the prompt
preparation of civil defence.

The author feels it incumbent upon himself to make his
position quite clear at the outset.

He has considerable sympathy with the sentiments of the
idealist but is forced by consideration of the facts of the present
position to abandon utopian ideas and come out in the open
definitely a realist.

He is not an alarmist nor an ultra-pacifist and has
endeavoured to present and examine the facts fairly and
without political bias in the fervent hope that Civilian Defence
in all its aspects will be taken up seriously by the nation. The
civilian population trained to protect itself will be largely
insured against injury and panic and thus the great cities of
this country — at present almost an invitation to the air raider —
will not present tactical advantages worth the military effort
and risk in securing them.

The appalling increase in the offensive power and suddenness
of aerial attack makes even the hasty improvisation of defence

vii

PREFACE

Messrs. Richard Costain Ltd.
Messrs. Kontragas Ltd.

Messrs. Conjoint Constructors Ltd.
Messrs. Nissen Buildings Ltd.

FIG. NOS.

• 77

78, 79

. 80

86, 87

The author also wishes gratefully to acknowledge his
indebtedness to officials of the Home Office for much valuable
help and criticism in the preparation of the work.

Views expressed are solely those of the author and are in no
sense official.

Chapters are addressed to the layman as well as the architect
and builder, and it is hoped that the details, working drawings
and suggestions herein contained will assist forward the
humanitarian work of the protection of the defenceless citizen.

July 7th, 1938.

C. W. G.

Inventor and author Captain C. W. Glover, explaining to Pathe
news reel his new plan tor London’s Air Port Of The Future, 1933

SOURCE: http://www.britishpathe.com/video/the-air-port-or-the-ruture-aka-airport-or-ruture

CHAPTER I

PROBABLE FORMS OF AERIAL ATTACK

It is obviously not possible to predict the exact form which
aerial attack in the future would take, but there is no doubt
that the element of surprise and the demoralising effect of the
swift use of overwhelming force would be tactical advantages

which would be seized by an enemy.

A study of the statistical summary of raids on the adminis-
trative County of London during the Great War indicates the

tactics then adopted. 65 (See Table I, p. 9.)

The attempts to “ set fire to London ” from the air per-
sistently carried out in the raids during 1915-17 failed > lar g el Y
because of the low efficiency of the incendiary bombs then used,
the bad marksmanship of the bomber and the brilliantly
effective fire fighting services employed by the London Fire
Brigade. Out of 354 incendiary bombs on London only eight
caused fatal casualties and seven other injuries.

The maximum number of incendiary bombs which fell in
London during one raid was 258 and these were distributed over
a wide area averaging seven bombs per square mile.

There is no reason why a ruthless and untiring enemy zone
bombing from a great altitude should not be able to increase
this concentration a hundredfold, using incendiary bombs each
many times more effective.

The increased use of high explosive bombs brought about a
corresponding increase in casualties and material damage an
effect also observed in Paris. Out of 567 explosive bombs on
London, 144 caused fatal casualties and 74 other injuries.

The total number of casualties in England from aerial attack
during the Great War were 1,414 killed and 3,416 wounded ;
material damage £3,000,000, produced by 643 aircraft, which
dropped in all 8,776 bombs weighing about 270 tons in the
aggregate. About two-thirds was concentrated upon London.

In Germany the number killed by allied air raids is said to

JrKUr>Ai5I^il/ ^UKJVIb UP A1SLU Al. Ai lA^lY y

Piecemeal spasmodic efforts in a task of such dimensions are
bound to be ineffective ; and the avoidance of promiscuous
large-scale national expenditure on protective construction can

Table I

Statistical Summary of Raids on the Administrative
County of London during the Great War.

Bombs dropped

Date.

Time.

Weather.

Raiders.

Killed.

Injured.

Fires.

Damage.

Incen-

Explo-

diary.

sive.

31/5/15

Night

Fine

1 Zep. L.Z.38

4 i

£18,396

moon

17/8/15

Clear

„ L.io

5,000

7/9/15

Mist

f Zep. L.Z.74
\ShipSL.2 /

7,809

8/9/15

))

Clear

Zep. L.13

530,787

13/10/15

Clear,

slight

r Zep. L.13 "1

1 „ L.15 J

50,250

N. wind

24/8/16

Rain

Zep. L. 31

130,000

23/9/16

Misty

r Zep. L. 31 ^

l „ L.33 /

2 7

64,662

28/11/16

Day

Sunny

i aeroplane

—

510

13/6/17

»>

14 Gothas

—

145

382

125,953

7/7/17

21 „

—

182

203,821

4/9/17

Night

Cloudy

9 „

—

figi

31,548

24/9/17

Clear

3 99

24,002

25/9/17

3 99

16,101

29/9/17

4 ,,

—

21,873

30/9/17

8 „

7,600

1/10/17

8 „

—

44,094

19/10/17

Fog

Zep. L.45

—

48,205

i/u/17

Drizzle

3 Gothas

1 7

7,443

6/12/17

Just be-
fore day-
break —
clear

258

92,477

225,016

18/12/17

Cloudy

7 „

28/1/18

Misty

3 Gothas, 1

—

159

172,677

Giant

18,229

16/2/18

Cloudy

1 Giant

—

17/3/X8

1 ,,

—

38,898

7/3/18

E. wind

3 Giants

—

30,530

19/5/18

Fog

19 Gothas and

—

128

130,733

Giants.

25 Raids

631

644

614

1,746

245

£2,046,614

BOMBS

Table IX

Protection against Perforation and Explosion

Weight
of Bomb

Concrete,
5,690 lbs. at
28 days
specially
reinforced.

Limestone
rock or rein-
forced Con-
crete (3,130
lb. grade).

Concrete,
not reinforced
(2,150 lb. per
sq. in. at 28
days)

Constructions in Tunnel.

Soft Rock.

Compressed

Gravel.

Earthy Sand.

100

3 °°

2' 4 "
3 ' 7 '
4 ' l "

4' 3"

5 ' l "
6' 11"

4 ' 7 "

6' 11"

9 ' 2"

il' 6"

1 6' 5"
24' 7"

18' 1 ”
24' 7"
36 ' 1"

21' 4"
29' 7'
42' 8"

It has been estimated that the blast from a 500 lb. H.E.
bomb causes an instantaneous increase in atmospheric pressure
equivalent to about 200 times that produced by normal wind
pressure, say 6,000 lb. per sq. ft. 50 ft. from the burst.

This, however, lasts for but three ten-thousandths of a
second and the reaction immediately following results in a pull
in the opposite direction. Windows in buildings are often
blown outwards due to this effect by the bursting of a bomb in
the street.

The whole time taken for blast pressure to act and die away
is approximately TG \j 0 th of a second, and if the pressure were
maintained there are but a few walls in existence that could
safely withstand them.

Investigations tend to show, however, that buildings of
normal strong construction will not be seriously affected by the
blast of 500 lb. high explosive bombs bursting 50 ft. or more
away (see Chapters on Shelters).

According to an official Swiss formula the blast pressure at
any distance from a high explosive bomb explosion can be
calculated as below :

p = lb. per sq. in.

where Q is the weight of explosive in lb. and R is the distance
from the explosion in feet.

In light doors, windows and partitions the stabilising effect
of the inertia to resist this instantaneous pressure must be
neglected, but in heavy massive construction this effect is
appreciable.

CHAPTER III

GAS BOMBS AND THEIR EFFECTS

“ Gas ” to the layman holds unknown terrors, but thanks
to the advance of science it is no longer the most deadly weapon
in the hands of a potential enemy.

The total number of compounds known to chemical science
is estimated at nearly half a million, and about a quarter of a
mini on have been carefully studied and their various effects
recorded.

Nearly all chemical substances exert some toxic influences,
but during the World War about 300,000 substances were
investigated with a view to their use in combat.

Of about thirty found suitable for use only twelve were
finally adopted, the elimination being due to the stringent
technical and tactical requirements imposed.

Only about six compounds were notably successful, and the
following extract from statistical summaries is of interest.

125,000 tons of battle gases were used by the seven principal
countries engaged in the World War (all theatres), the approxi-
mate allocation being as below : —

Table XI

Tons.

Lbs. of gas
per casualty

Lung injurants

100,500

230

Vesicants .

12,000

Stemutators

6,500

650

Lacrimators

6,000

Total

125,000

192 av.

The total gas casualties were 1,296,853, or one for each
192 lb. of gas.

GAS BOMBS AND THEIR EFFECTS

Table XII

Quantity.

Form of Agent.

Casualties.

Rate per Casualty.

5.000. 000.000 lb.

1.389.000. 000 rounds.
50,000,000,000 rounds.

1,200 tons .
9,000,000 rounds.

High explosive .
Non-gas .

Small arms ammunition
| Mustard gas shell

10,000,000

13.356.435

10,000,000

400,000

500 lb.

104 rounds
5,000 rounds
1 60 lb.

{22-5 rounds

Mustard-gas shell proved to be twice as effective as the
average gas shell and nearly five times as effective as explosive
shells.

The mobilised forces engaged in the World War aggregated
68,321,638, 54-7 per cent, of which became casualties. Although
gas caused 4*6 per cent, of all battle injuries and 57 per cent,
of all non-fatal battle injuries, it caused only 1-32 per cent, of
all battle deaths.

Gas was therefore over four times as effective in causing
non-fatal casualties as in causing battle deaths.

Modern warfare does not take the form of annihilation of the
forces in the field so much as the paralysis of the economic
resistance of the nations engaged.

Chemical warfare being most effective in producing non-fatal
casualties, which are a military liability, is likely therefore to
be adopted to an increased extent in future wars. Indeed it is
now clear from the plans of the belligerents in the World War
that had this continued for another year the campaign in 1919
would have been largely a chemical war. 74

Among the gassed the sufferings are less severe and of shorter
duration than those caused by other battle injuries, and
statistics show that on the whole recovery from gas incapacita-
tion occupied about half the duration of hospital treatment
required in other cases of wounding.

The ratio of deaths to total casualties in non-gas cases was
over twelve times that of the mortality from gas.

Gas warfare is therefore most effective and humane, and
must be expected to play an important part in future wars.

It is a common misconception that there are some gases
suitable for use in chemical warfare and which are incapable of
neutralisation or filtration by any known means.

“ Those well qualified to speak on the subject, notably

CIVIL DEFENCE

Professor Haldane, have adduced a number of scientific reasons
for disbelieving in the existence of such gases, and also in the
likelihood of their being produced by future research. The
explanation is simple. The number of volatile chemical
substances is limited, and of these only a small proportion are
poisonous. Those with a small molecular weight are on the
whole the most volatile, i.e., go most easily into vapour. But
they are all of relatively simple chemical composition , and the
larger majority are already known. Any fears on this ground
are therefore practically negligible. With regard to the sub-
stances of high molecular weight, it is certainly possible that
some may yet be discovered to give off vapours more poisonous
than any known gas to-day. But, on the authority of Professor
Haldane, the charcoal in the ordinary respirator has the property
of adsorbing heavy molecules of vapour quite independently of
their chemical composition. And what, it may be asked, of
gases like carbon monoxide and hydrogen arsenide which
attack and kill without causing odour or irritation ? Again
the explanation is simple. Such gases may prove fatal if
encountered in the laboratory or factory ; but in the con-
centrations required to kill by an attacking force they could
not practically be produced in the open/' 66

Gas attacks on a civil population can be rendered practically
harmless by the equipment and organisation of the community
properly to combat them.

The underlying principles of chemical warfare can be traced
to ancient times when “ Greek Fire,” reputed to be compounded
of sulphur, spirits of wine, pitch, salt, olive oil and resin, was
used in the eighth century b.c.

In 1811 the systematic use of sulphurous fumes and carbon
smoke as an offensive weapon was proposed by Lord Cochrane,
but it was not until 1915 in the Great War that noxious and
toxic gases were effectively employed as a belligerent weapon.

Brief particulars of gases now used in war are tabulated
on p. 37 : —

There are two main types of poison gas which might be used,
namely : —

(1) Persistent. (2) Non-persistent.

Persistent gases usually consist of liquids ( e.g ., mustard gas)

GAS BOMBS AND THEIR EFFECTS

Table XIII

POISONOUS GASES

Approximate

Gas concen-

concentration

tration which

Date

Boiling-

to incapacitate

which if

will prove

point,

a man in a few

breathed for

fatal if

Chemical

intro-

degrees

seconds owing

more than one

breathed for

Substance.

formula.

due-

centigrade.

to lachrymation

or two minutes

half an hour.

tion.

or coughing.

would cause

Milligrams per

actual damage
to the lungs.

metre cube.

LUNG INJURANTS

Chlorine

Cl.

1915

— 3 V 6

1 : 10,000

>1 : 10,000

250

Phosgene .
Trichlor-

COCl 2

1915

+ 8-2

1 : 100,000

1 : 50,000

methyl-

chloro-

formate .

Cl.c00.ccl3

1916

+ 128

1 : 200,000

1 : 50,000

1 7

Chloropicrin

CCl.NO*

1916

+ 1 12

1 : 200,000

1 : 50,000
(Cumulative)

7 o

LACHRYMATORS (ACTION ON EYES)

Xylyl

bromide

CH 8 C,H 4 CH 2 Br

1915

+ 218

1 : 2,000,000

—

Ethyl iodo-

acetate .

CH 2 ICOOC a H 8

1916

+ 180

1 : 5,000,000

1 : 50,000

PARALYSANTS (ACTION ON NERVOUS SYSTEM)

Hydrocyanic

HCN

1916

+ 26-5

>1 : 2,000
(immediately

No cumulative

acid

action.

fatal).

(SENSORY IRRITANTS OF EYES, NOSE AND CHEST (STERNUTATORS)

Diphenyl-

chlorarsine

(C,H,) t AsCl

1917

+ 383
(M.P. 43)

< i : 10,000,000

i : 50,000

Diphenyl-
cyarsine.
Ethyl di-

(C«H,) t AsCN

1918

>+ 350
(M.P. 31)

< 1 : 10,000,000

1 : 50,000

130

chlorarsine

C s H 5 AsCl a

1918

+ 156

1 : 500,000

1 : 20,000

VESICANTS

(EVAPORATION IS SLOW AND

ACTION IS THEREFORE “ PERSISTENT

Dichlrrethyl-
sulphide
(Mustard gas)

(CH 2 CICH 2 ) 2 S

1917

4 - 217
(M.P. +14)

1 : 100,000
(with 60 min.
exposure).

which contaminate the area on which they are released, and
may continue to give off vapour for hours, days, or even weeks,
if not neutralised.

Non-persistent gases, when released, rapidly mix with the
atmosphere and disperse quickly.

War gases must have an injurious effect in low concentrations,
must be heavier than air and capable of a wide distribution.

They may be released on civil populations from gas bombs or
by spray from aeroplanes in liquid form, or irritant smokes.

Persistent gases of the mustard type are most dangerous when
released as spray, as the drops of condensed “ gas ” may
remain unsuspected on objects which may come into contact
with the human body.

CIVIL DEFENCE

Fig. 25.

To meet the increasing
concentrations of gas in 1916
the British box respirator
was introduced. This had a
canister filter carried in the
haversack connected with a
rubber pipe to a mouthpiece.
A nose-clip prevented breath-
ing through the nose and
close-fitting goggles inside
the face-piece were used to
protect the eyes against
lacrimators.

With but small improve-
ment this mask served the
British till the end of the
war.

On December nth, 1915,
the Germans first used the
deadly phosgene gas. The
British Intelligence Service
obtained five months' notice,
and also ascertained the
sector in which this would
be employed. The attack
was successfully met by the
timely issue of a modified
form of P.H. helmet which
had two eye-pieces and an
outlet valve of rubber. It
was impregnated with caustic
soda, phenol and glycerine,
producing sodium phenolate,
which neutralised the phos-
gene. It was known as the
P. helmet.

Fig. 25.

Fig. 40. — The general Civilian Respirator, 30 millions of which have
been manufactured and stored officially for local issue in an
emergency.

126

CIVIL DEFENCE

Fig. 46. — Protection of window opening with sand-bags.

Fig. 62. — Norcon tubular shelter (emergency exit not shown).

i66

CIVIL DEFENCE

Air lock

li*:

Double gas
curtains

Corrugated iron -

L W with bunks

Communication trench

Note : covering not shown

18 “earth

* j

Crave/

board

6*3"- l : 6"crs.-

12"* 2" plate -

^ 5‘* 5 ‘sir fits/

4 "reinforced
concrete fining
if necessary

Boards

Drain

SCALE OF FT. FOR SECTIONS
0 I 2 3 4 S 6 7

Rock garden

9' of rubble

4 ' 'concrete I
5 / 5 ^ reinforced
with Lewis
dovetail
corrugated
steel sheeting H- 2-0

h — 3'6-

Fig. 'j'Z . — Showing (A) entrance to trench system Fig. 71.
(B) and (C) alternative sections.

TRENCHES

179

ALTERNATIVE SECTIONS OF LOCKSHEET STEEL SHELTERS

Fig. 77. — Costain’s locksheet steel shelters. A, enlarged section of lock-
sheet steel ; B, constructed in deep trench and covered with
concrete, earth and rubble ; C, constructed in deep trench and
covered with earth and rubble ; D and E, partly underground,
and F, in area of building.

shelter for the floating population in an air raid.

COSTS OF PROTECTION

241

before and after evacuation. It would therefore appear that
allowing for a certain necessary amount of duplication of
shelter accommodation, provision should be made ultimately
for the following protection : —

Table LI

Population.

jCostper

capita.

Total cost.

Principal danger zones requiring
shelters proof against heavy
bombs .....

4,000,000

£3°

^120,000,000

(Allowing for 33 £ per cent, addi-
tional accommodation for use
before evacuation.)

Medium danger zones requring
shelters proof against small
bombs .....

20,000,000

£™

£200,000,000

Outskirts of towns requiring splinter -
proof protection

8,000,000

£5

£40,000,000

(Allowing 14 per cent, additional
accommodation . )

Rural districts requiring no special
protection ....

15,000,000

TOTAL POPULATION FOR
WHICH SHELTER ACCOM-
MODATION IS NEEDED .

32,000,000

£360,000,000

It is probable that a fair percentage of shelters, especially
of the light bomb and splinter-proof type, can be provided by
the adaptation of existing premises, thus reducing materially
the total cost of new work. Against this saving has to be set
the costs of transportation, temporary housing and general
provisioning of the evacuated population.

On the whole, therefore, a total national expenditure approxi-
mating 300 millions sterling will be incurred in the adequate
passive defence of the civil population of the British Isles.

That this expenditure shall be as productive as possible it
will be necessary to ensure that the highest possible proportion
of shelters are constructed for the dual purpose of some peace-
time use and the assurance of protection in emergency/

Public money will be expended as well as a great deal of
private money, but the very nature of the construction will
render shelters less vulnerable than ordinary buildings in air

COSTS OF PROTECTION 245

A peace-time utilisation of an air-raid shelter might therefore
render the “ addition or improvement ” liable to taxation.

EVACUATION

Evacuation necessarily forms an important part of any
general scheme for passive defence and the French plans are
worthy of consideration.

In 1936 the French Government issued a handbook on
evacuation, and the following extracts and notes are of
interest.

There is no doubt that the orderly and methodical execution,
at the time of need, of a plan of evacuation which has been
carefully prepared in every detail during peace time is calcu-
lated to save a great number of human lives. Such a result
makes it worth while to make every effort to prepare such a plan,
in spite of all difficulties that may be encountered. The general
scheme proposed by the French handbook recommends : —

“ (1) All persons who will leave the town voluntarily should
be encouraged to do so.

“ (2) Permanent evacuation of the people unimportant from
the military or administrative point of view into the
country districts.

“ (3) Evacuation of people whose relatives must remain in
the town, to places nearby.

“ (4) Nightly evacuation of people who must work in the
town.

“ (5) Shelters to be provided for all people who must remain
in the town.

“ These plans must be formulated by the mayor of the town,
and he must arrange with the local authorities of the villages
how many refugees each village can accommodate. The order
for evacuation will be given by the Government before they
issue the order for the mobilisation of the armed forces.

“ It is proposed that each person should have an evacuation
ticket at the outbreak of a war and these tickets are already
printed.

“ Such a ticket would read as follows : — -

“ ‘ Mr. X. is instructed to take the 8 p.m. train this
evening from the Gard du Nord for Amiens. He is to take

246

CIVIL DEFENCE

with him his wife and four children, travelling in seats
Nos. 37-42 inclusive/ ”

In this country detailed arrangements are not yet disclosed
but Sir Samuel Hoare, in the House of Commons on June 1st,
1938, explained that time-tables had been worked out to move
3,500,000 people by rail fifty miles from London in seventy-two
hours, without train tickets. Evacuation is obviously a more
effective passive measure than the provision of shelter accom-
modation but complete evacuation is not possible.

It would probably be safe to assume that all children under
the school-leaving age, babies and their mothers, old people and
invalids, amounting to about 25 per cent, of the urban popula-
tion, could be permanently evacuated to areas requiring no
special protective measures.

All specially dangerous locations might also be vacated
except for a permanent cadre of key men, thus possibly
accounting for another 10 per cent, of the population.

The central zones of cities and areas near military objectives
would need the highest degree of protection and the outskirts
splinter-proof protection.

The difficulties attendant upon evacuation would cause
delays in its execution and it would therefore be necessary to
provide shelter protection on a crush capacity basis for larger
numbers at the outset.

It would consequently appear that the distribution of
the urban population would be adjusted in an emergency
somewhat on the lines indicated below: —

Table LI I

Approximate Day-time Distribution of Urban Population

Before evacuation.

After evacuation.

Principal danger zones

13,000,000

3,000,000

Medium danger zones

22,000,000

20,000,000

Outskirts of towns .

10,000,000

7,000,000

Rural districts

Nil

15,000,000

Totals

45,000,000

HOME OFFICE

CIVIL DEFENCE

TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 3

The Control of Civil Defence Operations

under

Fall-out Conditions

(England and Wales)

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1959

SIXPBNCB NBT

Civil Defence Training Memorandum No. 3, “The Control of Civil Defence Operations under

Fall-out Conditions,” U.K. Home Office, 1959

Paragraphs 6-14 explain that the need for rapid
life-saving rescue and evacuation from the
damaged areas near ground is to be balanced
by the fallout gamma dose rate hazard to the
civil defence workers; for optimum results first
aid and rescue workers should move inwards
(toward ground zero) at about the same speed
the 10 R/hour gamma outdoor dose rate
contour moves inward due to the natural
radioactive decay of fallout (because fallout
radiation decays rapidly, the dose rate at 48
hours being only about 1% of that at 1 hour):

“The balance of advantage would differ
according to the nature of the work; but for the
rescue and casualty services it is thought that
the best results would be obtained from
working at or about a dose rate of 10 R/hour,
so that the wartime emergency dose [75 R]
was used up in a single shift of about 8 hours.

. . . Some forces, e.g. ambulances, could
operate profitably where their dose was spread
out over longer periods than 8 hours by
working at lower dose rates than 10 R/hour.
Others, e.g. reconnaissance parties with special
responsibility for rapid penetration, might have
to take their wartime emergency dose without
heed to the 10 R/hour [fallout map
pattern/contour] line and reduce their working
period accordingly. . . . units would continue
with their task . . . with reference only to the
total dose accumulated on their dosimeters. . . .
The radiological limit should be taken as the
1,000 R/hour at H + 1 contour which will be
10 R/hour line at H + 48 [due to the 100 fold
decay of fallout radiation between 1 and 48
hours after a nuclear explosion] and so mark
the limit to which life-saving forces can be
expected to have penetrated by that time. . . .

‘The task will be set by the number of
casualties trapped, or seriously injured but
untrapped ... capable of being succoured
within the first 48 hours. As soon as possible
after ground zero, weight and nature of attack
are known, the Controller should have casualty
estimates made . . . This will be done by
applying the population figures for the Sectors
casualty percentages as shown on the graph
(from Exercise ARC) attached as an appendix
to this memorandum, which sets out, on the
best evidence at present available [blast
casualties from applying Blitz casualty data as
a function of house damage to nuclear test data
showing the amount of house damage versus
distance from a nuclear explosion, which
automatically takes account of the duration of
the blast wave in nuclear explosions], the
proportions of seriously injured, trapped and
untrapped, to be expected at different distances
from ground zeroes of bombs of varying
power. ... A single Forward Medical Aid Unit
can be expected to deal with about 120
seriously injured an hour - say 1,000 in each
shift - and to continue working throughout the
operational period with only internal reliefs. . . .
At the beginning of operations a 4-berthed
ambulance can be expected to take about 1
hour on the round trip from ambulance loading
point ... A single casualty collecting party can
handle and send to ambulance loading points
about 12 seriously injured an hour, or, say, 100
per shift [8 hours]. ... A single [light] rescue
party [using slow manual methods used in
1941, without any of the tracked cranes used
and rescue dogs used to rapidly clear debris of
casualties in the 1944-1945, during the VI and
V2 attacks on London] can release two or three
trapped persons an hour or, say, 20 per shift.

HOME OFFICE

SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

General

Information

(All Sections)

CIVIL DEFENCE
POCKET BOOK NO. 3

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1960

Zone

Dose-rate at
//+48 hours

Summary of permissible and
recommended action

Less than 0.3 r.p.h.

Remain in refuge until released, which can
be as soon as dose-rate falls to 0.3 r.p.h.
or when fall-out is complete if the rate has
not reached that figure.

0.3 — 3 r.p.h.

Remain in refuge until H+48 hours; then
qualified release. Indoor workers to follow
normal occupations, but not to exceed 4
hours per day in the open for the next
5 days. Outdoor workers would have to
do half shifts to keep within this figure.
At the end of a week the zone would be
normal, except that all would be advised
to be out of doors as little as possible, and
not in any case to exceed 8 hours per day
in the open for the next 3 months.

3 — 10 r.p.h.

Remain in refuge until at least H-r48
hours; then release under stringent control.
For the next 12 days time in the oper
should not exceed 2 hours per day. On
this basis essential indoor workers should
be able to get to their work, but outdoor
work would remain suspended. After the
first fortnight it would be possible to
increase the essential time spent out of
doors to 4 hours per day for the next three
weeks, increasing this to 8 hours per day
thereafter for the rest of the first year.

10 r.p.h. or more

Remain in refuge until told to leave. All
movement outside refuge in this zone
would be dangerous. People should re-
main until instructions for clearance are
given; they should then leave by the
nominated route if they have means of
transport — or wait in their refuge to be
collected if they have not. The clearance
operation might start after H-f-48 hours
and removal from the Zone would be for
at least 3 months.

HOME OFFICE

CIVIL DEFENCE
TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 4

The Clearance of Z Zones
by Road

( REVISED 1965)

(Z Zones are fallout areas where the 48 hour gamma
dose rate is above 10 R/hour.This corresponds to
a dose rate of 1,000 R/hour or more at 1 hour after
a nuclear explosion. The outside dose accumulated
from an arrival time of 1 hour after a 1 megaton
burst, up to evacuation at48 hours, is:

Dose = 5 x 1000 x (1 - 48' 02 ) = 2,700 R outdoors
or 67 R in a brick house's room with blocked windows)

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1965

SIXPENCE NET

The Clearance of Z Zones by Road

Introduction

1 This memorandum is concerned with the drill for clearance by road from
those parts of a Z Zone which are not in a damaged area. In a damaged area
the drill would have to be modified as necessary to meet the special conditions
obtaining, e.g. restriction of road access. The memorandum deals only
incidentally with the areas to which people will be cleared. It is assumed that
‘assembly towns’ of, say, from 8,000 to 50,000 population at distances up to
about 20 miles from the Z Zone will be selected to receive those cleared; and
that the bases from which clearance operations will be mounted will be on the
outskirts of those assembly towns commanding main routes into the Z Zone.
It may sometimes be desirable to site the clearance bases further forward;
in which case staging points will be set up from which people will be trans-
ported to the assembly town by train or other means.

2 In clearance the maximum use must be made of all forms of petrol-driven
transport, including public transport already within a Z Zone. Families
capable of clearing themselves should do so; and wardens should, so far as
possible, arrange in advance that spare places are reserved for neighbours.
The opportunity should be taken wherever possible to provide for people
living in remote areas without their own transport to be collected by private
transport on the way out. This will simplify the task of clearance from out-
side. Instructions to the public will require that houses left completely
empty should be marked by the last person to leave by hanging a sheet out
of a front window.

3 The proportion of population capable of being moved by transport already
in a Z Zone is likely to be substantial but the remainder will have to be cleared
by transport sent in from outside.

4 The closest contact will have to be maintained at every level between the
warden organisation within the Zone and the clearance forces working from
outside. The wardens will be responsible for providing clearance forces with
essential information; and, in anticipation of the area coming within a Z
Zone, should make the preliminary plans described in Appendix I.

General principles of clearance

5 The physical clearance of a Z Zone would rarely start before H-f48 hours
although planning might be instituted at an earlier time. The wartime
emergency dose of 75r will apply to all engaged. The object will be to clear
the Zone as quickly as possible within the limits set by this dose and the size
of the forces available.

6 Clearance by night or when visibility is bad, is likely to increase the time of
exposure and should be avoided if possible. Delays caused by suspending
clearance during the hours of darkness would make little difference to the
total dose received by those in their fallout rooms in the Z Zone.

7 For clearance from outside, passenger carrying vehicles with a capacity of
not less than 30 should be used. The use of vehicles of lesser capacity would
be radiologically extravagant to clearance personnel, and should not be
used unless there is no practical alternative.

8 Zones will be cleared inwards sector by sector or district by district. Through-
out each sector or county district* council areas in turn self-clearance will
be effected first and clearance organised from the outside will then be under-
taken as far as possible simultaneously in every warden post and patrol area.

9 Clearance vehicles will operate in convoys of about five. In general one convoy
will be allotted to each patrol area. To avoid unnecessary exposure to
radiation of their occupants, vehicles should be sent individually to assembly
towns as soon as they are loaded unless there is some good reason for acting
otherwise. After unloading they will be reformed into convoys at the clear-
ance base.

10 In built-up areas convoys will on their initial trip be directed to the warden
posts and from there to the patrol areas they are to clear. In rural areas this
method of routing would be radiologically expensive and should be un-
necessary. Where the position of a patrol post can be easily indicated on a
r map the rule will be for the convoy to go direct to the patrol post in rural
areas.

Allotment of responsibilities

11 Overall responsibility for deciding when a Z Zone is to be cleared and where
the population of the Zone is to be moved will rest with the Regional Seat
of Government which will allot responsibilities to individual Sub-regional
headquarters. Responsibility for clearing segments of a Z Zone, and the
transport for that purpose will be alloted by Sub-regional headquarters to
county or county borough controls. Responsibility for receiving the people
cleared will be apportioned to the county or county borough controls
within whose boundaries the assembly towns lie. Where responsibilities
are separated co-ordination will be maintained by the next higher
control, e.g. co-ordination between county or county borough controls by
Sub-regional headquarters.

12 A single Z Zone may well extend into two or more Regions and a single
Region contain parts of two or more separate Zones. Each Zone will have
been given a code name. For clearance purposes segments will be known as
Regional, Sub-regional, county, and in some cases county sub, or county
borough segments as the case may be, and will be further identified by the
appropriate numbers and letters of the responsible control, e.g. county
segment (or simply segment) 62A.

* NOTE: All later references to ‘district’ refer to ‘county district council areas’.

13 Operations will be conducted by clearance units, set up by the responsible
control, which will appoint the commanders, establish the bases and give
each unit a segment, to be known as a clearance segment, to deal with. The
boundaries of clearance segments should so far as is possible follow those
of warden sectors or districts if sectors do not exist. Clearance unit comanders
will normally be civil defence assistant controllers (Ops) or mobile controllers,
unless the unit is provided by the military or by a police mobile column.
Within a county or county borough all units, under whatever command, will
be lettered in sequence and the same lettering will be used to identify the
clearance segments, e.g. (clearance) segment 62AA.

14 A clearance unit should have about 125 buses or coaches, with an average
lifting capacity of, say, 5,000 people. One hundred and fifty vehicles (average
lifting capacity 6,000) should be regarded as the maximum. The number of
lifts that can be accomplished in a day will depend on the time of year,
whether the population of the segment is concentrated or scattered, and the
length of run to the assembly town or staging point; but it may be expected to
vary from about two to four. County or county borough control must judge
from these factors the number of units required and the size of the clearance
segments to be allotted to each. During the progress of operations there may
well be need to adjust either the boundaries of the segments or the strength
of the units.

15 It may be necessary for a clearance unit to call in the ambulance resources of
counties or county boroughs in order to clear people whose physical con-
dition makes it impossible to transport them by bus or coach. For radiological
reasons the use of ambulances must be kept to an absolute mini mu m . If
there should be an acute hospital, containing a large number of patients, in
the Z Zone, special arrangements for their clearance and reception would
have to be made at county or county borough level or above.

The clearance unit

16 In order that a clearance unit, when clearing each sector or district in its
turn, should be able to work simultaneously in every warden post and patrol
area within that sector or district it should have an operational staff approxi-
mating to the following “standard”.

Clearance unit commander (1): to be responsible for organising the clear-
ance of the sector or district generally.

Clearance officers (5) : each responsible for organising the clearance of a
warden post area and taking charge of a section of five convoys.

Convoy commanders (25): each in charge of a convoy of five buses or
coaches operating in a given patrol area.

Drivers and mates will be needed for the 125 buses and/or coaches and
drivers for the six cars with which the unit will be provided. Relief bus
drivers should be sought as required, if necessary with the help of local
Ministry of Labour representatives.

Signal staff and equipment for maintaining communications with the static
control, should telephones not be working, and office staff for a mobile
control plus six messengers, would also be required.

17 Of the above, the convoy commanders, bus drivers and mates whose duties
will take them constantly in and out of the Z Zone, will have to be replaced
as and when their wartime emergency doses are expended — perhaps after
seven or eight lifts over two or four days. Clearance officers and car drivers
and messengers will also enter the Z Zone, but less frequently and for shorter
periods; so that in their case replacement should not be necessary for a long
time, if at all.

(For administrative staff at base see paragraph 22).

18 This “standard” unit may be varied as required by increasing or reducing
the number of buses or coaches and so the size or number of convoys or
convoy sections with consequent alterations in the number of convoy
commanders or clearance officers. Considerations of administration and
maintenance will, however, require an upper limit of 150 vehicles.

19 Whatever unit is employed there will almost certainly be need to make con-
stant readjustment between the various parts during the course of operations;
according, for instance, to the number of warden post and patrol areas within
whichever sector is being cleared, their populations, and the particular
difficulties they present.

20 The designations used in paragraph 13 are entirely functional. Except where
a clearance unit is provided by a military formation or a police mobile
column its operational staff may be drawn from a variety of sources. (See
Appendix III.) It is of great importance that the right people should be found
to act as convoy commanders, since these will have the major responsibility
for dealing with the public in the Z Zone, and (as will be evident from
paragraph 32) the task is one requiring an ability to inspire confidence and
the highest qualities of firmness and tact. The work might be undertaken by
post or deputy post wardens from areas unaffected by fallout; but it is one
for which police officers would be particularly well suited.

The clearance base

21 The essential facilities required for a clearance base are:

(a) Good communications.

(b) Access to adequate P.O.L. supplies.

(d) Accommodation for personnel.

(e) Feeding facilities (these might be provided in billets or by Welfare
Section emergency feeding teams).

It should be possible for the facilities to be found on the outskirts of most
towns. A large bus depot would be ideal.

HOME OFFICE

CIVIL DEFENCE

TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 6

The Evacuation of Casualties

(PROVISIONAL)

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1961

EIGHTPENCE NET

APPENDIX B

THE ORGANISATION OF AN AMBULANCE COLUMN

Appointment

In charge of

Composition

Personnel

Vehicles

Column Ambulance
Officer

Deputy Column
Ambulance Officer

Ambulance Column com-
prising one Ambulance
Company and one First
Aid Company

334

(including drivers
for staff cars
and D.Rs.)

72 Ambulances
18 Personnel and
Equipment
Vehicles
10 Staff cars
10 Motor cycles

Company Ambulance
Officer

Deputy Company
Ambulance Officer

Ambulance Company com-
prising four Ambulance
platoons

187

(including drivers
for staff cars
and D.Rs.)

72 Ambulances
5 Staff cars
4 Motor cycles

Company First Aid
Officer

Deputy Company First
Aid Officer

First Aid Company com-
prising three First Aid
platoons

141

(including drivers
for staff cars
and D.Rs.)

18 Personnel and
Equipment
Vehicles
4 Staff cars
3 Motor cycles

Platoon Ambulance
Officer

Deputy Platoon
Ambulance Officer

Ambulance platoon com-
prising three Ambulance
detachments

(including driver
for staff car)

18 Ambulances
1 Staff car

Platoon First Aid
Officer

Deputy Platoon First
Aid Officer

First Aid platoon compris-
ing six First Aid Parties

(including driver
for staff car)

6 Personnel and
Equipment
Vehicles
1 Staff car

Ambulance Detachment
Leader

Deputy Ambulance
Detachment Leader

Ambulance detachment

6 Ambulances

First Aid Party Leader

Deputy First Aid
Party Leader

First Aid party

(including driver)

1 Personnel and
Equipment
Vehicle

Note: Personnel and Equipment Vehicles (PEVs) Staff cars and motor cycles will not be
issued for training purposes.

APPENDIX C

THE MOVEMENT OF AMBULANCES

©s © ,'© Loading points

FORWARD

SHUTTLE

Welfare —

CHECK POINT
(liaison withWarden Section)

Blankets & Stretchers

Column H.Q.

REAR

SHUTTLE

Loaded

Empty

V
'' ^ '

t\ V x

1 \ \

CHECK POINT
(liaison with Hospital

Service)

F flA/hs

fo?vU7> t,\FD /CXh

JFD o T Arfib/fE p -cb 0fftr
fttfren 6T ~zb fhaes uns

ere }

.<*>

-c

H— j

CD ^

Uo c

Oh Q

In Hiroshima, only 0.9% (17 burns) of 1,881

burns were due to ignited clothing, and only 0.7%
(15 burns) were due to burns by firestorm flames!

TABLE 8.3A

Number of Persons with Burns from Different Causes (Tokyo Imperial University's

First Survey, October-November 1945)

Distance from

Secondary Burns!

Secondary Burns+

Hypocenter (km)

From Clothes on Fire

By Flame

Total Burns

0,6- LG

(3.3)

1. 1-1.5

327

(11)

1. 6-2.0

717

(0.5)

(1.2)

2. 1-2.5

558

(0.8)

2.6-3.0

140

(0.8)

(0.5)

3.1-3. 5

(2.8)

(0.7)

3. 6-4.0

(2.4)

Total

1,881

(0-9)

(0.7)

* Primary bums are bums by thermal rays from the A-bomb,
f Secondary burns are bums by fire other than thermal rays,
t Figures in parentheses arc percentages of incidence.

Source: T. Kajitam and S. Hatano, “Medical survey on acute effects of atomic bomb in Hiroshima/* in CRIABC
vol. I, p. 522,

Note; there were 5 burns cases within 0*6 km, all primary

TABLE 8.3B
Region of Burns

Head

Face

Neck

Total

Outdoors Indoors

Number of
persons

Total

179 44

(11.7)* (12.3)

223

(11.8)

1,030 127

(67.4) (35.7)

1,157

| (61.5)

643 78

(42.1) (21.9)

721

(38.3)

1,526 355

1,881

* Figures in parentheses are percentages of incidence.

Source: T, Kajit&ni and S. Hatano* “Medical survey on acute effects of atomic bomb in Hiroshima," in CRIABC
vol. I, p. 522.

Above: extract from "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The
Physical, Social and Medical Effects", 1981
by the Japanese Committee for the Compilation
of Materials on Damage Caused by Atomic Bombs

* While the total number of exposed is known, it has not been possible to determine how many died instantly or soon after the explosion.
Source: Science Council of Japan, Gtttshibakudan Saigai Chdsa Hokokusho [SRIABC] (Tokyo; Nihon Gakujutsu Sh.nkflkai, 1951), p. 26.

Above: extract from "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The
Physical, Social and Medical Effects", 1981

SURVIVAL IN WOODEN AND CONCRETE BUILDINGS, HIROSHIMA

TABLE 7.3

Casualties among the Groups Exposed to the Atomic Bomb inside Wooden Houses, Hiroshima

18th April, 1950,

Sir,

Civil Defence A ot, 1 948
Regu lations relati n g to the Evacuation of th e
Civil Pop ulation (Stat uto ry Instrument 1949, No. 21 47)

1. I am directed to refer to Circular 8l/49 (Wales) of 23rd August, 1949, which
transmitted for your information a copy of the draft Civil Defence (Evacuation and
Care of the Homeless) Regulations, 1949* These Regulations have now been approved
by both Houses of Parliament and are now operative* I am now to enclose a copy of
a Memorandum on Evacuation (Memo Ev.1 (1950) which contains an outline of the
general plan for the transfer of certain sections of the civilian population from
the more densely populated areas in the event of war or the immin ence of war*

For the purpose of this transfer the system developed in the 1939/45 war has been
adopted, whereby the country is divided into evacuation, neutral and reception areas

9* ESTIMATES OF ACCOMMODATION IN RECEPTI ON AREAS

In order that specific allocations may be worked out and each Reception
Authority informed of the number of members of the priority classes for whom thoir
plans should provide, it is requested that every Reception Authority will proparo
an estimate of the total number of habitable rooms in their area. The Minister
of Health has been advised by the Associations of Local Authorities that the Rocoptia
Authorities (who are the Housing Authorities) will be able to make reasonably aocurat
ostimatos from information already available to them* The estimate should includo
all rooms normally used in the locality either as living rooms or as bedrooms*

I am to ask that this estimate may be forwarded to the Department, not later than
30th Juno, 1950.

10* The Department do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by
carrying out at this stage a detailed survey of the accommodation which could be
made available for evacuees suoh as was undertaken in January, 1939*

IV. LATER ACTION

11. When the specific allocations of the number of members of the priority classes
for whose reception arrangements should be made in each reception area have been
decided, it will be possible to link each Reception Authority with a particular
Evacuation Authority* When the plan has been developed in this way, or as the

The Memorandum on Evacuation (Memo Ev*1 (1950) has been placed on sale*

Further copies may bo purchased direct from His Majesty’s Stationery Office or from
•ay bookseller*

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

She Clerk of the Council*

§§§§§§§§!

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Registrar^General 1 s estimate of civil population as at mid-1948*

TM 23-200/OPNA V INSTRUCTION 03400.1C/AFM 136-1/FMFM 11-2

THIS PUBLICATION SUPERSEDES TM 23-200, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400.1B,
AFM 136-l/NAVMC 1104 REV, NOVEMBER 1957, INCLUDING CHANGE 1, 24 JUNE 1960
AND CHANGE 2, 3 OCTOBER 1960 THERETO.

105483

CAPABILITIES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS [U]

ClASSTflCATTON CANCELLED .*•

US DOE ARCHIVES

326 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION

Collection
Box 1

i!<**rczs

JA h IjJdSL

Folder jju CM^kdxtSXi. *£ &±B£Sl£z

United States Government Printing Office
Washington: 1964

GROUP- 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
Not automatically declassified.

Table 7-1 Estimated Casualty Production in Structures for Various

Degrees of Structural Damage

£ 5 'cT

3 ft*--

cog
-c .53

U5 *0

o o to

CM iH ^

tO LO

^ V

o bo

us to
N V

o O us

2 ^ v

*These percentages do not include the casualties that may result from fires, asphyxia-
tion, and other causes from failure to extricate trapped personnel. The numbers repre-
sent the estimated percentage of casualties expected at the maximum range where
the specified structural damage occurs. For the distances at which these degrees of
damage occur for various yields see Chapter 8.

example, although such effects as capacitor dis-
charge are usually referred to as transient ef-
fects, the time constant for recovery of the
capacitor to its normal operating potential may
be so long that recovery may not be effected
before the mission of the system involved is
complete. In this instance the effect would be
classified as permanent damage even though the
capacitor itself would have eventually com-
pletely recovered.

ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE RADIATION DAMAGE

a. General. Permanent damage due to over-
heating or puncturing of insulation is possible
where the electromagnetic pulse energy is high,
where the induced voltage triggers an electrical
fault and the damage energy is supplied by the
affected system, or where the electromagnetic
pulse energy is carried for some distance along
a cable or line as a power surge.

Interruption of service may occur where the
voltage induced in a cable or line causes fuses to
blow or circuit breakers to trip. This may take
place many miles away from the point of deto-
nation due to transmission of the surge. An in-
terruption could also result if an electronically
stored program were subjected to a strong
enough transient electromagnetic field to scram-
ble it.

Transient disturbances to electronic systems
may occur in several ways. The electromagnetic
pulse may be received via the signal or power
lines acting as antennae. Or, the low frequency
portion of the pulse may penetrate the enclo-
sures and directly induce transient signals in
the circuits.

Many instances of all three kinds of damage,
i.e., permanent, interruptive and transient, have
been experienced. So far, little if any, correla-
tion of damage with measured electromagnetic
field strengths has been established. This has
been the result of factors previously described,
and of uncertainty of the point where electro-
magnetic pulse pickup actually occurred in cases
where many cables and lines were in use for
power, signal, control and mechanical purposes.

b . Power System Damage. Very regular zero-
time tripping of power circuit breakers at a sub-
station more than 30 miles away was observed
on one series of tests. Standby personnel were

always posted to reset the breakers to keep elec-
trical equipment functioning. Within a mile of
ground zero, pinholes in underground cable in-
sulation have frequently been found. Such
cables carried up to 4160 volts.

At power distribution stations, porcelain cut-
outs have been observed to arc over and the
fuses have often blown. At other stations power
transformers have been shorted internally or
have had insulating bushings destroyed. Ordi-
nary lightning protective devices provided in-
adequate protection against the electromagnetic
pulse, in those cases.

c. Signal System Damage. Damage to signal
systems has also been frequent in the form of
burned or fused relays, potentiometers, cable
insulation and conductors, as well as blown or
damaged meters. In many instances, reviews of
the circuits have shown that induced energy
caused the damage, rather than triggered sys-
tem energy. Free ends of cable pairs have often
arced and melted.

d. Electronic System Damage. Oscilloscope
presentations have frequently been disturbed or
obliterated, even as far as 11 miles from ground
zero.

Pulse counters in a timing circuit have been
scrambled directly by the induced field (this
effect has actually been duplicated in a simula-
tion test in which a 1 mfd capacitor was charged
to several thousand volts, then discharged into
10 turns of wire wound around the cabinet).
Memory circuits employing magnetic elements
may be vulnerable to the magnetic field, H, in
a direct manner, as well as to the time deriva-
tive of the field.

Elaborate protective measureP^^i^S^M^
tromagnetic effects have been devised, on occa-
sion, such as extensive grounding plate systems,
double-walled screen rooms, precautions against
forming loops, and special bonding. These meas-
ures appeared effective on certain occasions,
but on others, when higher yield weapons were
tested, the precautions did not always suffice.

General recommendations for protection
against electromagnetic pulse radiation damage
cannot yet be made. Protective measures to be
taken will depend principally upon the nature
of the target and the degree of protection re-
quired.

13-2

YIELD

•EACH PAIR OF VALUES INDICATE, RESPECT- SEA LEVEL (BURST AND OBSERVER)
IVELY, CALORIES AT THE CENTER OF THE WATER VAPOR PRESSURE: 5mm HG
IMAGE AND CALORIES ON THE LENS SURFACE PUPILLARY DlAMETER;3mm

Figure 7-3. Yield vs. Maximum Distance at which a Retinal Burn will be
Formed. Visibility 10 Statute Miles; Standard Normal Day, and Daytime

Adapted Eye

THERMAL RADIATION DAMAGE

13-5 FIRE IN URBAN AREAS. The em-
ployment of an air burst weapon over urban
areas may produce, besides blast damage, mass
fires which, under proper conditions, materially
increase the degree and extent of damage. The
behavior of such fires, whether they are of
primary or secondary origin, follows the pat-
tern of fires in forest and wildland areas. The
burning potential for urban areas varies with
weather conditions, much as for wildlands ; how-
ever, the fire season as such is not as pronounced
as in wildlands. During those seasons when
weather conditions may reduce exterior po-
tentials to zero, dwellings are usually heated,
so that interior fuels are dried out. Fire inci-
dence and subsequent fire buildup depend also
upon the amount and distribution of flammable
material used in interior furnishing and build-
ing construction, the incidence of interior
kindling fuels, and the relative cleanliness of
the living habits of the population.

13-6 Ignition Points. A survey of metro-
politan areas in the United States indicates
that the incidence of exterior ignition points
can be correlated with urban land use. Table
13-1 presents a relative tabulation based on ex-
terior kindling fuels. Newspapers and other
paper products account for 70 percent of the
total, and dry grass and leaves account for an-
other 10 percent in residential areas. Most other
exterior kindling fuels are present in small per-
centages or require radiant exposures in ex-
cess of 10 cal/cm 2 for ignition. Weathered and
badly checked fences and building exteriors that
contain appreciable dry rot constitute an igni-
tion hazard. The tabulation presented in table
13-1 is not representative of European cities
and other areas where fuel is at a premium, or
where extensive use is made of stone, brick,
masonry, and heavy timber construction. Multi-
story buildings and narrow streets reduce both
interior and exterior primary ignitions, because
such ignitions are proportional to the amount
of sky seen from the location of the probable
ignition point.

13-7 Humidity Effects. Because paper is
the major exterior kindling fuel and is also an
important interior fuel, the extent of ignitions

Table 13-1 Relative Incidence of Ignitions in
Metropolitan Areas of the United States by
Land Use (Based on Exterior Kindling Fuels),

Land use

Relative

incidence

Downtown retail

1.0

Large manufacturing*

1.4

Good residential

1.6

Small manufacturing

3.8

Poor residential

5.2

Neighborhood retail

5.5

Waterfront areas

8.0

Slum residential

11.7

Wholesaler

15.1

* May be likened to a typical fixed military
installation in the Z.l.

may be estimated from the minimum radiant
exposure requirements for newspaper. Figure
13-1 shows the radiant exposure required to
ignite darkly printed picture areas and printed
text areas of newspaper at 50% relative hu-
midity. The effect of relative humidity on the
ignition of this cellulosic fuel can be estimated
by multiplying the ignition radiant exposures
for the dry material by the factor, 1 + 0.005 H,
where H is the relative humidity in percent.
Maximum fire effects occur during daily periods
of lowest relative humidity, usually mid-after-
noon. Guides for estimating urban burning po-
tentials are given in figures 13-2 and 13-3. Fig-
ure 13-2, which gives burning potential for
urban areas when central heating is not in use,
represents approximate values ^f wind speed
and average daytime relative humidity condi-
tions corresponding to low, dangerous, and criti-
cal burning potentials according to the follow-
ing definitions : POE ARCHIVE*

Low. Slow burning fires; fire can be con-
trolled at will. Control action can be on unit
structure basis.

Dangerous . Fires burn rapidly; individual
building fires combine to form an area fire. Or-
ganized action needed to confine fire to area
originally ignited.

Table 13-2 Critical Radiant Exposures for Damage to Various Materials

ambient relative humidity of 65 percent Radiant Exposure

Weight Effect on (ca1/em=)

Material

(oz/sq yd)

Color

Material

40 kt

1 mt

10 mt

Clothing Fabrics

Cotton

White

Ignites

Khaki

Tears on flexing

Ignites

Olive

Tears on flexing

Ignites

Dark Blue

Tears on flexing

Ignites

Cotton»nylon Mixture

Olive

Tears on flexing

Ignites

Wool

White

Tears on flexing

Khaki

Tears on flexing

Olive

Tears on flexing

Dark Blue

Tears on flexing

Dark Blue

Tears on flexing

Rainwear (double neo-prene coated ny-

lon twill)

Olive

Begins to melt

Tears on flexing

Tinder Materials

Paper, bond, typing, new (white)

Ignites

Newspaper, printed text

Ignites

Newsprint, dark picture area

Ignites

Paper, kraft, single sheet (tan)

Ignites

Rags (black, cotton)

Ignites

Rags (black, rayon)

Ignites

Tent Material

Canvas, white, 12 oz/sq yd

Ignites

Canvas, OD, 12 oz/sq yd

Ign ites

Aluminum aircraft Skin (0.020 in. thick)

Blisters

coated with 0,002 in. of standard white

aircraft paint

Sandbags, cotton, canvas, dry, filled

Failure

Construction Materials

Roll Roofing, mineral surface

Ignites

>34

>116

Roll Roofing, smooth surface

Ignites

—

Plywood, douglas fir

Flaming during

DOEAR

exposure

Sand, coral

Explosion*

Sand, siliceous

Explosion*

Rubber, pale latex

Ignites

110

Rubber, black

Ignites

* Popeorning

13-6

Table 7-2 Radiant Exposures lor Burns

Under Clothing

Clothing Burn 40 kt 1 mt 10 mt

Radiant exposures 12

Bare skin

none

2.0

2.6

2.9

1 D

2,6

3,1

3.6

2°

4,6

6.3

7.0

Summer uniform

none

(2 layers of light
porous fabric)

1°

2°

Winter uniform

none

(2 to 5 layers of
tightly woven

1°

fabric )

2°

Sub-artic and

none

arctic (3 to 8
layers of tightly

1°

woven fabric) 8

2°

1 Expressed in cal /cm 1 2 3 incident on skin or outer sur-
face of clothing when the inner layer of the clothing
is Bpaced 0.5 cm from the skin and when at least the
first 70% of the thermal pulse is received normal to the
surface.

2 These values are sensitively dependent on many
variables and are probably correct to within ±50% for
the range of normal military situations.

3 Burns to personnel wearing these heavy uniforms
will occur only by contact with flaming or glowing
outer garments. Some systems require in excess of 100
cal/cm 2 to produce burns by direct transmission of
heat through the fabrics.

cvj

0311IW3 NOIlVIOVd ~IVWd3Hl !N30d3d

Figure 7-2. Percent Thermal Radiation Emitted vs. Time for Detonations

eapot-MET (1955) distance from burst point

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-o

Table 7-4 Summary of Clinical Effects of Acute Ionizing Radiation Dose

Therapeutic range

Lethal range

100-200

rems

200-600

rems

600-1000

rems

1000-5000

rems

Over 5000
rems

Range

Subclinical

range

Clinical

surveillance

Therapy

effective

Therapy

promising

Therapy palliative

Incidence of
vomiting

None

100 rems: 5%
200 rem : : 50 %

300 rems:
100%

100%

Up to 100%

Delay time

3 hours

2 hours

1 hour

30 minutes

Leading organ

None

Hematopoietic tissue

Gastro-

intestinal

tract

Central nervous
system

Characteristic

signs

None

Moderate

leukopenia

Severe leukopenia; pur-
pura; hemorrhage; in-
fection. Epilation
above 300 rems.

Diarrhea;
fever; dis-
turbance of
electrolyte
balance

Convulsions;
tremor; ataxia;
lethargy

Critical period
postexposure

4 to 6 weeks

5 to 14 days

1 to 48 hours

Therapy

Reassurance

Reassur-
ance* hemato-
logic sur-
veillance

Blood trans~
fusion;
anti-
biotics

Consider
bone marrow
transplan-
tation

Maintenance
of electro-
lyte balance

Sedatives

Prognosis

Excellent

Good

Guarded

Hopeless

Convalescent

period

None

Several

weeks

1-12

months

Long

pOE

archives

Incidence of
death

None

0-80%

(variable)

80-100%

(variable)

95-100%

Death occurs
within

2 months

2 weeks

2 days

Cause of death

Hemorrhage; infection

Circulatory

collapse

Respiratory fail-
ure; brain edema

Table 7-5 Dose Transmission Factors (Interior Dose/Exterior Dose)

Geometry

Gamma rays

Initial Residual

Neutrons 1

Foxholes 2

0.20

0.10

0.30

Underground — 3 ft

0.04-0.05

0.0002

0.002-0,01

Builtup city area (in open)

— -

0.70

Frame house

0.80

0,30-0.60

0.3-0, 8

Basement

0.05-0.5

0.05-0.1

0.1-0.8

Multistory building;

Upper

0.9

0.01

0.9-1.0

Lower

0.3-0.6

0.1

0.9-1.0

Blockhouse walls:

9 in

0.1

0.007-0.09

0.3-0.5

12 in

0.05-0.09

0.001-0.03

0,2-0. 4

24 in

0.01-0.03

0,0001-0,002

0.1-0.2

Factory, 200 x 200 ft

0.1-0 .2

Shelter, partly above grade:

With earth cover — 2 ft

0.02-0.04

0.005-0.02

0.02-0.08

With earth cover — 3 ft .

0.01-0.02

0.001-0.005

0.01-0.05

Rough Terrain

—

0.4-0. 8

—

Tanks: M-24, M-41, Tank Recov.

Vehicle M-51, M-74

0.3-0.5

0.2

0.5-0.7

Tanks: M-26, M-47, M-48, T-43E1;

Eng. Armd. Vehicles, T-39E2

0.2-0.4

0.1

0.3-0.6

Tractor, crawler, D8 w/blade

1.0

0.4

1.0

1/ 4-ton truck

1.0

0.8

1.0

3/4-ton truck

1.0

0.6

1.0

2-1 /2-ton truck . .

1.0

0.5-0.6

1.0

Armd* Inf. Vehicle M~59, M-75* and

8P Twin 40mm Gun M-42

0.8-1.2

0.2-0.6

0.8-1. 0

SP 105-mm howitzer M-52

0, 6-0.8

0.4-0.6

0.8-1. 0

Cruisers 3

Navigating Bridge

0.12-0.35

0.005-0.2

0.75

Superstructure Deck

0.008-0.25

0.0001-0.1

0.7

Main Deck

0.005-0.25

0.00003-0.1

0.7

Second Deck

0.0002-0.2

0-0.07

0.6

First Platform

0.0002-0.2

0-0.07

0,2-0. 3

Second Platform

0.0001-0.10

0-0.01

0.05-0.15

Destroyer 3

Navigating Bridge .....

0.25-0.40

0.1-0. 2

0.85

Superstructure Deck

0.015-0.40

0.00025-0.2

0.8-0.851

Main Deck

0.008-0.34

0.0001-0.2

0.75-0.8

First Platform

0.001-0.25

0-0,1

0.76-0.8

Second Platform

0.0005-0,20

0-0.07

0.6-0.75

1 Estimated values.

2 No line-of -sight radiation received.

3 Assuming a beam-on orientation.

DOSE TRANSMISSION FACTOR

THICKNESS, CM

Figure 7 - 12. Shielding from Residual Gamma Radiation

tf)

rvj

-j

Lki

LjJ

DOE ARCH

Figure 4-21. Fission-product Decay Factors Normalized to Unity,

1 hr after Detonation

* TO.I 2 5 7 | 2 57 10 2 57 JOQ * 5 7 I000

TIME t f DAYS

Figure 4-22. Normalized Theoretical Dose Accumulated in a Fallout-
contaminated Area from H -(- 1 hr to H -|- 1000 Days

4-13 AIK BURST. The surface contamina-
tion effects of fallout from an air-burst weapon
are militarily insignificant in most cases be-
cause the bomb cloud carries most of the radio-
active bomb debris to high altitudes. In general,
by the time this material can fall back to earth,
dilution and radioactive decay decreases the
activity to levels that are no longer militarily
important. An exception may occur in the case
of a small-yield weapon burst in the rain, where
the scavenging effect of the precipitation may
cause a rainout of radioactive material that will
be hazardous to personnel located downwind
and downhill, and outside the hazard area of
initial radiation and other effects. Although
the range of weapon yields for which rainout
may become hazardous is not large, quantita-
tive treatment of the problem is difficult. The
contamination pattern on the ground depends
upon the scavenging effect of precipitation on
suspended fission products in the atmoshere,
and the flow and ground absorption of rain
water after reaching the ground.

Some of the factors that influence the
scavenging effect are:

(1) Height and extent of the rain cloud

(2) Raindrop size and distribution

(3) Rate of rainfall

(4) Duration of precipitation

(5) Position of the nuclear cloud relative
to the precipitation

(6) Hygroscopic character of the fission
products

(7) Solubility of the fission products

(8) Size of the fission fragments

4-8

SOLID CONTOURS- JANGLE S
DASHED CONTOURS -I DEAL IZED MODEL

CsJ — O

S3Tiw ainitis

1 )OE ARCHI\

C\J

Figure 4-3. Comparison of Actual Fallout Contours with Idealized Model
for a Yield of 1.2 kt and Effective Wind of 20 knots

SOLID CONTOURS-A UNITEO KINGDOM SHOT
DASHED CONTOURS-IDEAL1ZED MODEL

*■

OJ O CVJ

S 31 IW BiniViS

-L

Figure 4-4. Comparison of Actual Fallout Contours with Idealized Model
fora Yield of 1 kf and Effective Wind of 10 knots

10“' I 10 I0 2

D0WNWIM0 DISTANCE, STATUTE MILES

10® I0 4

DOE ARCHIVES

Figure 4-23. Yield vs. Downwind Distance, 10-knot Effective Wind

YIELD, KT

DOE ARCH!

Figure 4-24. Yield vs. Downwind Distance, 20-knot Effective Wind

YIELD, KT

DOE ARCHIVES

Figure 4 - 25 . Yield vs. Downwind Distance, 40-knot Effective Wind

YIELD, KT

Figure 4-27. Yield vs. Maximum Width, 10-knot Effective Wind

-I

I 10 I0 2

UPWIND DISTANCE, STATUTE MILES

10 3 I0«

POE ARCHIVES

Figure 4-31. Yield vs. Upwind Distance, 10-knot Effective Wind

YIELD. KT

10-2

f 10 I0 2

GROUND-ZERO WIDTH, STATUTE MILES

DOE ARCHIVES

Figure 4-39. Yield vs. Ground-zero Width, 10-knot Effective Wind

YIELD, KT

Figure 4-33. Yield vs. Upwind Distance, 40-knot Effective Wind

YIELD. KT

GROUND-ZERO WIDTH , STATUTE MILES

doe archives

Figure 4-41. Yield vs. Ground-zero Width, 40-knot Effective Wind

HEIGHT OF BURST

Figure 4-44. Height-of-burst Adjustment Factor for Dose-rate-contour Values
Underwater Explosion, 15-knot Wind, Range of Burst Depths, 150 to 1000 ft

Figure 4-53. Height of Cloud Tops vs. Yield, Tropical Climates

OOSE RECEIVED, RAD

3 7 | 2 3 ? |0 « 3 T 100

TRANSIT TIME THROUGH CLOUD, MIN

DOE ARCHF

Figure 4-55. Dose Received While Flying Through a Nuclear Cloud vs.

Transit Time Through Cloud

DOSE TRANSMISSION FACTOR

THICKNESS, CM

Figure 7-11. Shielding from Initial Gamma Radiation

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GAMMA RADIATION DOSE, RAD

SLANT RANGE, M

Figure 4-10. Initial Gamma Radiation Dose vs. Slant Range for Various Average
Relative Air Densities, 1-kt Underground Burst, Surface Target Depth 17 ft

GAMMA RADIATION DOSE, RAO

SLANT RANGE, M

Figure 4-9IA). Initial Gamma Radiation Dose vs. Slant Range (to 1500 yd) for
Various Average Relative Air Densities, 1-kt Air Burst-Surface Target

Problem 4*6 Neutron Radiation Dose

Weapon design strongly influences neutron
radiation. Figures 4-17 to 4-20 are given as
representative curves applicable to four general
weapon categories based upon expected neu-
tron output. Figure 4-17 applies to sub-kiloton
yields and the dose is given in units of rads/ton.
Figures 4-18 and 4-19 apply to average and
high-flux kiloton fission weapons respectively,
and the units are in rads/kt. Figure 4-20 applies
to fusion weapons and the dose is given in units
of rads/mt. From these curves the slant range
can be determined at which a weapon of given
yield will produce a specified dose; conversely,
the yield required to produce a given dose at a
desired range can also be found.

Several other factors will influence the dose
expected at a given target location. If either
the target or the burst is raised above the sur-
face the dose can be expected to increase by
approximately 50 percent. If the target is lo-
cated on the water the dose can be expected to
be reduced. Figures 4-17 to 4-19, curves for
sub-kiloton and kiloton fission weapons, apply
directly to the dose received by a land surface
target from a low air burst (fireball does not
touch the ground). Figure 4-20 applies directly
to the dose received by a land surface target
from a surface burst.

Table 4-5 Adjustment Factors for Varying
Given Conditions

Example 1.

Given: A high flux 50-kt burst at 2000 ft
above a water surface where the average air
density between the point of burst and the tar-
get location is 0.8.

Find: The maximum neutron dose on the
surface of the water at a slant range of 2200 yd.

Solution: From figure 4-19 for p = 0.8 the
dose for 1 kt at 2200 yd is 2 rads. The correction
factor for the target being on water rather than
on land is 0.85.

Answer: Therefore the maximum dose on
the surface of the water for 50 kt at 2200-yd
slant range and p = 0.8 is 2 X 50 X 0.85 = 85
rads.

Example 2.

Given: A sub-kiloton weapon burst on the
ground where the relative air density is 0.9.

Find: The yield required to deliver a neu-
tron dose of 450 rads to the outside of a bunker
500 yd from ground zero.

Solution: From the information given, fig-
ure 4-17 (sub-kiloton fission) must be used. Be-
cause the given conditions for figure 4-17 are
air burst-surface target, the adjustment factor
“changing burst location from air to surface —
0.67” (see table 4-5) must be used to correct
for a surface burst.

Answer: From figure 4-17 for p = 0.9 read
7.2 rads/ton at 500 yd, air burst-surface target.

Condition Factor

Target location on water surface 0.85

Target location airborne 1.5

Changing burst location from air to surface 0,67

Changing burst location from surface to air 1.5

Scaling . At a given range and relative air
density, the neutron dose is proportional to
weapon yield. For relative air density, see ap-
pendix B.

7.2 rads/ton X 0-67 (adjustment factor)
— 4.82 rads/ ton delivered to target

450 rads total

92 tons

4.82 rads/ton £ ARCH , V

Reliability. Depending upon weapon design,

it is estimated that the dose values given in fig-
ures 4-17 through 4-20 may be low by as much as
a factor of 2 for certain very high flux designs
and high by as much as a factor of 5 for some
older weapon designs.

Related Material. See paragraph 4-6.

NEUTRON RADIATION DOSE, RAD/TON

Table 4-1 Chemical Composition of Illustrative

Soils

Percentage of soil type (by weight)

Type I

Type II

Type III
(lava,

Type IV
(beach,
sand,
Pensa-

Element

(Liberia,

( Nevada

clay,

cola,

Africa)

desert)

Hawaii)

Florida)

Sodium

Manganese

Aluminum

Iron

Silicon

Titanium

Calcium

Potassium

Hydrogen

Boron

Nitrogen . .

Sulfur

Magnesium

Chromium

Phosphorous

Carbon

Oxygen

0.008

7.89

3.75

33.10

0.39

0.08

0.39

0.065

0.07

0.05

0.008

3.87

50.33

1.30

0.04

6.90

2.20

32.00

0.27

2.40

2.70

0.70

0.03

0.60

0.04

50.82

0.16

2.94

18.79

10.64

10.23

1.26

0.45

0.88

0.94

0.26

0.34

0.04

0.13

9.36

43.32

0.001

0.006

0.005

46.65

0.004

0.001

53,332

rad/hr/ton

RAO/HR/KT

SLANT RANGE, M

200 400 600 600 1000 1200 1400

400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

SLANT RANGE, YDS

t>OE ARC

Figure 4-57. Neutron-induced Gamma Activity vs. Slant Range at a Reference
Time of 1 hr After Burst, Fission Weapons per kt

decay factor

Figure 4-59. Decay Factors for Neutron-induced Gamma Activity

DECAY FACTOR

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE , RAD

DISTANCE FROM SURFACE ZERO, M
3000

10,000

DISTANCE FROM SURFACE ZERO, FT

Figure 4-49. Total Do$e at the Surface Downwind from a 10-kt Underwater
Explosion, 1 5-knot Wind, Range of Burst Depths, 1 50 to 1 000 ft

some fission products are lost along the path of
migration to the surrounding water.

4-28 Fractionation, "The radioactive mate-
rial carried by the base surge, in most cases,
fractionates in favor of those fission products
having rare-gas ancestors. This probably re-
sults from scavenging of the more-refractory
fission products by the early subsiding masses
of water from the columns of plumes, thereby
returning them to the ocean in the immediate
vicinity of surface zero.

4-29 Time-space History of the Above-sur-
face Radiation Fields. For all types of under-
water explosions, the major source of radia-
tion, to the observer on the surface, is probably
the base surge, which can be extremely danger-
ous to any station it engulfs. Although the total
quantity of fission products within the base
surge amounts to some 10 to 30 percent of that
initially formed, the specific activity is very
high because of the early age of the radioac-
tivity. It should be emphasized that very close
to subsiding columns or plumes, the base surge
deposits significant amounts of radioactive ma-
terial on the surface causing a temporary
radiological hazard. The phenomenon is almost
entirely transient in nature, similar to being
engulfed by a heavy fog.

Evidence to date suggests some distinct dif-
ferences in the geometry of the base surge de-
pending on whether the explosion is shallow
(columns) or deep (plumes). In either case the
resulting surge expands radially at a high ve-
locity, and takes the form of a toroid for shal-
low explosions and is more like concentric mul-
tiple toroids for deep explosions. These differ-
ences in geometry have two effects on the time-
space history of the radiation: as the single
toroid passes over a station, the dose rate and
dose are delivered in two increments (the for-
ward and rear actions of the ring), as seen in
figure 4-6; where concentric multiple toroids
are formed, as is the case for the deep explo-
sion, the radiation is delivered over one broad
continuous increment, as shown in figure 4-7.
The time of passage depends on the maximum
extent of the surge periphery, the location of
the observer, and the wind speed.

Figure 4-6, Dose Rate vs. Time for a Shallow
Underwater Burst

4-30 Water Surface Shot. Nominal-yield
bursts on the surface of deep w r ater will re-
semble the very shallow detonation with the ad-
dition of some prompt gamma and neutron
activated nitrogen in the atmosphere. For high
yields such as a megaton surface burst over
shallow water (less than 200 ft deep) the above-
surface effects will be similar to those of a land
detonation, with the cloud rising to greater
heights. Probably, no base surge will develop,
but the fallout likely w r ill be different from a
land surface burst, and the area of militarily
significant fallout will probably be smaller.
If the yield is large enough for the cloud to
reach the tropopause, the cloud upon reaching
this level will rise more slowly and increase in
lateral dimensions more rapidly as though flat-
tening out against a ceiling. After reaching
maximum altitude, the diameter slowly in-
creases as the cloud drifts downwind. Figure

4-18

DOSE RATE, RELATIVE UNITS

Figure 4-7. Dose Rote vs. Time for a Deep
Underwater Burst

4-54 shows the cloud diameter-versus-time re-
lationships. Figure 4-55 gives the dose received
by personnel in aircraft flying through an
atomic cloud at various times after the detona-
tion.

RESIDUAL BETA RADIATION

In general, the hazard due to residual gamma
radiation exceeds the beta hazard for all cases
except those in which intimate contact with
beta-active materials occurs, as when an in-
dividual lies prone in a contaminated area, or
when particles fall out directly upon the skin
or scalp. For such cases, superficial burns may
result, as discussed in paragraph 7-21,

SHIELDING

The dose rates obtained from the contours
described, and the total doses derived there-
from, are free-field values that must be reduced
if the individual concerned is protected by some
shelter. Shielding factors can be estimated from
the considerations stated in paragraphs 7-26
through 7-28. For example, personnel in the
open in a built-up city area would receive 0.7
of the free-field dose, whereas personnel in
shelter such as the basement of a dwelling would
receive about 0.1 of the free-field dose.

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RUSSIAN CIVIL DEFENCE: GAS MASKS, RESCUE TEAMS, BASEMENT SHELTERS AND EVACUATION

THREE WELL-INFORMED AUTHORITATIVE
WRITERS DISCUSS URGENT PROBLEMS OF—

THE

Air Defence

OF BRITAIN

I. THE NEW FACTOR IN

WARFARE

BY AIR-COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

2. AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS

BY G. T. GARRATT

3. BRITAIN’S AIR STRENGTH

BY LIEUT.-COMMDR. R. FLETCHER, M.P.

THE AIR DEFENCE
OF BRITAIN

Too little definite informa-
tion about Britain’s air defences
has so far been available to the
general public. This book, in
which three responsible author-
ities cover every important
aspect of what has now become
a most urgent problem and
everybody’s concern, has been
specially planned to remedy
this. Between them they dis-
cuss the nature of the diffi-
culties inherent in defending
Britain against air attack, the
actual steps being taken now
to retaliate against possible
enemy air aggression, and the
protection and evacuation of
the civilian population from
London and other crowded
cities.

Each author is specially quali-
fied to write with authority
on his section of the subject,
and their reputations for clear
thinking and responsible judg-
ment are a guarantee against
unwarranted sensationalism.
The facts themselves are sen-
sational enough.

AIR-COMMODORE
L. E. O. CHARLTON

Served in South Africa, 1899-1902, twice
wounded, mentioned in dispatches, D.S.O. ;
served W.A.F.F. ; European War, again
wounded, C.M.G. ; Air Attache, British
Embassy, Washington ; Chief Staff Officer,
Iraq Command ; Officer in the Legion of
Honour. Author of a remarkable autobiog-
raphy, Chcrltcn , recently issued in Penguins.
Has lately established himself as a writer of
repute and as an acknowledged authority on
air strategy.

G. T. GARRATT

Author of another Penguin Special, Mussolini's
Roman Empire. Served with the Indian Cavalry
during the war, spent 2^ years in Mesopo-
tamia. Correspondent for the Westminster
Gazette in Germany and Russia. Political
Secretary at the Indian Round Table Confer-
ence. Went to India and to the Abyssinian
war for the Manchester Guardian. Spent most
of 1937 and much of 1938 in Spain on relief
work, observing the effect of concentrated
bombing of civilian populations, an experience
which gives him special knowledge of the
problems he deals with in this book.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER
R. FLETCHER, M.P.

Distinguished career in the Royal Navy ;
served at the Dardanelles, in the Grand Fleet,
in the Channel Patrol, in the Light Cruiser
Force and at Dartmouth Naval College.
After the Armistice he served for three years
at the Admiralty as head of the Near Eastern
Section of the Intelligence Division. Was a
member of the Special Committee recently
set up to investigate the progress of British
air rearmament and which prepared a
Report recommending drastic changes.

PENGUIN BOOKS LIMITED

(ALLEN LANE)

HARMONDSWORTH, MIDDLESEX
ENGLAND

Reading-case label

Penguin Books keep better in
the bookshelf if they are pro-
tected by the special Penguin
reading-case (6 d. from any
bookseller). Cut out this
label and paste it on to the
back of the case .

Published in Penguin Books October 1938
Reprinted October 1938

CONTENTS

Part I: THE NEW FACTOR IN WARFARE

by Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton

CHAPTER pAfiB

I. The Method of the Air .... 9

II. The Manner of its Use . . . .18

III. London the Loadstone • . . 28

IV. The Invincibility of the Bomber . . 38

V. Attack Versus Defence .... 48

VI. A Snare and a Delusion .... 61

VII. Strategical Factors .... 70

VIII. The Situation Vis-a-Vis Germany . . 80

IX. Mediterranean Purview .... 90

X. Prevention is Better than Cure . .101

Part II: AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS
by G. T. Garratt

I. Attacks on Civilians . . . .113

II. Protection in Dangerous Areas .129

III. Evacuation of Dangerous Areas . .143

Part III: BRITAIN’S AIR STRENGTH
by Lt.-Commdr. R. Fletcher, M.P.

I. Our Needs in Air Defence . . .165

II. Are our Aircraft Good Enough? . .174

III. The Causes of our Air Inferiority . 181

CHAPTER I

THE METHOD OF THE AIR

There have been many fateful dates in the history
of our island since that day, September 28th, 1066,
when William the Norman landed unmolested on
our southern shore at Pevensey, to inflict a crushing
defeat on Harold at Senlac a fortnight later, and
to be crowned King at Westminster on Christmas
Day. Regarded as a successful feat of arms, it is
an outstanding event. There was also something
of prophecy in the ruse by which the long resistance
of the English was overcome at last. For the
Norman archers were instructed, towards nightfall,
to raise their bows so as to pitch the arrows at a
steep angle of descent in the midst of Harold’s
“ huscarles ” and rain them down as missiles from
'the sky. Something of the same sort, though in
nature much more determined, and on this occasion
to take citizenry at a disadvantage instead of stout
defenders drawn up in serried ranks, occurred after
a lapse of 850 years, the date of which should rank
with us, and will in the eyes of posterity, as the
marking of an epoch. On the 13th June, 1917,

10 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

to be explicit, at the noon hour and all unsuspecting,
London was reached and raked by eighteen monster
aircraft of the Gotha type, the bombs falling in
clusters from East Ham to Finsbury, and accounting
for 594 casualties, of which 162 were killed outright.
There was even something of prophecy, again, in
this visitation, for an infant school in Poplar was
the scene of one attack, and forty-six small children
in the kindergarten stage of life were blown to pieces,
thus foreshadowing the peculiar aptitude of the
aerial bomb, later to be evinced in Barcelona, for
the massacre of innocents.

These Gothas were twin-engined aircraft capable
of flight at 80 miles per hour, and could carry a
dead weight in bombs, additional to protective
armament and crew, of 660 pounds. They could
stay up on a full-tank capacity for four and a half
hours, and were specially designed for the air
bombardment of England from the Channel ports.
They were the prototype of the modem heavy
bomber, though it is almost ludicrous to compare
the then and now. To-day the lineal descendant
of the Gotha, belonging as it may to any air force,
large or small, has thrice the speed, four times the
carrying capacity and five times the range. Such
is evolution !

In those days, so far away to the rising generation
and yet so short a while ago, aircraft had no free
scope as an independent arm. Aviation was
tightly tied to the apron-strings of military com-
manders in the field, and was strictly tethered to
the needs of armies for Cinderella use. But the

THE METHOD OF THE AIR 11

law of evolution works in thought as well as in
practice, even to the dumbfoundment of strait-laced
generalship, and at present it is universally acknowl-
edged that the air arm has a strategical and unilateral
raison d'etre, the purpose of which is to be the
spearhead of aggression in the hands of an aggressor,
or equally the reprisal weapon for the counter-
attack of a defender. Let us briefly examine either
claim and endeavour, thereby, to assess what
likelihood exists of the bomber becoming king of all.

Most people are apt to think of air bombardment
merely as an appendage of ordinary warfare. But
it is much more than that, and it so differs from the
usages in vogue, commonly the attributes of forces
opposed in the field, or of ships stripped for battle
on the seas, that it is not too much to say that it is
a revolution in the art of war, rather than a mere
technical extension of the modes of combat. War
in any case is a m eans to an end and not an end in
itself. It is the fisticuff continuation of a political
argument, dispassionately considered, wherein the
acerbity of notes excha nged develops at a certain
point into the sharper altercation of blows. What
is the actual purpose for which war is waged ?
Certainly not for mere reasons of slaughter, either
of an unarmed civilian populace or of men trained
to arms. T he ultimate object of war is, by means
of armed force, to brush aside opposition and
to march on the enemy’s capital, the victor from
that commanding position being enabled to dictate
terms of peace. In democratic countries, and even,
eventually, in authoritarian states, it is the people

! 12 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

thems elves who hav e the last say in the ma tt er, for
no Gove rnment in the world could prolong resis-
tance in the lace of an expression of growing popular
j i: dissent Hence the invader’s e xtrem e desire to
m arcHPahead, and the b loody battles which are
' fought en route , possession of the principal city being
a s>mb^ the world to see, besides

“Being a. centre of occupation from which the life of
the invaded country can be slowly stifled u ntil the
^remaining sparks of nat ional resistance cease to
glow. Such is tiSTchief object of war with so-called
civilized communities, and the main objective of
attack is not, as many are apt to think, th e army of
" tHe^defender, but the po pulaceltsel^ and especially
that large section of it which inhabits the pr incipal _
city and which can bring a paci fist influence to bear

orPtheir rulers if it finds the r igou rs of existence

unendurable under the regime of war.

When this is once appreciated the role of aircraft
assumes a new significance, and it will be proper
at this juncture to explain the salient distinction
which divides the new form of warfare from the
old. Ever sinc e the nations of the world e me rge d
from TKPchaos of warring tribes to form themselves
into settled communities under a common flag their
home and foreign policies have been directed
* tow ards the one, single necessity of security.
Indeed, the very frontiers were largely delineated
with that end in view. The mountain barrier of the
Pyrenees is a natural strategical division between
France and Spain. The Alps neatly enclose the
northern frontier of Italy, and the sea does the rest.

THE METHOD OF THE AIR 13

I n the absence of hilly tracts we find a broad river
serving the same~pu^ as tli^M
Europe, the lo"we f~~fea~ches of tho ^imbe^ ^d the
Dniester in the eastern portion of the Continent.

~ Wheff neithe r mountain range nor river serve, a
swampy district will suffice , as witness the Pripet
“ Marshes which now roughly demarcaFe the bouELdary
between Poland and the U .S.S.R. On the landward
"side a strategical frontier formed by the hand of
Nature was sought as adding to territorial security,
while seawards countries made haste, wherever
possible, to reach the coast and secure themselves
by means of the salt-water belt which lapped their
shores. When the framers o f the Peace Treaties, in
191 9, c arved up Austria-Hungary to create the new
State of Czechoslovakia they hadPthe ^principle in
mm37~and incIudecO Germans in Its

boundary be cause the mountains of Bohemia
form ed a strategical frontier in that particular
part of central Europe. Warfare in those days,
a nd eve n up to now, meant the cut and thrus t oT
opposing forces on the ground. Armies crawled
wormlike in two-dimensional space, and the natural
obstacle of mountain, river, marsh or narrow arm
of sea provided strength against invasion and eased
the tasTT"of the defenders. T he best situation of
al l was to be an island nation, for the sea was the
str ongest barrier which Nature provided. This has
be en our situation ever since the ~umon~of the
Kingdom as a resul t of which there has never been
a serious threat against the security of our shores^
and no fighting whatever on land excepting civil war,

14 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

while the Continent, so nearly adjacent to our
' southern coast, has seldom Tiad a respite from

r ri i i . wammmminra '*****#***,»

unending conflict.

The science, or art, of war grew up in keeping
with these conditions and assumed, likewise, a

barrier formation. Fortifications were erected for

— — „

the improvement, or extension, of NatureVTi ne.
That we are still in this stage of military development,
despite the menace from above, is proved by the
existence of the French “ Maginot Line ”, and other
systems of the sort now a familiar feature of the
European landscape, which have been constructed
largely underground to form an artificial barrier
to invasion wh ere the give and take of past wars
h as resulted in an unprotected boundary. “ Secure,
or as nearly so as possible, beEihd Their natural
and artificial barriers, whether composed of physical
features on Nature’s grand scale, of bricks and
mortar or of reinforced concrete, of a living line
of men drawn up in battle array, or of opposing
fleets at sea, the nations did not shrink from the
arbitration of war in the final issue of events. They
were strengthened, sometimes, by the righteousness
of their cause, but more so, and more often, by the
surer realization that as long as those walls were
neither breached nor overtopped they might sit in
safety and defy the foe.

The fact that fighting could only take place on
the surface of land or sea did more, however, than
shape a military technique. In the interludes of
peace the ceaseless search for security still went
on, and diplomacy was put in play to make, or

THE MANNER OF ITS USE 19

accomplished in complete neglect of what trans-
pires on the ground as regards the set-to of armies,
or of what takes place at sea when fleets join battle.
Air action, thus applied, in certain circumstances
^ may so defe at civilian courage that a popular cry
for peace at any price arises, and the Government,
depri v ed - o f the support on which it must needs rely
in order to prosecute the war, has no option but to
ask an arm^tice and accept what terms are given.
We have an instance in the late war of the effect on
hostilities of a people driven into revolution against
their rulers because they were called upon to suffer
beyond endurance. Far t oo little attention has been
drawn to the fac t that the German armies, though^
in retreaCwere still in fighting trim when the change -
~~ofgovemmenroccurred , in 1918, and the^Kaiser waT

deposed. It is a lesson which we, for~reasons later

to be gi ven, should not neglect, and it runs like this.

^ From the very comm encement of hostilities the
^~ Ihnti sTn^ enforced the laws of blockade

againsOhe Central Powers, frequently embroiling “
themselves with neutral countries in the process,
but facing all suchlike risks, and the consequences
therefrom, rather than, for a single instant, to
relax an effort which must logically conduce in the
long run to victory. Th e length o f the run, it so
happened, was about four years, at The end of which
fame the throttling process was having full effect.
With the exception of the soldiers at the front, who
fiad to be fed, the entire population was under-
nourished, and the city folk especially were reduced
in large measure to a condition of semi-starvation.

20 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

as are the inhabitants of Barcelona to -da ^ , In
addition they were woefully ill clad, and most of
the amenities of life, partic ularly those wh ic h had

to do with fuel, and lighF and hea t, ha djeither been

withdrawn or were greatly diminished. It is
common laiowledge that the germs of disease fasten ^
on~a~ suf^^ ^stre^
prlvatfon, however constitutionally strong it may
— fee, and in obedience to this law the subversive
elements in Germany found a wide and fertile soil
- — forlhe^eeds' of rebellion which they proceeded to

scatter. The resuIt“S“as we know it. With this

fertnent oh~fhe liome Front the mihtary mightoF —
Germany coTTa^edTand" the war was brought to
a sudden and unexpected conclusion because the
national will to fight had been broken beyond repair.
During all that dreary day in which the opposing
armies had been stagnating at the front, a slow and
insidious process had been in operation, the strangle-
hold of blockade, and the large offensives in Flanders
and elsewhere, with their terrible toll of life on either
side, the enormous energies outlaid, and the huge
treasure wasted, did not sensibly affect the final
outcome, which was due to the invisible pressure
of our Navy against the real point of resistance,
the people’s will to war.

It is quite obvious that we have not taken that
' useful object lesson to heart, for otherwise we would
noTliave delaved rearmame nt until the potential
enemy was far and away ahead and out of sight, __
particul arly wit h refere nce to air power, that post-
war weapon which, owing to our peculiar circum-

THE MANNER OF ITS USE

stance, is calculated to do to us, and in much quicker
timeT that which o ur Navy did to Germany over
four long years. Germany has not forgotten the
“lesson she received, and~ with good reason. We
char ged her with baby-Elfing because her cruisers
sheHed a n East Coast p ort, and because latterly her
“aircraft dropped their bombs without discrimination
“orfcity centres. But indirectly we were baby-killers,
too, of a much higher order, by inducing food
“shortage in the enemy c ountry, a s the health reports
in Germany for the later period of the war fully
“Sear out. It was legitimate warfare, and well it
served its purpose, so much so that it would be

sheer folly for our late enemy not to take advantage

of the situation now that the tables are turned,
and do j o jig, if war should come again, as they were
done by. Such methods have a boomerang effect
when opportunity serves, and if ever the time does
come once more to submit affairs to the arbitration
of war, the air arm now exists as a weapon precisely
fashioned for the purpose of an aggressor.

There is still a vast amount of ignorance about
concerning the application of air power. People”
In ihis“"coi mtty

that aTFwill be weU with them in this respect as long
as they pos sess strength in the air equal to that of
the enem y. Why this is a fallacy which may have
a tragic significance one day, and how diff erent
“such equality is from being able to give as good
as^ one gets, will be explained in due course. If
two opposing air forces merely canc elled each other
out, only leaving destruction ~5r~t5eir wake, war

22 THE AIR DEFENCE. OF BRITAIN

...

would becoj^too farcical a game for ev en d ictators
to play. jp ^Again, there is a considerable body of
opinion which claims that a sufficiency of fighter-
interceptors, together with a barrage belt of anti-
aircraft batteries, could successfully defend a
locality, either keeping the invaders off or shooting
them down from the sky. The situation is not yet
in sight when air defence can be counted on to
counter air attack, and this also will be dealt with
in its place. There are others, and among them
men o f emin ence in Parliament, inchidmg Mr.
WmstonJChu of State" for War

— ancTAir and one-time First Lord oT the Admiralty,
who maintain that events, both in Spain and China,
go to prove that in spite of much damage and inevit-
able loss of life, bomber attack on citie s is no t of
~"Hffiat ~ decisiv e nature which assists to victoryf^Xet
us examine this last contention inlheTighfof what
may happen in the future, for the argument lies
near home to us and the truth should always bear
examination.

Of the destructive effects of bomb attack, con-
sidered in relation to the after-results of the individual
bomb, we have had ample experience during the
air raids over England in the Great War, while the
modem spectacle is outstandingly before our eyes
in regard to the two aforesaid countries. Indeed,
the matter does not require proof. Reduced to its
essentials, the aircraft is itself a projectile, just as
truly as if it were fired from a gun, and the actual
dropping of the bomb can be likened to the bursting
charge of a shell when it arrives. There is, however.

24 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

in all three cases. Air power to be effective must
be applied at full strength a nd with sustained effort.

HR must be usedrfn^a toTalltarian sense, with single-

purposed endea^uf anJ ^ main strategical
aim, to^cow the people into the mood of surrender.

1 hat is how its luture iise Is loreshadowed by the

two central European dictators who have amassed
air power and are constantly adding to it. From
their own mouths, and through those of their
spokesmen, they have let it be known that they will
attack cities with ruthlessness by means of the aircraft
fleets they have in readiness for war. And why,
indeed, should they not, knowing full well, as they
must, that big cities are the nerve centres of a country,
and wishing for a quick war? Not during the
Great War, and neither in Spain nor China to-day,
is this condition being fulfill ed Germany never
hoped that her air attacks on London would bring
victory to her side. At the most she aspired to cause
alarm and despondency, to delay munition output
and to constrain us to withdraw guns and aircraft
from the front in France for the needs of local
defence. In all these aims she well succeeded and,
as regards the latter, it is worth while to note that
in each case it was popular clamour, rather than a
strictly military necessity, which induced the Govern-
ment to elaborate the various schemes of defence
until the odd score of Gothas employed in raiding
were immobilizing, on the home front, more than
twenty times their number. The Germans only
utilized their surplus energy, for the paramount
'^aeed in the eyes ~oFTEe~ ffufitary High Command

THE MANNER OF ITS USE

was the front-line battle waged unceasingly in the
air, and aircraft had not then been considered as a
separate weapon of war. The new arm was still
in apron-strings to the old, and jealously regarded.

In Spain and China, curiously enough, both
invaders are in the Great War stage of development
as regards the use of aircraft, though the equipment
which they dispose of is modern and up to date.
Franco does not possess enormous air power,
greatly though it may exceed that of his adversary,
and he has found great use for it in battering the
front-line systems of defence where the air opposition
is slight. The e arly air raids on Madrid^and the
later ones over Barcelona , Vale ncia, and other
coast towns, were all sporadic efforts ^amed out by
small formations an d bear no resembl ance to the~
unintermitt en t day and nigh t attack which wilf be
the mark of the war to come when great powers go
to work. Moreover, a temper is aroused by civil
war whicKTias no counterp art m a struggle between”
nations. It was alw ays much easier for the British
soldier to dislike the Fr ench than to hate~ the
Germans d uring the Great War, looking on the latter
as people who were in the same pickle as himself
and worthy opponents at that. But in Spain there
is savagery of disposition on both sides, and hate
bordering on frenzy, the result of whlcK is to harden
resistance on the p art of the defender and dispose
film to welcome death rather than surrender and
lose the fight for liber ty into which he has put his
alL Chiefly, though, the war in Spain came gradu- _
ally nearer to the city populace, who were not

e near future holds for us unless the sky of Europe
dears. The courage and endurance which they

have shown is great, but these are hard ly a tithe

■ ~ — ■ — — —

of the display which will be necessary when bombers,
to be counted in their hundreds, appear over London.

In China somewhat of a similar situation obtains,
though the people there are long-enduring for a
different reason altogether. Japan is a much
militarized nation, with the war-lord and the politi-
cian so intermixed in nature that it becomes a dual
personality. The Navy and the Army are in power
over there, and there is no Air Force as a separate
and strategic arm, such as occurs in Europe with
our own and other countries. In consequence,
when war breaks out, or, better still, when “ inci-
dents ” occur, her air power is fettered to the other
services to subserve a purely naval or military
end, and is only released for long-distance action
at the instigation of a naval or military commander.
Shanghai suffered greatly under air bombardment

THE MANNER OF ITS USE

when its immediate vicinity was the scene of action,
and so did Nanking as the Japanese advanced. But
the raids on Hankow, or on Canton and other
localities of military importance far afield, though
not infrequent, have never been conducted as a
major enterprise and have seldom been attended
with very great success. The cramping effect on
air power when it is in tutelage to other arms
is here painfully apparent to a trained observer,
especially to one who was able at the time to realize,
during the Great War, what opportunities for effec-
tive action were missed owing to the dependence of
our Air Force on the General Staff. The Japanese
may be right, however, in this instance, for the
bombing of a Chinese city when it is not immediately
in the line of next advance might easily become a
waste of energy. For the vocal clamour of a
Chinese city populace would be inaudible to its rulers
amid the stress of war. The teeming millions in
China are born to sorrow. Flood and plague and
famine have been their lot for years, and they have
become submissive to disaster as no other popula-
tion in the world. The masses, it is true, are now
awakening, but the percentage of the total which
is racially and politically conscious is a meagre
number indeed. There is no opportunity he re fo r
the bomber to break the spirit of resistance by
attacking the popular will, for the spirit is bowed
already to suffering, and the will does not rest with
those who mostly suffer.

it»«w i iiw^ ■ »■ i ■

Such, mainly, are the reasons why air power has
not been decisive of events in eit her SpamTor Chfiuu

28 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

It is important that they should be realized, for
far too many people are drawing a false deduction
and imagining, in self-complacent fashion, that
air attack is not to be so greatly feared after all.
Surely, they say, we can undergo the trials which
these people are so bravely coming through ! Our
courage is as great as theirs !

It is not a question of individual courage, but of
"mass psy chology. We have not b een put to the
test, norTias any other' count ry in the world as yet,
and it is s heerly impossible to pre dict what be haviour^
will res ult when the trial is on. Highly centralized
communities which are hand fed by the services of
public utility are in a different category to those
of lesser development which are either brutalized
by their condition, as in China, or systematically
exploited, as in Spain.

Let us try to picture next the effects, as far as they
can be foreseen at this stage, of a real exercise of
air power over a huge metropolis. For our purpose
let us take London.

chapter in

LONDON THE LOADSTONE

At this present moment we are very busy devising
means for the protection of this great city of ours,
than which there is none bigger in the world. It
is worth while, p erhaps, to remember in pa ssing
that it had a military origin, for the Lon dinium

32 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

to spoil the war. But supposing the civilian insists
on spoiling the war ! What if it were unendurable
to him ? What then ? Germany possessed a proud
citizenry prior to her collapse in 1918, which
supported the war in heart-whole fashion. And yet
she found the limit of endurance. Have we more
resilience, and a greater capacity to bear duress
than the Teuton, who is racially our blood brother ?
The trial under which they bent in Germany took
four years to reach its climax, during which they
were naturally inuring themselves until the breaking
strain was reached.

The coming war, for so it must be called, will
burst like a storm-cloud overhead, giving no
opportunity for an acclimatizing process, and with

no more warning than an avalanche. Why sh ould

there be warnin g ? Formal declarations of war_are _

ouTof fashion^ nowadays. And did not Hitler*__
^wherTThe Anschluss wis”proclaimed, dispatch 200

Bombers to^cIrcTe over Vie^ the ult imatu m

^Tven td” Schuschnigg was expiring .' they" were

overhead for demonstration purposes," beca use
- — Hitler ktiew surrender to be certain. But it his
ca j^^ion"Tiad been wrong, or if a - single anti-
— aircraft gun had~fTred~ar them; is there anybnelo
dou bt what would have happened, or a nyone un able
' to picture the result ?

art 0 f milit ary strategy, according to th e best

authorltiesTnd from the point of view of geWalship
''''TTtblind a weak point in the enemy’s defensive
svslem and~then 5tack it b y^sihprise.. It is a ques-
tion of material damage to an adversary’s defences

A SNARE AND A DELUSION 67

produced for that specific purpose, and which he
knows to be superior to that of his opponent
It is little recognized in matters to do with air
^defence that Th e whole balance can be completely ♦
upset by a sudden s tep f orward in improvement of
performance, by an advance in the science of b omb
manufacture, or by the dis covery of some mechanical
con trivance which would increase the fire-power of
small cannon and machine-guns, all of which can
be secrets closely guard ed until the day arrives.
Imagine, as an instance, that ln theljreat "War the
interrupter-gear, enabling fixed guns to be fired
through the airscrew, had been an invention ex-
clusive to ourselves and that the Germans were
long incapable of copying it. The result would
have been complete mastery of the air, for the anti-
aircraft gun of those days was quite ineffective. It
is not too much to claim that the total absence of
air power on the enemy’s side, thus brought about,
would have sufficed to destroy his military morale
and hastened victory. Such a little thing would
have had that vast result. Something similar would
have the same re sult to-dayT
It is thus seen that parity, which can only mean
Trough equality m numbers of types, must always
■^IffTi^Ton^ag^e^or at a disadvantage. In the
"first plac e there wouldlie no possibili ty of agreement
On the sub ject and it co uld only be achieved by
mutual arrangement In the second place, even
Supposing agreement were come by, complete reli-
ance must be placed on good faith for the observance

of the contract, for no system of surveillance could

~ — - - - - - — -

68 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN
be devised accurately to check up on construction

' ***•«■ - mvi \ semi tmmma m — -

in secret. And thirdly, the child of an inventor’s
brai n might quite suddenly so increase the offensive
power of attacking aircraft or the defensive power of
defending ones that the equality would be that of the _
hawk to the dove, merely becaus e both are birds.

This very tal k of air parity, and the way the word i
is bandied abou rin~and out of Parliament, as if it
were our bottom plank of policy, is merely proof,
if further proof were needed, of our complete
Failure* to separate our thought from the older forms
~ of war fare by sea and landT Navies fight oth er
navies, and a rmies fight other armies . They can *
measure up against each other, and if the forces '
pitted in the field, or on the sea, are approximately
equal, then victory will go to the side whose leaders
have the better brains, or whose rank and file are
braver. That is fair enough. But air forces do __
not fight like that at all. They have no natural
enemy to bar their progress and fight it to a finish.
Even if It were not so, indeed, and a battle between
air armadas could be staged above, even then it" ~
could only co me about by mutual consent, so vast
is the power of evasion which the im mensity of^
~~ space confers. The Italian General Tpouhet, dreamt 1
like that, and argued neatly from it that the battle-
bomb er, a veritable armoured cruiser of the sky,

must be the primary arm o f national defence, to

acf offensively and compel surrender while the forces
by seaand land assumed a passiveposture of defence.

Constructional development may be, though with-
out set purpose, taking steps towards the fulfilment

74 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

were chalked “ a ’ Berlin ”, and on the German side,
“ nach Paris ”. These inscriptions, it is true, were
part of the ebullience engendered by war-fever, and
derisory besides, but they did express subconsciously
the instinct to grasp that symbol of victory which
possession of the enemy capital will always grant.
Why did Napoleon, in 1812, brush every military
^obst acle aside and march on Moscow ? TfecausV
in his con sideration the fall of her capital would
settle Russia’s hash. In the Franco-German war
of 1870 the siege of Paris, and the subsequent
march of victory by German troops through
Napoleon’s “ Arc de Triomphe ” were calculated
to impress the rest of France with the uselessness
of further resistan ce. By occupying Bloemfontein
first, and Johannesburg later, in the Boer War, we
were acting in true conformity with the principle
of possessing ourselves of the enemy capitals in
order to enforce surrender, though vainly, as it so
happened, owing to the nature of the terrain and
the peculiar aptitude of the Boers for guerilla war-
fare.

Even in Italy’s recent Abyssinian campaign,
for proper conquest it was not, the semi-savage
defenders of their country were supposedly to be
counted out as soon as the capture of Addis Ababa
occurred. Take it all in all, in little country or in
big, the heart of national resistance will still reside
in the principal town or city, and the symbol of
conquest will be its occupation. In that one
particular way war has not changed, and the advent
of aviation saw the dawn of that day, now, a quarter

'75

STRATEGICAL FACTORS

of a century later, fully broke, on which the regi-
ments of bombers can, and will, do more devasta-
tion, in an inconceivably short space of time, than ever
siege artillery could do to subjugate the inhabitants
of a country’s capital city. Military opinion still
stoutly maintains that effective occupa tion can al one
ensure the downfall of a city and th e surrender o f a
Government, and that accordingly air bombardment
cannot do it But llTthe people’s lives are broken,
if a state approaching famine stares them in the
Tace,if they arelaFgelyliomeless, lfthey do not know
whidTway to t urn for succour, if every service is
suspended^and if the bombers keep on coming, then
such a city is as effectively occupied as if the pickets
oFllie enemy guarded every crossing and martial law
were^beni g rigorou s ly enforc ed by firing-squads.

The greater the extent of ground which it
covers, the more ineffective the measures which are
taken for the passive protection of the populace,
the larger the area of surrounding country which
is dependent on it, and the less inured to mass
discipline its people are, so much the more vulner-
able will that city be. If two capitals belonging to
two countries at war suffer air bombardment from
their respective air forces, with approximately an
equal number of bombers on both sides, and a
similar capacity for carrying bombs, that one with
the greater vulnerability on the above-mentioned
lines will be the first to voice a demand for peace,
and that country of which it is the seat of govern-
ment will be the first to sue for terms. The con-
clusion cannot be escaped that we must enlist much

PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE 109

of security would gradually eclipse the fear which
is reigning now, national armaments, little by little,
would be reduced, and eventually, it might be, the
supra-national air force would stand alone as the
policeman of the world.

Meanwhile, however, there is the present to con-
sider, for this force could not be assembled in a day,
and, more likely, would take as long as five or
seven years to reach a necessary pitch of efficiency.
There is no escape from the immediate necessity to
rearm, and as regards our own particular air
rearmament, it should be even on a larger scale
than is envisaged. No harm is done thereby to
" the princip le of peace, for as the supra-national
air forc e grows and waxes strong, and as the shadow
of war on that account retreats, surplus equipment
can be handed over to it for its special use. If we,
for instance, could only adapt our sight to loo£ on
rival airjDOwer as once we regarded the growth of
Germany’ s rival fl eet, then nothffig could re strain us
J ?om buil ding up our air strength, in spite of
cost, until we cam e to have a lead so great
that she would g ive up the race as hopeless. We
hav e done it on the sea, and now, the times being
changed, we musf do it in the air. It is not a
question of finance or budget-balancing. We are at
the commencement of a new era in warfare, and in
deadly danger. Posterity must pay its whack, for
it is being insured, 'and the present generation must
not be constrained from motives of quixotic honesty
to foot the entire bilir /ZuM & f /

Aircraft production is needed on a scale surpassing

110 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

any which has yet been taken into account. We are
now attempting to provide this need without
interference with industry at large, as if a man
should add another story to his house when the
lower walls are cracking. Even considering the
comparative modesty of the present programme, we
are not able to produce the goods, and meanwhile
the rival whom we dread, and with good reason,
too, has made, and is still making, her national
effort under a dictatorial regime, and is becoming
the hare to our tortoise in the race for life. T his
matter of a halting production of the aircraft
programme now on order is dealt with in the
succeeding section of this book. It only remains to
say here that our industiral resources are equal to
any demand if only the clamp of officialdom can be
thrown off and trained intelligences be given full
play.

In another respect, as well, we are dabbling with
a subject which requires universal and heart-whole
endeavour, and that is in the matter of Air Raid
Precautions. There is no grasp about our handling
of this life-or-death affair. We run from pillar to
post, taking up one aspect to the exclusion of others
of equal, or greater, importance, and then reverse
the process, quite unheeding of the lessons which are
before our eyes in Spain and China. There at least
the bomber is enacting its role, and if, in our own
predicament, we fail to take advantage of the grim
lessons so afforded, we shall come to rue the day.

Part II

AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS

G. T. GARRATT

i&i

CHAPTER I

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

It is now generally admitted that in any future
European war we must expect air attacks directly
aimed at non-combatants as well as raids on military
and industrial objectives. The next three chapters
will be devoted to what is known as Air Raid
Precautio ns or A.R.P .— the passive side~oFair
defence. The rest of this book has dealt with the
wolves who do the fighting. We must now consider
sheep. H ow can they best be fenced round, and
"h uddl ed away, so as to have as f^IosslT^possible
an dJ° he no trouble to their own wolves^ But just
becauselfiis analogy is not really accurate, and the
civil population of a democratic country is not
entirely ovine, there is a third side to the precautions
which must be taken before and after the beginning
of hostilities. We have also to consider the probable
behaviour of the non-combatants when exposed to
certain experiences.

Air Raid Precautions can^ t hen, be taken a s having
"Three main objects. (1) To avoid as much damage
to life, limb, a nd property as possible. (2) To

114 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

release as many aeroplanes and soldiers as possible
‘Tor"" " carrying o n "aggressive warfare. (3) To
minimize internal troubles and dissensions which
~ would endanger the country’s efficiency in carrying
~ on~ the war7 Tfee three aims may, for our
convenience, be described as humanitarian,
s trat egic, and po HticaI7 ~ It is essential that we
should keep these ideas separate in our minds.
It should not be assumed that methods suited
for one purpose will also assist the others. To
some extent the objects are mutually imcompatible.
It is good, strategica lly, to persuade people that
They are safer than they really are, in order
“ to prevent them politically clamou ring for more
interceptor planes to be detailed for their protection.
It may be good, politically, to tell Londoners that
certain expensive forms of protection are not
practical. We will return later to the weight which
has been assigned to each of these considerations
in our own A.R.P.

There is, fortunately, no need in this book for the
evasions and reticence which characterize all political
and most Press references to this subject. If our
A.R.P. have not been taken sufficiently seriously
in England, it is because the whole business has been
surrounded by an atmosphere of “ make belief ”,
which is fatal to efficiency. To anyone wh o has
been working in eastern Spain, where air a ttacks
were part of one’s normal life, the arrangements
novT being made i n London and elsewhere seem
hopelessly amateur and casual. It is rather like
returning from the last European war, and being

116 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

their best machines and materials, or whether they
have abstained from using certain weapons, notably
gas bombs, for reasons which would not apply in
the case of an attack on London, Birmingham, or
Manchester. We do know that they have used
their good pilots, and that the men who would
bomb London are mostly the same as have led the
attacks on Spanish objectives, so that we can expect
something of the same technique as they will have
tried out themselves or watched the Italians doing.

Most of the German bombing has been directed
against the smaller towns of northern Spain, in an
area without any serious anti-aircraft armament,
and denuded of fighting aeroplanes. More inter-
esting from our standpoint has been the work of
the Italian aeroplanes operating from the Italian
mainland or more usually from the Balearic Islands
against Barcelona, Valencia, and Alicante. Their
method was to come over at a great height, shutting
off their engines for the last stage, so that their
arrival was almost soundless. They dropped large
high-explosive bombs, whereas the Germans,
operating against the older and more combustible
towns like Guernica and Durango, made greater
use of incendiary grenades.

The modem bomber is a very speedy machine,
about three times as fast as the “ Gothas ” and
'^"Giants ” wEI^~raided London during the last
war. The Gothas then carried about half a ton of
bombs, and th e Giants n early a ton. Their most
"effec tive raidTwas on June 13th, 1917, when seventeen
aeroplanes dropped 128 bombs , Lilling 162 persons.

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS 117

and injuring 432. It seems to h ave taken about a
ton of bombs to kill twenty people. The modem
bomber does not carry much more weight, but its
speed is 250 to 300 miles per hour, and it has a
considerably higher “ ceiling ”. A slower machine
would have little chance against interceptor planes.
During the attacks on Madrid in the early part of
1937 th e German bombers, though flying too high
to aim at definite objectives, usually lost one or
two out of a dozen machines, but these were the
second- or third-class stuff which Herr Hitler
contributed in the early days.

The explosives seem to be about twice as effective
as those used in the last war, but evidence on this
point is difficult to get. During twenty-three
bombardments of Barcelona 528 bombs were
dropped, causing 916 deaths, 2,500 wounded, and
destroying 863 houses. The subsequent attacks in
March and April were relatively more severe, but in
no case has ther e been evidence of any specific ob-
jectives except the generaftarg et of an industrial area.

A combination of common sense and experience
would suggest that we are likely to be subjected to
mass attacks on thickly inhabited industrial areas.
The object will be to kill off as many working men
and women as possible, to put out of action some
factories, which if the enemy are lucky may include
some power stations and key industries, and finally
to have an adverse effect upon our morale, partly
from fear, and partly by setting the working classes
against the rest of the population and especially
against the Government.

119

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

motor-cars, and there were very few privileges for
those with money. The small pro-Franco element
kept extremely quiet.

For many reasons the Germans are not likely to
be deterred by their Spanish experiences from
planning their air raids with a strong political bias.
There are a number of tacit and quite unjustifiable
assumptions about our A.R.P. We have no reason
to expect that the next war will begin in the least
like the last. The Fascist mentality and methods
of diplomacy entirely exclude the probability of a
formal declaration of war as between one united
country and another. General Ludendorff laid it
do wn as a guiding pri nciple that a country which
mid decided to go to war would lose a great advan-
did not begin by a surprise rai d aime d at
paralyzin g the lme^ Tfr<TFascist

State will also wantlo uselts' Advantage in having
complete control over the lives and even the thoughts
of its own people. Their usual technique is, there-
fore, to stir up trouble in another country, and then
interfere forcibly and decidedly.

This technique has been worked by Germany in
Austria and Spain, and by Japan in China. It
would be a mistake to assume that something of
the kind would not be tried in England, or that the
hard-bitten German politicians of 1938 will neces-
sarily be so maladroit as the rulers of the Kaiser’s
Germany, who expected risings in India and Ireland
immediately after the declaration of war, though
they had done little to ensure them. The Nazi
leaders will probably not look for much help in

120 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

either of these countries, India or Ireland, but they
will expect some help inside England. There are
considerably more signs of Fascist activity, and more
avowed Fascist sympathizers in high places in
England to-day than there were in Spain in 1935.
Decent Spaniards did not then know that Spanish
Fascists were actually intriguing with Italy and
Germany ; we know equally little of what has been
done by Fascists in England.

The Germans may well hope that a raid, aimed
at the chiefly “ left-wing ” East End of London
and carriedfout while the Government is ruled by
a very “ right-wing ” Government, may cause a
serious split and lead to la rge- scale fighting or
rioting. The A.R.P. instructions seem to envisage
some time for preparations after war has begun,
and completely disregard the political dangers — a
subject to which we must return later. There is a
kind of picnic atmosphere about our precautions,
a reliance on our genius for “ muddling through
This worked well enough in the age of horses, but
will not necessarily save us in the new mechanical
world which is so much less suited to our national
“ tempo ” and characteristics.

We were very lucky in 1914. The country may
never be so united as it wasTunder the middle -class
Lib eral Asquith. It is ce r tainly not united to-day.
The suspicion aroused by the attempt to form a
wealthy one-party Government in 1931 has been
immensely increased by the lamentable deceptions
and evasions necessitated by our foreign policy since
1935. The Abyssinian and Spanish affairs have

124 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

in his house, keeping his children with him. He
is to make a room gas-proof, turn on the wireless,
and wait quietly until the storm is over. If he is a
person of independent means, he is to take himself,
and his pets, to the country, presumably in his
car. One detects at once a certain middle-class
bias, a feeling that “ an Englishman’s home is his
castle ”, and an outlook engendered by living in
detached, or semi-detached houses, or in London
mansions well shored up and separated by thick
walls. For those so situated the advice is not
inept, though if you have a garden it is still better to
make a crooked trench and sit in it, with or without
the wireless.

Unfortunately it is Shoreditch rather than Surbiton
which is likely to be raided, and East Woolwich
rather than West Kensington that may be blown up.
From the strategic and political standpoint there
is much to be said for assuring people that if they
sit at home and take a few elementary precautions
they will probably be safe. The chance of being
killed or injured in an air raid is comparatively
small, and most normal persons get to look at raids
in that light. An air raid which killed and injured
70,000 p eople in Lo ndon would be out of al l pro-
porti on to anything which has happened up to the
present. It would mean dropping 4 thousand tons
of bombs, by no means an impossible feat, but
perhaps as much as may be expected in a single
raid. The chance of any ^particula r Londoner
being amongst the first 70,000 is only one in a hun-
dred, a chance which a healthy-minded person

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

125

would not take too seriously unless it was going to
be repeated several times. It is therefore good

tactics to tell people that they shou ld stay at home,
seal up their windows, or retire in to the cellars
rather than go on to the streets and discuss the

rather than go o n to th e streets and discuss the
situation with their neighbours.^ But it is dishonest
to make people believe that the precautions have
much to do with their chance of escaping injury or

neattb f FoYifJtr ti*(AS.

It is difficult for anyone who has seen the condition

of a bombed industrial area to take the protection
of individual houses very seriously. The high-
explosive bombs s hatter and crack all except the
first-clas s steel-fr amed buildings within a consider-
able! area. Yet th e A.R.P. instructions seem to
envisage a very mod est use of high explosives, but
give much attention to gas bombs, and the small
thermite grenade which has not been a great success
in Spain. The Spanish Government at first took
something of the same line. They were dealing
with a people at least as individualistic as the

English. Painstaking officials busied themselves
with handbooks and posters about gas precautions,
and where to stand in your house when it was being
bombed. It is doubtful if carrying out these
instructions to the letter would have made a
difference of more than one or two per cent to the
casualt ies. XAs to cellars, these were often sheer
death traps ; the effect of a “ delayed-action ” bomb
is to bring the whole building, except the outside
walls, down on the cellar, thus threatening a
peculiarly horrible death, unless a very powerful man

126 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

with a pick-axe could hack his way out before being
suffocated.

It is a little difficult to understand the A.R.P.

“emphasis on gas precau tions. The use of gas is,
of cour se , forbidden in sundry conventions, and its
employment against non-combatants was considered,
up till 1934, as sheer barbarity. During the
Ethiopian war, when our policy was to hasten the
end of Abyssinian resistance, and rehabilitate Italy
as a civilized power, our Government was at special
pains to minimize or deny the Italian use of gas. 1
It is curious to find that, although it has not been
used in Spain, either in battle or against civilians,
it should loom so large in A.R.P., and that a Govern-
ment with so many prominent supporters who are
strongly pro-German should assume that the
Germans will begin to use gas from the first in its
most indefensible manner — against women and
children.

We may, however, be right in considering that
the Germans will not refrain from any weapon in
order to bring the war to a speedy close. A long
war would ruin them, even if they won, and they
probably hope to force an immediate conclusion
either in France or England — as they had thought
to do in Spain — by a mixture of frightfulness and
the encouragement of internal dissensions. Whether
or not they use gas is likely to be a pu re ly p ractical^
"question— whether gas bombs would do as mu ch
damag e as equal wei ghts of other b ombs, zf)

x Lord Halifax denied any knowledge of its use though it had
been reported by American and British Red Cross, and the
Italians had declared its passage through the Suez Canal.

127

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

Probably gas will only be a secondary factor in
the early raids, and above all in that first unheralded
raid on which so much will depend. An army
with complete control of the air, fighting against
virtually unarmed troops — as the Italians in Ethiopia
— can fly their aeroplanes at whatever level they like,
and spray gas or drop gas bombs where they will.
In this way it is effective for protecting the flanks
of armies, or dispersing groups of soldiers, or
destroying non-combatants behind the lines. But
dropping gas bombs from a great height, scattered
over an urban area, is a “ hit-or-miss ” method.
On a w arm d ay the gas r ises rapidly and may do
little harm . 1

The little evidence which we have suggests that
weight for we ight the gas bomb inflicts little or no
m ore casualt ies th an high explosives dropped in
bad ly built and congested areas. The material
damage done by gas is obviously negligible com -
p ared with heavy explosive bo mbs . 2 The weather
conditions are of no importance in connection with
high explosives, and it is doubtful whether Herr
Hitler will be able to choose his day for the first
mass attack with an eye solely to the weather. If
gas is used, it will be chiefly for its moral effect — for
this mustard gas is^ also useful — and as an additional

1 In 1928 some eleven tons of phosge ne exploded in Hamburg.
Al thou gh it was entirely unforeseen it only caused eleven deaths
and a few hundred casualties. It w as a warm day, and although
most windows were open tfie gas rose~

2 Gas bombs are far cheaper, weight for weight, than high
explosive bombs, but the economic factor is not important with
Fascist Powers.

128 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

“ frightfulness ” subsidiary to the real bombing
and destruction of a large congested working-class
area. Combined with high explosives on a cold,
still, foggy day, the gas bombs would certainly add
to any tendency to panic, and would increase
enormously the difficulties of salvage work.

For t his reason gas masks are an essential feature
^ of mod em life in Fa scist-dominated Europe, but the
real questions which should be agitating English
minds is the probable effect of a mass attack on
east London, on the Euston to King’s Cross railway
termini, and, for a day raid, on the City and
east central area. It will be made regardless of
expense. In Spain both Italians and Germans
have been very cautious. Some of the Germans
who crashed had written instructions not to risk
their experimental machines. To be killed raiding
Valencia would be something of an anticlimax,
but “ bomb London and die ” would appeal to
the heart of any young Nazi. We must also expect
some of the pilots to go on and use machine-guns
on the great arterial roads, or bomb the western
and southern railway stations and lines, though
this probably means certain death.

England, unfortunately, has not woken up to the
fact that the world has gone savage. Carefully
screened by their Government and their Press from
the real course of events abroad, most Englishmen
are still living in a completely false sense of security.
Once war has begun the veneer of civilization
disappears very rapidly, but the great danger is
that the war will be lost in the first few days. All

PROTECTION IN DANGEROUS AREAS 129

the fiddling methods of A.R.P. house protection can
be dismissed as irrelevant. There are two ways of
meeting the danger of mass attack by high -explosi ve
bombs — combined or not with ot her forms of
incendiary and gas— aimed again st po pul ation
centres by pilots who do not mind taking an even
chance of being killed. These two ways are either
protecting part of your population in situ by getting
it safely underground, or by dispersing most of your
p opulation ov er the countryside, before the raids
begin. A com bi nation of b oth is essential, and
will be considered in the next two chapters.

rerft s" i a/

f CHAPTER II v

'il/ZCTfK- CoNdrfT \ )

PROTECTION IN DANGEROUS AREAS

If the general premises in the last chapter are
correct, we may expect German raiders to concen-
trate their attacks on certain industrial areas, which
will, for the most part, contain badly built workmen’s
houses surrounding factories. They may also aim
at some closely tenanted office areas, if they come
over London during the daytime. They are
likely to make high explosives the basis of their
bombardment, though they may use incendiary and
gas bombs simultaneously, or after a short interval.
All experience suggests that, except with very
modern buildings of the concrete-and-steel -frame

130 THEoAIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

type, the bulk of the casualties will come from falling
houses and masonry.

There would be no great difficulty in scheduling
some areas as extremely dangerous, and round
them zones in which the danger would gradually
decrease. Over most of England the likelihood of
being bombed is, of course, infinitesimal. In spite
of this, careful preparations are being made in
remote villages, preparations far more effective
than in parts which ought to be considered as
natural targets. This probably does little harm,
when it is only a question of drilling the inhabitants
of Clovelly, but it helps to give a sense of unreality
about the business. The first and real duty of
villages is to consider how many refugees they can
take.

The danger areas only cover a small part of the
map, but they include the houses of a considerable
proportion of our population. Two general policies
suggest themselves — evacuation, which will be con-
sidered in the next chapter, and shelters in the area
itself. The making of the houses' t hemselves safe
from air atta ck is , of course, impossible . No amount
oT structura l alteration of a n ordinary brick
"building can mak e much difference t^the effect of
high explosives, “and th^reparation ot ^gas-proof
roomsT ” ~of the shoring -up of cellars is equivalent
to advising people to stay in their houses in the hope
that the commonest form of bomb will not drop
anywhere near Them. House protection means very
Tittle except in the comparatively well-to-do parts

ofTEeTgreat cities, in suburbia, or in the new council

trVov* %m re^ ? L t€% » / M '

* *

134 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

? >. VV . *

system much of which is deep enough to be perfectly
safe against the heaviest bomb. It is possible that
the%ltimate solution lies in the really deep shelter,
using our great knowledge and experience in mining.
It has been pointed out by Mr. Wintringham that
it only costs a few shillings to get a ton of coal out
and to the surface of the earth, yet that provides
standing-room for a person. The argument is not
quite as simple as all that. The chief expense in
all mining operations is the sinking of shafts, and
not the tunnelling. P eople ha ve got to be got under
cover in a hurry, but the London tubes, with their
“well-known stations, could "be used, and the refuge
area at the tube level or less could be immensely
increased . 1

y The question has been considered, and it is one
of the many points upon which the A.R.P. authorities
do not seem to have made up their minds. It was
first announced that tubes would not be used, but
subsequently that the position would be reconsidered.
If it was known that electricity would be cut off
from the rails at the sounding of the warning sirens,
the tubes could undoubtedly accommodate large
numbers during a succession of raids. The weakest
points about the “ tubes ” as refuges are their
narrow entrances, designed for checking tickets
rather than for rapid transit, and the very limited
area which they serve. If we mark off* London
into zones of greatest danger, only a small part of
the population threatened is in reach of the deeper

1 Durin g the last w ar about 100.000 people were accustomed
t o make for the tubes, and remain there durihg'atrraids.

164

THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

The political question did not arise. There was
a clear alignment against Germany, and the pro-
German elements in the population kept very quiet
until the crisis was over. A mere alarm provides
no evidence on this point. Political troubles, if they
were to occur, would be consequent on heavy
destruction and loss of life, and to the discovery of
inefficiency and class bias in the arrangements.

Our stock-taking, then, after the crisis is not
reassuring. The voluntary system works fairly well
in regard to the evacuation of children, because of
the attitude of English parents and the high quality
of our professional teachers. It fails badly in the
provision of salvage services. Our transport system
is still untested, but it showed signs of breaking down
under the mild strain to which it was subjected. We
are left equally uncertain as to the effect of a bom-
bardment upon the nerves of the town populations.
They took the preliminaries of a war without much
concern, and the mass hysteria which afflicted the
House of Commons, on September 28 th, did not
communicate itself to the people generally. There
was something of a rush amongst the comfortable
classes to get themselves and their families out of
London, but this had no special repercussions,
though it would have added greatly to the difficulties
of the real evacuation by road and rail if it had
actually been carried out. On the whole it would
seem that, even after the tightenlng- up itid uced by
" a serious crisis, our Air Raid Precautions still remain

H opelessly amateur and incomplete, and are still
adve rsel y affected by a bias towards the s afety and
well-being of the wealthier rather than the poorer

inhabitants of London.

fit irC^ f ' « V y p> X

Part III

BRITAIN’S AIR STRENGTH

Lt.-Commdr. R. FLETCHER, M.P.

CHAPTER I

OUR NEEDS IN AIR DEFENCE

For centuries Great Britain has been able to play
a major part in European History, to engage in
Europe’s major wars and to win through. So long
as the Navy held command of the seas, our island
went untouched by an invader.

The coming of the air weapon has changed all
that. Either we must succeed in organizing inter-
national law to such an extent that air forces can
be dissolved, leaving order to be maintained by an
International Air Police Force or, if we wish to
retain immunity from attack and destruction, we
must, with our friends, control the air above
our island as we have controlled the seas around it.

This country is peculiarly vulnerable from the
air. It is a small island; its vitally important
industrial and administrative centres concentrated
in a few areas, and its capital, and nearly a quarter
of the population, lying close to the Continent,
clearly marked by the Thames running through its
centre.

The air forces employed on a limited scale in

166 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

Spain, Abyssinia and China have sufficed to show
the devastating effect of high explosive used in air
attacks. To inflict damage on London, Birmingham,
Manchester, Newcastle, so serious as to render us
helpless, for some time at least, is a task well within
the compass of an Air Force of the size possessed
by any great Power of to-day, unless confronted
by an effective defence.

Effective defence includes anti-aircraft artillery,
balloon barrages, and A.R.P., as well as fighter
aircraft ; but our main defence from air attack must
remain the strength of our own Air Force to oppose
raiding squadrons sent against us and to answer raid
with raid.

We can only measure the strength and adequacy
of our Air Force in the same way as we have always
measured the strength of our Navy; by comparing
it with the Forces it may have to meet. It is difficult
to ascertain the effective strength of any country’s air
force. Figures and facts are kept secret ; and, out of
such as are published, we have to sift the figures of
“ first-line ” strength, of immediately available
reserve machines, of other reserves, and of training
and civil aircraft; as well as numbers of trained
pilots, state of equipment, preparedness, etc. etc.

We are only concerned with machines here in
which connection the most reliable figures to which
I can refer you are those recently published in the
News Chronicle in an article by Pierre Cot, who, as
Air Minister in the French Popular Front Govern-
ment, would have Intelligence figures at his disposal.
M. Cot says that the front-line air strength of the
European Powers is as follows :

OUR NEEDS IN AIR DEFENCE 167

Russia , . . . 4,000 Gt. Britain . . 2,000

'' Germany . . . . 3,500 Italy . . . . 2,000

France . . ' . . 2,500 Poland . . . . 550

Czechoslovakia 550

Behind these first -line machines each country has
a reserve of immediately available machines,
largest, probably, in the case of the dictatorship
Powers, which began rearming earliest. Germany
and Russia, for instance, may well dispose of
reserves of over 50 per cent of their first -line figures.
Italy may not be so well found but she is in a better
position than France or ourselves, whose air
rearmament has been later and slower. The air
armaments of the Great Powers, first line and
effective reserve machines inclusive, may be estimated
as follows :

Russia 6,200 to 6,500

Germany 5,200 to 5,500

Italy . . 2,300 to 2,600

France 2,200 to 2,500

Gt. Britain . . . . 2,300 to 2,600

It must, however, be noted that much of the British
force is spread out along our Imperial lines of com-
munications, and we cannot rely on more than about
1,900 or 2,100 machines for Home Defence or what
is sometimes called the Metropolitan Air Force.

The available data are so unreliable that I should
not like to guess at the production, actual and
potential, of any other Powers than this country,
Germany and possibly France. But I should say
that by the time this book is published, Germany
will have an actual production of almost 600

168 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

machines a month, this country about 400, and
France less than 300.

These figures, if approximately correct and
which I have put down only after careful sifting
of evidence, reveal a very serious situation for this
country — remember we are only 250-300 miles
from the Rhine, which Lord Baldwin called “ our
frontier ”.

An essential fact to bear in mind when considering
questions of aircraft production and air rearma-
ment is that we must expect a 50 per cent wastage
of first-line strength per month, in actual warfare,
as a very minimum. Some experts say it will be
nearer 100 per cent. Our production potential
per month then must be not less than half of our
front-line strength for war machines only. There
are trainer and other aircraft needed as well.

We cannot comfortably face the world with less
than an equal strength in first-line aircraft — “ parity”
as it is called — with any Power within striking
distance of our shores. To achieve and mairitain
such parity was the aim of Lord Baldwin’s Govern-
ment. Looking at the figures I have set out above,
you will realize at once that we need a first-line
strength of not less than 3,000 planes now , in our
Home Defence Force ; and, since other Powers will
be carrying on whilst we are making a supreme
effort to catch up, we cannot contemplate, under
present conditions, attaining parity short of the
5,000 front-line strength mark. The potential pro-
duction we have to aim at is, therefore, not less than
2,000-2,500 monthly, or over 25,000 aircraft a year.

That is, I believe, roughly the arithmetic, and the

OUR NEEDS IN AIR DEFENCE

169

logic, which inspired the Sunday Times to say that
the aim of Sir Kingsley Wood’s recently reformed
Air Ministry, is a potential production of 25,000
per annum, to be reached in two years, and an actual
production of half that, which will be needed to reach
parity and maintain it.

Note that this means two and a half times our
present actual and at least five times our present
potential production. 1

Of course, the figures I have used are necessarily
approximate since I have no Intelligence Service to
give me precise information ; but I am satisfied that
they are sufficiently accurate for our purposes here
and they illustrate the magnitude of the task and
the urgency of the race to achieve security in the air.

From 1931 onwards there were repeated
Government warnings that failure to achieve a
measure of general disarmament would necessitate
an expansion of our defences. No effective plans
had, however, been prepared for such an expansion,
and when expansion became a necessity the Air

1 General Veuillemin’s Report to the French Government on
his recent visit to the German Air Force was as follows ; “ that
Germany had a production of 800 machines per month ; a poten-
tial production of 2,000 per month; was concentrating, since
July, on the production of four types; a new Dornier heavy
bomber, powered by four Daimler Benz 1,100 h.p. engines, with
a bomb load of about 2 tons (nearly 4,500 lb.) and a speed of
350 m.p.h. ; a medium bomber of less formidable performance
but greater range ; a single-seat fixed-gun fighter, the new Mes-
serscmidt 98, capable of well over 400 m.p.h. and mounting a
cannon as well as machine guns, and a new heavy fighter (two-
seat) of the type advocated earlier in this book, with a speed of
over 360 miles per hour and mounting two swivelling cannon in
addition to machine guns. Production of the older types has
been stopped and is now concentrated on these four very formid-
able types, the first and last of which, I should say, are in advance
of anything we have. This information serves to underline the
danger in which we are, so long as international tension
continues.**

170 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

Ministry was found to be with no list of require-
ments prepared ; there was no emergency programme
on paper covering aircraft, equipment, armament,
etc. Nor was there in existence any survey of our
industrial resources for meeting an expansion pro-
gramme. The Air Ministry should have known
what it wanted and how to get it. It knew neither.

Nor was our small existing Air Force up to date
or efficient as regards materiel. We had not even
a first-rate, if small, nucleus from which to expand,
in spite of millions spent on research at Farnborough
and elsewhere. Certain aircraft firms had enjoyed
a monoply of orders without any corresponding
obligation to keep up to date technically and in
design. The Royal Air Force was equipped with
obsolescent types; no designs for modem types or
plans to produce them existed. When expansion
was decided upon in grim earnest this country was
anything up to seven years behind the latest practice
as regards monoplane design, stressed skin con-
struction, blind-flying instruments, variable pitch
propellers, the retractable undercarriage, etc. etc.
Ideas adopted from other countries were hastily
incorporated in designs, and aircraft were, it was
stated, ordered off the drawing board without any
prototype being built. It was in this way we are
told that we got the Fairey Battle. There being no
prototype, resulted in many and various modifica-
tions, each entailing some delay in production. The
first orders given for the Battle were for a design
which provided no accommodation for the navigator.

In a word, expansion caught the Air Ministry
napping, and the attempt to expand, side by side

OUR NEEDS IN AIR DEFENCE 171 .

with getting up to date technically, resulted in con-
fusion and muddle so that no expansion programme
— and they succeeded each other rapidly — was ever
punctually or completely carried out. Here is the
brief history of them.

In 1934 the Government announced an expansion
programme providing for 1,304 first-line aircraft by
July 1939.

In May 1935, Mr. Baldwin announced that he
had been misled about German air strength, that
she had already achieved parity in first-fine strength,
and had outstripped us .as regards production
potential. Thereafter the 1934 expansion pro-
gramme was amended to produce 1,500 first-line
aircraft by March 1937.

The Abyssinian crisis resulted in another amend-
ment of the programme in February 1936, to provide
for the Air Force being equipped with 1,750 com-
pletely new machines by March 1939. This was an
admission that the Air Force was largely equipped
with out-of-date aircraft.

The programme was amended for the fourth time
in May 1938 to provide 2,370 first-line aircraft by
March 1940. Germany already has some 1,000
more front-line machines than this !

(N.B. — These figures all apply to what is called
the Metropolitan Air Force, i.e., Home Defence.)

The failure to fulfil the first three programmes
should be considered in the fight of the following
pledge, the “ parity pledge ”, given by Lord Baldwin
when Prime Minister:

“ Any Government of this country — a National

172 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

Government more than any — and this Govern-
ment — will see to it that in air strength and in air
power this country shall no longer be in a position
inferior to any country within striking distance
of our shores.”

(Mr. Baldwin, H. of C., March 8th, 1934.)

Lord Baldwin’s second thoughts followed over a
year later :

“ It is always difficult to know what parity is
or from what angle it is envisaged . . . for our
purpose,, for the parity of the three nations , we have
taken a figure of round about 1,500 first-line
aircraft”

(Mr. Baldwin, H. of C., May 22nd, 1935.)

N . ' The italics are mine and the passage so
emphasized establishes the failure of the Govern-
ment to appreciate or to plan for the situation
confronting them.

It will be convenient, in view of what follows, to
amplify here the expression “ ordering off the
drawing board Prototype, i.e. trial, machines
used to be produced rather slowly and were first
tested at Martlesham before being sent to various
squadrons which reported on them.

At one period of the expansion schemes the Air
Ministry announced that as an emergency measure
construction of prototypes had been temporarily
abandoned and that machines were being ordered
“ off the drawing board ”.

Now that production shows signs of improving,

214

THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN j

into the air. When production does begin the
aircraft delivered will b e obsolescent .

The' posi tion can b e summarized as follows:
tEe~Air Ministry’s policy of restricted monopoly is
Eampenng^ the development ^ofastrmg^ healthy Air-
craft Industry. In consequence the production
“potential of the Industry is neither being fully
developed nor utilized.

With the best will in the world, the privileged

firms cannot give the country the aircraft production

needed'

The monopoly policy has resulted in stagnation in
design and equipment and a lag in technical ability.
To meet the urgent need of an increase in production
potential, the Shadow Factory scheme has been
devised to buttress up a faulty system instead of
scrapping it, as should have been done. Meanwhile
capable firms outside the Ring are not allowed to
pull theiFweight and are excluded from the Supplies
C ommittee a nd lndustrial Pane l on which the Ring
firms are represented. Nor will t he Government
agree to creat^aldmistry of Supply to clear up the
muddIe, Te-org anize the system and get production
going on a scale w hich will give us numerical parity,
at leas t, with Germany. Side by side with this
^melancholy record o f inefficiency we find Air Ministry^
officials retirin g to become directors of Approved
Firms, a jractice^wKich, in the circumstances, is to
. be deepl y deplored.

What are the results of all this? We have
Hurricanes and Spitfires designed 1934 and flown at
""TEe Air Reviewl^^ be making and

LABOUR AND THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 215

using these in 1940 ., \ We have a Shadow Scheme

four years ago which h as just produced
its fi r st aircra ft! We have a “ R ing ” industry, a
sub-contracting system, a Shadow industry, and
now a "Nuffield factory. The whole thing is a
muddle.

I turn to the third partner in Aircraft production —
organized labour.

CHAPTER VIII

LABOUR AND THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

It is idle to talk of a shortage of skilled labour
eSstmg while the production potential of the aircraft
industry is not, for the reasons set forth above,
bein g anythin g like fully utilize^ It will be time
for such talk when the Air Ministry and the aircraft
industry have so organized production as to ensure
the fullest results from the skilled labour available.
Many instances can be adduced of aircraft firms
not working to capacity and paying off men, and of
Unions connected with the industry paying large
sums in unemployment benefit to their members.

The Trade Unions concerned are :

National Council of Aircraft Workers.

Vehicle Builders.

Ship Constructors and Shipwrights.

216 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

Boilermakers.

Woodworkers.

Plumbers.

Foundry Workers.

Coppersmiths.

Woodcutting Machinists.

Brass and Metal Mechanics.

Patternmakers.

Musical Instrument Workers.

Amalgamated Engineering Union.

No approach was made by the Government to
these Unions until March 1938, although the
Government White Paper of February 1936
mentioned the matter.

The Amalgamated Engineering Union in its
journal of May 1938 complains that it:

“ has been placed in a false position. It has
been made to appear that we are obstructive on
the question of available skilled labour. The
contrary is the fact. The available resources of
skilled labour are not being properly utilized.
There is unemployment among our neighbours.
It increased last month by 669. There are thou-
sands of skilled craftsmen on short time in the
railway engineering shops whose services could
be utilized if production was properly planned.
It is creating difficulties to put to the Union in
such circumstances proposals for the dilution of
skilled labour. There is maldistribution as
between one part of the country and another and

LABOUR AND THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 217

as between engineering establishments. The plant
and equipment of the engineering industry are
not being fully utilized in priority of armaments
production, and still no inconsiderable part of
the products of the armament industry continue
to be shipped overseas. These are some, but not
all, of the considerations which determine the
attitude of the Union towards the Government’s
request for co-operation. The Union’s insistence
on them does not betoken a refusal to help re-
armament. By insisting on these aspects the
Union is discharging a national service.”

Labour complains that with skilled la bo ur avail-
able at U nion" rates and on Union conditions
enployers ha ve repeatedly trie cT To introduce
unskilled and semi-skilled men at lower rates.
Inevitably strikes and stoppages h ave followed.
The Unions cannot in justice to their members make
concessions regarding wage rates, dilution, hours,
conditions, if employers attempt to dilute skilled
labour while skilled men are unemployed, to
introduce non-Union labour and to lower conditions
of labour.

There being a shortage of skilled technical men in
the industry contractors endeavour to attract such
men away from other firms or from the firm whose
type they have been given a contract to construct.
Nor do men so recruited settle down easily into a
good team while the Aircraft Industry has little to
show in the way of scientific management of labour.
Skilled labour is an all important factor in aircraft

CONCLUSION

223

would be required to hold two months’ stocks of
all materials, etc., and to prepare a standardized
system of storekeeping. On going into war-time
production the parent firm of a group would cease
production in detail and become the control of the
group, sending selected men to the subsidiary firms
with knowledge of the production of the component
allocated to that firm, and issuing jigs, tools, tem-
plates and materials as necessary, for the work
issued to each firm.

Such an organization would enable a chain of
planned production to function without delay and
to a determined time-table and volume of production.

CONCLUSION

Space does not permit me to point the morals of
the facts and figures I have set down. Let me say
that those facts and figures are given in all good
faith and I have endeavoured in every way to have
them verified and checked.

To my mind they tell a story of incompetence,
waste, inefficienc y and muddle, for which the Prime
Ministers concerned bear, of course, the respon-
~ sibifit^ wLile the blame must be divided between
successive Air Ministers and the personnel of the
Air Ministry.

Worst of al l, sel f-seeking and profit-seeking have
been put before~natIonal interests.

224 THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

I will not enlarge upon this theme because I am
reading my proofs while the Czechoslovak crisis is
at its height and it is no moment for recrimination.
I prefer to say only that Sir Kingsley Wood is, for
what my opinion is worth, an able and devoted
public servant with a first-rate record as an
administrator.

I wish him, and the team he has gathered round
him, every success. They can do with everyone’s
good wishes, for in the words of our American
cousins, they have quite an assignment.

It is written of Nelson, that he once went into
action exclaiming “ victory or Westminster Abbey ”.
The House of Lords having now become a refuge for
our melancholy succession of unsuccessful Air
Ministers, Sir Kingsley may be grimly reflecting while
he works, that it is “ parity or a peerage ” for him.

SPECIALS

Penguin and Pelican Specials are books of topical importance published
within as short a time as possible from the receipt of the manuscript.
Some are reprints of famous books brought up-to-date, but usually

they are entirely new books published for the first time.

Previously

published

r GERMANY PUTS THE CLOCK BACK

Edgar Mowrer

MUSSOLINI’S ROMAN EMPIRE G. T. Carratt ★
- BLACKMAIL OR WAR Mme. Tabouis ★

SEARCHLIGHT ON SPAIN The Duchess of Athol I ★
BALLET Arnold Haskell *

l MODERN GERMAN ART Peter Thoene ★

Sept. 1938

EUROPE AND THE CZECHS S. Grant Duff *
THE MORTAL STORM Phyllis Bottome (Fiction)

October

1938

★ a new book

r THE AIR DEFENCE OF BRITAIN

Charlton , Garratt, Fletcher ★
THE JEWISH PROBLEM Louis Golding ★

LITERARY TASTE Arnold Bennett
I Revised by Frank Swinnerton

BLUE ANGELS AND WHALES Robert Gibbings ★
WARNING FROM THE WEST INDIES

W. M. Macmillan

THE PRESS Wickham Steed ★

k THE GREAT ILLUSION — NOW Norman Angell

Home Office and
Scottish Home and
Health Department

Home Office

Scottish Home and Health Department

First published 1956 EXTRAC T S

Third Edition 1974
Fourth Impression 1980

Nuclear Weapons

Preface

1 . Information obtained from the study of the results of British and
American trials of nuclear weapons of different types and power has
rendered obsolete some of the information in the Manual of Civil
Defence Vol I Pamphlet No I “Nuclear Weapons”. This booklet
reviews the effects of nuclear detonations in the light of this infor-
mation and also presents the latest considerations on the control of
radiological exposure. Chapter 10 on ‘Hazards to Food, Water,
Crops and Livestock’ similarly incorporates current knowledge. The
booklet is intended primarily for use by persons who are involved in
home defence planning, but it may be of interest to others.

2. The booklet describes a wide range of nuclear weapon effects. In
cross references in the text the first number denotes the chapter and
the second the number of the paragraph in that chapter.

Contents

Chapter Page

1 General Features of Nuclear Weapons 1

2 Biological Effects of Nuclear Radiations 10

3 Detection and Measurement of the Effects of

Nuclear Explosions 16

4 Effects of Initial Nuclear Radiations 19

5 Effects of Thermal Radiation 23

6 Crater Formation and Ground Shock 28

7 Effects of Damage from Air Blast 30

8 Effects of Residual Radiation from Fallout 36

9 Protection against Gamma Radiation from Fallout 44

10 Hazards to Food, Water, Crops and Livestock 57

Appendix I Atoms and the Structure of Matter:

Some Definitions 64

Appendix II Scaling Laws 69

1.10 The more familiar units of energy (eg the kilowatt hour) are too
small to express the vast quantities of energy released in the detona-
tion of a nuclear bomb. Two units are commonly used; the kiloton
(KT) unit equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT, and the megaton (MT)
unit equivalent to the energy released by the detonation of 1,000,000
tons of TNT.

1.14 The temperature of the air in northern temperate latitudes falls
gradually with increasing altitude and, at a height of about 35,000 to
40,000 ft, there is a region called the tropopause where it remains
constant at about — 60°C: above this is the stratosphere. The cloud
produced by the detonation of a KT weapon, if it does reach the
tropopause, will not penetrate far but will flatten out into the well-
known mushroom shape.

1.26 To counter attacks from IRBMs and ICBMs within the time
available between launching and impact, it is necessary to detect the
weapon, to compute its ballistic path and to fire and detonate as far
away as possible from the target a defensive missile which is close
enough to its path to destroy it.

Water bursts

1.19 Detonations in shallow water or at such a height that the fireball
touches the water surface are termed ‘water bursts’. Large quantities
of water and, in shallow water, bottom mud will be carried up into
the fireball. When the vaporised water in the cloud reaches a high
altitude it will condense to rain and bring down with it radioactive
fission products, some of which may be gelatinous or dissolved in the
rain drops. The fallout pattern on neighbouring land will be less
extensive in area but more intensely radioactive than from a ground
burst. Wet fallout may be also more difficult to remove, especially
from rough or retentive surfaces, than the relatively dry particles
which occur in fallout from a ground burst.

1.20 A nuclear weapon may burst Un deep water and, apart from the
absence of mud, the effects will be similar to those from a surface
burst except that a larger amount of the total energy released will be
expended in vaporising water, in producing a shock wave through
the water and in forming surface waves. Most of the fission products
will be trapped in the water near the burst and will diffuse and dis-
perse rapidly.

Air bursts

1.21 An air burst is one in which the weapon is detonated so that the
fireball is well clear of the surface beneath it. There will be very few
dust particles to which the vaporised fission products can adhere
and they will therefore condense to minute particles with such a low
speed of fall that they will have been dispersed far and wide by the
winds before they reach the ground. No significant fallout hazard will
occur from this type of burst except perhaps to the extent that heavy
rainfall may carry down some of the fission products from the lower
parts of the cloud before it disperses.

1 .22 The height and the power of an air burst determine the extent
of blast damage at the surface and this in turn depends upon the type
of terrain. For a 20 KT weapon the optimum height to produce the
heaviest blast damage in residential areas in the United Kingdom is
about 1,000 ft: this may be compared with 600 ft, the maximum
height for a contaminating burst (see paragraph 1.15 and Table 1).
The corresponding figures for a 10 MT weapon are 1.5 miles and 1.36
miles : even these small differences between the optimum heights for
damage and contamination become insignificant for weapons of 20
MT and above.

Plate 1 The Fireball

7.2 Initially, the pressure wave is transmitted at a speed considerably
greater than that of sound (which is about 1,100 ft per second) but it
gradually slows down to this speed. Its speed also depends upon the
temperature of the air through which it is transmitted and this factor
gives rise to the shock wave. When the front part of the wave reaches
a particular point, the air at that point is compressed and heated and
the rear portion of the wave is able to move faster through the hot air.
Eventually it catches up with the front part. The wave front then
becomes steeper and almost vertical as illustrated in Figure 1 .

PRESSURE

(Ib./sq. in.)

(a)

►

Figure 1 Simplified representation of development of shock front

Any obstacle in its path would experience a sharp blow due to the very sudden
rise from atmospheric pressure to the peak pressure of the wave front.

7.3 Shock waves can be reflected from surfaces. When this happens
the peak pressure on the surface of the obstacle may be increased by
a factor between 2 and 8 depending upon the strength of the original
shock wave.

The 'cube root' law (of weapon power)

1.35 The power of a nuclear weapon is defined as the total energy

released in detonation. Thus, a 10 MT bomb is 500 times as powerful
as a 20 KT bomb and so liberates 500 times as much energy in each of
the forms of radiation, blast and fission products. Now the cube root
of 500 500) is nearly 8 and it has been found that the two weapons

produce the same peak pressure (blast intensity) at distances from
ground zero which differ by a factor of 8. In other words, the peak
pressure at, say, 1 mile from the 20 KT detonation will be the same as
the peak pressure, at 1 x ^500 or 8 miles from the 10 MT detonation.
Similarly a 1 MT weapon, which is 1 ,000 times as powerful as a 1 KT
weapon will give the same peak pressure at a distance from GZ
which is 1 ,000 or 10 times greater.

1.36 The structural damage caused at any point by a nuclear detona-
tion is determined largely by the maximum shock pressure at the
point in question, but the duration of the shock wave is also signific-
ant in the case of larger buildings.

7.9 In buildings with a greater percentage of openings, equalisation
of pressure will occur fairly quickly and, because of reflections, the
pressure inside may build up until it exceeds the external pressure.
This may lead to the building exploding outwards, since buildings
are not normally designed to withstand abnormal internal pressures.
This explosion effect, which is common in hurricanes and has been
observed in atomic tests, could be typical in British houses at the
limiting distances for total destruction (Plates 2 to 6).

Table 9 Average ranges of blast damage to typical British houses and blockage of
streets. Ground burst nuclear weapons: ranges in miles

Weapon power 20 KT

100 KT

£ MT

1 MT

Damage ring ‘A’

Houses totally
destroyed, streets
impassable 0-g

1 1

0-|

0-1 i

Damage ring ‘B’

C fii

i-1 H-li

Houses irreparably
damaged, streets
blocked until cleared
with mechanical aids f-f

n- 2 i

Damage ring ‘C’ .

Houses severely to

■ 5 i

moderately dama-
ged : progress in
streets made difficult
by debris f-1 f

l-2f

lf-4i

2i-5i

Damage ring ‘D’

Houses lightly Q - rf /

damaged, streets
open but some

glass and tile debris If— 2^ 2f-4J 4£-7i 6-9

Plate 6 The end result (4)

The debris problem

7.16 It will be seen from Table 9 that the problem of access would be
a serious one in built-up areas. Even without the radiation hazard,
movement of vehicular traffic might be seriously restricted or halted
over wide areas until the debris is cleared. Wide streets, streets with
front gardens and routes radial to the point of burst are less likely
to be blocked to the same degree and might be given priority for
clearance.

7.17 Trees are very vulnerable to long duration blast and in many
cases fallen trees would block roads at a greater distance from ground
zero than any other type of debris. The estimated distances for
trees in leaf damaged by ground burst bombs are given in Table 12.

Table 12 Tree damage from ground burst nuclear weapons. ( Ranges in miles from
ground zero)

Weapon power

20 KT

100 KT

4 MT

1 MT

Trees

90% blown down

30% blown down

Branch damage

At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, because the bombs were air burst, there
was little fallout but the effects of initial radiation were felt (see also
paragraph 4.3).

Table 3 Distances ( in miles) of initial gamma effects on people exposed, in the
open, to a ground or air burst nuclear weapon

Weapon power 20 KT 100 KT 4 MT 1 MT

50 per cent survival

(450r) f 1 HU

Table 5 Range of heat effects on people in the open in a clear atmosphere: Radii
in miles for ground burst weapons

Weapon power 20 KT 100 KT 4 MT 1 MT

Charring of skin 12 4 5

Blistering of skin If 24 4| 6f

Reddening of skin If 3f 64 84

For an air burst, under exceptionally clear conditions, the distances could be
about 50 % greater.

Personal protection from thermal radiation

5J0 To Obtain protection from thermal yadiation7one has only t o
move out of the direct path ofThTrays from the fireball and any kind
of shade will suffice.

Fire protection and p r ecautions

5.12 Primary fires in buildings would result from heat flash through
windows and other openings igniting the contents. To reduce the
risk, inflammable items should be placed as far as possible out ot tne
direct path of any heatTays that~lnight enterthrough windows o r
other openings. If windows and skylights are whitewashed or painted
this would keep out about 80 per cent of the heat radiation.

5.1 3 Because buildin gs have a considerable shielding effect on one
another in a closely built u p a rea the windows of the u pper floo rs are
more important t han those lower down.

5.14 Blast damage, the scattering of domestic fires, the rupture of
gas pipes or short-circuiting of electrical wiring may start secondary
fires. Theriskjj f these fires woukLhc - xeducedb y extingui shing boi lers
and open-fires and by turning off gas and electricity at the mains.

5.16 In the l ast war fire storms were c aused in the old city of Ham-
burgas a result of heavy incen diary attac ks andatH^

Nagasaki. A close study of these fire storms and of German citiesin
which fire storms did not occur revealed several interesting features.
A fire storm occurred only in an area of several square miles, heavily
built-up with buildings containing plenty o f combustible material
and wh ere at least every other building in the area had been set alight
by incendi a ry attack. ’ ' =: “ ! ===== —

5.17 It is considered unlikely that an initial density of fires, equival-
ent to one in every other building, would be started by a nuclear
explosion over a British city; studies have shown that due to shielding
a much smaller proportion of buildings than this would be exposed
to heat flash. Moreover, the buildings in the centres of most British
cities are now of fire-resistant construction and more widely spaced
than 30-40 years ago. Fire storms after nuclear attack are therefore
unlikely in British cities but the possibility would be greatly reduced
by the control of small initial and secondary fires.

Table 23 Approximate protective factors in ground floor refuge rooms of typical
British housing with timber upper floors and with windows and external doors blocked

Types of housing

Protective

factor

Bungalow

5-10

Detached two-storey

Semi-detached two-storey 1 1 inch cavity walls

25-30

Semi-detached two-storey 13£ inch brick walls

Terraced two-storey

Terraced back-to-back

Blocks of flats and offices (see paragraph 9.1) Lower floors

50-500

second floor and above (decreasing)

50-20

9.20 The amount of fallout retained in the United Kingdom on a
clean dry roof with a slope of about 30° (about 1 in 2) or more would
be insignificant. If the roof were damp, most of the fallout would be
retained until it becomes dry. Rainfall, other than a very light
drizzle, would wash fallout off the roof. Consequently the protective
factors of prepared refuges in most British houses may be higher than
the values given in Table 23.

Table 13 Downwind Contamination. Areas of contours for reference dose-rates at
one hour after burst ( DRl's ) assuming 50 % fission yield for £ MT and larger
weapons and 100 % for KT weapons

Reference contour Areas in square miles for weapon power
dose-rate rph at one —

hour after burst
(DRl’s) in rph

20 KT

100 KT

£ MT

1 MT

3000

0.2

1.2

1000

1.3

6.4

300

200

300

100

450

900

250

1,100

2,000

200

1,000

2,250

4,500

8.18 The time between the first arrival of fallout and maximum
dose-rate may be anything between one quarter and 4 times that
between detonation and the first arrival of fallout : it may be several
hours after the maximum dose-rate is reached before fallout ceases.

Figure 4 Comparison of fallout prediction with test results °

UPWIND DISTANCE 8 MILES

Basements and trenches

9.21 A substantial increase in protection is obtained in cellars or
basements, or in trenches under the floor. For example a trench under
a detached two-storied house could give a PF of about 100 and a
basement of between 50 and 100, if all the floor was 5 feet below
ground level.

9.22 A properly constructed slit trench in the open with 3 feet of
earth cover would have a protective factor of 200 or more.

Protection afforded by vehicles

9.23 The protective factors of various types of road transport are
very low compared with buildings and would be about 1.5 or slightly
more depending upon the size and weight of the vehicle, the height of
the seating above ground and on the number of passengers. In
passenger trains the protective factor would be equally low, between
3 and 5 depending upon the amount of fallout retained on the coach
roof. In ships and boats away from land, protection would be signific-
antly greater owing to the sinking of particles of fallout in water.

_% J

dose

_ 3 /4 ^

dose

Figure 3 Total dose from fallout — contribution from different distances

Relation between the external radiation hazard and the
hazard from breathing or swallowing fallout particles

8.10 When fallout is coming down, or in an area already covered by
radioactive fallout, the gamma radiation hazard from the surround-
ings would be far greater than the hazard from any radioactive dust
which might be inhaled or swallowed.

3.4 About 200 isotopes, or different radioactive species, of the atoms
of about 35 elements are released in a nuclear fission detonation and
their half-lives vary from a fraction of a second to thousands of
years. The rate of decay of the mixed fission products is rapid at first
but it slows down in time as the shorter-lived isotopes disappear.

R t =R 1 .r 1 * 2 , where R x is the nominal dose-rate in rph at 1 hour
after burst and R t is the dose-rate at any later time t hours

Table 2

Time after burst

Dose-rate rph

1 hour

100

1 \ hours

7 hours

2 days (49 hours)

2 weeks

0.1

14 weeks

0.01

Entry of fission products into the human body

10.1 Over and above the main contact hazard described in paragraph
8.6 et seq , additional hazards to humans might arise from the
consumption of :

a. products derived from animals grazing contaminated pastures
or from fish caught in contaminated waters ;

b. growing crops superficially contaminated by fallout ;

c. superficially contaminated stored food or food in transit ;
and

d. contaminated water.

Radioactive strontium and iodine

2.17 In order to dispose of some of the myths surrounding radiation
hazards, mention is made here of Strontium 90 and related isotopes.
The radioactive strontium isotopes found among the fission products
of a nuclear detonation are Strontium 89 which has a half-life (see
paragraph 3.3) of about 51 days and Strontium 90 which has a
half-life of about 28 years. Both of these emit beta particles (see
paragraph 6, Appendix I) but no gamma radiation; some Sr90 may
accumulate and persist in growing bone for many years, but the
beta particles have a very short range and only affect the bone mar-
row, without reaching the germ cells. Radioactive strontium is
therefore not a genetic hazard; nor is radioactive iodine, which
tends to accumulate in the thyroid gland in the neck. The predomin-
ant form of radioactive iodine has a relatively short half-life of about
eight days and could be a hazard, primarily to infants and young
children with small thyroid glands.

Eggs, milk and fish

10.19 Eggs, derived from exposed but surviving animals, would not
contain enough radioactivity to present a serious ingestion hazard.
Most fission products are eliminated via the egg shells. Free-range
hens would obviously be at greater risk of dying than those kept
under cover. Thyroid damage from the consumption of eggs from
apparently healthy poultry can be discounted.

10.20 The main ingestion hazard in the immediate post-attack period
is presented by the consumption of milk and milk products, obtained
from dairy cattle which have grazed contaminated pastures. Owing
to the concentration of radioactive iodine in the animal thyroid and
its rapid transfer into the milk, the radioiodine level would reach a
maximum after about two to three days. The risk to children would
be avoided by the use for, say, three weeks of milk powder, milk
substitutes or milk from cows kept under cover and fed on uncon-
taminated fodder. Contaminated milk could be used to prepare
products such as cheese or butter, where normal storage prior to
consumption would allow the decay of the short-life iodine isotopes

Fallout on crops

10.16 Radioactive fallout will contaminate large areas of crops and
pasture.

Cereals— Wheat, barley etc. Fallout particles lodge mainly in the
outer part of the ear. The threshing process and rejection of the
husk fraction after milling would remove up to 90 per cent of the
original contamination. Qwfiu* £2 fcff oUfx lt(
Root crops — Potatoes, beet etc. The direct contamination hazard to
the root is negligible. Rejection of the contaminated tops, washing
and/or peeling of the root would give almost complete decontami-
nation.

Surface crops , open leaf—C abbage, lettuce etc. The rough leaf
and open structure of this class of vegetables could result in high
retention of fallout particles. These vegetables, which have a low
energy value, could be used after rejecting the outer leaves and
washing the remainder.

Surface crops , legumes — Peas, beans etc. The pod structure of
this class of vegetables provides a natural protective cover, and

pod removal ensures almost complete decontamination.

Hard fruits— Apples, pears etc. The acts of washing and peeling
provide almost 1 00 per cent decontamination .

Soft fruits — Plums, blackberries etc. This relatively minor source
of food would be difficult to decontaminate.

Greenhouse vegetables — Tomatoes, lettuce etc. Contamination
also occurs if the greenhouses are damaged. If the food inside is
salvageable, washing in the the case of tomatoes and outer leaf
removal and washing of the lettuce ensure adequate decontamina-
tion.

Table 28 Conversion of relevant British and non-Sl units to equivalent values in
SI units

1 micron (micrometre)

1 inch
1 foot
1 mile

1 square foot
1 square mile
1 foot per second
1 mile/h (mph)

1 gallon

1 lb force (0.4536 kg force)

1 lb per square inch (1 psi)

1 psf

1 calorie (Btu=252 cal.)

f one thousandth of 1 millimetre
\one millionth of 1 metre
25.4 millimetres
0.305 metres
1 .609 kilometres
0.093 square metres
2.59 square kilometres
0.3049 metres/sec
1 .609 kilometres/h
4.546 dm 3
4.448 newtons
6895 newtons/sq metre
47.9 newtons/sq metre
4.187 joules

12. Published information suggests that an unconfined sphere of
U-235 metal of about 6| in. diameter and weighing about 48 kilo-
grammes would be a critical amount: this would be reduced to about
4| in. diameter (16 kg) fora U-235 sphere enclosed in a heavy tamper.

MIS- Ill

PAM (AIR) 226

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

RESTRICTED

ARCTIC

SURVIVAL

THIS PAMPHLET IS TO BE
INCLUDED IN THE EMERGENCY
PACKS OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING
OVER THE ARCTIC

(Obsolete information on old
radio Morse sets is omitted)

PAM (AIR) 226

ISSUED BY

THE AIR MINISTRY (A.D. RESCUE)

*953

Contents

Page

Introduction

Pre-Flight Preparation

Action in an Emergency

Immediate Actions after a Crash Landing ...

Emergency Signals

Shelter ... ... ... ... ... ...

Fires and Emergency Stoves

F ood ... ... ... ... ... ...

Water ... ... ... ... ... ...

Health Hazards

Clothing Precautions

ARCTIC SURVIVAL

INTRODUCTION

1. Survival depends on two, largely psychological, factors: the
determination to live and the elimination of fear. Fear is caused
through ignorance, in other words inadequate training . However,
no amount of training or other material aid will suffice without the
natural instinct of self-preservation.

2. The Arctic The Arctic has been defined geographically as
the area north of the Arctic Circle at latitude 66°33°N. From the
survival aspect, however, it is more practical to consider the area
north of the timber line as Arctic. Along certain Siberian rivers
forests grow up to 400 miles north of the Arctic Circle, while along
the west shore of the Hudson Bay the tree line is 400 miles south of
the Circle. These areas north of the timber line, with a mean annual
temperature below 32°F., are known as “barren lands”. The
region includes the north coasts of Alaska, Canada, Scandinavia,
and the U.S.S.R.; the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, Greenland,
and the majority of Iceland.

3. The Sub- Arctic The sub-arctic is a belt of coniferous vegetation
of variable width south of the Arctic Circle. Within it the mean
annual temperature is above 32°F. It includes most of Alaska and
the interior of Canada, the northern territories of the U.S.S.R.,
and the most of Scandinavia. The term must be used flexibly.

4. Other Cold Regions The principles of arctic survival have
to be applied to other mountainous or desolate regions where low
temperatures at high altitudes, high winds, a permanent snow
covering, or other wintery phenomena prevail at various times.
These regions include the Rocky Mountains, the Andes and the
Himalayas.

5. The Arctic Climate The Arctic is bleak, and in the winter
cold, but it is not, as many people think, a region of continual
snowstorms, and howling gales where the temperature is always
“sixty below”. Many Eskimos and quite a few white people live
there contentedly. The idea that snow is always falling arises from

the fact that snow is easily stirred by the wind long after it has
stopped falling. The two seasons, a longwinter and a short summer,
are clearly defined and the temperature varies considerably. In
general, the interior areas have the coldest winters and the warmest
summer. A temperature of— 96°F. has been recorded in Central
Siberia. At the other end of the scale, temperatures of 80°F. in the
shade are common in many places north of the Arctic Circle. The
annual temperature range may be as much as 176°F.; as at Fort
Yukon, on the Arctic Circle, where a maximum summer tempera-
ture of 100°F. in the shade, and a minimum winter temperature of
— 76°F., have been recorded. With these high temperatures it is
not unusual to find a summer landscape which can be favourably
compared with the Orkneys and Shetlands.

PRE-FLIGHT PREPARATION
Prepare for Trouble

6. The best time to start learning what to do when you have been
forced down in arctic regions is before the event. The correct
preparation involves acquiring a thorough knowledge of: —

(a) Cold-weather flying clothing.

( b ) Safety and survival equipment.

(< d ) The principles of survival.

Cold-Weather Flying Clothing

7. Cold-weather flying clothing has been designed to enable
aircrew to fly effectively in any type of aircraft, and particular
emphasis has been made on freedom of movement. The main
essentials are to keep windproof outer materials intact over
sufficient inner insulating clothing, and the avoidance of any
tight or restrictive clothing. In survival conditions you must
depend for warmth, not on fires or fuel stoves, but on your clothing.
Your clothing is your first line of defence against low temperatures
and high winds. BE PREPARED. Dress for the possible emergency
and adjust the temperature of the cockpit accordingly.

8. Inner Clothing The principle of correct underclothing is
not thickness but insulation. Air in fact forms the main insulation

°f all materials used m clothing. The inner flying clothing consists
of multiple layers of loosely fitting garments each designed to fit
over the clothing immediately beneath it, holding a layer of air
between the garments. Your inner clothing will normally consist

(&) A string vest made of thick cotton cord, knitted in a wide

mesh* The wide mesh holds a layer
of air in contact with the body.

W Pyjama-type inner trousers worn
ill under war service flying dress
III! trousers. The looseness of the
underpants holds air and allows free
circulation and ventilation. In very
III cold conditions two pairs should be
worn.

V\i

[

1 if

Fig. I.

Cold Weather Flying Clothing

(c) A woollen aircrew shirt with
attached collar and buttoning cuffs.
A tie should not be worn during
flight because it would restrict
ventilation at the neck.

(d) A long-sleeved, slit-necked, rib-
bed woollen pullover. A draw cord
is provided at the neck opening to
help in the control of ventilation.

(e) A necksquare made of soft
cotton and resembling a large dish-
cloth. It effectively protects the
neck oening and allows some
ventilation at the neck. It is designed
to protect the face in high wind
conditions, and at night, when the
face is the only part of the body not
protected by the sleeping bag.

9. Outer Clothing Outer garments must be windproof and
durable. The weave must be close to prevent snow compacting
into the material. A certain degree of porosity is necessary to

allow water vapour to escape and evaporate in the cold dry air.
You will normally wear : —

(a) a cold-weather flying overall which is essentially two
garments, trousers and jacket, which have been combined
to make an overall as this is more effective in flight conditions.
For ground survival the jacket, or inner parka, and the trousers
can be separated to allow adequate ventilation. Draw cords
are provided at the bottoms of the trousers legs: these are
intended for use in survival conditions to help in keeping
snow out of the trousers and boot tops. A hood is attached to
the jacket and in normal flying conditions it is folded neatly
at the back. The face aperture can be closed by a draw cord.

(fi) A cold-weather cap made of windproof material and
lined with woollen fabric. It may be worn alone or under the
hood of the flying overall or outer parka. The atp has internally
stowed flaps which can be turned down to give protection to
the back of the neck, ears, and forehead.

(c) An outer parka to be worn in extreme cold over the flying
overall. It has both windproof and insulating properties. The
collar, to which the hood is attached, is fur-lined. The hood,
closed by a draw cord, is designed to protect the face in high
wind chill conditions. An extension to the hood, for use in the
severest weather, consists of an adjustable wire-stiffened
curtain edged with wolverine fur, and helps in preventing the
wind reaching the face.

10. Handwear Handwear must be insulating and windproof,
and must not be tight. Mittens are preferred to gloves as the
Angers will give mutual warmth, but mittens are not ideal for
aircrew. The handwear assembly consists of: —

(а) Long woollen wristlets which give protection to the wrist
and the back of the hand.

(б) Inner mitts of wool.

(c) Outer mitts made of soft leather. The palm of the hand is
lined with a wool pile material, and a pad of the same material
is sewn on the back. This pad is used for warming the nose or
the face in the event of frostbite, and also as a nose wiper.

Pyrotechnics

34. You will have a limited supply of emergency pyrotechnics,
and possibly the aircraft signal pistol and cartridges. Fire them
only when you are fairly certain that there is a chance of them being
seen by the search aircraft. The search aircraft at night, using the
Night Service Technique, will fire green cartridges every 5 to 10
minutes. When the survivors see a green light, they should wait for
the aircraft to clear the glare and then fire a red pyrotechnic; after
a short interval fire a second one. If the search aircraft sees the reds
he will turn towards the first one and check his course on the second
one, at the same time firing a succession of green lights until he is
overhead. The survivors should conserve their pyrotechnics, and
only fire a third red signal when the aircraft is almost overhead or is
going off course.

SHELTER

35. In the winter you cannot stay in the open and expect to live,
unless you are on the move. You must have shelter even if it is
only a hole in the snow. Shelter is less important in summer, but it
will provide comfort and relaxation under the most ideal con-
ditions. The type of shelter you elect to build will depend on : —

(a) What tools are available.

(b) What materials are available.

( d ) How long you expect to remain in that location.

Regardless of the type, the shelter must provide adequate venti-
lation to prevent carbon monoxide poisoning and to allow moisture
to escape.

Selection of Site

36. A summer camp site should not be on low-lying ground,
which is likely to be damp, or in areas that might be flooded.
Select a spot in cool breeze to keep the insects away, either on top
of a ridge, or the shores of a cold lake, or a place that gets an onshore
breeze. The lee of boulders and shelving rocks should provide dry
camp sites.

37. During winter, protection from the wind is a prime consid-
eration. Avoid the lee of slopes and cliffs where snow may drift
heavily and bury your shelter.

38. In mountain camp sites avoid areas which you suspect are

subject to avalanches, floods,
and rockfalls. Temperature in-
versions are common in the
Arctic so do not camp on a
valley floor; it may be several
degrees warmer on the slopes.

39. If on sea ice, the site must
be on the thickest ice, the biggest
floe, and away from thin ice
joining two floes where pressure
ridges may form.

40. With all sites the
nearness to fuel and
water must be con-
sidered. An ideal camp
site is seldom found,
and a compromise may
be necessary. A site
which does not give
protection from the
wind can be protected
by a windbreak. Other
deficiencies of a camp

Fif. 4. Natural Hole under a Tree site may be similarly

converted into a Shelter Overcome.

Natural Shelters

41. Caves and overhanging rockshelves will often provide dry
shelters. They should be used in the winter only if well insulated,
and in summer only if they can be made insect-proof. In timbered
country where the snow is deep, spruce trees often provide ready-
made shelters. The natural hole under the lower branches will
provide a quickly available shelter. The lower branches at snow
level will form the roof. (Fig. 4.)

Aeroplane Shelters

42. In the summer the fuselage will make an adequate shelter if it
is on safe ground; it is waterproof and can be made insect-proof
with parachutes. Is SHOULD NOT be used as a shelter in winter
unless it is well insulated. The metal is a good conductor of heat
and will quickly dissipate any available heat. In Winter you can
make two types of shelters using a wing or tailplane as a roof or
support. The first, a snow block shelter, is made by piling up snow
blocks to form a windbreak, walled shelter, or snow-house. The
second is made by hanging engine covers or a parachute over the
wing. The loose ends can be anchored by rocks or piles of snow.

Fig. 5. Wing-Showblock Shelter

Parachute Shelters

43. Paratepee An excellent shelter for protection against
drizzly weather and insects is made from a parachute canopy.
In it you can build a fire, cook, eat, sleep, dress, and make signals—
all without going out of doors. You will need ten good poles about
12 to 14 feet long, and half a parachute canopy. The method of
construction is shown in the illustrations. The other half of the
canopy can be used as additional tenting to provide insulation,
should the weather demand it.

EXTRA POLES LAID ON
TRIPOD AND COVERED
WITH PARACHUTE FABRIC FINISHED

Fig. 6. Construction of Paratepee

44. Pup Tent A simple pup tent can be made by placing a
rope or pole between two trees or stakes and draping a parachute
over it. Stretch the corners down and secure them with stones
or pegs.

Fig. 7. Pup Tent

45. Simple Bell Tents A variety of bell tents can be constructed.
Always use the double layer principle to provide adequate insulation.

46. Willow Shelter Where willows are plentiful this shelter
can be made very quickly. The floor area should just accommodate
the sleeping bags and the maximum height should just allow the
occupants to its up without their heads touching the roof. The
tunnel-like construction is shown in Fig. 10. The framework can
be covered with several layers of parachute canopy which may
be anchored with snow.

Wood Shelters

47. Lean-to and Bough Shelters If you are in timbered country
and have plenty of wood, the best shelter is a lean-to. A good three-
man lean-to is shown in Fig. 11. The roof can be covered by sod
blocks, spruce boughs, or any similar materials should be woven
in from the top like a tiled roof to prevent rain from entering the
shelter. A quickly improvized temporary shelter is a two-sided
bough den (Fig. 12); it requires fewer poles and less time to build
than a lean-to, but it cannot be waterproofed as efficiently.

Snow Shelters

48. The type of snow shelter you can construct will depend on
the quality of the snow. You will have to decide whether or not
the snow is suitable for cutting up into snow blocks. The ideal
snow for snow block shelters is that upon which a man can walk
without breaking through or leaving deeply embedded footprints.
The snow must also be tested by pressing a probe into it slowly;
if it goes in evenly the snow is ideal for cutting snow blocks.
Snow blocks should measure about 18 inches wide by 20 inches long
and four to eight inches thick. Blocks of this size should be easy
to cut and handle. They will be thick enough to provide good
insulation and strength, yet thin enough to allow maximum
penetration of the sun’s rays. The lighter the interior the warmer
it will be and fuel will not have to be used for light. In addition, a
light inside a snow block shelter makes a good beacon at night.

49. Snow Trench The ideal snow block shelter is the snow
trench, which is designed for one man. Start the construction by
marking out a rectangular floor area; big enough to accommodate
only one sleeping bag. Remove the snow from this area, by cutting
out snow blocks, to the full width of the trench and to a depth of
four feet. Along the top edges of the sides of the trench, cut an
L-shaped step six inches deep and six inches wide; these steps
serve as a base for the snow blocks when the trench is roofed. At
the end away from the entrance, place two blocks on the steps on
each side of the trench and lean them together to start forming an
inverted V roof. The two blocks should be offset, so that after the
first pair of blocks are joined, it will be necessary to handle only
one block at a time. Each end of the roof should be covered with

blocks and an entrance dug through the snow at the down-wind end.
If the snow is not four feet deep, the walls can be constructed of
snow blocks to the required height.

Fig. 13.

Construction of Snow Trench

50. Snow Caves and Snow Holes

(a) A snow cave can be dug wherever snowdrifts of sufficient
depth can be found. Caves are difficult to dig without getting
wet and are therefore less desirable than a trench-type shelter.
The roof of the cave should be arched to allow moisture to
run down the walls without dripping. Also, an arched ceiling
will not sag readily from the weight of the snow above.

( b ) An excellent temporary shelter can be constructed by
simply digging a hole in the snow and using your parachute
canopy as a roof.

51. Big crews should build individual or two-man snow shelters
radiating from a central or communal entrance. The entrance
can be protected by a circular snow wall and tented with a parachute
canopy.

6FT

Beds and Bedding

52. ^ In snow shelters beds should be made on a sleeping bench
which Will raise you into the warmer air of the shelter. In all types
of shelters beds should be well insulated from the actual floor of
the shelter. Depending on your resources the following make good
insulating material

{a) Parachute canopy, backpad, or seat cushion.

( b ) Inverted dinghy.

(d) Seat cushions, asbestos, etc., from the aircraft.

(e) Ferns, shrubs, lichens, moss, evergreen boughs (particu-
larly spruce tips).

Your insulating can be as thick as time permits; six inches at least
is desirable. Rearrange it regularly to prevent packing down.

Practical Hints

53. The following points should not be neglected : —

(a) The- smaller the shelter the warmer it will be.

(b) Adequate ventilation to prevent asphyxiation and carbon
monoxide poisoning is of vital importance.

fa) Two ventilation holes, one near the top of the shelter
and the other at the entrance, must be kept clear. One hole
is not sufficient, as the air cannot then circulate.

(d) Shovels and tools must be taken into snow shelters, as
it may often be necessary to dig a way out if snowfalls or
drifting occur.

(f) The entrance of each shelter must be clearly marked so
that it can be easily found.

(/) A mark should be made on the snow above each shelter
to show its position and to prevent men from walking over
the roof.

(g) Drips in snow shelters can be stopped by putting a piece
of snow on the source of the drip.

(h) The roof should be at least twelve inches thick unless
the snow is very hard, when six inches may be sufficient.

( J ) Snow floors should be well tramped down before starting
to build the shelter. 5

FIRES AND EMERGENCY STOVES

54. During survival you are kept warm by a combination of
body heat, insulative clothing, and shelter. However, you will
need a fire to prepare hot food and drinks in order to maintain
and replenish your body heat. A fire is also necessary for drying
clothes, for signalling, and to provide external heat. In extreme
cold, however, very little heat can be obtained from a fire unless
you get so close that you are liable to scorch your clothing. A fire

will increase your morale, particularly during the long dark winter
days.

55. Your immedate source of heat for cooking is supplied by
the emergency stove in the aircraft survival pack; however, this
will not be available should you bale out. Your personal survival
pack contains candles, which are most suitable for heating snow
shelters, fire-making tablets, and matches. These immediate
sources of heat may be supplemented, according to your natural
fuel supply, by open fires and improvized stoves.

Fires

56. The main ingredients for a good open fire are a good fire-
place, kindling, fuel, and a means of lighting the kindling. To these
can be added a little knowledge and a lot of patience.

Fig. 16. Log Platform for Fire

Fig. 17. Log Reflector for Fire

57. Fireplaces Prepare the location of your fires carefully.
Don’t build a fire under a snow-covered tree — snow may fall

and put out the fire. Protect domestic
fires from the wind, and so save
fuel. Build the fires on a firm plat-
form; use green logs, stones, cow-
lings, or dig down to firm soil.
Cooking fires should be walled in
by green logs or stones, not only
to concentrate the heat but to
provide a platform for your cooking
pot. Fires for warming shelters
should be built against a reflector of
rocks or green logs to direct the heat
Fig. 18. Cooking Platform into the shelter.

✓

✓ '

</ ✓ *
/ /

58. Kindling You will need some easily inflammable kindling

to get a fire going. Pick up kindling whenever you

can find it, even if you do not expect to make yyvJaW

camp for some hours. Gather

birch bark, dry lichens, twigs, f WWl I III

resinous shrubs, bits of fat (if cr^J| fill// ////)

not required for food), feathers, l/lll/l) tllrffl jr

tufts of dry grass and sedges \> '^WJ
against the possibility of a short- IjfaJl
age of good kindling at the camp a/ fy |^\

site. Larger twigs can be cut in * \w//i I f

“feather fashion” if kindling , f|l| iff' ))

Fig. 19. Birch Bark Under-layers

Fig. 20. Feathering Wood for Tinder

is scarce. Paper or rags and twigs soaked in fuel or oil are good
artificial kindling. *

59. Natural Fuel

(a) Wood . Even in polar regions there are clumps of dwarf
willow and birch. Birch is oily and if split fine will burn
even if wet. Standing deadwood and dead branches provide
your best fuel; the dead trees can be easily pushed over and
chopped up. Lying deadwood and driftwood is likely to be
frozen or waterlogged and is useless unless dried out. Green
timber can be burned on a hot fire.

(b) Coal . Outcrops may be found occasionally on the surface
and coal may be found washed up on beaches.

(c) Animal Fats . Use animal fats for food rather than fuel.
Your will derive more heat from fat you eat than from fat
you bum.

{d) Gassiope . In some barren grounds, where there is no
driftwood and little willow or birch, the Eskimos depend
almost entirely on this plant for fuel. It is a low, spreading,
evergreen plant, with tiny leaves and white bell-shaped
flowers. It grows from four to twelve inches high and contains
so much resin that it will bum even when green or wet.

(e) In treeless areas you can find other natural fuels such as
dry grass which can be twisted into bunches, peat dry enough
to bum (found at the top of undercut river banks), and dried
animal dung. Try anything for fuel, but in small quantities
until you are certain of its qualities.

Firelighting

60. Get all your materials together before you try to start the

fire. Make sure your kindling and fuel are dry, and have enough
fud on hand to keep the fire going. Arrange a small amount of
kindling in a low pyramid, close enough together to allow the
names to lick from one piece to another. Leave a small opening
for lighting. Save matches by using a candle to light the fire, or
make a faggot of thin dry twigs tied loosely. Apply the lighted
c ?P,l® or . to the lower windward side of the kindling,

shielding it from the wind as you do so. Use the firemaking tab-

lets only if the tinder is damp.
Small pieces of wood or
other fuel can be laid gently
on the kindling before light-
ing, or can be added as the
kindling begins to bum. Add
larger pieces of fuel when
the kindling pile is consid-
ered large enough to support
and ignite them. Don’t pack
the wood so tight that the
draught is shut off. Encour-
age the fire by blowing
gently on it.

61. For a large fire, the sticks in each layer should be parallel
to each other and at right angles to the layer below. Space the
sticks so that the air can get between them and create a good
draught. For a small fire lay the sticks in radial fashion, and as
they bum push them into the fire. With this method longer sticks
need not be chopped up.

Emergency Fire Lighting

62. The availability of fire-lighting equipment may mean success
or failure in a fight for survival. Many people have lost their lives
because they have been unable to light a fire to provide warmth
or attract attention. Your personal survival kit provides matches,
candles, firemaking tablets, and a magnifying glass for this purpose.

63. Firemaking without matches requires bone-dry tinder
which will bum very easily. Very dry powdered wood, finely
shredded dry bark, cotton, twine, first-aid gauze bandage, fuzzy
or wooly material scraped from plants, fine bird’s feathers, or
bird’s nests are most suitable. You can make it bum more easily
by adding a few drops of fuel.

64. Burning Lens An emergency burning lens may be obtained
from binoculars, gunsights, bombsights, or cameras. The lens
should be used to focus the sun’s rays on the timber.

/ ;

LIGHT YOUR FIRE WITH A CANDLE

NOTE CORRECT WAY TO LAY FIRE
Fig. 21. Laying a Fire

65. Flint and Steel A flint and steel is the easiest and most

reliable way of
making fire with-
out matches. Your
knife and sharpen-
ing stone or a piece
of hard rock should
produce a good
spark. Hold the
flint as near to the
tinder as possible;
strike it with a
sharp scraping
downward motion
so that the sparks
fall into the centre

Fig. 22. Lighting a Fire with Flint and Steel of the tinder.

66. Bow Drill Another standby is the bow drill. This consists
of a bow made from a willow strung with some cord mada

from your parachute
shroud lines. The drill
is a circular shaft of
dry wood around
which the bow string
is wound once. The
drill shaft is pointed at
one end and round at
the other. The round
end revolves in a de-
pression made in a
piece of wood which is
held in one hand.
Lubricate this depres-
sion. The point of the
drill is placed in a
notch in another piece
of wood, which is filled

with tinder. By holding
Fig. 23. Bow and Drill Method of Fitomaking the drill shaft in posi-

tion and moving the bow back and forth in a sawing motion
in a horizontal plane, friction is set up and the tinder ignited.

67. Pyrotechnic A pyrotechnic may have to be used to light
a fire if all other means have failed. Weigh the use of the pyrotechnic
as an emergency signal against the need of a fire. The powder
extracted from a pyrotechnic will bum so quickly that it will be
necessary to mix a slower burning material with it; powdered
wood or shredded fabrics are the best mixing materials. The powder
from one pyrotechnic will provide sufficient tinder for a number of
fires. The unused powder should be kept dry. Above all, be extremely
careful when you are extracting the powder from the pyrotechnic.

Stockpile

68. Make all your preparations as far ahead as possible, re-
gardless of whether or not you have been located. Stockpile fuel
against bad weather or shortages. Stack it where it cannot be lost
by drifting snow and protect it from rain. Prepare your kindling at
least three fires ahead and store it inside your shelter.

Improvised Stoves

69. Aircraft fuels such as rubber, wax insulation, fuel and oil
are more economically burned in improvised stoves. These stoves
can be used inside or outside the shelter as required. To bum
petrol, place one or two inches of sand or fine gravel in a tin or
similar container and saturate it with petrol. Make slots at the top
of the can to let the flames and smoke out and punch holes just
above the level of the sand to provide a draught. To make the fire
bum longer mix some oil with the petrol. If you have no container
dig a hole in the ground, fill it with sand or gravel and pour on the
fuel. Be careful when lighting; the petrol may explode; protect
your face and hands. Lubricating oil, kerosene, or animal fats will
not bum directly, but you can use them with a wick arrangement.
Make a wick of kapok, asbestos, rope, rag, etc., and support it
in the oil with a wire frame. A very simple stove can be made by
putting a candle in a ventilated tin can. This will provide all the
heat required for a snow shelter. (Figs. 24 and 25.)

Fig. 24.

Improvised Petrol Stove

Ventilation

Fig. 25.

Improvised Stove using Wick
to burn Oil or Animal Fat

70. The need for proper ventilation cannot be over-emphasized.
When open fires or stoves are burned inside shelters, carbon
monoxide and other gases will accumulate unless the shelter is
ventilated. Also if animal fats or oil are burned, good ventilation
will carry away the heavy black smoke. If a vent is made in the
lower portion of the shelter — the entrance should be sufficient —
and another at the top, cold air will move in through the lower
opening, be warmed, and pass out through the top vent. The
current of air will carry away the carbon monoxide and soot.
Remember that carbon monoxide is heavier than air and a man
lying down will be first affected. To retain the maximum amount
of heat in a shelter restrict the vent holes when fires are out. Restrict
the temptation to “ get up a good fug ”

FOOD

71. Take stock of all your available food. Your emergency
food packs and uneaten flying rations are your immediate, and
in the barren land probably your only, sources of food. Your

food pack has been designed to provide sustenance for three
days’ very hard work, five days’ active work, or seven days’ normal
work. The food packs contain their own directions of how they
should be used. In extreme cold, two hot meals a day are necessary
one for breakfast and the other in the evening. Also, if you have
enough, a hot drink at midday is desirable. Avoid drinking two
hours before bedding down and remember to urinate immediately
before getting into your sleeping bag.

Living Off the Land

72. Contrary to general belief, food is not abundant in the Arctic.
All wild life is migratory and, since neither the time nor the position
of the crash can be predetermined, there is no point in attempting
to take up the involved subject of seasonal game distribution.
The game you get in survival will either be there or come there.
It means that you should survey the locality, set suitable traps,
and wait for the game to come. To get food from the land you will
have to do some very determined foraging. Leave a man in the
camp at all times as look-out, while the rest of the party searches
for food; detail men for fishing or hunting according to their
talents. Care should be taken to blaze a trail back to camp. In large
aircraft you might be carrying some sort of firearms, but you will
normally have to rely on the snares and fishing kits in your survival
packs. Additional snares may be made from wire and parachute
elastics salvaged from the crash. You will have to learn where to
look for, and, in all except plant food, how to catch it. When you
find local animal or plant food, eat as much as you want and save
your emergency rations. Fat is heat-producing food and very impor-
tant to your health in the Arctic. Eat a lot of fat only when you can
drink at least two pints of water daily. If you have any doubt about
the safety of any wild food use the following rule; eat a spoonful
and wait eight hours; if there are no ill effects, such as vomiting
or diarrhoea, eat a handful and wait another eight hours. If there
are still no ill effects, you can eat reasonable quantities safely.

Animal Food

73. Finding animals on the open tundra is not easy, but don’t
be too quick in deciding that the area is lifeless. Keep on the
lookout for any signs of animal life — such as excrement, tracks,

hair, and, in extremely cold weather, “animal smoke” steaming
from their bodies. These may put you on the trail of food. Wherever
there is one kind of animal there are almost sure to be other forms
of life. The animals you may find mge from lemmings, which are
stub-tailed mice, to polar bears. What you catch will depend on
your facilities and skill. Small animals such as lemmings, muskrats,
hares, woodchucks, squirrels, and snowshoe rabbits, can be caught
with sling shots, snares, deadfalls, and other simple traps. The
larger animals such as polar and brown bears, caribou, moose,
seals, mountain sheep and, wolverine, are difficult to kill. They
may be snared or captured by deadfalls and pit traps, but unless
they are strangled or stunned they are hard to kill without a gun.
Learn to attract animals by kissing the back of your hand vigorously
and making a squeaking noise which indicates the presence of a
wounded mouse or bird ; that should definitely attract some
hungry animal. But learn to conceal yourself.

74. Hunting Hints

(a) Keep the wind in your face. A calm day is not generally
windless ; make sure of the wind direction.

(b) Try to have the sun in your back, especially a rising or
setting sun.

(c) In timber country move slowly and carefully; don’t
break any twigs under foot or allow swinging branches to
hit your clothing.

(d) In hilly and mountainous country big game animals
generally watch below them more than above. Keep slightly
above the level where the game is most likely to be seen.

(e) In mountainous country, cross currents make it less
important to keep the wind in your face.

(f) Animals are used to rolling stones in the mountains,
therefore it is not quite so important to avoid noise.

(g) Avoid crispy snow; try to hunt where snow is soft.

(h) Don’t expose yourself against a skyline.

(/) Never stay on the game trail; all wild game watch their
back trails.

(k) If game is feeding, you can attempt to approach it by
stalking in the open. Crawl slowly when all heads are down.
Freeze motionless — whatever your position — the instant an
animal starts to raise its head.

(/) When shooting game aim for the vital areas: behind the
ears, in the throat, or behind the foreshoulders. Much game
is lost because it is out of range.

75. Poisonous Animals The liver of polar bears and bearded
seals is poisonous at certain times of th# year and should not be
eaten. Rabbits are generally so lean and have so little food value
that to get enough energy out of them you have to eat a little too
much for comfort. Try to supplement your diet with other things.

Bird Food

76. Many northern birds nest in colonies which may run to
hundreds of thousands of pairs. Near such a colony a man can
keep alive— even without a gun. Some Arctic birds are well supplied

with fats — notably ducks, geese and swans. These water birds all go
through a two- or three-week flightless period while they are
moulting in midsummer. The best known winter birds are the
ptarmigan or snow partridge, which is rarely fat; the white owl,
which is usually fat and tasty; and the raven, which is tough. All
birds are good to eat cooked or raw. Their blood and livers are
edible. The feathers can be used for insulation. The entrails and
toes make good bait.

77. Bird Catching Study bird habits closely. Hunt for birds
on their meeting grounds on islands, cliffs, marshes and lakes, on
coastal plains, and on flats in interior areas. An improvized
slingshot is a good bird catcher. Ptarmigan are very tame and can
be killed with a stick or stone. Gulls can be caught with a gorge
hook and line; bait the hook and let it float on a piece of wood or
stake it out on a beach. Eskimos set a simple noose snare in the nest
itself to catch the bird’s feet.

Fig. 30.
Bird Trap

HOOK MADE OF NAIL
OR TIN-CAN KEY

Fig. 31.

Hook for Catching Seagulls

Fish Food

78. The deeper streams, rivers
lakes, and tidal pools are all
worth fishing. Along most
Arctic shores clams, mussels,
snails, limpets, chitons, sea
urchins and sea cucumbers, are
plentiful. Don’t eat shellfish
that you find dead. Live shell-
fish move when touched or
cling tightly to the rocks. The
small blackish-purple mussel
in Northern Pacific waters is
poisonous at certain times of
the year and should not be
eaten. The chief characteristics
of poisonous fish is that they
lack ordinary scales, and in-
stead have either a naked skin
or are encased in a bony box-
like covering or are covered
with bristles, spiney scales,
strong sharp thorns, or spines.
Others puff up like a balloon
on being taken out of the
water. Cooking does not de-
stroy the poisonous alkaloids
in these fish. Never eat a fish
that has slimy gills, sunken
eyes, flabby flesh or skin, or
an unpleasant odour. If on
pressing the thumb against the
fish it remains deeply dented,
the fish is probably stale and
should not be eaten. Avoid all
types of jelly fish.

Fif. 32. Edible Seafood 38

79. Fishing Equipment The
fishing gear in your survival
kit is not your only means of
catching fish. They can be
speared, caught in improvised
nets, or stunned with sticks
and stones. In shallow water
you can even catch them with
your hands. Those who have a
fish net, or know how to make
one and use it properly, will
catch the most fish. Remember
that a net works twenty-four
hours a day.

80. Line Fishing In addition
to your fishing kit, hooks can
be made from stiff wire or tin
openers, and lines from the
inner cords of your parachute
shroud lines. Another effective
device is a fishing needle of
wood or bone sunk in bait (see
Fig. 31). The needle is swal-
lowed whole and a pull on the
line swings it crosswirse, caus-
ing it to catch in the fish’s
stomach or gullet. Use the
least appetising parts of ani-
mals and birds for bait. A
white stone used for a sinker,
or a bit of shiny metal or
brightly coloured piece of
material tied just above the
hook will also attract fish.

( a ) Jigging Fish may be
caught by jigging for them.
Let the hook, or a cluster
of hooks attached below
a “spoon” or shiny metal,
down into deep water.
Jerk it upward at arm’s
length, and let it sink back.

81. Narrowing a Stream To catch fish, a shallow stream may
be narrowed by building an obstruction of stones or stakes out
from both banks, leaving only a narrow channel through which
the fish can swim. An improvized net is streched across this
channel ; be sure to secure it firmly with stakes or boulders or you
will loose both net and fish. If you have no net, you can stand ready
to hit, spear, or trap, the fish as they swim past. Keep very still
while you wait — fish dart away at the first sign of danger.

82. Diverting a Stream If you are certain that a small stream
has fish in it, divert it and so strand fish in the pools in the stream
below the diversion.

83. Tidal Fish Trap To strand fish when the tide goes out,
pile up a crescent of boulders on the tidal flat. Scooping out the
area inside the crescent is not essential, but increases the effectiveness
of the trap.

TIDAL FLAT FISH TRAP MAZE TYPE FISH TRAP

Fig. 34. Tidal Fish Traps

84. White Fish Traps If you come across a lagoon, select a
spot about eight feet from it and two feet below water level. Dig
a hole four feet in diameter, and join the hole to the lagoon with a
trench about two feet wide, and deep enough to allow four inches
of water to flow easily through the channel from the lagoon.
Place a small log about three inches in diameter where the channel
drops into the hole and fill the trench in behind it to smooth the

channel bed. Sit where the fish cannot see you and wait. Soon the
fish will feel the current and, thinking that it will be taking them
out to sea, allow it to carry them over the artificial falls into your
pools.

85. Fish in Tidal Pools Tidal pools with masses of seaweed
in them may seem to contain no fish, but you may find small fish
among the seaweed near the surface and a few big ones deeper
down. For the small fish you will need a scoop or net. For the big
ones use a spear of fish catcher.

86. Fishing through Ice The main deterrent when attempting
to fish through ice is thickness of the ice; it may be as much as
12 feet thick. Fishing with a hook and line through a hole in the ice
requires no special technique, but setting a net beneath ice requires
skill and patience. To set a net under ice, the float line may be fed
under the ice by using a series of holes in the ice, one or two long
poles, and a leader line tied to the float line. Fish get caught by
entangling themselves in the mesh, therefore the net should be

fairly loosely tied to the float line to allow some flexibility in the
meshes. The net may be supported in the water by a combination
of poles, floats, and ropes. Weights made of almost anything,
should be tied on to the bottom line.

Plant Food

87. Though plant food is not abundant in the Arctic, it is by
no means absent. There are many varieties of berries, greens,
roots, fungi, lichens, and seaweeds, which can be used as emer-
gency food. In forested areas, food plants are most abundant in
clearings, and long streams and seashores. On the tundra they
are largest and most plentiful in wet places. Don’t be discouraged
by the bare appearance of northern vegetation: food is often
hidden. Watch the feeding habits of animals, particularly birds;
they will lead you to plants you might otherwise overlook. If you
are on the march, gather food plants as you go along so that you
will have enough for a meal by the time you make camp.

88. Poisonous Plants Generally speaking do not eat plants
which taste bitter or have a milky sap. The following poisonous
plants grow in the sub- Arctic forest; they do not normally grow

(a) Mushrooms . The common

characteristics of the two species
of poisonous mushrooms are
that they have white gills and
swollen or bulbous bases. The
nutritive value of mushrooms is
very small, and unless you are
an expert they are best left well
alone. There is a possibility that
the very young of the deadly
amanita mushrooms family may
be mistaken for a puff ball. By
cutting the ball in half you can
make certain. If gills are found
inside throw it away: no true
puffballs have gills.

north of the tree line: —

(6) Water Hemlock . The water hemlock grows in the wet
soil of river valleys in forested areas. On an average the
plant is four feet tall, but in favourable locations it grows to
six to eight feet tall. The arrangement of the flowers is a
conspicuous characteristic which enables you to recognize
immediately the members of this family (the parsley or carrot
family). The root is hollow and has cross partitions. The leaves
are streaked with purple and when crushed emit a disagreeable
odour. (Fig. 38.)

(c) Baneberry The berries are usually red or white but
may turn blue as they get older. It can be distinguished
from the edible blueberry by the fact that baneberry bushes
carry their fruits in clusters and have big leaves made up of
several parts; edible blueberries grow singly (Fig. 39.)

Fif. 38. Water Hemlock-Poisonous

Cooking

89. Whenever possible, cook your food before eating it. Meals
should be prepared in sheltered places. Windbreaks and large
stones should be used to protect the flame and reflect the heat.
Hot embers provide the most heat.

90. Since fuel is usually scarce, it is advisable to cook by means
of boiling, and if possible drink the cooking water. Boiling in
water is the easiest and most satisfactory method of preparing
fish and game under survival conditions. Boiling preserves the
essential elements of the food. It is best to boil sea food in sea
water; no additional salting is then required. Undercook rather
than overcook; it saves vitamins and heat. Boil for two or three
minutes only. Plant foods should be mixed with other foods in
stews and soups. Lichens are most edible when soaked overnight,
dried until brittle, crushed to a powder, and then boiled until they
form a jelly. The jelly will make an excellent base for any soup or
stew.

91. When a cooking pot is not available, in winter the food
may be roasted or fried over a slow, non-smoking fire; in summer
the food is best cooked by wrapping it in clay or mud and wet
leaves, and baked in hot embers, When food is baked it should net
be skinned or cleaned until it is cooked.

92. If no fire is available food becomes more palatable if dried
or frozen. Before eating frozen food is should be brought to a
temperature a few degrees below freezing since, when very cold
the frozen food sticks to the lips and tongue. When carved or sliced
into thin shavings, it is really palatable and does not appear raw.

Food Storage

93. Your food supply — especially fresh meat — will attract thiev-
ing animals. Another problem is the alternate freezing and thaw-
ing which is bad for any food. It is not necessary to thaw before
cooking. Frozen food may take a little longer to cook, but other-
wise it is unaffected. In summer, your fish can be cut into strips
and dried in the sun; meat and game should be kept in a cool
place in the shade. Newly-killed meat or game should be tied
in a parachute cloth to keep out flies which otherwise will lay eggs

on the meat. A hole dug in the shady side of an embankment,
with a wet piece of heavy material hung over the entrance, will
give a small degree of refrigeration. A hole dug in the ground
similarly covered will also make a good refrigerator. On the
tundra a common method of storing food is to place it beneath
a pile of boulders. If boulders are not available bury your food in
the snow, and mark the spot. In timbered country, if it becomes
necessary for every one to be away from the camp (one man should
be left to operate the emergency signals) don’t leave the food where
animals can reach it. Tie it in a bundle and hang it from a tree at
least six feet from the ground and a foot or two from the branches.

WATER

94. Your water supply will be limited only by the amount of
heat available for melting snow and ice. In an effort to save fuel
men deprive themselves of drinking water. Inefficiency, exhaustion
and dehydration may occur through lack of water, even in the
Arctic. Drink if possible two pints of water daily. The water lost
through the sweat glands, and in the form of urine, must be replaced.
The amount of water lost in the form of sweat, and therefore your
requirements, can be limited by regulating your rate of work and
removing some of your clothing whenever you begin to feel warm.

95. In summer, water can be obtained from streams, lakes, or
ponds. On the tundra, pond water may be brown because of stain
from grass roots and other plants, but it is fit to drink.

96. In winter, your water supply is most easily obtained from
lakes under the ice and snow. The lower surface of the ice follows
the contours of the top surface of the snow; dig where the snow is
deepest and then chip through the ice under this to find the least
cold water. Melt ice rather than snow for water; you will get more
water for volume and it takes less time and heat. The deeper layers
of snow are more granular and give a better yield of water than the
soft upper snow. When melting snow, place a small amount in
the pot at first, adding more as it melts. If you fill the pot with
snow, the first water will be soaked up by the absorbent snow
above it, leaving a cavity directly over the heated bottom of the
pot and the pot will bum.

97. At sea you can obtain good drinking water from old sea
ice. Ice a year old rarely has any noticeable saltness, while ice
two or three years old is generally fresher than the average river
or spring water. Old sea ice can be distinguished from the current
year’s ice by its rounded comers and bluish colour, in contrast
to the rougher sea ice which has a milky grey colour. In summer,
drinking water can be obtained from pools in the old sea ice. Avoid
pools near the edge of the floe where salt water may have blown in.

98. Purification of Water If there is any doubt as to the quality
of the water you intend to drink or cook with, it should be purified
by one of the following methods : —

(a) Halazone Tablets . Crunch and dissolve one halazone
tablet in each pint of water. Shake well and allow to stand
for half-an-hour. If this is insufficient to produce a distinct
smell of chlorine, add more halazone until the odouris
present.

(b) Boiling . Boil the water for at least three minutes and
allow any sediment to settle before using.

HEALTH HAZARDS

Hypothermia

99. Hypothermia is the condition existing when the body tem-
perature is below normal. Low temperature, winds, and dampness,
supplement each other in depleting the body’s heat resources to
produce a sub-normal temperature. Hypothermia may be recognised
be decreasing resistance to cold, excessive shivering, and low
vitality.

100. The treatment consists of returning the body temperature
to normal. The patient should be put in his sleeping bag, or a bed
improvised from a parachute canopy, the buttocks, shoulders, and
feet, being well insulated. The patient should be warmed by placing
heated rocks, wrapped in some material, near the various parts
of the body. If the number of heating units is limited place them

as far as they will go in this order: pit of the stomach, small of the
back, armpits, back of the neck, wrists, and between the thighs.
Stimulation with hot drinks will also help if the patient is conscious.
Avoid the use of alcohol; it opens the blood vessels at the surface
of the skin allowing heat to be lost more rapidly. A victim of
hypothermia is not cured when his body temperature returns to
normal. Build up his reserves of body heat. To prevent hypothermia
take all possible measures to conserve body heat.

Frostbite

101. Areas Most Affected Frostbite affects particualrly the
exposed parts of the body and regions which are farthest from
the heart and have the least circulation, i.e. the face, nose, ears,
hands, and feet

102. Prevention To avoid frostbite remember these precautions : —

(a) Keep wrinkling your face to make sure that stiff patches
have not formed. Watch your hands.

(b) Watch each other’s faces and ears for signs of frostbite.

(d) Avoid tight clothing which will reduce circulation and
increase the risk of frostbite.

( e ) Avoid exposure in high winds.

(/) Avoid spilling petrol on bare flesh. Petrol-splashed flesh
in sub-zero temperatures will freeze almost at once.

(g) Do not go out of your shelter, even for short periods,
without adequate clothing.

( h ) Take special care if you are unfit or fatigued; the risk
then increases.

( j ) Don’t let your clothing become wet from sweat or water.
If it does, dry it promptly.

103. Symptoms

(a) Frostbite first appears as a small patch of white or cream-
coloured frozen skin, which is firm to the touch, and feels
stiff. Frostbite can be felt by making faces and moving all the
skin on the face and forehead. The subject may feel a slight

Fig. 40. Making Faces to Prevent Frostbite

pricking sensation as the skin freezes, or may not notice it at
all. If treatment is given at this tage the consequences will
not be serious; but if the process goes further, the deeper
tissues of muscle and bone are frozen, the blood vessels
become clotted, and so much tissue may be destroyed that part
of limb, an ear, or a nose, may be lost.

0 b ) If the frostbite is quite mild when the area is warmed
up, there will be some swelling and redness of the skin with
a little pain and, as the condition heals, the skin may scale off.

(c) If the bite is deeper and more serious, swelling and pain
are marked and blisters form. These may become infected,
forming ulcers, and in the worst case the tissues become
grey, then black and dead. Such tissues will fall off eventually.

104. Treatment Careful and immediate attention must be given.

(а) Very slight cases may be treated by simply getting out
of the wind. A small area may be warmed by placing a
bare hand over it, covering the outside of the hand with its
mitt. The woollen pads on the backs of the mitts may provide
enough warmth in some cases.

(б) Frostbitten hands should be thrust inside your clothing
against your body.

( d) Keep the part covered with dry clothing until you reach
shelter.

(e) Never rub frostbite with snow.

(f) In more serious cases the patient will almost certainly
require treatment for exposure. Get him to shelter or build
a shelter round him.

O) If blisters appear, do not burst them. Dust them with an
antiseptic powder.

( h ) Cover the frostbitten parts lightly with surgical dressings*
or clean soft clothes. Wrap up the parts loosely.

(/) Never rub a frostbitten area.

( k ) Never warm up frostbite quickly by holding before the
fire or dipping into hot water, or by any other means. Use
“animal” warmth only.

(/) If there is severe pain give morphia if available. Very
severe pain is usually an indication that frostbitten parts
have been made too hot and further damage is occuring.

(m) Keep the damaged areas at rest.

Snow Blindness

105. Snow blindness is a temporary form of blindness caused
by the high intensity and concentration of the sun’s rays, both
direct and reflected from the snow-covered ground or ice and
ice crystals in the clouds. However, snow blindness may occur
during a bright overcast when there is no direct light, but a bright
general haze from all directions. It occurs most frequently when
the sun is high, particularly in areas which do not lose their snow
cover.

106. Symptoms First the eyes become sensitive to the glare,
then blinking and squinting occurs. Next the landscape takes
on a pinkish tinge and the eyes begin to water. Blinking and
watering become more intense and the vision becomes redder,
until a sensation similar to that of sand in the eyes is noticed. If
the exposure is continued the sensation becomes more violent until
the vision is blanked out completely by a flaming red curtain. It is
impossible to open the eyes or black the red vision. There is
intense pain which may last three of four days.

107. Treatment The treatment consists of getting the person
into a dark place. If there is no dark place available a blindfold
may be used. The pain is aggravated by heat and may be relieved
by the application of a cool wet compress. Time is the only cure.

108. Prevention The wearing of the standard goggles in the
personal survival kit is recommended. If for some reason you have
no goggles, some kind of goggles can be made from wood, bark,
cloth or paper; do not use metal. Blackening the skin round the
eyes will cut down the number of rays entering the eyes.

Carbon Monoxide Poisoning

109. All forms of fires and stoves are liable to give off carbon
monoxide gas, and are therefore a potential danger in shelters
unless ventilation is adequate ( see para. 70). Poisoning by these
fumes is common in severe cold conditions because of the very
natural tendency to batten down closely. The gas is colourless
and odourless.

110. The effects of breathing the gas are insidious. There may
be slight headache, dizziness, drowsiness, nausea, and perhaps
vomiting, but usually these symptoms are very mild and may pass
unnoticed, and the subject becomes unconscious without any
warning. Unless discovered promptly the subject will die as the
effects of the gas increase.

111. The treatment is simple. Remove the patient to a well-
ventilated place and encourage him to breath evenly and regularly.
If he is unconscious and breathing shallowly, apply artificial
respiration. Administer oxygen if available. When he is conscious
keep him warm and at rest and give hot drinks. Do not allow him
to exert himself until he is fully recovered.

Persona] Hygiene

112. Strict attention must be paid to personal cleanliness to
prevent skin and intestinal infections which are associated with
neglect of personal hygiene.

(a) Hair and beards should be trimmed as short as possible.
Frost accumulates readily on beards and can only be removed
by thawing.

(b) Winter survival is not conducive to bathing; however,
it is still necessary to remove accumulated body oils and
perspiration from the skin. Under severe conditions a dry
rub-down is all that is possible; otherwise wash the body
with a damp rag.

(c) The teeth and mouth should be cleaned daily. Feathers
make a good toothpick and several tied together make a
reasonable toothbrush. A piece of cloth can also be used.

id) Attend promptly to any tender skin, particularly on the
feet. It may prevent real trouble later on.

Camp Hygiene

113. Use a little commonsense when arranging your camp site.
Site your lavatory to the leeward of the camp, well away from
your shelter and water supply. Clean the camp site regularly,
and above all do not contaminate your water supply.

General Health

114. Conserve your energy. Do not rush around aimlessly.
Avoid fatigue. Get plenty of sleep. If you cannot sleep, just lie
down and relax your body and mind. You will not freeze to death
when you sleep unless you are utterly exhausted. If you are doing
hard work remove excess clothing before you get hot, and rest as
soon as you begin to feel hot, at least for five minutes in every
thirty.

CLOTHING PRECAUTIONS

115. It has been previously been stated that your clothing is your
first line of defence in Arctic survival, and it follows that care
of the clothing is most important. The following points should
be particularly observed.

116. Regulation and Ventilation Strange as it may seem, one
of the chief causes of freezing to death arises from having become
overheated in the first place. Excess body vapour will condense
and in extreme cases will freeze. This has two effects: the moisture
will destroy the insulating qualities of the underclothing, and the
water vapour, being a good conductor of heat, will draw heat from
the body. Constantly regulate your clothing so that you do not
become hot enough to sweat. This is a considerable nuisance, but
absolutely necessary. Slacken off all draw cords, open up the
clothing at the neck, and loosen belts to allow ventilation. When
necessary, remove enough layers of clothing to keep cool, whether
you are indoors or travelling, or working outdoors. Replace the
clothing as soon as you start to cool off.

117. Repairs Immediately mend tears and holes, particularly
in outer garments which must be windproof.

118. Drying Out Dry your garments as soon as possible if
they have become wet. Clothing should be hung high up in shelters
to dry, as the warmest air is high up. In emergency, clothing can be
dried by body heat, by putting it under your outer clothing or inside
your sleeping bag. Mukluks and boucherons should be dried
in the open by sublimation, that is, allowing the perspiration to
condense and then freeze. The frozen perspiration can then be
brushed out.

1 1 9. Fluffing Out Compression reduces the fluffiness of a material
and hence the volume of insulating air it can obtain. Socks must
be turned frequently and fluffed out to prevent matting. Insoles
should be changed from foot to foot to prevent them always being
compressed in the same spot. All other woollen garments should
be fluffed out regularly.

120. Spares for Changing If possible carry extra dry clothing
for changing, particularly socks. Several layers of the parachute
canopy wrapped round your feet are better than wet socks. Dry
grass stuffed between the layers provides useful insulation.

121. Frost Removal Remove snow and hoar frost from clothing
by beating, shaking and scraping, before entering a warmer atmos-
phere. Willow canes or a whisk made of spruce tips can be used
for this purpose. Snow or frost does not wet clothing unless it is
melted by warmth, so if you cannot remove the snow it is better
to leave the outer garments where it is cold, so that the snow will
not melt.

122. Snow Contact Don’t sit down directly on the snow. Your
body heat will melt it and your clothing will become wet. Always
sit on surplus clothing, a log, or some piece of equipment. Don’t
put your hands with snow-covered gloves into your pockets. Shake
off the snow first.

123. Tightness of Clothing Avoid tight clothing, particularly
tight footgear and handwear. Don’t try to cram too many pairs
of socks into your footwear, because a tight fit is as bad as, if not
worse than, insufficient covering.

124. Cleanliness Keep all your clothing as clean as possible.
Dirty, matted clothing is less warm. The dirt will fill the space
normally occupied by the insulating air.

125. Gloves Don’t lose your gloves or mittens. Secure them, by
the loops provided, with a neck string.

126. Tacking Chances Don’t take chances about clothing.
Unprotected fingers and ears can be frostbitten in a few minutes.

127. Sleeping Bags Never get into your sleeping bag wearing
wet clothing. Sleep in the minimum clothing required for warmth ;
naked if possible. Turn the bag inside out in the morning and dry
it before a fire or by sublimation. When it is dry, reassemble it and
roll it up tightly until it is needed again. Don’t sleep with your
head in the bag, otherwise moist exhaled air will enter the bag.
Sleep with your head in the aperture, and cover your face with
your necksquare folded up to at least four thicknesses.

1 28. Clothing Hints

(a) When walking in deep snow, wear your trousers outside
your footwear and secure the bottoms of the legs with the
draw cords.

(b) If you are unfortunate enough to fall into water, im-
mediately roll yourself in the snow. The snow will act as a
blotter and soak up the water. The violent exercise will
generate body heat and will also knock off any unsaturated
snow. If possible wring out underclothing, but let the outer
clothing freeze to maintain and protect body heat.

(c) Never take off boots filled with water until you are in
some form of shelter. As long as water remains liquid there
is no danger of frostbite. Walking generates enough heat
to prevent solidification for a considerable time even at very
low temperatures.

(d) Footwear can be made temporarily waterproof by dipping
them, while on the feet, into water, until a film of ice is formed
on the outside. The footwear will not let in water until the ice
has melted. Coating with ice is an extreme emergency pro-
cedure and should never be used if there are other alternatives.

INSECTS

129. From mid- June to mid-September, when the first heavy
frosts come, your worst enemies are the insects. During this
period, there are ten times as many mosquitos per square mile
over two-thirds of the land north of the tree line than in the tropics.
Hence the provision of the head net and insect repellant cream in
your personal survival kit.

130. There are four insect families: mosquitos, black flies, deer
flies, and midges. They do not resemble each other in general
appearance, but they are alike in several significant ways:

(a) They all bite, that is, they do not sting.

( b ) They do not generally carry disease.

(d) If it turns cold, they become inactive, even when they are
abundant.

(< e ) Only the females bite.

(/) During their larval stage they live in water.

Types

131. (a) Mosquitos. Mosquitos need no description; they are
universal pests.

( b ) Black Flies. Sometimes known as sandflies or buffalo
gnats. Their bites stay open and will continue to bleed for
some time; the bite causes severe swelling. They attack
especially at the collar line, and, if they get inside the clothing,
at the waist line.

(c) Deer Flies. These large pests are also known as gadflies.
Other flies in the same family are mooseflies; these are larger
still and are also called horseflies or bulldogs. The last name
is particularly apt in view of their tenacity and the size of the
hole they drill in the skin. Their bite is like the cut of a scalpel,
drawing blood in a trickle.

(d) Midges. These are minute flies about one twenty-fifth
of an inch long; also known as no-see-ums, pinkies, and gnats.
They are persistent blood suckers and cause a sharp burning
pain out of all proportion to their size.

Protection

132. Clothing Wear two thicknesses of light clothing: mosquitos
bite through one layer but rarely through two. Tuck your trouser
legs in your boots and your sleeves in your gloves.Whenever
you can, cover bare flesh with clothing.

133. Headnets Make sure your headnet is well tucked in to the
collar of the shirt.

134. Insect Repellant Apply to the face and exposed skin every
four hours. Apply to the face even when wearing a headnet ; midges
are small enough to penetrate the mesh.

135. Smudge Fires Any green wood or green leaves will produce
an insect repelling smoke.

136. Parachute Canopies In summer, the aircraft may be used
as a shelter and can be made insect proof with parachute canopies.

TRAVEL

137. The experience of Arctic crashes reveals that the best
policy for survivors is to stay with the crashed aircraft and await
rescue. Travel to a camp site should be undertaken, however, if
the scene of the crash is endangered by natural hazards, such as
crevasses and avalanches. There may be times when walking
home is considered to be the only solution.

Considerations

138. Your Position Have you been able to fix your position?
Quite often the reason for crash landing is that the aircraft is
lost. An approximate position, say within 50 miles, is worthwhile
for the purpose of narrowing the search by air. But it is not accurate
enough to use as a departure point in an attempt to walk out.
You must know the exact location of your camp and your objective.

139. Wireless Contact Is the search organization aware of
your plight and your position? Was your distress message ack-
nowledged ? Have you made wireless contact since the crash ?

140. Physical Condition Even with snow shoes and skis, Arctic
travel is slow, strenuous and hazardous. Don’t overestimate your
physical capabilities.

141. Weather The weather should be assessed from two angles.
Is the prevailing weather likely to hinder search forces? Is the
weather conducive to an Arctic route-march and sleep in temporary
shelters?

142. Orientation You must have reliable methods of determining
and maintaining your intended route. In the barren lands part-
icularly, you must have a compass. Should you lose your compass
the following methods may be used to determine direction: —

(a) Sky Map . A high uniform overcast reflects the sur-
rounding terrain. Clouds over open water, timber, or snow-
free ground will appear black, while clouds over sea ice or
uniform snow covering will appear white. Pack ice or drifted
snow are indicated by a mottled appearance on the surface
of the cloud. New ice is indicated by greyish patches on the
sky map. A careful study of the earth’s reflection on the
clouds may be used for determining the proper direction to
travel.

( b ) Bird Habits. Migrating waterfowl fly towards the land
in the thaw. Most sea birds fly out to sea in the morning
and return to land at night.

(c) Vegetation . Although there are few trees on the tundra,
the moss theory still applies ; moss is heaviest on the north side.
The bark of the alders is lighter in colour on the south side
than on the north side. Don’t rely on one observation; make
several and average the direction. Lichens on rocks are most
numerous on the south side where they receive the greatest
warmth of the sun.

(< d) Stars. In the northern hemisphere, true north can be
ascertained from the constellation of the Great Bear, which
points to Polaris (North Star), the star over the North Pole.
Trying to estimate your latitude by measuring the angle of
Polaris above the horizon will give you only a very approximate

result, unless you have a sextant and tables. In the southern
hemisphere, the Southern Cross indicates the direction of
south. Other constellations, such as Orion, rise in the east
and set in the west, moving to the south of you when you are
north of the equator and vice versa.

0) Sun. If you have the correct local time on your watch,
the shadow cast by an object at 1200 hours will indicate
north and south. The object must be perpendicular to the
ground and straight. In the northern hemisphere the base of
the shadow will indicate south and the tip will indicate north.
If you have no watch, place a straight object in the ground or
snow on a level spot. Starting in the morning, and, con-
tinuing about once every hour throughout the day, mark the
point at the tip of the shadow. At the end of the day, connect
these points and you will have a line which runs true east and
west. The shortest distance between the base of the shadow
and the east-west line will indicate north and south. The
method of determining direction by pointing the hour hand
of a watch at the sun is considered inaccurate and should
not be used.

143. Final Decision A crashed aircraft with a prominent signals
area is more likely to be spotted from the air than a man on the
march with limited signalling devices. Your final decision should
be based on two factors: your nearness to civilization and the prob-
ability of rescue. Once you have made your decision, stick to it.
The decision will have been reached after considering all the
factors when your minds were fresh. As time goes on, your powers
of reasoning will deteriorate and there may be a tendency to
consider the factors individually instead of collectively. However,
if it is at all possible, or if you are in doubt, stay with the aircraft.

Routes

144. The majority of the settlements are to be found on the
rivers or on the coast. Water is the highway of the north. Dog
teams and sledge trains travel on the ice in the winter. In addition,
food and fuel are available along the waterways both in summer and
winter. Travel downstream to reach civilization, except in Siberia
where the rivers flow north.

NORTH STAR

♦

GREAT BEAR

Fig. 42. Great Bear and North Star

SOUTHERN CROSS

V'
\

*-r

◄

•

* *

% »

% i
% «
\ *

FALSE CROSS

SOUTHERN CROSS

Fig. 43. Southern Cross

ORION

Fif. 44. Orion

145. Mountain Routes Mountain routes, where ice caps, glaciers,
crevasses, and avalanches may be encountered, are extremely
hazardous and should be used only if there is no alternative. The
minimum requirements are a climbing rope, two ice axes, and an
experienced leader. If any one of these is not available select
another route. In areas where avalanches are prevalent, travel in
the early morning when it is coldest. At all times proceed with
extreme caution.

146. Timber Country Snow lies deep in the timber country and
travel is extremely difficult without snowshoes or skis. Two miles
a day in these circumstances is good progress. Trail breaking is
very strenuous, and it should be taken in turns for periods of not
more than five minutes. Rest for five minutes about every half-an-
hour. When possible travel by the rivers. Make a raft or use your
dinghy in the summer, and travel on foot over the ice in winter.
When travelling on river ice keep on the inside of the bends; the
swifter current on the outside of the bends wears the ice away from
below. At river junctions walk on the far side, or take to the land
until you are well downstream from the junction. When river travel
is not feasible, travel along ridges. In winter the snow does not lie
deep on the ridges; in summer the ridges are drier and firmer
underfoot.

147. Barren Land Routes Barren land travel without snow-
shoes or skis is difficult and slow. You cannot afford to follow the
rivers, which wind and twist and greatly increase the distance
to be covered. Beware of thin ice on the edges of tundra lakes
and in the connecting channels. Lack of landmarks, blowing
snow and fog, emphasize the need of a compass for barren land
travel. If your tracks are clear, check your course by taking back
bearings of your tracks; otherwise proceed in single file about 30
paces apart. The last man carries the compass and, using the middle
men as sighting objects, controls the course of the first man by
calling out instructions to him. Constant compass check will
ensure that you are travelling in a straight line, which is the shortest
distance. Summer travel in the barren lands presents another
problem. Soggy vegetation and bogs make the going slippery and
heavy. Tundra lakes, quicksands, and swamps must be avoided.
In these circumstances it is usually preferable to float down a river
than to travel across country.

148. Sea Ice Routes On sea ice travel in one party; there is
nothing to be gained by anyone who remains behind. The problems
of coursekeeping are identical with those on the barren lands, but
the movement of ice floes makes it difficult to determine your
actual track. Pressure ridges and hummocks may be used as land-
marks over short distances only, since they are constantly moving.
The unreliability of the magnetic compass in high latitudes
necessitates course checks on the sun and stars. Avoid tall, pinnacled
icebergs which are liable to capsize. For shelter at sea, look for low,
flat-topped icebergs.

149. Trail Equipment The amount of equipment you can
take on the trail will depend on what you can carry, or haul on
improvised sledges. Individual packs, adapted from the personal
survival packs, should be worn high up on die shoulders and should
not exceed a weight of 35 pounds. Avoid carrying whenever
possible; float down the rivers in summer and haul a sledge in
winter. Sledges can be made from cowlings, doors, pieces of
fuselage, or timber. A single tow line attached to a bridle, with
individual shoulder loops tied in, is preferable for travel over
snow. Only one trail need necessarily be broken. Over ice, it is
better to have several towlines attached to the bridle, since they
enable each man to choose his own footholds. It may be necessary
to leave behind many useful atricles. Basically you will require food,
shelter, and fuel, or means of obtaining them. The value of each
piece of equipment must be carefully considered. For instance,
a fuel stove is superflous in timber country, but is an absolute
necessity on sea ice. Always carry spare clothes and a sleeping bag.
Travel is difficult over any terrain without snowshoes or skis.
Short wide skis are best; they should be about three feet long and
eight inches wise. They can be made of metal or timber. Snowshoes,
which are. simply load-spreaders, can be made of metal tubing,
spruce, or willow. Finer limbs can be woven in and secured with
shroud lines.

150. Preparation While the advice to all survivors is “Stay with
the aircraft 9 \ the possibility of the necessity for travel should be
recognized at the beginning of the survival period. Items of equip-
ment such as snowshoes, skis, and sledges, should be made and
tested before setting out on the trail. Indeed, they will be very
useful around the camp site for collecting fuel and foraging for food.

151. Blaze your Trail If the entire survival party is going to
walk out, or if a small group is setting out to get help, messages
stating the intended route should be left at the base camp. In the
Arctic communication is very slow, and the more signs of your
presence left along the trail the greater is your chance of being
found. Mark your trail clearly. Strange trails are nearly always
followed by trappers and Eskimos. On the trail make your camp
well before nightfall; leave plenty of time to build your shelter,
prepare emergency signals, and have a hot meal. The following
morning, all signals, particularly snow writing, should be changed
to large arrows showing the direction the party has taken.

152. Finally, it must again be strongly emphasized that if you
are in any doubt at all stay with the aircraft.

STRAIGHT

AHEAD

TURN

RIGHT

TURN

LEFT

Fig. 45. Trail Blazing

RESTRICTED

JUNGLE

SURVIVAL

A. M. PAMPHLET 214

ISSUED BY

THE AIR MINISTRY (A.D. RESCUE)

February , 1950
{Reprinted June, 1951)

Reprinted May, 1957 (A.L.i. INCORPORATED)

RESTRICTED

JUNGLE SURVIVAL

INTRODUCTION

1. There is no standard form of jungle and the word implies either
wet tropical rain forest, which is the jungle we usually think about,
or dry open scrub country ; it refers to any natural uncultivated
forest in tropical or sub-tropical lands.

2. Jungle is not constant in composition even in the same climatic
zones. Its vegetation depends on the altitude, and, to a large
extent, on the influence of man through the centuries. Tropical
trees take over ioo years to reach maturity and are only fully
grown in untouched primeval virgin forest. This is called “primary”
jungle and is easily recognized by its abundance of giant trees
150 feet to 200 feet high and up to 10 feet in width at the base. The
tops of the trees form a dense carpet over 100 feet from the ground
beneath which there is little light and therefore comparatively
little undergrowth : consequently travel is not too difficult in most
primary jungle and its animal inhabitants live mainly in the upper
branches.

3. Jungle is not all primary. Far eastern hill tribesmen grow one
rice crop a year by burning down a suitable area of jungle and
planting seed in the ashes which form a natural fertiliser. When
the harvest is gathered the tribe moves on to find a fresh jungle
area to be burned for next year’s crop. In this way one tribe will
devastate large areas of primary jungle in a decade. European
exploitation has added to the cleared area by felling accessible tall
timber along river banks. The cleared area is soon reclaimed by
the jungle, but by jungle without tall trees and composed of dense
undergrowth and creepers. This is “secondary” jungle and it is
much harder to traverse than primary jungle, but it is better for
forced landing or parachute descent because of the absence of giant
trees.

4. In most far eastern countries, the secondary jungle is greater
in extent than the untouched primary jungle. The latter is now
found only in the most inaccessible mountainous country or in

areas of forest reserve, preserved by colonial governments for water
catchment or other reasons. Don’t, however, believe that all the
tropics consist of jungle of any sort. Well over half the land is
cultivated in some way or other and you will find rubber plantations,
tea plantations, coconut plantations, and native allotments. You
should learn to recognize these from the air as they are a sure
indication of human activities. Remember that neither rubber
trees nor coconut palms grow wild in any quantity, and if the
plantation is there then the planter cannot be far off. He may
only be an isolated Malay but he has to sell his crop somewhere,
so he will have good though infrequent contacts with civilization.
Remember, too, that rubber trees must be tapped daily to draw
off the valuable sap, so that if you get into a rubber plantation you
will be found within 24 hours.

5. Primary or secondaiy, the tropical rain jungle is a difficult and
unpleasant land to live in and travel through. The soil is covered
with dead and rotting vegetation over which leeches move in
countless millions. Numerous other slugs, insects, and small
animal life will be found, all in some way loathsome and unpleasant.
In low-lying country the ground may be marshy and even under
water, with only the trees and their buttressed roots showing the
presence of soil below. Close to the ground will be found thick,
and, in secondary forests, sometimes impenetrable, undergrowth
containing a considerable number of plants, fruits, and vegetables,
some edible and some poisonous. Over the undergrowth in primary
jungle is the rather more open space beneath the jungle tree tops,
with an abundance of all types of trees, creepers, and vines amongst
which you will sometimes see animal and bird life. Over all this
is the thick jungle top or umbrella through which little fight
penetrates. Here amongst the tree tops may be found birds, bees,
moths, monkeys, and so on. Yet, despite the teeming fife of this
jungle you may journey for several days and see no sign of it, so
timid and shy are the majority of the inhabitants ; and, among all
these living things, you may starve if you are not jungle-wise.

6. The dry scrub country is more open than the wet jungle, and
prickly-pear, cactus, and leafless cactus-like trees are common
amid the thorny brakes and tall grass. It is tiresome to be caught
in this country, for its lack of topographical features, population
and tracks, make it difficult to find a way out. But patience, a
compass, and common sense will do the trick.

7. Despite all the perils and unpleasantness of the jungle, thousands
of Englishmen have lived and travelled in it safely for months on
end, and hundreds of them have enjoyed it and still do. With a
little knowledge you can achieve safety if not enjoyment.

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE “JUNGLE HIKER”

8. Whatever the type of country into which you are unfortunate
enough to crash-land, or “bale-out”, or if after a successful ditching
you make a landfall on some small tropical island, your chances of
survival and eventual rescue depend on a few definite factors. By
far the most important of these is the first, “determination to live” ;
but together they will give you the morale to bring you through : —

(a) Determination to live.

(b) Previous knowledge ; ignorance of a few simple rules on
the part of one member of the party is a danger to the
remainder.

(d) Common sense and initiative.

(e) Discipline, and a previously considered plan of action.

(/) Ability to learn by your mistakes.

ACTION DURING EMERGENCY

9. The ways of getting into the jungle are baling-out or crash-
landing, and the decision will be dependent on the circumstances
at the time of the emergency. But whichever course is chosen, on
the way down, make a mental note of the following : —

(a) The character of the country into which you are going.
Consider the relative positions of rivers, lakes, clearings,
paddy fields, high ground, ridges, villages, in fact anything
which might be of use to you later on.

( b ) Try to pin-point yourself in relation to one of these, i.e. get
a mental note of the bearing.

(1 c ) If baling-out into thick jungle, it will be vital that you
should have some idea of the heading or bearing of the
aircraft, or members of the crew in relation to each other,
as once “in”, it will be found extremely difficult to make
contact if you have no knowledge of your relative positions.

To Jump or Not to Jump

to. If the terrain is at all suitable it is normally better to crash-
land than to bale-out. However, if you are over mountainous
country, or if the aircraft is on fire or out of control, a crash-landing

may be out of the question. Xo sum up, the advantages of staying
with your aircraft are : —

(a) The crew is not separated and no member of it will be left
alone. This is most desirable from the morale aspect.

(b) All the equipment in the aircraft will be available and it
will be possible to improvise other essential items from air-
frame and engine parts.

(</) The aircraft or its wreckage is plainly visible from the air.

11. In contrast, baling-out offers only one distinct advantage,
that is, the ability to get you down safely on almost any sort of
country. However, try not to bale-out over primary jungle if
you can avoid it, as you will almost certainly sustain some sort of
injury when you land in the tree tops, and you may even find
yourselves dangling twixt heaven and earth over a hundred feet
from the ground.

12. For the reasons outlined above, if you have to bale-out over
^ jungle, try to arrange a rendezvous for the crew before you jump.
The best rendezvous is your wrecked aircraft and you can decide
on that action before you even take-off on a flight.

FORCED LANDING GROUNDS—

SUITABLE TERRAIN

13. The jungle does not offer much in the way of forced-landing
areas, but if you have any choice or time to make a selection,
consider the areas mentioned below, in order of preference *

(a) Beaches.

(b) Clearings.

(r) Paddy fields land along the ^bunds’’, i.£. banks of mud
dividing the fields.

(d) Lakes and rivers.

Do not land on tree tops — if it has to be the tree tops, bale-out if
there is the height and time to carry out the drill, with due con-
sideration to all those in the aircraft.

IMMEDIATE ACTION ON LANDING

I 4* # The planning of a standard procedure is essential to the
ultimate success of the incident, and the following immediate
actions should be carried out after landing. This procedure or

drill is, of course, subsequent to the normal crash landing drills,
precautions against fire, etc. : —

(a) First Aid . Administer immediate first aid to the slightest
scratch. In hot and tropical climates the risk of poisoning
from an open wound is very great.

(b) Fix Position . You cannot decide on a reliable plan of
action until you have decided just where you are. You
may not be able to fix your position to the nearest mile,
but you must be able to say “I am within this area”. If
the aircraft is intact, use the sextant, chronometer, and
altimeter to help fix your position.

(r) Rendezvous if Scattered. The place for rendezvous after
parachute landing should normally be the wreckage of the
aircraft. If the captain has sufficient time before ordering
his crew to jump, he may decide to rendezvous at some
geographical landmark. If so, he must ensure that all the
crew know and can recognize the point of rendezvous and
that the landmark is prominent, e.g . the confluence of two
rivers.

(d) Establish Two-way Radio Contact if Possible. If the
aircraft radio equipment is intact, try and contact the
outside world on W/T or R/T. Erect an emergency aerial
if necessary and run one of the engines to maintain power
if you can do so without risk of fire.

(e) Prepare all Signalling Gear for Immediate Use. You
will not have time to prepare signalling fires, etc., if you
wait until you see aircraft searching for you. Have fires
lighted in readiness for the search aircraft and keep oil and
petrol near the fires so that you can produce a dense column
of smoke at short notice. The petrol will make a rapid
flare-up by night. Consider what steps can be taken to
make the scene of the incident more noticeable from the
air. Make a clearing for the display of ground signals
(see page 68), or move to a clearing nearby if you
can find one. Spread out parachutes and polished aluminium
panels to reflect the sun. Try and evolve signalling methods
which will show above the jungle top, i.e. smoke columns
or parachutes spread over the trees.

(f) Check Emergency Equipment , including Rations. Check
the survival equipment available from your personal kits
and emergency packs. Examine the other equipment in
the aircraft and decide what will be of use to you, e.g . fire
axe, compasses, parachutes, etc. Drain-off supplies of

petrol and oil for signalling purposes, check all available
rations and water supplies. Try and repair any unservice-
able or faulty equipment.

(g) Institute Immediate Rationing . No matter how much
food and water you have, you should attempt to conserve
it as long as possible by rationing. Do not cut the water
ration below one pint per person per day unless in dire
emergency. If food and water supplies from the aircraft
are scanty, take immediate steps to implement them from
natural sources. Don’t leave it until you are too weak
before you begin to hunt for your meals. If you can get
food and water locally do so, and reserve your emergency
rations for a real emergency.

(h) Elect a "Leader and Delegate Duties . Normally the
captain of aircraft will act as leader, but in special circum-
stances another member of the crew may be better suited.
The captain may be injured, or one of his crew may be a
jungle expert. In any event make a decision and stick to
it. Each member of the crew should be given a special
job, e.g.' cooking, collecting water, building shelters, pre-
paring signal gear, collecting edible plants, etc. Boredom
and apathy can be dangerous to an idle man.

(j) Relax and Formulate a Plan of Action . After you have
checked your equipment, don’t be in too much of a hurry
to start on “trek” towards the nearest town. There may
be very good reasons for staying with the aircraft and
there is plenty of time for careful thought. Assume from
the start that you are in for several days in the jungle and
another 24 hours either way will not make much difference.
A. good night’s sleep in a well constructed jungle camp
will make all the difference to a shaken crew. Do not
relax if you have force-landed in enemy territory.

PLAN OF ACTION

15. If in wartime you have landed behind enemy lines, you must
leave the scene of the crash at once. It may be advisable to split
a large crew into parties of three or four men than to travel together.
Once you are well clear of your crashed aircraft, set course for the
nearest allied or neutral territory.

16. In peacetime or in friendly territory you must decide whether
it is better to stay with the aircraft wreckage or to set out towards
the nearest civilization. You may even decide to split the crew
and leave some men with the aircraft while others go for help.

The main consideration is : Are search aircraft likely to find you in
less time than it will take to walk to civilization ? Once you start on
“trek” there is little likelihood of your being seen from the air.

17. Once you have come to a decision based on careful considera-
tion, put it into effect at once and stick to it. Your mental
processes will be strained after several days in the jungle and you
may later be tempted wrongly to abandon a good plan before it
has had time to mature. Persevere and you will be successful.

18. Factors on which to base your decision are : —

(a) Do the authorities know that you have force-landed and
do they know the position of the incident ? If so, you will
soon be found if you stay with the aircraft.

( b ) If your position is not known, were you on track as per
flight plan at the time of the crash ? If you are missing,
the first search will be along this track.

(d) Have local forces sufficient aircraft at their disposal for an
effective search; have the aircraft sufficient range to reach
you ?

(e) Is the weather favourable for search aircraft ?

(f) Are transit or other aircraft likely to fly over your position ?
If so, how frequently ?

(g) Do you know your own position accurately ? If so, are
you in easy reach of any known human habitation ? Is
the country between it and your present position easy to
traverse ? How long will the journey take you ?

(li) Are all the crew fit for a journey through the jungle ? Is
any member so seriously injured as to need immediate
medical aid ? In the latter event, it may be advisable to
send one party off for help while others stay with the
injured man.

(J) Have you good supplies of survival equipment for a long
march through the jungle : compasses, matches, etc. ?

(k) What are your supplies of food and water ? Consider the
supplies available from aircraft emergency packs and those
obtainable from natural sources. Is there a good water
supply near your wrecked aircraft ? Will you be able to
live off the jungle when your emergency rations are
expended ?

(/) Lastly, how much do you know about jungle survival ?
If you have little confidence in your knowledge, stay where
you are.

19. If you decide to remain with the aircraft you must ensure
that every possible means of attracting attention is ready for instant
use. Sound does not travel through thick jungle vegetation, so
you can expect little warning of an approaching aircraft, and
should one come within range the opportunity must not be lost.
See that you are prepared and try to erect as many permanent
indicators as you can.

(a) Permanent Ground Signals . Parachute canopies spread
out preferably over tree tops or in open clearings. Yellow
dinghies inflated and placed in clearings. Bright panels
or cowlings spread out near the aircraft, broken glass, the
aerial kite flown above the tree tops, white clothing spread
out on a line.

(b) Distress Signals . Flame fires using petrol or dried wood
by night; smoke fires, using oil or damp leaves by day;
(keep fires lit all the time if the local wood is damp and
fires are difficult to light); pyrotechnics; and fluorescence
in streams.

20. If you intend to leave the aircraft you must first decide how
much equipment to take with you. Don’t take too much as you
will soon find it heavy and cumbersome. Take such items as
parachute canopies, for tents and hammocks; shroud lines for
ropes, etc.; personal survival kits, first aid kits, fire axes and food
and water. If you have not all got tropical back-packs a good
container can be made from the parachute pack by cutting away
surplus webbing. Another method of carrying equipment is to
sling it on a long pole carried between the shoulders of two men.
Don’t discard too much clothing when setting out on “trek”. The
jungle is cold at night and you will need protective covering against
mosquitoes and leeches, etc. Gloves are invaluable for clearing
away thorns. When you leave the aircraft wreckage display a
prominent notice saying where you have gone, and spread out
the appropriate Ground Air Emergency signal.

JUNGLE HAZARDS

21. The large majority of people have an entirely erroneous
impression of the risks and dangers involved in jungle travel. The
majority think immediately of the big game, snakes, and other
reptiles; so it must be made perfectly clear, that though the wild
animals may abound in jungle country, they are as much concerned
about keeping out of your way as, no doubt, you will be about
keeping out of theirs. Where then are the dangers, from what
source, and direction ?

22. The greatest dangers lie in the demoralizing and cumulative
effect of sometimes rather insignificant factors, which may be
summarized under the following headings: —

(a) Panic.

(b) Sun and heat, and sickness therefrom.

(d) Demoralizing effect and danger from all forms of animal
life.

(e) Poisoning, by eating or contact with plants. (See paras.
99 and ioo.)

Most of these hazards are avoidable by taking precautions as
provided by Service medical treatment, plus an elementary know-
ledge of personal hygiene.

Effects of Sun and Heat

23. The sun is highly dangerous because the effects are so frequently
ignored. It causes sunstroke — or heatstroke — sunburn, and what is
often referred to as heat exhaustion.

24. Sunstroke may occur at any time, day or night ; the victim
becomes feeble and giddy, his throat is dry, he suffers from thirst,
his skin becomes cold and clammy, the pulse increases and weakens,
his temperature rises, he appears flushed, and he vomits. Move
the victim into the shade, where there is a free circulation of air,
strip to the waist and place in a sitting position on the ground.
If possible spray cold water over the head and back, and give the
victim ice or cold water ; as the temperature falls cover him with
a blanket, and ensure he remains in the shade.

25. The prevention of sunburn is much easier than its treatment ;
remember this when in the tropics. Many people become severely
burned because they fail to realize that the effects of sunburn are
not felt until too late 5 that is, when you notice your skin turning
pink, or feeling hot. When hazy or overcast, danger from sunburn
is greater, as it is even less noticeable, there being so much reflected
light. Should sunburn affect more than two-thirds of your body,
it is likely to prove fatal. Therefore go carefully, take the pre-
caution of keeping out of the sun as much as possible, and allow
your skin to tan slowly, after which the dangers from sunburn are
somewhat reduced.

26. Heat exhaustion is caused from long and continuous exposure
to heat with high humidity, and may occur without direct exposure
to the sun. The skin becomes cold and clammy with sub-normal
temperature ; the only cure is to get into the shade, and cover
yourself to avoid becoming chilled, taking plenty of water and salt.
Salt tablets should be taken daily if you have an ample supply of
water available. Don’t take them if water is scarce, as they will
increase your thirst.

Sickness and Fever

27. Malaria , This is caused by the bite of an infected mosquito
and the fever occurs at regular intervals after the first attack. As
it begins the victim feels chilly and shivers; later in the attack he
feels a burning fever. The hot and cold fevers alternate throughout
the illness. Malaria may be prevented or minimized in two ways:
by taking mepacrine consistently, and by avoiding mosquito bites.
The latter course entails wearing long-sleeved coats and long
trousers at all times. The jungle mosquito does not bite only by
night, as the jungle is always protected from direct sunlight. The
treatment for malaria is rest, copious drinks of water, and strong
doses of mepacrine, six to eight tablets per day, until the attack is
over. Once the temperature falls the patient can continue working
or marching but there may be minor after-effects for some days.

28. Dysentery, Caused by eating or drinking polluted food or
water. There are two types, but both have the same symptoms
which are severe inflammation of the bowels and abdominal pains,
and severe and continuous diarrhoea accompanied by green and
bloody faeces. To prevent dysentery see that all doubtful food is
cooked and all water purified. Be particularly careful near native
villages where the vegetables, etc., are often fertilized with human
excreta. To treat dysentery, sulphaguanadine is supplied in the
tropical first-aid kit. Routine treatment is to put the patient on
a soft liquid diet of milk, boiled rice, coconut milk, boiled bread,
etc. The patient should take plenty of boiled water. Ordinary
diarrhoea, which may be mistaken for dysentery, is often caused by
stomach chills at night. To avoid chill, wrap a towel or cummer-
bund around your stomach when you go to sleep no matter how
hot you feel.

29. Sandfly Fever, Caused by the bite of the sandfly and has
symptoms similar to malaria. To avoid the fever don’t get bitten.
Treatment as for malaria.

30. Typhus, Usually caused by the bite of an infected louse or
a tick. The symptoms are a severe headache, weakness, fever and
aching, the victim’s face turns dusky, the tongue and lips become
coated with a brown fur and on the fifth day the skin becomes

SANDFLY

mottled and covered with a bright pink rash. Typhus is likely to
prove fatal without medical attention. It can be avoided by
regular innoculation and by personal cleanliness. Ensure that all
ticks are removed from the skin and check clothes daily for lice ;
wash the body at least once a day.

Danger from Forms of Animal Life

31. The forms of animal life differ in various parts of the world
and a certain type might be dangerous to man in one part and not
in another. The most deadly form of animal life is the mosquito
which is found all over the world in different forms, but it can only
be dangerous in certain areas.

32. Mosquitoes . The anopheles mosquito carries malaria and is
a menace against which every precaution should be taken.

(a) Always wear a mosquito net and leave no part of the body
exposed.

(b) If you have no mosquito net, a handkerchief, parachute
canopy or large leaf can be used as a makeshift.

(r) At night in particular, but at all times if possible, have
trouser legs tucked into the tops of your socks, and shirt
or tunic sleeves into gloves.

(d) When encamped, have at all times a smoky fire burning
and sleep to leeward of it.

M Keep away from swampy and stagnant areas when resting
or camping in the jungle, for these are the mosquitoes’
breeding ground.

(/) There is no preventive innoculation against malaria, so
very strict observance of these anti-malarial measures must
be insisted upon at all ti mes.

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HORNETS NEST

33. Wasps f Bees and Hornets . These are dangerous pests.
Their nests are generally brownish bags or oblong masses on trunks
and branches at a height of 10-30 feet, and often on dead standing
trunks. If a nest is disturbed and you are some yards away, sit
still for five minutes and then crawl carefully away. Wasps go
for moving targets, but should you be attacked, run through the
bushiest undergrowth.

»3

34* Leeches . Never pull them off, as their jaws will remain in
the bite, and possibly fester and irritate. When moving through
the jungle, if smoking, keep the pieces of unbumt tobacco, and
wrap them up in a piece of material. When de-leeching, moisten
the bag so formed, and squeeze the nicotine onto the leech. Other
methods of de-leeching are the juice of the raw lime, salt, ash,
and ash from a cigarette-end, or pipe. By using these methods,
you force the leech to withdraw its jaws from the flesh and to drop
off, with no risk of infection. Leave the blood clot on the leech
bite as long as possible, squeezing it slightly at first to ensure the
wound is clean, and the bleeding will stop in a few minutes.
Leeches abound in lowland forest after rain, so keep a look out for
these pests, and inspect your legs and boots every few minutes,
and flick off any leech which has not yet got a hold. The large
horse-leech will normally be found only in the sluggish lowland
streams and swampy forest.

35. Ticks . Small grey ticks cause irritation, they swarm on
plants or on dead fallen trunks, and might swarm onto a person
in great numbers. Found during the wet season, ticks should
immediately be removed from clothing, by hanging over or to lee-
ward of a smoky fire; in the same
way if ticks are on the body they
can be smoked off. Remember
also, when dealing with dead
game, that ticks thrive on game,
and especially on wild pig.

TICKS.

36. Ants • The Red Ant makes its nest on the twigs of trees or
shrubs, and is persistent in ks biting attacks ; other smaller biting
ants have nests like earthy
lumps, and it is wise to
avoid trees with such
apparent growths on them.

Trees seen with leaves
clumped together into
small masses, or those on
which ferns and orchids
grow should also be avoided, as these will most probably harbour
the biting ant.

37. Snakes . Even the most deadly snakes prefer to glide away
at the approach of man ; but watch out for alarming one, or
cornering it, particularly if following animal tracks, where they are
found motionless on the ground, blending with their surroundings.
Details of some of the snakes to be found in the jungle are given
below : —

(a) Python. Length up to, but usually well below, 20 feet.
A large constricting snake, sluggishly active by day and
night. It prefers the forest, and may be found on the

ground, up trees, or in the water. It is not of a timid
nature, but though of very great strength, makes no attempt
to avenge injury or offence. Has rarely been known to
attack human beings.

(b) Hamadryad or King Cobra. The largest of all poisonous
snakes and is said to be the only one which will deliberately
attack a man. It is olive or a yellowish brown in colour

and may have a length of up to 18 feet. It is found in
India, Malaya, South China and the Philippines. It is
very aggressive and its bite is dangerous.

{c) Krait. Length about 3 feet, colour glistening black with
narrow white cross bars. It lives in fields, grass, paddy
and low scrub jungle and is found in India, Malaya and
South China. Its bite is lethal, but it will seldom attack
even under provocation.

KRAIT

(d) Handed Krait • Colour black with broad yellow bands.
Is found in the same countries as the ordinary krait, but
prefers wet jungle areas. Not aggressive.

(e) Cobra . Length 5-6 feet. Its colour varies from pale
brown to black. It has spectacle-like markings on the
upper surface of the neck which are best seen when the
hood is distended. It is most active by night, but will
only attack man if disturbed or frightened. The bite is

i\w

RUSSELL’S VIPER

(/) Russell's Viper or Tic-Polonga. Length up to 4 feet,
dark brown in colour with three longitudinal scries of
black rings. Its underside is normally white or pale yellow
but is sometimes mottled brown, the head is large and
ugly and is covered with symmetrical dark markings. It
is nocturnal in habit, usually sluggish but violent when
roused. It is particularly dangerous in that, because of
sluggish nature, it fails to get out of the way, and when
attacking it can jump its own length. Its bite may be
fatal in 24 hours. Found throughout South East Asia.

( g ) Hump-nosed Viper . Length about 30 inches. Its habits
are similar to those of the Russell’s Viper, but its bite is
seldom fatal. Generally found under dead leaves and
undergrowth.

(h) Saw-Scaled Viper . Found in dry sandy areas where
there is little vegetation. Its length is about 2 feet, and

it is sandy yellow in
colour with darker
spots. It is aggressive
and very poisonous.
It may be found in
the full blaze of the
sun or beneath hot
stones and in cran-
nies heated by the
sun. It has a habit
of lying in a figure
of eight with its
head in the centre.

SAW-SCALED VIPER Found in Syria,

Persia and India.

O') Sea Snakes . Found around the tropical shores of the
Pacific and Indian Oceans and in river estuaries. They
do not frequent deep water. All sea snakes are poisonous
but are seldom known to have attacked bathers. 2-4 feet
long.

38. Scorpions and Centipedes . Although common in the tropics
they are seldom seen in the open. They may be found under the

bark of fallen tree trunks and under stones or rocks. Neither
scorpion nor centipede will normally attack unless molested, but
take care when handling rotten vegetation or when moving rocks.
Inspect your boots before you put them on, as scorpions like to
hide in discarded footwear.

39. Sandflies . Abundant by rivers, old forest clearings, and/ on
sea shores. Take precautions as for mosquitoes.

40. Big Game. Most big game will avoid the scent and sound
of man. If you travel noisily everything else will get out of your
way. At night and in camp, keep a fire going to scare off wandering
animals. Wild elephants may be inquisitive but will not approach
a fire or light. Tigers are only dangerous when old and confirmed
man-eaters. Avoid the banks of rivers, waterholes, and game trails
by night and look out for crocodiles in the water at all times.
Throwing stones is supposed to drive off crocodiles but you may
not care to trust this.

JUNGLE TRAVEL

41. It is not generally possible to travel direct across country
through the jungle. Your choice of paths will normally be restricted
to streams and rivers, dry water courses, game trails, native paths,
and along crests of ridges. These are the jungle highways and
they have one thing in common — they run parallel to or follow
the tilt of the land. Few jungle tracks cross from one valley to
another or traverse a series of crests ; rather they run along the
valleys or along the ridges separating the valleys. If there arc no
paths or streams, etc., and you have to cut across country, you may
be able to make headway, but only at less than one mile per hour.
Even a track 25 0 off your required bearing is better than no track
at all. In jungle country you may find difficulty in reconciling the
map and the compass. If in doubt, trust the compass, as jungle
paths change position frequently and even rivers change their
courses.

42. Tracks, game trails, streams, and ridges are animal highways
at night, so keep clear of them in the hours of darkness.

43. To reach human habitation, follow down the course of a
river or stream. Native villages are invariably sited on the banks
and at the confluence of rivers which are the natives* trade routes.

44. If you wish to leave your camp site and later return to it,
mark your trail. Blaze trees to show the white wood as you
proceed, or cut off palm leaves and turn them upside-down to
show their lighter undersides. Stones and broken branches will
also mark a trail.

BLAZE TRAIL

45. If you are without a compass, follow a stream or river and
do not attempt to strike across country. If you have a compass,
use it constantly and maintain direction by sighting on a landmark
ahead on your required bearing. Make for this landmark and
then consult the compass again.

SPLIT ROOTS

46. If you wish to attract attention, do not wear yourself out by
shouting. Hitting the trunk of a tall tree with a stout stick will
make a drumming noise which carries much further than the
voice.

47. In the lowlands trees with split roots will indicate swampy and
perhaps tidal ground. Avoid all swamps, particularly mangrove
swamps. The going is almost impossible and you are likely to
get stuck half-way and have to turn back.

48. Never rush blindly forward. Whenever possible go slowly
and deliberately, looking well ahead for hornets’ nests, etc. Look
out for snakes lying in the path. If you are in a party, travel in
single file and have a “slasher” with a machete or knife in the van.

49. Do not tread or sit on rotten trunks or tree stumps, as they
often harbour ticks. For the same reason avoid the wallows of
large animals and wild pig. Never hit any dead or decaying
vegetation without looking upwards. Dead branches may fall on
you if you do not look.

50. In steep gullies or on hillsides there is often an accumulation
of boulders and tree roots which become covered with mould and
moss and form a false ground layer. Beware of breaking a leg by
falling through this.

51. If you have no compass, you can judge direction by the sun,
but you can only do so with accuracy in the morning and evening.
At midday in the tropics the sun is so high that it is useless as a
directional aid and you cannot find the North Point from your
watch as you would do in England. Remember that the sun may
be North or South at midday, depending on the time of year and
your position relative to the equator. However, the sun always
rises in the East and sets in the West. At night the Southern Gross
gives a good indication of South.

52. For crossing streams and rivers make a raft of bamboo or
some other light wood. Palm logs and jungle hard- woods do not
float. If anyone has to swim across a river, throw stones in the
stream and splash about to scare off crocodiles.

53. Take things easily, giving yourself a break every hour or
thereabouts, depending on the type of country. This break of
five or ten minutes should be utilized to discuss your route, take
refreshment, to de-leech and to repair clothing and equipment.
Make an early start and strike camp early so that by sundown the
camp is organized and all are ready to setde for the night.

JOISTS

CROSS-TIES

LASH LOGS AND JOISTS TO ALL
CROSS-TIES. LASH DECK TO
JOISTS AT POINTS THROUGHOUT
LENGTH OF RAFT

54. Take all normal precautions to keep yourself fit and see that
other members of the party do the same. Scratches and bites
should be attended to right away, and make sure that due care
and attention is given to the feet. This involves taking off all
footwear at night and, where possible, washing and drying socks
and stockings. Check footwear in the morning for scorpions by
tapping them on the ground. If you find you are getting blisters
on your feet, stop at once and put a dressing over the blister. Do
not wait until the blister becomes unbearable.

LASHING POLES

DECK

TOP CROSS-TIE
AT ENDS

CAMPING SITES

55. The requirements of an ideal camp site are as follows : —

(a) Proximity to water and food.

( b ) Solid ground tree from mud.

(d) Freedom from overhanging branches, or from coconuts
overhead.

(< e ) Natural protection from weather and animal life.

(/) Concealment in wartime.

56. Unless one is able to keep dry and free from insects and other
irritants, there will be little rest during nights spent in the jungle :
so take some care over the selection of the camp site. Make your
decision in good time so that the site may be made safe and com-
fortable before nightfall. Do not, however, insist on finding a
place which meets all the above requirements or you are likely to
search all night.

57. Start off by clearing away all dead and rotting vegetation,
as such rubbish encourages ticks, ants, leeches, etc., and as soon
as possible light a fire, as the smoke will drive away those irritating
insects, quite apart from being ready to cook and heat water later
on, as required. Arrange for a supply of bamboo, if it is available,
as it will be found invaluable for cooking and boiling water.

CAMPING SITE

58. Make yourself a bed, either by utilizing the parachute canopy
you have brought with you or by collecting twigs and small branches
from the trees, covering a cleared area of ground with them, and
then adding a further covering of leaves. This will ensure your
having a good night’s rest, and also insulation against ground chill
and dampness. You are likely to be very cold at night, so don’t
discard blankets and heavy clothes if you have them with you.

59« Your fire will produce a certain amount of ash, which should
be removed from the fire, and spread in an unbroken line around
the camp site, thus ensuring no intrusion from the innumerable
insects to be found crawling around on the floor of the jungle,

DON’T camp in river beds, though they might look clear and
dry, as a storm in the hills might flood the river in a few
hours.

DON’T be too concerned about the proximity of water. If
making camp for an indefinite period, consider the laying-on
of a water supply by using sections of split bamboo in the
form of guttering, having tapped the stream at a point further
up from the camp site.

DON’T overlook the necessity of making sanitary arrangements,
as this will avoid risk of developing one of the numerous
diseases affecting the intestines. See that all refuse is deposited
well clear of the camp, and buried if possible. (See First Aid
and Personal Hygiene.)

FIRES

60. On the assumption that you have the means to kindle a fire,
the following points should be borne in mind : —

(a) Use judgment in the selection of a fire site. Pick a spot
where there is no danger of the fire spreading ; dry and
sheltered if possible. During the wet season find a dry
spot under a leaning tree or similar shelter.

(b) Use dry fuel, which may consist of dry grasses or plant
stems, dry leaves or bark from trees. Dead wood from
trees, and pieces found in rotting trunks or fallen branches
will be found to be dry even in the wet season. Do not
use wet bamboo as it may explode in the fire and throw
out dangerous splinters.

(c) Have a good supply of firewood and kindling available
before starting a fire, and having got some of the smaller
pieces of wood to bum, add the others and build the fire
up, rather than attempt to start with a large one.

61. A fire, quite apart from giving a little moral comfort, dis-
courages the approach of any wild animal, and also smokes away
all forms of insect life. Remember when leaving camp to ensure
that the fire has been properly extinguished, either by watering
thoroughly, or spreading the ashes and stamping them out. In

dry country, prone to forest fires, use both methods and travel on
with a clear conscience.

Methods of Kindling

62. Although one reads of
various methods of kindling a
fire, apart from using matches,
most of these will be found
rather unsatisfactory. Rubbing
pieces of wood together, or pro-
ducing a spark from two stones
or flints is all very well, but in
practice it will not produce
results in the hands of the
inexperienced. It is, however,
most essential for the “jungle
hiker” to conserve his water-
proof matches, as, rather
obviously, these are going to
be the easiest means of
producing fire.

63. Another satisfactory way
is by using a piece of mag-
nifying glass, or lens ; often
termed a “sun-glass”. Aircrew
flying over desolate tropical
country should always see
that they have one amongst
the various “odds and ends”
they choose to carry with them.

64. If faced with the necessity
of producing flame without
matches first of all see that
you have everything ready to
start a fire, such as plenty of
dry small wood and kindling,
and choose a suitable spot.
Then go in search of a piece
of straight dry wood, well
seasoned ; such wood might
be found amongst dead trees ;

pick a soft wood in preference to a hard wood, and use one of the
following methods : —

(a) Fire , with Bow and Drill {see illustration ). Draw the
bow backwards and forwards, causing the drill to spin in
its hole, the action should be slow full strokes at the begin-
ning, and working up to a fast stroke as the smoke begins
to rise. Once smoke has been seen to come from the
hole in the block a spark should be found large enough to
start a fire. Take the block, and add a little tinder, blowing
gendy — you should then get a flame ; but be sure to build
up the fire from a small start, otherwise it will most likely
be smothered, and go out, when the whole procedure will
have to be done again.

BOW AND DRILL METHOD OF MAKING FIRE

(A) Fire Thong. Obtain a length of dry rattan, and draw it
smartly across a soft dry piece of wood. Have the kindling
underneath, ready to catch the embers as they drop.

(c) The Fire-Saw. This is another simple method, but
requiring rather more physical strength and stamina than
the other methods. It is just a question of drawing one
piece of wood across another. A piece of split bamboo or
soft wood will serve as one piece, using a sawing motion
across another section of wood.

RUBBING TWO PIECES
OF WOOD TOGETHER

f n 80 % humidity
igle, dead wood
> 16 % water and
will NOT burn.

Methods of Cooking

65. Food is generally more palatable and safer to eat when cooked
than when eaten in its raw state, and there is no reason why anyone
stranded in tropical country shouldn’t have a hot cooked meal.
Probably the most simple method is by “broiling” over a fire ;
all that is required is the fire and some means of supporting the
food. This method can be used to great advantage with fish, and
small joints, or animals.

66. Yams, potatoes, and some other roots can be placed
immediately in the fire, and left until they feel tender. Clean,
and remove the skin, and the meal is ready for serving.

67. The gipsy method of cooking certain types of meat is another
simple, yet very effective, method. This involves the collection of
mud, or clay ; the food to be cooked is covered with it and placed
in the fire. When ready remove from the fire and when the clay
is broken open, the food will be found clean, and ready to eat.
In the case of the porcupine, this method also removes all his quills
with the greatest of ease.

68. Boiling food is always a good stand-by, and it is generally a
question of finding a container in which to boil the water. This
should not cause any difficulty, particularly if in the vicinity of a
jungle stream or river, as a selection of bamboo will, no doubt,
be found along its banks. There are two simple methods of boiling
with the aid of bamboo, which incidentally will last for only two
or three meals, before the wood becomes charred and leaks. If
a considerable quantity of water is required, take a length of bamboo,
perforate each water-tight section, except the bottom one, suspend
over the fire, using a forked stick, in the manner of the illustration.

69. If only a small quantity of water is required to boil some fruits
or vegetables, etc., take one section of bamboo, cut a hole in the
top, and suspend over the fire by means of two horizontal sticks,
or two pieces of jungle vine or rattan.

70. If bamboo is not available make a vessel from fibrous barks or
leaves. A container thus made will not burn below the water-line ;
moisten the area above the water-line to reduce the risk of the

container burning from the top. Keep the fire small, and the
flames low, and there should be little difficulty in producing the
required results.

Suggested Methods of Cooking various Types of Wild
Food

71. Fruits . Boil succulent fruits, and bake or roast the thick-
skinned and tougher variety.

72. Potherbs ( vegetables ). These are best boiled. In some
cases, it may be necessary to boil in two or three changes of water
in order to remove undesirable acids, etc.

73. Roots . Either bake, roast, or boil ; the former is probably
the easiest of the three methods in this case.

74. Small Game . These may be cooked whole or in part ; if
uncertain as to the quality of the meat, boil first, then roast or
broil.

75,. Fish. All methods of cooking are suitable for fish meat, and
remember that most of the fresh water fishes should be boiled,
before eating or cooking by any other method.

76. Reptiles. The smaller varieties can be toasted over a fire,
but such things as snakes, eels, and turtles are best boiled. In the
case of the latter, when cooked the shell will come away from the >
meat ; it makes a good meal if boiled in vegetables, with the meat
cut up. Serve as a stew or soup.

77. Crustaceans. The simplest method of cooking these is by
boiling. They require little cooking, but will spoil very quickly
after being caught.

SALT

78. This is required in cooking, and to ensure the proper functioning
of the human body. It can be obtained from sea water, also the
ashes of burned nipa palm boughs, hickory, and one or two other
plants contain salt that can be dissolved out in water. The salt
remaining after evaporation is a dark gritty substance. The salt
tablets from the Tropical First Aid outfit can be used for cooking.

WATER

79. Survival is more dependent on a supply of drinking water than
on any other factor. Your emergency rations are no good to you
unless you have the drinking water to go with them. Remember
that with water alone one can expect to survive for about three
weeks, but without water the average man will last no longer than
two to five days.

80. In tropical forest, the availability of water is not so great a
problem as its purity, and the table given later in this section shows
where water can be obtained, and which of the sources should be
purified betore drinking. All non-flowing water found on the
surface should be purified, and there are a number of alternative
methods of doing this, as shown : —

(a) Use the halazone tablets in the Survival Kits, and allow
to stand for 10-15 minutes.

(b) Use two or three drops of iodine to one quart of water, and
allow to stand for 30 minutes.

(<r) A few grains of permanganate of potash to one quart of
water, and allow to stand for 30 minutes.

(d) Make a container from bamboo, if nothing else is available
, and boil for at least three minutes.

81. Numerous jungle plants have natural receptacles in which
water will be found ; though in certain cases, such as the cups of
the pitcher plants, the water will be foul with decaying insects and
quite impossible to drink. One of your most plentiful sources of
water is in the jungle vines, or the rattans, which hang suspended
amongst the trees and jungle vegetation. By cutting a length of
about four feet, from the lower portion of the vine, the jungle

hiker will obtain a quantity of cool refreshing water, in no need
of purification. A word of warning, however; look out for those
vines giving a milky or dark-coloured sap, as they should be avoided.

82. When drinking from a jungle stream, if you consider the water
pure and fit for drinking, don’t drink direct from the surface, but
cup your hands, or use a drinking mug of some sort, so that you
can see what you are drinking, and avoid swallowing such things
as leeches, or other small water life. If you find a plentiful water
supply, drink as much as you can, as the body can store plenty
of water for future use.

83. At times, it is often found necessary to use for cooking and
drinking, water obtained from animal watering places, or large
rivers, the water being muddy, and cloudy. This is not necessarily
dangerous, and this water can be purified by one of the methods
mentioned above. It is better to filter this water, and endeavour
to clear it ; this can be done by allowing it to stand for a while,
overnight perhaps, with a cover on the container. Then, to filter,
use a sand-filled cloth, or a bamboo stem, filled with leaves or grass.

84. Sources of Water in Tropical Forests . Fresh water, not in
need of purification : —

(a) Rain . Build a rain trap from large leaves, with framework
made up from bamboo or branches.

(b) Jungle Vines ( and Rattans ). Select the lower loop of any
vine, and cut out a length of four or five feet, from which
drinkable water may be drained.

(c) Streams . All fast flowing streams, having a mixed sandy
and stone bed, provide clean water. If there is no sign of
animal deposits, or sewage within half-a-mile up stream,
this water will also be pure, and ready for drinking.

(d) Plants . During the monsoon or rainy season water can be
collected from natural receptacles found on various plants.
This will be fresh rain water, and fit for human consump-
tion.

(e) Bamboo . In the base of large bamboo stems will be
found drinking water. It is not possible to guarantee
finding water from this source on every occasion.

(f) Coconuts . In the green unripe coconut will be found a
very good substitute for fresh water, i.e. “coconut milk”.
One nut may contain as much as two pints of this delicious
cold fluid. Do not drink the “milk” from the ripe, or
fallen coconuts.

85. Sources of Water which should he Purified before Drinking

(a) Water Holes . Water found here will probably be muddy,

and with pieces of rotten vegetation in it, so filter it first,
then allow to stand for a few hours, filter again, then
purify by one of the methods suggested at para. 80.

(b) Digging. Treat water as for (a) above. If on the sea-
shore, dig a small hole a few yards above high tide, and
as soon as you find water collecting, stop digging. Water
collected in this way should be fairly free from salt, the
fresh water floating on the top of salt water, hence don’t
go too deep. The water obtained in this way may taste
slightly brackish, but will be safe to drink. If very strong,
filter it a few times, or try again further up the fore-shore.

(c) Stagnant Water. This is not necessarily infected, but in
order to make sure, filter it, then purify. Stagnant water
may be found in small pools, amongst rocks, dead tree-
stumps, etc.

(d) Large Rivers. This water will be muddy and probably
infected, so treat as for water holes.

SOLID FOOD

86. Plant food alone is not likely to keep you alive indefinitely
unless you are prepared to spend all day hunting for it. It will,
however, prove a welcome addition to other food and will keep
starvation away for several days. There are a number of potential
food plants to be found throughout the jungle, but the most common,
found in abundance in the tropics, are mentioned here. These are
selected because of their abundance, simplicity of preparation for
eating, and comparative ease with which they can be recognized.

87. In addition, it is to be strongly recommended to those stationed
in tropical areas that they obtain the assistance of a native guide,
and arrange for an instructional walk through a typical part of
that country over which they operate, or visit the nearest botanical
gardens.

88. There is no need to worry unduly about the effects of poisonous
plants, for though a few might be considered highly dangerous,
the greater number will most likely cause you to be indisposed for
a matter of days. With reasonable care, and by taking the normal
precautions when taking strange foods, your troubles should be
small. Should you at any time be uncertain of the plant you wish
to try, the following points may be of guidance : —

(a) Eat sparingly of any strange plant, until you can be quite
certain as to the reaction, if any, it might have on you.

(If) Avoid all those things which are unpleasant to the taste,
those which are bitter, or acid, etc.

(r) Avoid those plants, with one or two special exceptions,
which give a milky or soapy sap.

( d ) If in doubt, endeavour to see what the monkey thinks of
the food, for you can always rely on him deciding whether
plants are fit to eat.

Selected Foods

89. Sweet Potatoes. Have a vine-like growth, with leaves, and
flowers that resemble those of the “morning glory”. The potatoes

SWEET POTATO

3f)

may be eaten raw or cooked, the latter by placing in a ground oven,
or in the base of a fire after which clean them, and peel. In
addition to the potato, the young shoots and leaves are delicious
when boiled, and make an excellent substitute for spinach.

90. Taro . A plant two or three feet in length, with a large heart-
shaped leaf, resembling “elephant ears”. Taro has thick potato-

like roots which differ in size, according to variety. This plant
provides one of the natives’ staple foods. The roots and young
leaves and stalks are all edible, but must be cooked, by boiling or .
roasting, which are generally the simplest of methods. After
cooking, the roots may be peeled, then mashed into a doughy-like

mass, with the addition of a little water. This may be preserved,
if required, for a few days, by wrapping in leaves.

91. Tapioca . Known as cassava or manico. The plant is
shrubby and three to seven feet high, with large tuberous roots,
this being the edible portion, which vary in size from six inches to

as much as two feet. There are two basic types, the sweet type,
and the bitter : and one can only be distinguished from the other
by the taste. Avoid the bitter type, unless it can be cooked, as
it is highly poisonous, containing the basis of the deadly hydro-
cyanic acid. To cook the bitter type, grate or mash the roots into

pulp, squeeze out the juice, and make the remaining “dough”
into cakes, which can then be baked in the ordinary way.

92. Breadfruit • Should always be cooked before eating. The
most practical way is to bake the entire fruit in hot embers for

ifx VW BREADFRUIT

half-an-hour or so, then peel off the skin before serving. It can
also be boiled, baked, or cut into slices and fried. To preserve,
boil first, then cut into strips, and allow to dry-out in the sun.
When required these slices can be served without any further prepara-
tion. The seeds may also be eaten if boiled or roasted.

93. Ferns . Several varieties are abundant in many areas, and
are to be found in marshes, swamps, along water courses, and

FERNS

other camp shady places. The tree ferns will be found throughout
the forests. The tips and shoots of most of the ferns are good food,
raw or cooked, and because of their widespread distribution, their
accessibility, and ease of recognition, may well serve as a most
important source of diet. Ferns, like all the food to be found in
the jungle, should be taken in small quantities during the first
few days, as the change in the form of diet may have an adverse
effect on the stomach and intestines and cause diarrhoea. Though
ferns are so readily available, they are not particularly nourishing,
and if other forms of food can be found, it would be well to vary
the diet.

94* Bamboo . Here is a good emergency food, which is familiar
to everyone, and is widely distributed throughout all tropical

BAMBOO

climates. The young shoots, up to a foot or so in height, can be
eaten raw, but are more palatable if cooked. See that the fine
black hairs along the edges of the leaves of the small shoot are
removed before cooking, as they are poisonous.

95. Coconuts • These contain, not only good drink, but also good
food. First there is the meat inside the nut itself, which makes
good eating, and also can be made to yield coconut oil, which is a
useful preventative for sunburn. In addition there is the palm
‘‘cabbage”. The cabbage is found in the top of the palm, inside

the sheath from which the leaves protrude, and may be eaten
raw, boiled, or roasted. Where it tastes pleasant it makes an
excellent vegetable though some varieties may be bitter. The
coconut is an excellent food and palm trees are numerous, but
getting the nuts is not quite so easy; healthy coconuts do not fall

the coconut, the next problem is to open it. The husk may be
cut away with a machete, but the best way is to place a stout

BREAKING COCONUTS

pointed stick in the ground point uppermost and bang down the
coconut on the spike. When you have got a split in the husk,
use the spike as a lever to prize it off ; once the husk is removed
it is easy to break open the inner shell.

96. Seaweeds . All forms of seaweed are edible ; oddly enough
they are not particularly salty in flavour, and their water content
is fairly fresh. Seaweed is probably more palatable in its raw
state, and the best types will be found amongst the pink and purple
variety and the reddish or green types.

97* Water Lilies • Those types found on the surface of fresh-
water lakes and in streams are a source of food. All these types

WATER LILIES

are edible, and the seeds and thickened roots of all varieties may be
eaten boiled or roasted.

98 . Fruits. It is amongst the infinite number of different fruits
to be found in the tropics that the main troubles lie. There are
quite a number of poisonous types, and it would be well to receive
some local advice as to those types found in abundance, which are
either edible or poisonous. Fruit found in native allotments is safe
to eat.

Poisonous Plants

99. In order to avoid the poisonous plants to be found throughout
the tropics, and in particular the Far East, the following rules
should be observed and the list of poisonous plants identified and
memorized : —

(a) Do not eat red — or brightly coloured — fruits and berries
unless you know them to be harmless. Avoid anything
looking like a tomato, though it might smell quite pleasant.

( b ) Do not eat roots, fruits, and vegetables with a bitter,
stinging, or otherwise disagreeable taste. If in doubt,
taste with the tip of your tongue, or take a minute piece
spitting it out immediately should you consider it to be
amongst the poisonous variety.

(r) Avoid all contact with any plant, shrub, or tree, with a
milky sap.

(i d ) On certain types of young bamboo there is a prickly form
of down, which causes intense irritation and sores. When
working this type of bamboo, be certain to wear your
jungle gloves, or at least cover your hands.

(e) Leave all toadstools or mushrooms alone.

(/) Because birds and animals eat certain types of plants, it is
no guarantee that it will be safe for human consumption,
as most animals can digest foods that are poisonous to man.
In an emergency, if you can find nothing eatable, watch
the food the monkey eats, as you can be certain that he
is eating food fit for human consumption.

100. List of Poisonous Plants, A few of the most common and
more dangerous of the poisonous plants are listed separately
as follows: —

(a) Strychnine Plant.

Grows wild throughout the tropics. Seeds contain
deadly strychnine.

(b) Milky Mangrove, or Blind-your-eyes.

Found in mangrove swamps, on coast or estuaries.
Sap causes blistering, blindness if in the eyes.

(;) Cowhage, or Cowitch .

Found in thickets, and scrub. Not in true forest.
Hairs on flowers, and pods, cause irritation and blindness
if in the eyes.

(d) Nettle Tree .

Widespread, especially in and near ponds. Poisonous
to touch, causing burning sensation. Relieve with
wood ashes, moistened.

(<?) Thorn Apple .

Common weed of waste and cultivated land. All parts,

THORN APPLE

SEED POD

(g) Physic Nut .

Common t in fences, and hedgerows. Large seeds,
violently purgative.

(h) Castor Oil Bean,

A shrub-like plant common in thickets and open sites.
Seeds are poisonous, and a violent purgative.

(j) Rengas Tree

Widespread in Malayan forests. Localized rash caused
from contact with bark, timber, or water off the tree.

RENGAS TREE

FLOWER

Meat, Birds and Insects

iok Birds . All birds are edible, though a few, including the
carrion-eating vultures and kites, have a flesh which is most
unpleasant to the taste.

102. Lizards and Snakes . All these are edible, the meat from
the hind quarters and tail in the case of the lizard being the best.
Snakes are not going to be so easy to catch, or to find for that
matter, but if you do happen to contemplate a meal of snake,
remove the head immediately the reptile has been killed. Frogs
are quite good food but they should be skinned before cooking.

103. Ants, Grubs, etc . Natives consider the white ant as a
delicacy, either cooked or raw, with the wings removed. Also
the white grubs of wood-infesting beetles are edible, and will be
found quite palatable, if split and broiled over a fire. They will
be found in decaying and rotten wood. Such insects as grass-
hoppers and crickets may be toasted over a fire, the wings and
legs having first been removed.

GRASSHOPPER CRICKET

EDIBLE INSECTS

104. Animals . Too much reliance should not be placed on
animals as a source of food. They are not only difficult to catch,

but finding them in the first place may present quite a problem,
and killing them and disposing of the flesh will also need con-
siderable thought. Those animals most easily found and caught
are probably the various species of deer and wild pig but you will
need a gun to kill them. A bow and arrow will kill small birds and
animals; you can catch others in traps.

Fish

105. All areas of water,
lakes, streams, and rivers
contain a variety of life,
most of which will be found
to be edible. If camping
in the vicinity of water there
should be no danger of
shortage of either food or
water — fresh or purified —
all of which can be ob-
tained from such a source.
Animal life is more abun-
dant in water than on land,
and generally speaking, is
more easily caught. The
chances of survival along
a body of water are always
excellent, and fish may be
caught with crude equip-
ment, if you know when,
where, and how to fish.

106. When to Fish. Differ-
ent species of fish feed at
all times of the day or
night, though there are
many governing factors
relating to feeding activity ;
however, in general, early
morning and later after-
noon are the best times
to fish with bait. Fish
rising or jumping are sure
signs of feeding.

107. Bait . Experiment with
bait, and try to obtain your
baits from the water, as
such bait will be more
natural. Such life as insects,

shrimps, worms grubs,
small minnows, or even
the meat of a jellyfish, are
all good bait ; in addition
the wasted parts of the fish
themselves, that is the eyes,
head, intestines. If a cert-
ain type of fish appears
plentiful, having caught the
first one, open it up and
find out on what it feeds,
and endeavour to find a
similar bait.

108. Technique . Try to
conceal the hook in the
bait, and approach the
fish upstream, as they nor-
mally lie heading into the
current. In clear shallow
water, move slowly to avoid
frightening, and if unsuc-
cessful, try fishing after
dark.

109. Hooks and Lines.
Hooks can be made from
pins, needles, wire, or any
pieces of available metal ;
fishing gear can also be
made from wood, bamboo,
bones, large thorns, or a
combination of these ; see
illustrations. Lines can be
made from a great variety
of plants, or the wiry stems
of high climbing ferns, and
the inner bark of trees,
or the skin of the banana
tree-trunk. For added
strength a number of these
can be twisted or platted
together.

EDIBLE SEA FOOD

no. Crustaceans. Crabs, crayfish, lobsters, shrimps, and prawns
are found in fresh water throughout the world ; all of them are edible,
though they will spoil quickly. As is the case for all types of
fresh water fish, the crustaceans contain parasites harmful to
man, and must always be cooked before serving. Many species
are nocturnal in their habits, and may be caught more easily at
night. All the meat within the skeleton of crabs, crayfish, and
lobsters can be eaten, but the gills are usually discarded. Fresh
water shrimps are abundant in tropical streams, and can be seen
swimming or found standing stationary on the rocks and the sand
of the stream bed. Look for them in the quieter parts of a stream
where the water is sluggish. They can be caught quite easily with
a small cane, with a loop at the end made from the skin or bark of
a tree. The idea is to drop the loop over the eye of the shrimp,
which protrudes from its head, and with a quick movement the
shrimp is caught in the loop. They will rise to the surface at night,
if a light is placed close to the surface, and may be scooped off.

hi. Fish Traps. A simple and very useful fish trap, capable
of catching all types of creatures found in fresh and salt water, can
be made from two pieces of bamboo. The scheme is to obtain one
small piece about a foot in length, and another rather larger and
somewhat longer piece, perhaps about two feet. Split each piece
down from the top, leaving the bottom intact, force the ends out
to form a cone, and then place one cone inside the other, attaching
the edges together with cord, or some fine flexible vine or rattan.
A hole made in the smaller cone will turn this device into a simple
“lobster pot”, and two or three of these placed in the stream near
to the camp will produce meals without time or effort being spent,
(see illustration to para 127).

NATIVES

1 12. In peacetime you can expect natives to be friendly. In
troubled areas you will be briefed of possible hostility before flight.
The natives will, no doubt, know of your presence however quietly
you may approach. If uncertain of your reception, send one member
of the party into the village first. Whilst he is away, move to another
position ; in the event of antagonism, it will be possible to get
away before the natives appreciate that you have moved from your
point of observation.

1 13. Having made contact, if receiving shelter or hospitality from

natives, throughout the time you are with them consider the
following points : —

(a) Deal with chief, or headman, and ask, do NOT demand.

(b) Show friendliness, courtesy, and patience — don’t be scared,
as fear tends to make them hostile.

(d) Greet natives as you would your own kind.

(e) Make gifts of small personal belongings and trinkets.

( f ) Take plenty of time when approaching either them, or
their village.

(g) Make use of the sign language; when ready state your
business briefly, and frankly.

( h ) Treat natives like human beings, and don’t “look down”
on them ; after all, you will be wanting their help sooner
or later.

0) If you make a promise be sure to keep it.

(k) Respect local customs and manners.

(/) Endeavour to pay in some manner for what you take ;
using tobacco, salt, razor blades, matches, cloth, empty
containers, etc.

(m) LEAVE THE NATIVE WOMEN ALONE— only have
contact with them when on “official business”.

(«) Respect their privacy, do not enter their homes until asked.

(o) Learn their laws, and abide by them — bounds, animals, etc.

(p) Entertain and be a good audience.

(q) Take pracdcal jokes in good fun.

(r) Try to pick up bits of their language ; they will appreciate
your efforts, when you make use of some of their words.

CO Avoid all leading questions — with the answer “yes” or “no”.

(0 Learn their woodcraft, and the sources from which they
obtain food and drink.

(w) If living amongst natives, endeavour to avoid personal
contact with them as much as possible ; make your own
shelter, and produce and cook your own food and drink.

(0 Always be friendly, firm, patient and, above all, honest.

(w) When you depart be sure to leave a good impression.

WELFARE SECTION

A™ a hydrogen bomb attack, thousands would be homeless,
hungry, exhausted and frightened. Help and comfort would
come from the Welfare Section. Its members are training now for
such tasks as evacuation and reception, emergency feeding, and
running rest centres, information centres and mobile canteens.

An Emergency Feeding Unit with an improvised hot-pJ ate cooker

CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS.

10. The Welfare Section are trained to look after the homeless, organise
and escort parties of evacuated children. They also run information centres.

‘*“Y (WRITTEN 2 DAYS BEFORE DCPA

£>tr &*',//< BECAME FEMA ON 15 JULY 1979)

July 13, 1979 ~7)CP'Q- °r William Chipman

M '**^*^****^1* t- — i~i ,, 7*Ti *■ ■■» ■ ».

CIVIL DEFENSE FOR THE 1 980* s- -CURRENT ISSUES

ABSTRACT:

Presidential Decision 41. PD 41 makes It clear that CD Is a factor
to be taken Into account In assessing the strategic balance: The

U.S. program Is to "enhance deterrence and stability," and to "reduce
the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us" In a crisis.

Civil Defense and the Cuban Crisis PAGE 47

There Is a final point worth making with respect to civil defense and
crises. In a 1978 interview, Steuart L. Pittman, who was Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense In 1961 to 1964, pointed out:

[I]t Is Interesting that President Kennedy personally raised
the civil defense question during the Cuban crisis’ . He was
considering conventional military action against Cuba to knock
out the missile sites. I understand he was the only one of the
"Coirmlttee" to raise the Issue of civil defense, which tells us
something. He asked whether It would be practical to evacuate
Miami and other coastal cities In Florida. ... I was called
.Into the marathon crisis meeting and had to tell him that It
would not be practical; we did not have any significant evacuation
plans. . . . The President dropped the Idea, but shortly after
the crisis was over, his personal concern over his limited civil
defense options led him to sign a memorandum directing a significant
speedup In the U.S. civil defense preparations. (Emphasis added. )93/

While history seldom repeats Itself exactly. It does Indeed "tell us
something" that In the only overt nuclear confrontation the world has

93/Op. cit. supra note 73 at 152-153.

yet seen, the American President was concerned about civil defense— and
that the Idea of population relocation during the crisis was one of his
specific concerns. Certainly It is clear that in 1962, the notion of
vulnerability being stabilizing held little attraction for the Chief
Executive. And as outlined below (In discussion of CD and SALT), the
notion that vulnerability Is desirable has never commended Itself to
Soviet leaders.

73/Sul 1 Ivan, Roger J. et al. The Potential Effects of Crisis Relocation
on Crisis Stability , System Planning Corporation, Arlington, Virginia,
September 1978^

Richard Titmuss's classic study of civil defence in the
Second World War, "Problems of Social Policy", 1950, made
the case that the postwar social state originated in the
wartime civil defence system to care for millions of
bombing evacuees and families who lost their homes.

[See: John Welshman, "Evacuation and Social Policy ... ",

Twentieth Century British History (1998) 9 (1): 28-53.]

Number and Classification of Official Evacuees in

GREAT BRITAIN IN 1939 AND 1940

900,000 of the 1.5 million

Septeubex, 1939

Jamuaet, 1940

returned to the target areas
after four months of war.

Numbtr

Percentage

Distribu.

bution

Number

Per cent of
Thoie In
September,
1939

1. Unaccompanied school children

826,959

56.1

457,600

2. Mothers and accompanied children. . .

523,670

35.5

64,900

3. Expectant mothers

12,705

0.9

1,140

4. Blind persons, cripples, and other spe-
cial duaea ”

7,057

0.5

2,440

5. Teachers and helpers.

103,000

7.0

46,500

Total

1,473,391

100.0

572,580

Soorn: R. M. Tltmuu, PrMtms of Social PMej (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 103 and 173.

IMPORTMjT AHHOUHCEMEHT

DISPERSAL OF
CIVILIAN POPULATION

COUNCIL

The Government have announced that the voluntary dispersal of the following classes of
persons from this area* to reception areas in other parts of the country shall be put into
effect immediately.

1. CHILDREN UNDER IS

Children of this age must be taken by their mothers, or by another responsible adult if their mother
cannot go. Only in most exceptional circumstances will children be allowed to go on their own.
(EXAMPLE : if neither of their parents can go because of illness and there is no one else to take them.)

2. CHILDREN BETWEEN IS AND 18 STILL AT SCHOOL FULL-TIME

Children in this class may either go with their mothers or on their own. In exceptional circumstances
they may go with another responsible adult. (EXAMPLE : a handicapped child whose mother is too ill
to go.)

3. CHILDREN BETWEEN IS AND 18 WHO HAVE LEFT SCHOOL

Children in this class should go on their own. Only in exceptional circumstances may they be
accompanied. (EXAMPLE : if they are handicapped, or if the mother is taking younger children.)

4. EXPECTANT MOTHERS

5. BLIND, CRIPPLED OR AGED AND INFIRM PEOPLE only if they are dependent on the
care of a person who is a member of the classes mentioned above and who is travelling under
the scheme.

Special arrangements are being made for the dispersal of children under the age of 18 who are resident at boarding schools,
homes or other similar establishments. Parents who do not wish their children to take part in such arrangements should
immediately contact the establishments.

Children in the care of a local authority who are living with fosterparents are included in the above classes. If their
fosterparents are unable to go with them the Child Care Authority should be informed at once.

Anyone living in the area of who comes within

the above priority classes and wishes to take part in the scheme should go immediately to

where they will be given further Instructions*

CLERK OF THE COUNCIL

*lf only part of the area is within the dispersal scheme, the districts affected are shown belovn

UK National Archives: HO 225/54 and CAB 21/4053

HOME OFFICE

SCIENTIFIC ADVISERS’ BRANCH

The Circulation of this nnncr has been
strictly lifted. CD/SA 54-

Tt is issued for the personal use of r j

SECRET Copy No, ^ 4

Some Aspects of Shelter and Evacuation Policy
to meet H-Bomb threat

The simplest way of specifying shelter performance is
by means of the "Safety Rating" concept developed in CD/feA 48, The safety
rating of a shelter was there defined as the saving in life, expressed as a
percentage of the deaths without shelter, resulting from the use of the shelter
in an area of uniform population density. This shelter with a safety rating
of 80 would save 80$£ of the lives that would have been lost if everyone had
been in a house. Put in another way, shelter with a safety rating of 80
would reduce the area within which deaths occurred to one fifth of that for
people in houses, and therefore the radius of death to y? , For a bomb with
a power factor of F the equivalent radius of death if Everyone is in a shelter
with a safety rating of 80 will therefore be 0,6 ¥ . Similarly for shelter with

a safety rating of 90 the radius will be 0.6 3/f.

Although, as stated above, the design details of shelters to give these
safety ratings have not been determined, it seems probable that surface or
trench shelters of rather less than Grade A strength (say 1000 lb/sq.ft.)
would be required to give a safety rating of 80, and that a strength of about
2000 lb/sq, ft. would be required for a safety rating of 90. For small street
surface shelters the extra cost of an increase in strength of this sort is very
s m a ll (e.g. the structural cost of a 12"/1000 lb/sq.ft, design is given in
CD/SA 48 as £15.2 per person, based on seated capacity) and of a 12"/1400 lb/sq. ft
design as £15.5 per person) and detailed studies may well show that shelters
with a higher safety rating than 90 are a practical proposition.

(N = 20 kt) Table 3

Deaths with no evacuation but with everyone
in a shelter with a Safety Rating of 90

2 Mt 10 Mt 20 Mt

City

Power of bomb

100N

500N

100QN

London

59,000

216,000

367,000

The considerations discussed above strongly suggest that the right policy
against the hydrogen bomb W'.uld be to evacuate the central areas of our
larger cities and to provide shelter where it is most useful, i.e. in the
annulus surrounding the central evacuation area.

CD/SA 48 ■ Nat. Archives HO 225/48

Table 4

Deaths from 100CN bombs after evacuation of 5 mile radius circle
for London and 3 mile radius for other cities. Evacuees assumed
accommodated in surrounding annulus where they and the original
inhabitants are provided with shelter having a safety rating

of 8 °* 20 Mt

City

Position of bomb

Central

2 miles
from centre

In position
to cause
maximum deaths

London

518,000

Birmingham

159,000

256,000

Glasgow

171,000

247,000

Liverpool

174,000

247,000

Manchester

164,000

257,000

Total

668,000

1,525,000

Table 3

Deaths from 100QN bombs after evacuation of 5 mile radius circle
for London and 3 mile radius for other cities. Evacuees assumed
accommodated in surrounding annulus where they and the original
inhabitants are provided with shelter with a safety rating of 90.

20 Mt

City

Position of bomb

Central

2 miles
from centre

In position
to cause
maximum deaths

London

261,000

Birmingham

56, 000

155,000

Glasgow

64, 000

152,000

Liverpool

67,000

152,000

Manchester

62,000

151,000

Total

249, 000

C71,00G

It will be seen from Tables 4 and 5 that, v/ith this scheme of total
evacuation of a central area and shelter in the surrounding annulus, a central
bomb causes no deaths at all. Clearly, however, the enemy would be aware of
our provisions and might well choose to drop his bombs where they would cause
maximum casualties. On average, and without allowing for local concentrations
which would be bound to occur in the "reception annulus", this would be at
about 7 miles from the centre in the case of London and about 4 miles for the
other cities. The average deaths from bombs in these worst positions are
therefore given in Tables 4 and 5. Comparing these figures with those to
Table 1 it will be seen that evacuation plus shelter with a safety rating of
80 has reduced deaths by 82$, and plus shelter v/ith a safety rating of 90 by 90$.

Conclusion

Without shelter or evacuation, the deaths from an attack with only five
hydrogen bombs might total over 85 - million. The primary object of Civil
Defence mist be to reduce this figure. Neither evacuation alone nor shelter
alone could reduce these deaths to a manageable proportion, but with a
suitable combination of the two, consisting of the total evacuation of the
population of the central areas into the surrounding annuli where shelter
would be provided, it should be possible to reduce the maximum deaths from
this particular attack to something of the order of one million.

April, 1954.

■a*. E. L. W. = Edward Leader-Williams
os a, 4.1/4/32. ^ W | 1Q j n yyyyu tested the Morrison shelter
while John Fleetwood Baker's colleague)

REFERENCES:

CD/SA 48 = Nat. Archives HO 225/48,
"The safety-cost relationship for certain
types of surface and trench shelters"

CD/SA 72 = Nat. Archives HO 225/72,
"Casualty estimates for ground burst 1 0
megaton bombs"

RESTRICTED

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against the Government and disruptive activit
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action to be taken

TOP SECRET

UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: CAB 158/51

JIC(63) 4 (Final)

22nd January. 1968 .

EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE EVENT
OF GENERAL ',7AR UP TO TOE END OF 1972

Report by the Joint Intelligence Comittee

INTRODUCTION

The likelihood of* war with the Soviet Union and the ways by which
it night cone about are examined in our reports JIC(65) 87 (Final) and
JIC(66 ) 77 (Revised Final) in which we concluded that "the Soviet
leaders will not deliberately start a general war and are nost unlikely
deliberately to start a United war". T7e also concluded that war
between the Soviet Union and the Tfest could result fron miscalculation,
but that this was unlikely. Notwithstanding these assessments there
is a requirement to provide views on how the Soviet armed forces night
be enployed in the event of general war.

2. In examining this problem we assume that a critical situation in
some part of the world has given rise to a period of mounting tension
between the Soviet Union and the West; and that as a result of a process
of miscalculation thp Soviet Union decides on all-out war, including a
full-scale strategic nuclear attack. Probable plans for the employment
of Soviet armed forces in this latter circumstance are discussed below.

3. We believe that the overriding Soviet aim in general war would be to
limit damage to the Soviet Union to the greatest extent possible. With
this in mind, their military objectives are likely to be -

(a) Primary Objective

To destroy as much as possible of the Western strategic
offensive capability and the Western will to fi$it;

(b) Secondary Objective

To engage and defeat such other 'western military forces
as remained, in order subsequently to extract any
possible advantage for the Soviet Union.

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

8 # . It would seen logioal therefore for the Russians to conclude that,
having covered those nuclear strike force and air defence targets whioh
are susoeptible to attaok, the nost profitable targets in the United
Stat es would be those re lated to the ain of destroying the will and
ability of the government and people to continue the war. These would
include centres of governmental and military oontrol and concentrations
of industry and population.

9» In Europe, all worthwhile targets in NATO countries, including the
United Kingdom , can bo covered by the large MRBK/lRE M and medium bonber
forces located in Western Russia.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

ICDMs

10, ICDMs would be used ag ainst targets in North America ; they have
the advantage of giving a shorter warning tine than aircraft and are
suitable for the engagement of static targets. In addition to the
systems now being deployed, there are several development projects
under way which could result in operational systems during the period.

A Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) has been undergoing regular
research and development testing and may be deployed as an operational
system. If so it would add to the diversity of Russia’s strategic
threat, reduce warning times and make target prediction more difficult.

A solid propellant ICEM is also believed to be under development, and
mobile ICBM concepts are being investigated by the Russians. If
deployed the mobile systems would supplement systems in permanent
sites; solid propellant ICBMs might be deployed in new sites or
installed as replacement missiles at existing sites.

MRBH/lRBMs

11. MRBl/lRBKs have sufficient accuracy and warhead yield, together
with short warning time, to be suitable for use against Western nuclear
strike forces in Europe all of which are at present unhardened. They
are also suitable for use against major cities, industrial targets and
centres of control.

12. MRBMs would normally be launched from permanent sites. However,
the Russians have constructed a large number of "field" type launch
positions in the vicinity of permanent soft MRBM sites. These "field"
sites ore believed to have no permanent facilities but to consist of

-3-

TOP SECRET

UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: CAB 129/21 6/1 06 Balance of nuclear forces 1982

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CIVIL DEFENCE
INSTRUCTORS’ NOTES

Welfare Section

Part III

Evacuation and
Care of the Homeless

CIVIL

DEFENCE

PUBLISHED FOR THE HOME OFFICE
AND MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BY HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

HOME OFFICE

MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

(published in August 1960)

Civil Defence Instructors’ Notes

WELFARE SECTION

PART III

Evacuation and Care of the Homeless

(NOTE: contrary to propaganda from CND,

New Statesman's Duncan Campbell , and
the USSR's "World Peace Council", civil
defence evacuation in Britain helped to
deter a Nazi "knockout blow" air raid:
BEFORE we declared war on 3 September 1939
we evacuated children from London in

"Operation Pied Piper". This is hard fact.)

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1960

PRICE 2s. 6d. NET

BILLETING SURVEY FORM

District Ward or Parish

1 Address

2 Name of Householder

3 Number of habitable rooms

Adult

Children

(age)

f Male

4 Number of persons ordinarily residents

(. Female

5 Is the house suitable for (a) Unaccompanied children

( b ) Aged-infirm

id) Expectant mothers

6 Is the householder willing to take unaccompanied children?

7 Has the householder any spare beds, bedding, or other equipment?

8 Any other comments (e.g. old age or infirmity of householder, etc.)

Date of visit

Signature of visitor

REGISTRATION OF PRIORITY CLASS EVACUEES REGISTRATION OF PRIORITY CLASS EVACUEES

HOMELESS PERSONS

REST CENTRE REGISTER

CLOTHING EMERGENCY ISSUE FORM Place of Issue

CLOTHING REQUEST FORM no:

CLOTHING STOCK RETURN PAGE

Total on stocktaking

Garments requested 1 |

* For women and girls. (After stocktaking, start a new page, and carry forward “ Total on stocktaking

WE 5: 1

THE PURPOSE OF EVACUATION ANP CARE OF THE

HOMELESS

A. Aims

1 Care of the Homeless: The provision of shelter and practical help for those who lose their
homes or have to leave them because of enemy action.

? rv i T rmTfmi r T o dii p m r p n rt o f thr population before an ittar k with the obkU uf tuftin g

fcfer

B. Plans

3 Care of the Homeless: Plans for the temporary accommodation of the homeless are based
on the use of existing buildings as rest centres in which the homeless can be lodged
temporarily until they can be found more permanent accommodation in billets or
requisitioned houses. The responsibility for providing rest centres lies with county and
county borough councils who are responsible for the ordinary peace time welfare services.
The responsibility for billeting and otherwise housing the homeless rests with county
borough and county district councils who are the housing authorities in peace time. The
decision to open rest centres in war would rest with the appropriate civil defence controller.
County councils may delegate the day to day administration of the rest centre service to
county district councils, in which case there will be a need for close liaison between the
district council officer in charge locally and the chief rest centre officer of the county.
The Ministry of Housing and Local Government is the Department responsible for rest
centre service policy.

Evacuation: Evacuation policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Housing and Local
GovernmeptrTtwould be the responsibility of the Government as a whole to decide whether
to puprfly previously prepared^vacuation scheme into operation on the threat of war.

would have to consjdefwhether there was time to complete the operation before war
jroke out.

Evacuation, like^bther defence planning, has to takp^count of the latest assessments of
the type of^aftack that might be launched ancj^tfie means of defence against it. At the
presenjMime the Government are reconsidering the proposals for the evacuation of
12^tMlion members of the prioritvpkgses, which were announced in 1956. It may be
assumed however that any futurp^acuation plans will have the following basic features :

(a) The country will be divided into evacuation, neutral and reception areas.

(b) Evacuation area^m be finked as far as possible witlpspecific reception areas.

(d) There wdlbe priority classes (e.g., wonjeri^ children, the aged and infirm, blind,
crippted, etc.).

(e) The scheme will be voluntary.

(/) The details of running it wjlHie the responsibility of the following local authoiities:

(i) In evacuation area^uie county boroughs andpounty district councils wifi,
responsible fpr'assembling those to bepvdcuated and seeing that^jthey are
entrained j^ecial arrangements will bednade for the London arej^-dnder which
the L.C.C. will be responsible).

(ii) In reception areas county councils will be responsible'" for the receptiptf" of
evacuees at detraining poihts and for their onwarcj/transport to theij>r€ception
areas. County district councils (and. county boi’oughs) will be-TSsponsible for
the local reception of evacuees, their billeting and their general welfare
thereafter.

(81152)

A* 2

WE 7: 1

REST AN -B RECEPTION CENTRES

Rest Centres

2 (a) Definition

A building used for the temporary accommodation of homeless persons until such
tim e as they can return to their homes or be billeted or otherwise rehoused.

(b) Types of Rest Centres

(i) Planned Centres: Those earmarked in advance. Some may be large buildings
with good facilities (e.g. schools) and a certain amount of equipment immediately
available. There may be an emergency meals centre in the same building.

WE 8: 1

MOVEMENT

Unplanned movement of homeless from a damaged area

4 (a) Despite exhortations to “ stay put ” under cover after a nuclear attack, there will

inevitably be a number, perhaps a very large number, of people who will seek to
escape from the damaged areas; others will be driven from their homes by fire or by
the destruction of effective cover. The control of this movement of the homeless
will be largely a matter for the police and wardens, aided by street leaders, whose
aim will be (1) to get the homeless under cover in any available accommodation and
(2) to keep them away from the essential services routes.

(b) It is likely that in damaged areas no trained help may be available from the Welfare
Section, e.g., in temporary refuges where homeless have been directed in order to
get them under cover quickly. In such cases reliance must be on self-help ; the only
amenities will be those which are to be found in the refuge or which are brought
in by the occupants. Where it is possible for Welfare Section members to get to
refuges where a number of homeless are known to have congregated they should
do so and give what help they can under the existing circumstances. The most
important problems are likely to be those connected with first aid, sanitation and
water.

Movement from fall-out areas

5 (a) After nuclear attack, it may be necessary to evacuate everyone from areas in which

radioactivity from fall-out exceeds a certain intensity. Such a movement will not be
possible until about 48 hours after the attack, and it will then be carried out on
instructions from the control organisation.

(b) Welfare Section members will be concerned with the arrangements for the reception
of persons evacuated from such areas. The procedure to be followed will be similar
to that for other homeless persons. Initially they will be accommodated in rest
centres; later, as far as circumstances permit, they will be billeted. It must be
remembered that the incidence of radiation sickness among persons evacuated from
areas of intense radioactivity is likely to be high.

Notes on teaching WE 8

6 Reference may be made to the Manual of Civil Defence, Volume I, Pamphlet No. 2
“ Radioactive Fall-out Provisional Scheme of Public Control ” and to WE/WF 34 “ Control
of the Public in Radioactive Zones ”. (See also Note WE/WF 3, Part II.)

7 Throughout this session emphasis should be on the need for speed because:

fa)- Any delay in th e-evacualldn'n Kniminl might mean that thouoando of people w ould
_jem ain a t risk who might otherwise have been moved .

( b ) In view of the danger of radioactive fall-out it is essential that homeless should be
got under cover without delay; shelter in a damaged building is better than remaining
in the open.

WE 12: 1

ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEDICAL CARE

Introduction

1 In time of war the number of doctors and trained nurses available would inevitably fall far
short of the need. It follows therefore that many injuries and illnesses, where normally
skilled medical aid would be sought, will have to be dealt with by untrained or semi-trained
helpers. A great deal of this work will fall to the lot of members of the Welfare Section and
it is essential that all volunteers should acquire as much experience as possible in Home
Nursing and First Aid. As far as possible families should be kept together and should tend
each other.

Rest Centres

2 Rest centres will be working under conditions of great stress but must have space set aside
for homeless persons requiring nursing care or first aid. The proportion of the accommoda-
tion of a rest centre which will be needed at any one time for this purpose will vary initially
according to the location of the centre, and later, to the demands placed upon it.

In rest centres near the area of damage, it is likely that a large number of the homeless will
need early treatment in some form or other. In addition if a Forward Medical Aid Unit
is working in the vicinity some of the less seriously injured and psychiatric casualties who
have passed through and have been discharged by the Unit will be homeless and may need
further care at the rest centre.

The length of time the casualties will have to remain in the rest centres will depend on
circumstances but in some instances it may have to be for a considerable time. Help in
caring for casualties should be obtained from members of the patient’s family or able-bodied
homeless with particular skill and experience. When circumstances permit, advice and some
assistance may be available to the rest centre staff from general practitioners and local
authority nurses in the area.

Clearance from Z Zones

3 Persons cleared from Z Zones will normally be brought to rest centres and the procedure
for meeting their immediate needs and for billeting will be as for any other homeless.
It must be remembered, however, that among those brought out from the Z Zone some
will have received a large dose of radiation and may be expected to develop radiation sick-
ness. Cases of radiation sickness will not normally be admitted to hospital since treatment
consists mainly of rest and quiet and hospital beds will be needed for more urgent cases.
There are several phases in the illness, and the nature, and scope of the provision which
will have to be made will depend to some extent on the time which has elapsed since the
radiation dose was received. The vomiting and diarrhoea are distressing and unpleasant,
and it may be desirable to set aside special centres for treating cases of the sickness. Nursing
could be on a rota system, shared by members of the Welfare Section and others willing
and able to help.

* Z Zones are defined as areas above 10 R/hr
(10 cGy/hr) of gamma at 48 hrs after burst.

WE 10: 1

WELFARE IN B]

JETS

Main headings

1 Immediate and long tprfii welfare; visiting^afid supervise
homes; unaccompanied children; speciapgroups.

Immediate welfare

2 Initial billeting would have to be'carried out
welfare would consist simply of seeing tjadt evacuees
enough food for their nee

r x

of billets; problems of shared

pressureylinmediate
roof over their heads and

great

mg term welfare

This is an entirely dilferent problem. If a heavy^aftack on this country followed closed on
evacuation, the life-saving ^pect of the schpfne would be appreciated; people would be
ready to accept the extpeme discomfort involved and woukkrealise that only/help with
major difficulties would be possible. If/nowever, there w^ no immediate attack, or if a
large part of the country were unaffected, many individual difficulties would be brought
forward which in an extreme crisis might have beep/accepted. The Welfare Section will
ave a large part to play in helping to solve theseindividual problems which cannot be
ignored since to do so wcprid lead to a widespread lowering pi morale. It must be
remembered also that th^-need for billeting/Will continue for a^ong time after the acute
phase of hostilities. Training should prepare the volunteer for the more detailed aspect
ofiong-term welfare some of the servipeior which trainings given may npt be needed or
/may not be practicable, but it is better/fo train to the ideafomd to get as neat’ to it in practice
as circumstances permit.

Visiting and supervision of billets

\ ( a ) The amount of visitipg will depend on conditions existin&dt the time and the numte

✓ of suitable staff ayailable. The initial introduction of evacuee to householder shpbld
if possible be made by a responsible' person. Doorstep altercations may be avoided
if both sides. feel that the situation is being handled by some one in author
( b ) Billeting visitors would form a link between the household and the billeting office.
Very lpfge numbers of billeting assistants and visitors will be needea if they are to
keepdn touch with households. There will be a need for tact and complete impartiality,
/ell as a detailed knowledge of th^help available.

fillets should be visited within a few days of the initial billeting in order to advise
on major difficulties which ipay have arisen. Further visits would depend
circumstances'. If the household is settling down reasonably well, it would be
not to visit loo often, but .both householder and p^acuee must know where
help is needed.

( d ) In bjHets where there are unaccompanied children regular visits shprfld be made.
Frequent visits should be made in the pdrly stages; later, if all seems well, once a
month might ber sufficient. Children/^ho were in the care of/tne local authority
(i.e., under Children Act, 194£/or the Children and Young Persons’ Act, 1933)
at the time of evacuation, woukkdome under the supervisioifof the Children’s Officer
in the jeception area; othejxunaccompanied children ^yrould be supervised bv the
staff of the billeting offic

Problems of shared homes

5 (a) Sharing a home ismever easy even when the families are known tp^each other and

sharing is by mutual agreement. Sharing uiyzter conditions resulting from evacuation
will be infinitely more difficult.

WE 10: 2

(b) As far as possible householder and evacuee should work out their own plan for
sharing, but the billeting visitor should be ready to discuss plans and to advise if

S Both evacuee and householder should appreciate the other’s point of

cry work in this connection might be possibly.

ulties arising from shared homes :

►ility for shared 'kitchens and bathroom^timing of meals, etc. ;
iment of cost of light and fuel; /

•ility for cleaning passages, stairs, em. ;

:aning /materials and cooking utensils.

(d) The social standards and customs of evaOuees and householder may be entirely
different. The easiest solution would be fpf families to live complexly independently
but the size of the house and the available rooms might make ibis impracticable.

/ Needs ojr special groups

Unaccompptued children / /

6 (a) Special arrangements will b^made for certain groups/6f unaccompanied children,

be. (1) nursery and nursepy school children (2) children attending special schools
/ (e.g., for the handicapped). These groups will be /Accompanied by their own staff
/ and will go to pre-arpfnged accommodation in/the reception areas; it is unlikely
/ that Welfare Section/members will be called upbn to help. b

/ ( b ) Those children wjzose relatives cannot accoffipany them will be Qmlected together

in parties, sent/fo reception areas and billeted in private houses. The choice of
billets for unaccompanied children shoijlu receive special care y

(i) they should only be billeted on persons willing to accept them;

(ii) if possible they should be billejdd on persons accustomed to the care of children ;

(iii) th 6 billet must be visited regularly to ensure thaj/the children are being well
cared for. The billeting Visitor should establish friendly relations with the
householder so that visits are not looked upon as an intrusion but as an

' opportunity for friendly discussion. /

/ {N.B. See earlier reference to children in eyre of the local authority.)

if) Even householders accustomed to children mdy not be prepared for problems which
may arise when a child is separated from his family. Such problems are likely to be
more acute when separation is the result ofnurried evacuation without an opportunity
for mental preparation. The child’s insecurity may show itself in : s

(i) bed-wetting; / / /

(ii) problems of behaviour — extreme aggressiveness or timidity, temper tantrums,

pilfering. / / /

Kindness and commonsense handling will usually Enable the difficulties to be
overcome, but the billeting visitor must be able to advise the householder and must
know what practical help js available. Cases of rpal difficulty should be reported
to the billeting officer. / / /

7 In addition to unaccompanied children there will be other groups wh^se welfare will need

special consideration: / / /

(a) Expectant mothers / /

Special arrangements will be made for those within one/month of their expected
date of confinement; others will be billeted in the ordinary way but may move to
special lying-in accommodation later, if such accommodation should be available.

WE 10: 3

The address of expectant mothers’ billets should be notified to the Medical Officer
of Health so that Health Visitors may visit and advise. On leaving hospital, mother
and baby will be re-billeted. It would be an obvious advantage if they could return
to henformer billet. Special arrangements may have to be made for the care of other

J ren in the family while their mother is in hospital.

-infirm, blind persons and cripples

; degree of infirmity or handicap is not too great, these will be billeted in private
eholds. M^iiy aged and handicapped will be accompanied by members of their
iy who will be responsible for their general welfare. Those who are unaccompanied
need,gf>ecially selected billets :

(i) With householders who are prepared to give the extra care necessary.

(iiyin houses suitable for thei?articular disability, e.g., few stairs, indoor sanitation,

/he local authority’s \yelfare officer and/or any appropriate voluntary organisation
/ in the neighbourhood should be put in touch.

/ A new priority class in the revised evacuation scheme. In general, adolescents will

/ be part of family units and may be billeted with that family. They may need suitable

work apdfthis will be dealt with by the local office of the Ministry of Labour and
National Service. Where possible, organised activity for out-of-work hours should be.
arranged. Social clubs and organisations should be asked to extend their facilities
•^evacuated young people. Billeting visitors should know what is available.

/ / Notes on teaching WE 10 /

8 Volunteers who are likely to be called upon to act as billeting visitors shouktfake advantage
of any opportunity of any activity which brings theffi in contact with all types of people,
e.g., helping with clubs, outings, welfare clinics, .etc. and so gain experience in soqkl work.

9 The instructor should make it clear that the priority classes mentioned in his talk are thosp'
of the provisional evacuation scheme. / /

10 Volunteers should make themselve^famihar with the peacetime welfare services in their
neighbourhood, both statutory and voluntary, but must^ealise thaj/many, if ^ot all, of
thege services might be disrupted by war. / / 7

11 In dealing with human problems the personality of *ne individual concerned plays a very
large part in deciding how a situation may besp be handtea. Any abroach must be
extremely flexible and Capable of being adapted to meet the/circumstanpes.

Environmental Radiation Protection Factors
Provided by Civilian Vehicles

Protection

Factor

Vehicle

Position

Range

Commercial bus
(common type)

Throughout bus

1. 5-2.0

Commercial bus

(scenic cruiser type)

Throughout bus

1. 5-2.0

School bus

Throughout bus

1.5-1. 8

Passenger car

Passenger side (chest)
Driver side

1.5-1. 7
1.5-1. 7

Pickup

Driver side

1. 9-2.1

Crew cab

Driver side
Back seat

1. 8-2.0
1.8-2. 0

Carryall

Driver side
Rear side

1.7-1. 9
1. 7-1.9

2-1/2-ton truck

Driver side
Center of bed

1.8-2. 0
1.4-1. 6

5-ton truck

Driver side
Sleeper

2. 0-2. 2
1. 9-2.1

Heavy Truck

Driver side
Center of trailer

1.4-1. 6
2. 7-3.1

Fire truck

Driver side
Standing area in back

2. 7-3.1
1.6-1. 8

Switch engine

Engineer's seat

3.0-3. 5

Railway guaru car

Sleeping quarters
Kitchen area
Center area

2. 2-2.6
2. 4-2. 8
2. 0-2. 4

Heavy locomotive

Engineer's seat

3.0-3. 5

SOURCE: Z. G. Burson, "Environmental and Fallout Gamma Radiation

Protection Factors Provided by Civilian Vehicles," Health
Physics , 26, 41-44, 1974.

Outdoor Fall-out Shelter

If it is impossible for you to prepare an indoor fall-out shelter, a
trench dug outside your home would provide good protection. It should
be deep enough to provide comfortable standing room and the sides
should be shored up. After placing supports across the trench, cover
the top with boards, metal sheets or concrete slabs, and heap earth on
top. Leave a manhole-type entrance with a movable cover such as a
dustbin lid. Keep a small ladder or a pair of household steps there.

1 fW

■ i

I jA |

UK CD Handbook 10, Advising the Householder, January 1963

PERSONAL AND
FAMILY SURVIVAL

SM-3-1 1

“ . . . the history of this planet and particularly the history of
the 20th Century is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of
an irrational attack, a miscalculation, and accidental war, or a
war of escalation in which the stakes by each side gradually in-
crease to the point of maximum danger which cannot be either
foreseen or deterred. It is on this basis that civil defense can be
readily justified — as insurance for the civilian population in case
of enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be
needed — but insurance which we would never forgive ourselves
for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.”

— President Kennedy, in May 1961

Remove doors from their hinges and place them over supports

Drinking-water is required for survival. It is also useful as a
shielding material. A collapsible children’s swimming pool filled
with water and located over the best corner of your basement will
help improve the fallout protection. A bathtub, if suitably located,
can also be used for this purpose.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Foreword

If the country were ever faced with an immediate threat
of nuclear war, a copy of this booklet would be distri-
buted to every household as part of a public information
campaign which would include announcements on tele-
vision and radio and in the press. The booklet has been
designed for free and general distribution in that event.
It is being placed on sale now for those who wish to
know what they would be advised to do at such a time.

Protect and Survive
ISBN o 1 1 3407289

May 1980

If Britain is attacked by nuclear bombs or by missiles, we do not
know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault will be.

If nuclear weapons are used on a large scale, those of us living in the
country areas might be exposed to as great a risk as those in the
towns. The radioactive dust, falling where the wind blows it, will
bring the most widespread dangers of all. No part of the United
Kingdom can be considered safe from both the direct effects of the
weapons and the resultant fall-out.

The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation can
be reduced if you do as this booklet describes.

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Government, May 1980

If there is structural damage from the attack you may have some
time before a fall-out warning to do minor jobs to keep out the
weather - using curtains or sheets to cover broken windows or
holes.

If you are out of doors, take the nearest and best available cover
as quickly as possible, wiping all the dust you can from your skin
and clothing at the entrance to the building in which you shelter.

Proceedings of the Symposium
held at Washington, D. C.
April 19-23, 1965 by the
Subcommittee on Protective Structures,
Advisory Committee on Civil Defense,
National Academy of Sciences—
National Research Council

Protective

Structures

for

CIVILIAN

POPULATIONS

1966

THE PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT RADIATION
AFFORDEO BY CORE SHELTERS IN A TYPICAL

BRITISH HOUSE

Daniel T. Jones

Scientific Adviser, Home Office, London

Protective Factors in a Sample
of British Houses (Windows Blocked)

Protective

Factor

Percentage of Houses

< 26

36%

26-39

28%

40-100

29%

> 100

"A very much Improved protection could be obtained by
constructing a shelter core. This means a small, thick-
walled shelter built preferably Inside the fallout room
itself. In whioh to spend the first orltlcal hours when the
radiation from fallout would be most dangerous. "(1)

The full-scale experiments were carried out at the
Civil Defense School at Falfleld Park. ( 2 )

In the staircase construction, the shelter con-
sisted of the cupboard under the stairs, sandbags
being placed on treads above and at the sides.

A 93 curies cobalt-60 source was used.

1. Six sandbags per tread, and a double layer on
the small top landing. 96 sandbags were used.

2. As (1), together with a 4-ft-high wall of sand-
bags along the external north wall. 160 sandbags
were used.

3. As (2), together with 4-ft-high walls of sandbags
along the kitchen/cupboard partition wall and along
the passage partition. 220 sandbags were used.

9 in. brick walls

The windows and doors were not blocked

contribution

r/hr/c/ft 2

Protective

Factor

Position

Ground

Roof

House only

16.0

8.4

Lean-to

10.4

2.4

Staircase cupboard:

Stairs only sandbagged

29.2

5.3

Stairs and outer wall sandbagged

16.4

4.6

Stairs, outer wall, kitchen wall

and corridor partition

sandbagged

8.8

1.8

sandbags 24 in. x 12 in. when empty; 16 In. x
9 in. x 4 in. when filled with 25 lb of sand.

1. Civil Defence Handbook No. 10, HMSO, 1963.

2. Perryman, A. D., Home Office Report CD/SA 117.

floor area 21 sq ft.

MODEL ANALYSIS

Mr. Ivor LI. DAVIES
Suffield Experimental Station
Canadian Defense Research Board
Ralston, Alberta, Canada

Nuclear-Weapon Tests

In 1952 we fired our first nuclear device, effec-
tively a "nominal'’ weapon, at Monte Bello, off north-
west Australia. To the blast loading from this
weapon we exposed a number of reinforced- concrete
cubicle structures that had been designed for the
dynamic loading conditions, and for which we made
the best analysis of response we were competent to
make at that time. Our estimates of effects were
really a dismal failure. The structures were placed
at pressure levels of 30, 10, and 6 psi, where we ex-
pected them to be destroyed, heavily damaged with
some petaling of the front face, and extensively
cracked, respectively. In fact, the front face of the
cubicle at 30 psi was broken inwards; failure had
occurred along both diagonals, and the four tri-
angular petals had been pushed in. At the 10-psi
level, where we had three cubicles, each with a
different wall thickness (6, 9, and 12 in.), we ob-
served only light cracking in the front face of that
cubicle with the least thick wall (6 in.) . The other
two structures were apparently undamaged, as was
the single structure at the 6-psi level.

In 1957, the first proposals were made for
the construction of the underground car park in
Hyde Park in London. The Home Office was inter-
ested in this project since, in an emergency, the
structure could be used as a shelter. Consequently
a request was made to us at Atomic Weapons
Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) to design a
structure that would be resistant to a blast loading
of about 50 psi, and to test our design on the model
scale.

Using the various load- deformation curves
obtained in this test, an estimate was made of the
response of the structure to blast loading. Of par-
ticular interest was the possible effect of 100 tons
of TNT, the first 100-ton trial at Suffield in Alberta.

34 p.s.i.

Dynamic tests, Monte Bello cubicles.

A total of seven more models was made; six
were shipped to Canada and placed with the top
surface of the roof flush with the ground and at
positions where peak pressures of 100, 80, 70, 60,

50, and 40 psi were expected. The seventh model
was kept in England for static testing at about the
time of firing. The results were not as expected.

In the field, the four models farthest from the charge
were apparantly undamaged; we could see no crack-
ing with the eye, nor did soaking the models with
water reveal more than a few hair cracks. The
model nearest the charge was lightly cracked in the
roof panels and beams, and one of the columns
showed slight spalling at the head. This model had
been exposed to a peak pressure of 110 psi.

BLAST AND OTHER THREATS

Harold Brode

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Chemical High-Explosive Weapons

As in past aerial warfare, bombs and missiles
carrying chemical explosives to targets are capable
of extensive damage only when delivered in large
numbers and with high accuracy.

Biological Warfare

Most biological agents are inexpensive to produce;
their effective dissemination over hostile territories
remains the chief deterrent to their effective employ-
ment. Twenty square miles is about the area that can
be effectively covered by a single aircraft; large
area coverage presents a task for vast fleets of
fairly vulnerable planes flying tight patterns at
modest or low altitudes. While agents vary in
virulence and in their biologic decay rate, most are
quite perishable in normal open-air environments.
Since shelter and simple prophylactic measures can
be quite effective against biological agents, there is
less likelihood of the use of biological warfare on a
wholesale basis against a nation, and more chance
of limited employment on population concentrations
—perhaps by covert delivery, since shelters with
adequate filtering could insure rather complete
protection to those inside.

Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons, like biological weapons, are
relatively inexpensive to create, but face nearly
insurmountable logistics problems on delivery.
Although chemical agents produce casualties more
rapidly, the greater amounts of material to deliver
seriously limit the likelihood of their large-scale
deployment. Furthermore, chemical research does
not hold promise of the development of significantly
more toxic chemicals for future use.

Radiological Weapons

The advantages of such modifications are much
less real than apparent. In all weapons delivered by
missiles, minimizing the payload and total weight is
very important. If the total payload is not to be in-
creased, then the inclusion of inert material to be
activated by neutrons must lead to reductions in the
explosive yield. If all the weight is devoted to nuclear
explosives, then more fission-fragment activity can
be created, and it is the net difference in activity
that must be balanced against the loss of explosive
yield. As it turns out, a fission explosion is a most
efficient generator of activity, and greater total
doses are not achieved by injecting special inert
materials to be activated.

Perret, W.R., Ground Motion Studies at High Incident

Overpressure, The Sandia Corporation, Operation

PLUMBBOB, WT-1405, for Defense Atomic Support

Agency Field Command, June 1960.

The Neutron Bomb

The neutron bomb, so called because of the deliber-
ate effort to maximize the effectiveness of the neu-
trons, would necessarily be limited to rather small
yields— yields at which the neutron absorption in air
does not reduce the doses to a point at which blast
and thermal effects are dominant. The use of small
yields against large -area targets again runs into the
delivery problems faced by chemical agents and ex-
plosives, and larger yields in fewer packages pose a
less stringent problem for delivery systems in most
applications. In the unlikely event that an enemy
desired to minimize blast and thermal damage and
to create little local fallout but still kill the populace,
it would be necessary to use large numbers of care-
fully placed neutron -producing weapons burst high
enough to avoid blast damage on the ground, but low
enough to get the neutrons down. In this case, how-
ever, adequate radiation shielding for the people
would leave the city unscathed and demonstrate the
attack to be futile.

The thermal radiation from a surface burst is
expected to be less than half of that from an air
burst, both because the radiating fireball surface
is truncated and because the hot interior is partially
quenched by the megatons of injected crater mate-
rial.

SUPERSETS MIC GROUND-SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT 5 -FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration : ~340 AP g /C L ± 30 per

cent. Here acceleration is measured in g f s and over-
pressure (AP g ) in pounds per square inch. An em-
pirical refinement requires Cl to be defined as the
seismic velocity (in feet per second) for rock, but
as three fourths of the seismic velocity for soil.

OUTRUNNING GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT ~10-FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration : a ym ~ 2 x loVc L r^

+ factor 4 or -factor 2. Acceleration is measured in
g’s, and r is the scaled radial distance— i.e., r =
R/W 1 / 3 kft/fmt) 1 / 3 .

Data taken on a low air -burst shot in Nevada indicate
an exponential decay of maximum displacement with
depth. For the particular case of a burst of ~ 40 kt
at 700 ft, some measurements were made as deep
as 200 ft below the surface of Frenchman Flat, a dry
lake bed, which led to the following approximate
decay law, according to Perret.

6 = 6 Q exp (-0.017D),

where 6 represents the maximum vertical displace-
ment induced at depth D, 6 q is the maximum dis-
placement at the surface, and D is the depth in feet.

18th April, 1950.

Sir,

Civil Defence A ot, 1948
Regulat ions relating to the Evacuation of the
Civil Pop ulation (Stat uto ry Instrument 1949, No* 21 47)

Por the purpose of this transfer the system developed in the 1939/45 war has been
adopted, whereby the country is divided into evacuation, neutral and reception areas

9* ESTIMATE S OF ACCOMMODATION IN RECEPTION AREAS

In order that specific allocations may be worked out and each Reception
Authority informed of the number of members of the priority olassos for whom thoir
plans should provide, it is requested that every Reception Authority will proparo
an estimate of the total number of habitable rooms in their area. The Minister
of Health has been advised by the Associations of Local Authorities that the Rocoptia
Authorities (who are the Housing Authorities) will be able to mak e reasonably aocurat
estimates from information already available to them. The estimate should includo
all rooms normally used in the locality either as living rooms or as bedrooms.

I am to ask that this estimate may be forwarded to the Department , not later than
30th June, 1950*

IV. LATER ACTION

11, When the specific allocations of the number of members of the priority classes
for whose reception arrangements should be made in each reception area have been
decided, it will be possible to link each Reception Authority with a particular
Evacuation Authority, When the plan has been developed in this way, or as the

l.iM The Memorandum on Evacuation (Memo Ev.1 (1950) has been placed on sale.

Further copies may be purchased direct from His Majesty’s Stationery Office or from
•ay bookseller*

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

She Clerk of the Council.

-P

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Registrar-General's estimate of civil population as at mid~1948<

1939 British Government Evacuation Leaflet.

PUBLIC INFORMATION EVACUATION

LEAFLET NO. 3

WHY AND HOW?

WHY EVACUATION?

There are still a number of people who ask “ What is the need
for all this business about evacuation? Surely if war comes it
would be better for families to stick together and not go breaking
up their homes ? ”

It is quite easy to understand this feelings because it is difficult
for us in this country to realise what war in these days might mean.
If we were involved in war, our big cities might be subjected to
determined attacks from the air— at any rate in the early stages—
and although our defences are strong and are rapidly growing stronger,
some bombers would undoubtedly get through.

We must see to it then that the enemy does not secure his
chief objects— the creation of anything like panic, or the crippling
dislocation of our civil life.

One of the first measures we can take to prevent this is the
removal of the children from the more dangerous areas .

THE GOVERNMENT EVACUATION SCHEME

The Government have accordingly made plans for the removal
from what are called “ evacuable ” areas (see list at the back of
this leaflet) to safer places called “ reception ” areas, of school
children, children below school age if accompanied by their mothers
or other responsible persons, and expectant mothers and blind
persons.

The scheme is entirely a voluntary one, but clearly the children
will be much safer and happier away from the big cities where the
dangers will be greatest.

There is room in the safer areas for these children ; householders
have volunteered to provide it. They have offered homes where
the children will be made welcome. The children will have their
schoolteachers and other helpers with them and their schooling
will be continued.

WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO
Schoolchildren

Schoolchildren would assemble at their schools when told to do
so and would travel together with their teachers by train. The
transport of some 3,000,000 in all is an enormous undertaking. It
would not be possible to let all parents know in advance the place to
which each ch : ld is to be sent but they would be notified as soon as
the movement is over .

If you have children of school age, you have probably already
heard from the school or the local education authority the necessary
details of what you would have to do to get your child or children
taken away. Do not hesitate to register your children under this

scheme , particularly If you are living in a crowded area. Of course
it means heartache to be separated from your children, but you can
be quite sure that they will be well looked after. That will relieve
you of one anxiety at any rate. You cannot wish, if it is possible
to evacuate them, to let your children experience the dangers and
fears of air attack in crowded cities.

Children under five

Children below school age must be accompanied by their
mothers or some other responsible person. Mothers who wish to
go away with such children should register with the Local Authority.
Do not delay in making enquiries about this .

A number of mothers in certain areas have shown reluctance
to register. Naturally, they are anxious to stay by their menfolk.
Possibly they are thinking that they might as well wait and see;
that it may not be so bad after all. Think this over carefully and
think of your child or children in good time . Once air attacks have
begun it might be very difficult to arrange to get away.

Expectant Mothers

Expectant mothers can register at any maternity or child welfare
centre. For any further information inquire at your Town Hall.

The Blind

In the case of the Blind, registration to come under the scheme
can be secured through the home visitors, or enquiry may be made
at the Town Hall.

cities. Another 2 million
privately evacuated cities.

PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS

If you have made private arrangements for getting away your
children to relatives or friends in the country, or intend to make
them, you should remember that while the Government evacuation
scheme is in progress ordinary railway and road services will
necessarily be drastically reduced and subject to alteration at short
notice. Do not, therefore, in an emergency leave your private
plans to be carried out at the last moment. It may then be too
late.

If you happen to be away on holiday in the country or at the
seaside and an emergency arises, do not attempt to take your
children back home if you live in an “ evacuable ” area.

WORK MUST GO ON

The invasion of France The purpose of evacuation is to remove from the crowded and

vulnerable centres, if an emergency should arise, those, more parti-
in 1 94 0 led to evacuation cularly the children, whose presence cannot be of any assistance.

of children on the East

Everyone will realise that there can be no question of wholesale
clearance. We are not going to win a war by running away.

and South coasts to Most of u’s' will have work to do, and work that matters, because

we must maintain the nation’s life and the production of munitions
Wales , in preparation and other material essential to our war effort. For most of us

therefore, who do not go off into the Fighting Forces our duty
for invasion defences . will be to stand by our jobs or those new jobs which we may

undertake in war.

Efforts to evacuate kids
to Canada ended when 77
were killed when the
City of Benares was sunk
by submarine U-48 on 18
September 1940.

Northampton Independent 8.9.39.

npHEY are here. They have settled
down. Northamptonshire’s popu-
lation has increased by 39,000 with
the arrival of evacuees from the
vulnerable districts of London, writes
an “ Independent” representative.

Young children showed a brave exterior
and declined to succumb to the emotional
pange of homesickness.

Northampton people with prodigious^sym-
pathy have recognised and appreciated the
inner feelings oi these little children and
others being ruthlessly torn from their homes
through the unknown contingencies of war;
tom from their cherished belongings, then-
parents and relatives.

Some people have asked what they ought to do if they have no
such definite work or duty.

You should be very sure before deciding that there is really
nothing you can do. There is opportunity for a vast variety of
services in civil defence. YOU must judge whether in fact you
can or cannot help by remaining. If you are sure you cannot, then
there is every reason why you should go away if you can arrange
to do so, but you should take care to avoid interfering with the
official evacuation plans. If you are proposing to use the public
transport services, make your move either BEFORE the evacuation
of the children begins or AFTER it has been completed. You
will not be allowed to use transport required for the official evacuation
scheme and other essential purposes, and you must not try to take
accommodation which is required for the children and mothers
under the Government scheme.

For the rest, we must remember that it would be essential
that the work of the country should go on. Men and women
alike will have to stand firm, to maintain our effort for victory.
Such measures of protection as are possible are being pushed for-
ward for the large numbers who have to remain at their posts. That
they will be ready to do so,, no one doubts.

The “ evacuable ” areas under the Government scheme are; —

(a) London, as well as the County Boroughs of West Ham and Hast Ham ;
the Boroughs of Walthamstow, Leyton, Ilford and Barking in Essex; the
Boroughs of Tottenham, Hornsey, Willesden, Acton, and Edmonton in Middle-
sex; (b) the Medway towns of Chatham, Gillingham and Rochester; (c) Ports-
mouth, Gosport and Southampton; ( d ) Birmingham and Smethwick;
(e) Liverpool, Bootle, Birkenhead and Wallasey; (/) Manchester and Salford;
(g) Sheffield, Leeds, Bradford and Hull; (h) Newcastle and Gateshead;
(/) Edinburgh, Rosyth, Glasgow, Clydebank and Dundee.

In some of these places only certain areas will be evacuated. Evacuation
may be effected from a few other places in addition to the above, of which
notice will be given.

Issued from the Lord Privy Seal’s Office July,. 1939

15 BOYS-BANG

THE CHAIRS

M RS - MAY WELCH, of Bcaconsfield Villas, Brighton, has
so many children she doesn’t know what to do.

But, unlike those of the Old Lady
Who Lived in a Shoe, they are not
her own. They are evacuees.

She has fifteen— all boys.

“ And I can’t cope with them,” she
told the magistrate yesterday when
she was summoned for showing a
light in the black-out.

“ was one of those boys,” she ex-
plained. “ He took a candle into an
empty room.”

R. Titmuss, 1950, Problems of Social Policy, page 356:
“GOVERNMENT EVACUATION SCHEME 1939-45. The
accompanying diagram depicts the important phases in the
history of evacuation. Line A represents the total number of
persons billeted or otherwise accommodated under Government
authority and includes, as well as mothers and children,
teachers, helpers, the aged and infirm, homeless people and
other assisted groups. Line B picks out only the unaccompanied
children.”

War Years 39

Under the impact of the emergency there was a rush to acquire
first-aid knowledge, which profoundly affected the Association.
Certificates issued in 1937 totalled over 48,000. In the peak year
of 1940, the number rose to over 298,000.

Class instruction became a major matter. The Government,
through air-raid precautions, invited the Association and the Red
Cross to train Civil Defence personnel in first-aid and anti-gas
measures. . . .

Numerically, the Brigade rose. At the end of 1938 the adult
strength was just over 55,000 men and 17,000 women. A year
later the figures read : 72,000 men and 31,000 women.

- Joan Clifford, "A Good Uniform: The St John

[Ambulance Association] Story" , London, 1967

First aid in an underground shelter during World War II.

British Ministry of Health 1939 poster about evacuation:
on Friday 1 September 1939, Hitler’s Nazis invaded Poland.
This IMMEDIATELY triggered Operation Pied Piper, the
evacuation of children from cities, PRIOR to Britain
declaring war on 3 September 1939!

EVACUATION

DETAILS OF FACILITIES ARRANGED FOR

(I) OFFICIAL PARTIES

(TO BILLETS PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT)

Evocuot Ion is available for

SCHOOL CHILDREN
MOTHERS with CHILDREN of School Age or under
EXPECTANT MOTHERS

(2) ASSISTED PRIVATE EVACUATION

A frit* t'TivyV voucher and billeting allowance are provided for

CHILDREN OF SCHOOL AGE or under
MOTHERS with CHILDREN of ^ h u 0 n°d l er ge
EXPECTANT MOTHERS
AGED and BLIND PEOPLE
INFIRM and INVALIDS

who have made their own arrangements with relatives
or friends for accommodation in a safer area

♦ *0* INFORMATION ASK AT THE NEAREST SCHOOL

Where
a womans
help is
needed

VOLUNTEER FOR THE

Welfare Section

|| CIVIl DEFENCE CORPS

Ask at your Council Offices

C I V I L DEFENCE

WOMEN WANTED FOR
EVACUATION SERVICE

POPULATION DENSITY, THOUS OF PERSONS PER SQ MILE

Effectiveness of Some
Civil Defense Actions in Protecting
Urban Populations (u)

Appendix B of
Defense of the US

against Attack by Aircraft and Missiles (u)

0R0-R-17, Appendix B

0R0-R-17 (App B) Ce+tfMuE 23

i 5 i 1 1 1 1 1 i i i r

DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CITY, MILES

Fig. 10 — Population Density of Washington Target as Function of Distance
from Center of City for Three Evacuation Times

THE

A C C THE auxiliary

Hmi «Uf FIRE SERVICE

AUXILIARY FIREWOMEN are trained to do
the same jobs as regular firewomen.

They learn organisation and administration,
the control and mobilising of fire appliances
and how to operate V.H.F. radio. They may be
drivers or crews of mobile controls or canteen vans.

THE HUKBKR OP ATOMIC BOI.33 EQUIYALEWT TO TIE LAST 'JAR AIR ATTACKS ON

GREAT BRITAIN AMD GERKANf

UK National Archives HO 225/16, 30 January 1950, Top Secret

Summary

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BLAST EFFECTS

OVERPRESSURE (Dtl)

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Auinwiitj t in iiiu i ..j

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CO? 8.333

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER

A CCUPAHiaON BETIBEN THE
NUMBER OP PEOPLE KILLED PER TONNE OP BCMBS

DURING WORLD MAR I AND WORLD MAR

FIG I DENSITY OF POPULATION AND CASUALTIES PER TON OF H.E'S. &
MINES IN LONDON REGION IN JANUARY TO MAY 1941

MATH* ft» TON

» — « TOTAL camaltim mb mb

BOMB SIZES

1 75

For "World War II the average bomb weight was between 150 - ,200 kg,

(R, C» 268, Table 6), whereas for World War I the majority of bombs were
12 or 50 kg. It is known that in World War II the smaller bombs (50 kg.)
certainly did not cause fewer deaths per tonne than the larger bombs.

Thus on size alone we should expect a higher death rate in World War I
if aiy thing.

For the country as a whole the death rate per tonne for World War I
was 5*8 times that for World War II. When the comparison is reduced to
comparable areas (roughly the county of London) this factor is reduced to
4. 25. Differences in population density in the two wars are shown to
account for a factor of nearly 2 and differences in exposure for a further
factor of 1,5 to 2.

Total, casualties include killed and injured
TABLE 1

Casualty rates per tonne for all baabs dropped
during the two wars

Tonnes

dropped

Killed

Killed/ "
tonne

Total/

casualties

Casualties/

tonne

14/18

39/45

14 / l 8

WHOM

14/18

59/45

14/18

39 A 5

14/18

39 A ^

Whole

country

Londor.

Remainder

301.8

62.8

239.0

74,900

14,800

60,100

1,414

670

744

60,595

30,300

4.7

10.7

3.1

.81

2.02

.50

4,830

2,630

2,200

146,777

80,000

66,700

16.0

41.8

9.2

1.96

5.41

1.11

TABLE 2

Killed rates. London County a for both wars

Tonnes

dropped

Killed

Killed/

tonne

1915/17

19.6

349

17.8

1939/45

3591

15,171

4. 2

POPULATION DENSITY

For equal conditions of exposure (i. e. in houses or shelters) it
would be expected that the casualties from a bomb would be directly pro-
portional to the density of population round the bomb. This was borne
out by the experience of World War H as shown for example in Fig. 1
(taken from R.E.N. 544) o It will be seen that deaths per tonne tend to
be proportional to population density up to a density of about 25 persons/
acre but that thereafter the rate of increase in death rate with popula-
tion density is reduced. Two factors might account for this: the

greater population densities are associated with greater building densi-
ties, and these should provide seme measure of shielding, thus reducing
the casualty rates. Alternatively in the more densely populated areas
more people are known to have gone to shelter, and this again would reduce
the casualty rate.

Now in "World War I London was more densely populated, and a substan-
tial prqportion of the discrepancy between the figures for the two wars
is undoubtedly due to this cause.

Ksan ratio at densities IrJrTT = 1*94.

»• XI

TABLE 5

Relative safeties in World War II deduced from
population and casualty distribution

In the
open

Under

cover

■E9MH

Population exposure

60£

Location people killed

62 %

Relative safety

2sy/ 0

logs

These values are:-

1 ) A house about 3w times as safe as in the open.

2) A shelter about twice as safe as a house.

TABLE 6

Relation between various population exposures
and death rate for World War I compared with known
exposure for “florid '/far II

Population

exposure

„ , , death rates W.W.I

Location of
killed

f 0 in $0 in in'

open cover shelter

E«tio " " W.W.II

f 0 in
open

f 0 in
cover

fo in
shelter

World War 31

Possible (

1.33

1.60

1.88

War I (

Table 6 also shows the location of killed which is implied by each
of the possible population exposures. The only evidence available on
this point is that, for the day raid on June 13th, 1916, in which the total
number killed was 59, 69. 5?o °f the people killed in t he City we re in th e
open. This very limited evidence would imply a ratio of death rates”
equal to about 2.

It must be remembered that while there were no shelters as such in
1914, basement windows were sandbagged and people encouraged to use them.
The tubes were also in use to some extent (Jones' "(far in the Air",

Vol. V, 109, 134). The information which is available suggests that
not more than 3$ used shelters. On this basis the assumption of no
one in shelter will not appreciably affect the results of Table 6.

Bearing in mind that a day-time public warning system was not
introduced until June, 1917 and that the eneny was using a new weapon
for which the public was not adequately prepared it is not unreasonable
to suppose that a high percentage of people were in the open. The
Government of the time actually expressed concern at the public coming
into the open when warnings sounded (Jones* "Jar in the Air", Vol. Ill,
P.179).

cms

The National Archives

HO 22 .&/ I

ins

C scosqg.

,**•*-■

Hor^Ti oftict.

K?ms OH THE OOCDPANCr OP SHELVES HIRING ATTACK BYi O •• 5 :.^ iy

v»i Labors on loicdon - 1944 1 ^

| j'te B '.a

For the purposes of the assessment to be carried out by the
Civil Defence Joint Plannir^ Staffs working Iferty on the effects
of a heavy air attack on London it was desirable to obtain some
basis for estimating the rusher of people who might be expected to
take shelter in the event of attack by V*1 weapons.

No survey having this particular aim had been carried out but
some of the data collected during a survey in the Borough of
Wandsworth (1944.) to determine the effectiveness of various types
of shelter against V.1 attack offered some chance of arriving at
a reasonable conclusion* The survey extended over the period
1 8th June 1944 to 28th August 1944, included approximately 100
incidents and involved the examinations of about 200 Morrison
shelters, 700 Anderson shelters, 90 brick surface shelters and
also some miscellaneous types* Only shelters within 170 ft* of
the explosion were examined and the data is. confined to such cases.

Of the 100 Incidents investigated by the survey team 57 of
them gave rise to reports on 428 Anderson shelters which were
accepted for present purposes* The reports cover incidents
whenever they occurred In the 24 hours*

The mnfcer of people to whom these shelters were accessible
amounted to 1,471* 2h«> numbers who sheltered or remained in the

houses were 853 snd 6l8 respectively* Tins the percentage who
took shelter was 5$** These figures confirm a previous estimate
based on this data although the method of working could not be
traced* Tae previous estimate referred to was expressed sb
follows j-

Anderson Shelters:-

Occupancy during (toy light hours

(0600 hours to 23*00 hours)?

Occupancy during night hours

6$b.

Morrison Sheltersi-

Oocupancy during daylight hours

69>?;.

Occupancy during night hours

76?;.

— - sfcCr** "V- .

(b*b» welch j

puft uc. occAje^ c ^_ bast

Authority

' veditch
■pw^enham
Hackney
Bast Ham
Stepney
Wanstead
Leyton

Bunks

installed

flia.

'2—1,

Occupants

On 26/6/44 On 25/9 /44

13,903

5,595

1,598

932

3,984

1,000

120

13,^7

11,624

4,427

1,535

3,939

2,078

1,073

874

22,898

16,915

4,762

3,769

2,385

1,819

945

484

7,144

4,894

1,959

1,471

67,720

43,925

14,884

9,039

Public Shelters

On dates between
17/12/44 & 7/1/45

[ 27 / 12 / 44 )
I7/52A4)
22/12/44)
18/12/44)
27/12/44)
//1/45)
k 1 8/1 2/44)

Enfield
Potters Bar
Elstree
Priern Barnet
Islington
Hendon

Staines

Heston

5,574
522
5 28
553
17,085
7,677

NORTH

1,705

38 7

18,676

2,621

384
63
nil
47
2,770
3 64

64 (20/12/44)
75 (19/12/1*4)
nil (27/12/44)
105 ( 20 / 13 / 44 )
2,000 ( 7/1/45 )
223 (18/12/44)

31,939

23,482

3,628

2,467

1,023

8,178

WEST

982

5,362

88
98 7

49 (18/12/44)
314 (20/12/44)

9,201

6,344

1,075

363

NORTH WEST

Willesden

9,135

4,257

640

371 (18/12/44)

Ruialip

2,631

936

nil (26/12/44)

11,766

5,193

657

371

SOUTH

Woolwich

Wandsworth

4,929

21,862

3,919

17,701

1,413

3,876

1,457 (18/12/44)
1,859 (21/12/U.)

Southwark

8,871

21,834

5,450

2,789 (22/12/44)
1,800 (3/1/44)

ChisLehurst Caves

10,000

1,846

45,662

43,454

12,585

7,905

Total

166,288

122,398

32,829

20,195

Capacity of
bunks used

74#

2 a#

12#

SHELTER USAGE

^ I AT LA" 3> oA 0

Bermondsey

Deptford

Greenwich

Lewisham

Woolwich

Total Group A

Barking

Chigwell

Chingford

Dagenham

East Ham

Ilford

Leyton

Waltham Holy Cross
Walthamstow
Wanstead
West Ham

Total Group 7

Finsbury
Holbom
St. Pancras
Orpington
Barnes

Malden & Coomb e

Croydon

Wandsworth

Coulsdon

Stepney

Total Misc.

British Museum
Kentish Town Disused
Southwark Deep
West Ham Tunnel
West Down "

Gainsboro' "

Bethnal Green Tunnel
Liverpool Street "

Aldwych

Deep Shelters (inner)
Total

Chislehurst Caves
Surrey Tunnels
(Riddlesdown
(Brighton Road
(Epsom Downs
(Ashley Road

Dee-o Shelters (Outer)
Total

Running Tubes
New Tubes

> J

Before Fly

height of

Present

Bombs

Fly Bombs

Time

823

11,960

4,780

—

4,429

2,489

44 7

3,879

1,615

209

6,745

2,090

183

4,926 .

1,509

4,215

31,939

12,483

163

1,769

694

669

140

1,075

22?

797

300

2,251

1 ,019

522

3,165

853

—

if., 600

1,834

Nil

1,400

3,913

1,708

104

1,868

621

1,300

8,035

2,974

28,235

10,144-

9,500

1,374

159

4,210

417

228

12,700

1,791

—

500

100

Nil

400

100

1,100

100

1,500

9,800

2,290

1,050

34,381

3,372

500

25,000

7,000

98,091

1 LJm 1

106

565

175

1,280

440

866

6,042

1,435

1,813

520

1,200

385

1,539

574

854

4,170

2,150

672

930

782

285

1 ,346

498

18,885

6,959

10,000

1,900

850

1,700

500

Nil

600

Nil

400

Nil

250

12,950

2,465

7,716

73,611

15,968

10,727

5,998

84,338

21,966

36;,

l7-o

22N

56fi

26 / ,

1 5th November, 1 944 .
Copied 18/12/45 - EH

UK National Archives: HO 207/386

NUMBER OF TUBE STATION SHELTERERS

(INCLUDING LIVERPOOL STREET ALDWYCH AND BETHNAL GREEN)

SECOND BLITZ - FEB. 18th. TO MARCH 31st. 1944
NUMBER OF LONDON ALERTS - 18

1944

SCIENTIFIC ADVISER’S BRANCH

CD/SA 11 6

RESEARCH ON BLAST EFFECTS IN TUNNELS
With Speoial Reference to the Use of London Tubes as Shelter

by P. H. Pavry

Summary and Conclusions

The use of the London tube railways as shelter from nuclear weapons raises
many problems , and considerable discussion of some aspects has taken plaoe from
time to time. But - until the results of the research here described were avail-
able - no one was able to say with any certainty whether the tubes would provide
relatively safe shelter or not.

This research, consisting of a series of model experiments, has demonstrated
that the risk from blast in the tubes would be less than the risks above ground.
The results are considered to be consistent enough to provide a good estimate of
full-soale conditions, and reliable enough to be used as a basis for Home Office
shelter policy regarding the London tube railways.

Introduction

When the Advisory Group on Structural Research for Civil Defence was formed
in 1957, the Chairman recommended that a study of the effects of blast on tunnels
should be one of the main research projeots. The relevant paragraphs of. his
proposals^ 1 ) for a research programme were:-

«In any consideration of tunnels as shelter the oruoial problem is the
entry of blast, either through existing openings or from a ora ter formed
by a ground-burst bomb. It is particularly important to know if the
collapse of a tunnel by earth shook would prevent the blast from entering
it, and also whether the oollapse would provide a seal against the entry
of water from the crater. It is probable that some data oould be derived
from model experiments using H.E. oharges. But it is for consideration
whether the results would be so conclusive that the behaviour of full-sise
tunnels when damaged by megaton weapons oould be forecast with the confi-
dence that a major shelter programme would demand. H

At the second meetingC 2 ) the Group agreed that model experiments with H.E.
charges would be worthwhile, and that the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment
(A.W.R.E.) should oarxy out this researoh, which has now been accepted by the
Advisory Group as successfully completed. A summary record of the progress
follows.

100 ton TNT test on 1000 ft section of London
Underground tube at Suf field, Alberta, 3 Aug 1961

300

200

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Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, "l/40th Scale Experiment to
Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System" ,
Report AWRE-E2/62, 1962, Figure 30. (National Archives ES 3/57.)

These trials are described in a preliminary report^) prepared for
the Advisory Group by A.W.R.E. It was shown that the blast pressure
inside a tunnel system, having openings at intervals to ground level, is
less than the pressure at ground level at any distance from the explosion,
by a faotor of about 3» This reduction in pressure was apparently caused
by the station entrances acting as expansion chambers. This observation
was of outstanding significance to the consideration of London tubes as
shelter.

■ ' ‘ • i . i

All previous research on blast in tunnels - and a great amount of
work was done on this in the last war - had been conducted with blast
entering the open end of a tunnel without side openings. This research
had shown that the blast, once it had got into a tunnel, tended to travel
great distances without appreciable diminution. This had, therefore, led
to the general belief that the London tubes could be death traps rather
than shelters.

The more recent research here described showed for the first time that
a person sheltering in a tube would be exposed to a blast pressure only
about 3 as great as he would be exposed to if he was above ground, (in
addition, of course, he would be fully protected from fallout in the tube.)

In fact A.W.R.E. carried out two further tests, with more accurate
scaling of station volumes based on more detailed information from the
London Transport Executive. A full report on all four tests is in
preparation.

These later tests showed that the pressure in station tunnels was only
about 1/6th of the ground-level pressure, but that the reduction was not so
great in the sraaller-diameter train tunnels.

At this stage the Advisory Group were reasonably satisfied that this
problem - of blast entry from stations - had been solved. But the other
ma.jor question of blast entry direct from the crater remained in doubt, on
account of the very small scale of the tests to date. Therefore, when the
opportunity arose of testing at a really large scale at Suffield, Canada,
it was naturally accepted.

Large-Scale Field Test 0/kO) at Suffield, Alberta

The test is fully described in an A.W.R.E. report^. The decision of
the Canadian Defence Research Board to explode very large amounts of high
explosive provided a medium for a variety of target-response trials that was
welcome at a time when nuclear tests in Australia were suspended. A.W.R.E.
used the 100-ton explosion in 1961 to test, among other items, the model
length of the London tube, at 1/40th scale, that had already been tested
at Vll7 scale.

Blast Entry from Stations

There was remarkable agreement with the ^/ll7th scale trials:

"maximum overpressure in the train tunnels was of the order of 3rd the
corresponding peak shock overpressure in the incident blast. The pres-
sures in the stations were about ^ / 6th those in the corresponding incident

blast ". In comparing the results at the two scales it was noted

that the pressures in the train tunnels (between stations) was higher at
Suffield than at the smaller scale; this may, the report suggests, have
been due to some blast entry from the crater at Suffield.

Blast Entry from the Crater

There may - as has just been noted - have been some entry of blast at
the crater. But the all-important fact is that it was nowhere enough to
bring the pressure in the tunnel up to more than a 3rd of the free-air pres-
sure (see fig. 30 reproduced, and attached to this note.) From this, and
from a detailed study of tunnel rings ejected by the explosion over a wide
area, it can be concluded that the instantaneous crushing of the tube near
the crater sealed it against the entry of any significant blast pressure.

Air Flow in Stations

The Report indicates that there would be turbulence generated by blast
entiy at stations and that there would be a danger to occupants there, on
account of blast "windage" acting on them and on missiles that could injure
them. This danger would be less in the train tunnels between stations.

Conclusion

The Advisory Croup discussed the Suffield Test on tunnels on Nov. 1 st
1962, and concluded that model experiments have successfully demonstrated
that the risks from blast inside the London tubes would be less than above
ground. The Croup considered that the results obtained were consistent
enough to provide as good an estimate of full-scale effects from megaton
weapons as was likely to be obtainable, and that the Chairman could advise
the Home Office confidently on the basis of these results. The Croup
acoepted that there would be a risk of casualty-producing air flow in
stations, but decided to defer a decision on whether further research on
this problem would be profitable. The Chairman said that he would first
convey the results of the completed research to the Shelter Division of the
Home Office before asking the Croup whether it was worth studying this
remaining, but less important, problem.

3rd October, 19&3*

References

(1) Advisory Croup on Structural Research for Civil Defence

Note by Chairman on the Structural Research Programme
for Shelters. SAB/SC(57)6. (Restricted)

(2) Notes of Meeting on 15th May 1957. SAB/SC(57)2hd Minutes

(Confidential)

(3) The Entry of Air Blast from Craters into Tunnels. A.W.R.E

Report El/59 (Official Use Only)

(4) The Effect of Tunnel Blockage on Shock Waves .... SAB/SC(58)6

(Confidential)

(5) Model Experiments on the Entry of Blast into the London Underground

System, Interim Report on Rounds 1 and 2. SAB/SC(59)4

(Confidential)

(6) Vwth scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on

the London Underground System. A.W.R.E. Report E 2 / 62 .

(Official Use Only.)

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Goodge Street, Stockwell, Clapham North,

Clapham Common, Clapham South FIG. 1

(government air raid shelters, built in 1940-2) Deep shelters were used by public from July 1944 after VI MOTT MAY AND ANDERSON

Building began on 27 November 1940 attacks began on 13 June 1944 (V2s began on 8 September) CONSULTING ENGINEERS, LONDON

UK National Archives: WORK 95/9, 1989-1997,
"Clapham South Deep Tube Shelter: Management"

Section of shelter Tunnel

TECHNICAL

GUIDANCE

Government bookshops

49 High Holborn, London WC1V 6HB
13a Castle Street, Edinburgh EH2 3AR
41 The Hayes, Cardiff CF1 1 JW
Brazennose Street, Manchester M60 8AS
Southey House, Wine Street, Bristol BS1 2BQ
258 Broad Street, Birmingham B1 2HE
80 Chichester Street, Belfast BT1 4JY

Government publications are also available through booksellers

Prepared by the Home Office and the Central Office of Information 1981

Printed in England for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office by Hobbs the Printers of Southampton

ISBN 0 11 340777 7 (2462) Dd7 17557 C40 1/82 G381

Introduction

This manual of technical guidance on the design of domestic nuclear shelters has been
prepared by a working group set up by the Emergency Services Division of the Home
Office. The working group was asked to consider designs of nuclear shelters which could
be made available to members of the public in the United Kingdom who might wish to
purchase and install shelters for the use of themselves and their families.

The working group realised that the range of designs which it might produce would not
be exhaustive. However, it was aware of the need to give technical guidance to
professional engineers to assist them in producing reliable shelter designs. Thus the first
three chapters of this book are written to give such guidance.

The other four chapters of the book give detailed designs of five shelters. These five cover
a range of types which are applicable to different sorts of houses; they also cover a wide
price range. These designs are not intended to be exhaustive, and as explained in the text,
the working group is already giving attention to other designs, particularly those which
might be incorporated into existing or new houses and also underground shelters of shapes
other than box-like and using materials other than concrete. It is planned to publish
details of this work at a later date.

The members of the working group are:

Mr J C Cotterill, Chairman
Dr J R Stealey
Mr A Lindfield
Mr K A Day

Mr R W T Haines, C Eng
Mr H G S Banks, C Eng
Mr M Connell, C Eng

Mr S Bell, C Eng

Mr S England, C Eng

Mr I Leys

Major I C T Ingall
Mr R Million, Secretary

Scientific Advisory Branch, Home Office

F6 Division, Home Office

Directorate of Works, Home Office

Directorate of Civil Engineering Services
Property Services Agency, Department
of Environment

Directorate of Mechanical and Electrical
Engineering Services
Property Services Agency, Department
of Environment

Atomic Weapons Research

Establishment, Ministry of Defence
Foulness

HQ United Kingdom Land Forces
Wilton, Wilts.

F6 Division, Home Office

Any enquiries concerning this manual should be addressed to the Home Office,
F6 Division, and not to individual members of the working group.

To obtain some protection from the heat it is necessary to move out of the direct path of
the rays from the fireball; any kind of shade will be of some value. In shelter design, any
materials affording protection against ionising radiation or blast will give more than
adequate protection against the heat. However it is important to ensure that no exposed
parts of the shelter (such as the facings of doors) are made of flammable materials. In
the case of shelters made from plastic materials such as GRP (glass reinforced plastic) it is
essential that no surfaces should be exposed to the heat pulse. It is unlikely that such
plastic materials would catch fire, but they may melt or distort. Since the blast wave
follows the heat pulse, such distorted areas may result in lowered blast fesistance.

It is considered unlikely that the heat flash from a nuclear explosion would give rise to
fire-storms. In the last war, fire-storms were caused in the old city of Hamburg as a result
of heavy incendiary attacks and at Hiroshima but not at Nagasaki. A close study of these
cities and of German cities where fire-storms did and did not occur revealed several
interesting features. A fire-storm occurred only in an area of several square miles, heavily
built up with buildings containing plenty of combustible material and where at least every
other building in the area had been set alight. It is not considered that the initial density
of fires, equivalent to one in every other building, would be caused by a nuclear explosion
over a British city. Studies have shown that due to shielding, a much smaller proportion
of buildings than this would be exposed to the heat flash. Moreover, the buildings in the
centres of most British cities are now more fire-resistant and more widely spaced than they
were 30 to 40 years ago. This low risk of fire-storms would be reduced still further by the
control of small initial and secondary fires.

2. Shielding for INR

INR has greater energy and penetration than the radiation from fallout. The intensity of
both INR and fallout radiation are reduced in proportion to the density of the shielding
material. This can be expressed in terms of the ‘half-value thickness’ which is the thickness
of a particular shielding material required to halve the radiation dose-rate. The approximate
half-value thicknesses of some shielding materials against INR are given in Fig. 8.

Fig. 8 Half-value thicknesses of shielding materials

Against INR
mm (inches)

Against fallout radiation
mm (inches)

Steel

(1.5)

(0.7)

Concrete

152

(6.0)

(2.2)

Earth

190

(7.5)

(3,3)

Water

330

(13.0)

122

(4.8)

Brickwork

157

(6.2)

(2.8)

3. Slant incidence of INR

Most of the INR from a nuclear explosion arriving at a given point comes in a direct line
from the fireball. There is a certain amount of scattering known as ‘skyshine’ which
means that some initial gamma radiation might be received by a person shielded by a
barrier from the light and heat flash (see Fig. 10). The amount of scattering of initial
gamma radiation depends upon a number of factors, but probably amounts to about 10
per cent of that in the main beam.

Chapter 5

Indoor kit shelter design

^ M of n So7\

General

JtjiMer)

This chapter gives information about an indoor shelter suitable for erection in homes that
have basements or rooms that can be converted into a fallout room. It can be used as the
‘inner refuge’ referred to in the Home Office booklet Protect and Survive and anybody
considering purchasing or using such a shelter should read Protect and Survive and be
totally familiar with its contents.

Fig. 65 Location of shelter

Indoor kit-type shelter

DOOR OF
II FALL OUT
]| ROOM l£FT|
OPEN

SOUP INTERNAL WALL

THICKNESS EQUIVALENT TO 1 BRICK WALL
FOR SIDES FACING SOLID INTERNAL WALLS

THICKNESS EQUIVALENT TO
BRICK WALL FOR SIDES FACING
EXTERNAL WALLS

**' >> }> >> . ,

// // // // //, ,
^ ^ ^ " U

EMERGENCY
ESCAPE TUNNEL

,600*600mmDRy
LAID EMERGENCY
KNOCK OUT AREA

EXTERNAL OPENINGS BLOCKED UP WITH MATERIAL
OF SAME WEIGHT AS EXTERNAL WALL

Fig. 67 Shelter surrounded with sandbags

E K^Ti^Ak) CEL To 0>e. Positioned
F^oiOG- A solid WAli

SOLID PARTY WALL

Fig. 12 Protective factors of various buildings against initial gamma, neutron and fallout
gamma radiation

Structure

Initial gamma

Neutrons

Fallout gamma

1 metre
underground

250-500

100-500

5000

Shelter partly
above ground:
with 600 mm earth
900 mm earth

15-35

50-150

12-50

20-100

50-200

200-1000

Considerations arising from the probable attack pattern

In section 1.1.1 reference was made to the fact that an expected attack pattern on the
United Kingdom might use 200 megatons on about 80 targets. If we now make an
assumption that this attack would be in the form of 100 weapons of 1 MT airbursts and
100 weapons of 1 MT groundbursts we can use the information given in Fig. 6 to indicate
the probability of areas being subject to various effects.

On this assumption, we should find that about 2.2 per cent of the land area of the UK
would be subject to overpressures in the ‘A’ ring of 77 kPa (1 1 psi) and above about 1.8
per cent would be subject to overpressures of between 42 and 77 kPa (6-11 psi) in the ‘B’
ring and about 10 per cent of the land area would be subject to overpressures of between
10 and 42 kPa (1.5 to 6 psi). The rest of the land area, about 85 per cent, would be
subject to blast in the D ring of 5 to 10 kPa (0.75 to 1.5 psi) or to no blast at all. Blast
effects in the D ring will cause minor damage to buildings and no lethalities. It is
impossible to determine the extent of the total D ring areas since many of these will
overlap from adjacent bombs. Any part of the country might be subject to radiation from
fallout.

Further comments on Home Office shelter designs

Chapters 4 to 7 of this book give details of the Home Office shelter designs and, where
appropriate, detailed instructions for construction. It will be useful however to discuss
here the reasons why this range of shelters has been chosen. Other designs are under
consideration and it is planned to make details of these available later.

Limitations related to houses and gardens

In making recommendations for shelters it has been necessary to keep in mind the varying
needs governed by the types of housing in the United Kingdom. Very roughly housing can
be divided into the following groups:

a. Detached or semi-detached houses where there is appropriate access to the rear
garden. (About 34%).

b. Semi-detached and terrace housing where there is no access to the rear garden,
except through the house. (About 20%).

c. Houses with no rear garden. Such houses usually have a passage between the rows of
terraces with access to a back yard. (About 25%).

d. Multi-storey blocks of flats. (About 12%).

e. Flats resulting from the conversion of 2, 3 and 4 storey houses. There is usually
some garden space available attached to such property. (About 7%).

f. Bungalows, usually with accessible gardens. (About 2%).

g. Caravans.

Protective

Structures

for

CIVILIAN

POPULATIONS

1966

MODEL ANALYSIS

Mr. Ivor LI. DAVIES
Suffield Experimental Station
Canadian Defense Research Board
Ralston, Alberta, Canada

Nuclear-Weapon Tests

34 p.s.i.

Dynamic tests, Monte Bello cubicles.

A total of seven more models was made; six
were shipped to Canada and placed with the top
surface of the roof flush with the ground and at
positions where peak pressures of 100, 80, 70, 60,

50, and 40 psi were expected. The seventh model
was kept in England for static testing at about the
time of firing. The results were not as expected.

THE PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT RADIATION
AFFORDEO BY CORE SHELTERS IN A TYPICAL

BRITISH HOUSE

Daniel T. Jones

Scientific Adviser, Home Office, London

Protective Factors in a Sample
of British Houses (Windows Blocked)

Protective

Factor

Percentage of Houses

< 26

36%

26-39

28%

40-100

29%

> 100

The full-scale experiments were carried out at the
Civil Defense School at Falfleld Park. ( 2 )

In the staircase construction, the shelter con-
sisted of the cupboard under the stairs, sandbags
being placed on treads above and at the sides.

A 93 curies cobalt-60 source was used.

1. Six sandbags per tread, and a double layer on
the small top landing. 96 sandbags were used.

2. As (1), together with a 4-ft-high wall of sand-
bags along the external north wall. 160 sandbags
were used.

3. As (2), together with 4-ft-high walls of sandbags
along the kitchen/cupboard partition wall and along
the passage partition. 220 sandbags were used.

9 in. brick walls

The windows and doors were not blocked

contribution

r/hr/c/ft 2

Protective

Factor

Position

Ground

Roof

House only

16.0

8.4

Lean-to

10.4

2.4

Staircase cupboard:

Stairs only sandbagged

29.2

5.3

Stairs and outer wall sandbagged

16.4

4.6

Stairs, outer wall, kitchen wall

and corridor partition

sandbagged

8.8

1.8

sandbags 24 in. x 12 in. when empty; 16 In. x
9 in. x 4 in. when filled with 25 lb of sand.

1. Civil Defence Handbook No. 10, HMSO, 1963.

2. Perryman, A. D., Home Office Report CD/SA 117.

floor area 21 sq ft.

BLAST AND OTHER THREATS

Harold Brode

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Chemical High-Explosive Weapons

As in past aerial warfare, bombs and missiles
carrying chemical explosives to targets are capable
of extensive damage only when delivered in large
numbers and with high accuracy.

Biological Warfare

Chemical Weapons

Radiological Weapons

Perret, W.R., Ground Motion Studies at High Incident
Overpressure, The Sandia Corporation, Operation
PLUMBBOB, WT-1405, for Defense Atomic Support
Agency Field Command, June 1960.

The Neutron Bomb

SUPERSETS MIC GROUND-SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT 5 -FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration : ~340 AP g /C L ± 30 per

OUTRUNNING GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT ~10-FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration : a ym ~ 2 x loVc L r^

+ factor 4 or -factor 2. Acceleration is measured in
g’s, and r is the scaled radial distance— i.e., r =
R/W 1 / 3 kft/fmt) 1 / 3 .

6 = 6 Q exp (-0.017D),

where 6 represents the maximum vertical displace-
ment induced at depth D, 6 q is the maximum dis-
placement at the surface, and D is the depth in feet.

Foreword

Protect and Survive
ISBN o 1 1 3407289

May 1980

If Britain is attacked by nuclear bombs or by missiles, we do not
know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault will be.

The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation can
be reduced if you do as this booklet describes.

Use tables if they are large enough to provide you all with
shelter. Surround them and cover them with heavy furniture
filled with sand, earth, books or clothing.

Use the cupboard under the stairs if it is in your fall-out room.
Put bags of earth or sand on the stairs and along the wall of the
cupboard. If the stairs are on an outside wall, strengthen the
wall outside in the same way to a height of six feet.

What to do after the Attack:

After a nuclear attack, there will be a short period before fall-out
starts to descend. Use this time to do essential tasks. This is what

you should do.

Do not smoke.

Check that gas, electricity and
other fuel supplies and all
pilot lights are turned off.

Go round the house and put
out any small fires using
mains water if you can.

If anyone’s clothing catches
fire, lay them on the floor and
roll them in a blanket, rug or
thick coat.

If there is structural damage from the attack you may have some
time before a fall-out warning to do minor jobs to keep out the
weather - using curtains or sheets to cover broken windows or
holes.

■II

2 Jems The National Archives

— r — r -

■

HO 2 .15 hZ\

CSOO 5^4-

HOME OFFICE

SCIENTIFIC ADVISER’S BRANCH

CD/SA 121

IGNITION AND FIRS SPREAD IN URBAN AREAS
FOLLOWING- A NUCLEAR ATTACK

INITIAL FIRE INCIDENCE

G. R. St anbury

For a 1 MT grocndburst bomb the height of the top of the fireball above
ground is about 0.72 miles. Because this distance is large compared with
the height of most buildings, the exposed upper floors do actually see a
large part of the fireball and not just the top of it, but in assuming that
the radiation is just as intense from the top as from the middle we were
overestimating the fire risk.

On the above basis the following table gives the number of exposed
upper floors (to the nearest £ floor) for a range of distances from the
explosion and a range of street widths.

Effect of Shielding: Estimation of the number of exposed floors

Assuming that buildings on opposite sides of a street which is
receiving heat radiation from a direction perpendicular to its length
are of the same height

we take the average depth of a floor to be 10 ft.

Angle between heat
flash and street
(degrees)

90-75

75-60

60-45

45-30

30-15

15-0

Proportion of heat
flash entering
windows %

92*5

SPREAD OF PIEB

Prom last war experience of mass fire raids in Germany it was concluded
that the overall spread factor was about 2; i.e« about twice as many buildings
were destroyed by fire as were actually set alight by incendiary bombs

Number of fires started per square mile in the
fire-storm raid on Hamburg. 27th/28th July, 1943

Bombs dropped

102 *°as H.B. 88 tons I*B.

However, the important thing to note is that the total number of fires
started in each square mile (2,500) was nearly half that of the total number of
buildings; in other words, almost every other building was set on fire the

raid itself* When this happened no fire-fighting organisation, however efficient
could hope to prevent the fires from joining together and engulfing the whole area.

When the figure of 1 in 2 for the German fire storms is compared with the
figures for initial fire incidence of r*j 1 in 15 to 30 obtained in the Birmingham
and Liverpool studies it can only be oonoluded that a nuclear explosion oould not
possibly produce a fire storm*

Firg situation from 1 .499 fly bomba in the built-up
. , part of the London Region

yjvJU hqfr f \ 'TNj r^Wfs)

Where dropped

Number
of fly
bombs

V «

Fly Bombs Caused

No fire

Small

fire

Medium

fire

Serious

fire

Major

fire

City

119

439-

West-End

Closed

Residential

430

207

205

Open

Residential

804

478

296

Docks

113

Grand Totals

1,499

804

609

D1 sou ss ion of results

Two important points emerge from a study of these results

(i) The small proportion of fly bombs - less than 20$ - which
started fires of any greater category than "small" even in
the most heavily built-up areas; and

(ii) Tbs large proportion which started no fires at all even in
the most heavily built-up areas.

All these fly bombs fell in the summer months of 1 944 which were unusually
dry. In winter in this oountry in residential areas there are many open fires
which may provide extra sources of ignition. The domestic occupanoy is a low
^■ re risk however * and as the proportion of such property in the important City
and Vest End areas is small this should not introduce any serious error , Uore-
ov °r, io winter, the high atmospherio humidity and the correspondingly high
moisture oontent of timber would tend to retard or even prevent the growth of fire.

In order to determine how many fly bombs are equivalent to one nominal
atomic bomb one method is to compare the areas over which a given category of
house damage is produced by each. If we do this for a fth mile air burst as
at Hiroshima, the result is that 1 atomic bomb does as much damage as about
1 ,200 fly bomba.

This in itself is not a serious fire situation and it Is doubtful whether
it could ever give rise to a fire storm. In Hamburg 2,500 fires were started
per square mile by a bomb density (combined H.E. and I.B.) of 2oo tons per
square mile, and for the area of destruction produced by an atomic bomb this
would correspond to a total of about 10,000 fires.

Takata, A.N., Mathematical Modeling of Fire Defenses, IITRI, March 1970, AD 705 388.

IF YOU THINK ITS HOPELESS , YOU’RE WRONG

The FOURTH Arm

Traditionally, we have three Services in this country: the Royal Navy,
the Army, and the Royal Air Force. Now, we have a fourth service of the
Crown — unarmed, volunteer, put-time — but not less vital than the
others: Civil Defence. We have peacetime Civil Defence for just the
same reasons that we have a peacetime Navy, Army and Air Force: it is
an essential part of our ordinary peacetime national preparedness.
Thai is all there is to it.

FOUR STRAIGHTFORWARD SIMPLE FACTS ABOUT

Civil Defence Today

WHAT YOU CAN DO IN CIVIL DEFENCE

Five Sections: which will you join?

The WELFARE Seaton would be
called on fint to help in bringing
care and comfort to tome tnillioos of
cvacucct. But that is only the begin-
ning of their job. After an attack,
there would be more milltocu of
people, to be housed, clothed, fed
and kept healthy. Our very survival
could depend on what the Welfare
Seaton did then. The Welfare
Seaton needs dependable, intelli-
gent, capable men and women; and
it needs them now.

The basic minimum of information for every responsible man and woman

unde manding of many important events that we are all involved
in, whether we like it or not.

Besides this, there is a practical, everyday value in the things
you learn. Take just one pan of it — Fint Aid. In Great Britain in
1956 there were over a quarter of a million casualties from motor
accidents, and probably at least another million casualties from
wri dfnrs in the home. What you know— or don’t know about
First Aid could make all the difference to somebody.

Do you know how to put out a fire? Do you know bow to
eperate a radio transmitter? These are two more of the useful,
interesting things that Civil Defence could teach you, now.

Do you remember the East Coast floods, the Lynmoutb
disaster, the Harrow rail smash? These arc three of the emergen-
cies where trained volunteers from Civil Defence were ready and
able to help. They were needed.

fl The H-Bomb: we hear too much of the horrors,
J not enough about our chances of survival. Some
people will tell you that if this country were attacked with H-Bombs,
every man jack of the population would be wiped out. That just
im'f true: it isn’t anything LIKE the truth.

There would be terrible devastation, but for millions and
milli ons of people, chances of survival would be very good. It
depends very much 00 our Civil Defence. The mote people we
have in it, the better.

Warden Section

Civil Defence is well on with the Job already.

f ‘ Some people think of Civil Defence equipment as a long-

handled shovel, a rather odd tin hat, and so on.

Well, it’s not like that at all. Civil Defence today is a modern,
country-wide Service, which offers you training with first-class
equipment — radio and radiation-testing instruments, fire-fighting
apparatus and rescue gear, and the latest four-wheel-drive vehicles.
There are th o u sand* of qualified Instructors, three full-time
Instructors’ Schools, and a Staff College for advanced courses
and studies.

The more you get to know about Civil Defence, the more
impressed you become.

There is a Civil Defence organisation in every town in the
Kingdom, and there are units in thousands of industrial firms.
There arc half a million people in the Civil Defence Services
today. But half a milli on is not enough: not nearly.

well h strength.

^TCivfl Defence wants more volunteers, NOW.

It’s no good saying “I’ll be there on the day.” That’s
loo late. There wouldn’t be time to train you and organise you.

It’s no good leaving Civil Defence to other people. For every-
body else. The Other Fellow is YOU.

You live in this world, you are part of the nuclear-age— there is
no opting-out for anybody. Civil Defence maUerr—aad matters

to YOU.

Go along to your Council Offices today, and ask about Civil
Defence. There’s no commitment, no ‘bull’, no length-of-service

The AMBULANCE AND CASU-
ALTY COLLECTING Sea ion
want two sorts of people— casualty
collectors, to give First Aid and
see that the injured get back safclr
to the ambulances — and driven
to take the ambulances back n
hospital. This is work for both men

IN EVERY SECTION
YOU GET

FIRST AID TRAINING

Your training takes only about one hour a week. The classes are
free, and are near your own home. The knowledge you gain could
be useful to you at any time, and would be vital to you if we
were at War.

Civil Defence is sound common sense. It’s high tune you
were in it.

ArV) civil Defence is useful to you now, in peace. In
Civil Defence today, you learn. That is the whole aim and
object of joining.

You learn, first and foremost, how to live with your eyes open
in the same world as the H-Bomb. You begin to learn what this
new, nuclcar-age world is really like. You acquire a fuller, deeper

Ambulance and Casualty Collecting Section

Civil Defence Recruiting Drives are going on now, all over the country.
Their object is to tell you all about Civil Defence — what it can do,
what it IS doing and whai there is in tt for you.

Go to your Council Offices and ask, today. They will be glad to see you.

UK National Archives: INF 2/122 September 1957 national press advert

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HOME OFFICE

CIVIL DEFENCE

Manual of Basic Training

VOLUME II

ATOMIC WARFARE

PAMPHLET No. 6

(Based on survival in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki after 20 kt bursts)

LONDON: HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1950

TWO SHILLINGS NET

FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER

The object of this pamphlet is to provide all members of the Civil
Defence Corps and other Services associated with Civil Defence
with a short manual of practical information about the atomic bomb
and its effects. It is, of course, our earnest hope that we shall
never have to experience the horrors of an atomic attack. The
tremendous force of atomic power should be used for industrial and
humanitarian purposes and not for mass destruction. Ever since
the Washington Declaration, which I signed with the President of
the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada in November
1945, the United Kingdom has pressed for international agreement
to ensure that atomic energy should be used only for peaceful pur-
poses. But any such agreement would be illusory without the most
rigorous system of international control. Although nearly two years
ago nine out of the eleven members of the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission agreed on what they considered to be a really
effective plan for the control of atomic energy and although this
plan was subsequently approved by the overwhelming majority of
the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Soviet Union has
so far refused to accept it, and has instead put forward counter-
proposals which were rejected in the Commission by a nine to two
vote on the ground that they did not provide an adequate basis for
effective international control. We shall not, however, abandon
our hope that an effective system of international control may
ultimately be adopted by the United Nations, and we for our part
will certainly do all in our power to make such an agreement possible.
In the meantime we must proceed with our Civil Defence prepara-
tions on the basis that, in the event of war, we might be subjected
to atomic attack and with the object of minimising the casualties
which must inevitably accompany such an attack.

June, 1950.

CONTENTS

NOTE

The pagination of this pamphlet is not continuous as it
may be necessary to introduce new pages at a later date.

FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I FEATURES OF AN ATOMIC EXPLOSION

Page

Methods of Attack

• • •

General Description of the Explosion ...

• • ♦

Dangers Resulting from the Explosion

# • •

(i) Heat Flash

(ii) Radioactivity (Immediate Danger)

(a) Gamma Rays

(b) Neutrons

(iii) Radioactivity (Delayed Danger) ...

(a) Fission Products

(b) Induced Radioactivity

(iv) Blast

Casualty Considerations

5. Estimate of Casualties in a British City
CHAPTER II HEAT FLASH

10.

Effects on Persons

...

11.

Effects on Material

• •

...

12. Problems of a Fire Storm

CHAPTER III RADIOACTIVITY

. . .

...

17.

Immediate Effects

• 1 «

• • #

18.

Protection against Immediate Effects ...

• • •

t « a

19.

Delayed Effects

• • •

t • ♦

20.

Protection against Delayed Effects

• • •

v ♦ *

(i) Detection (Radiation Metering) ...*

• • •

(ii) Suitable Clothing and Equipment

t • •

(iii) Avoidance of Heavily Contaminated Areas

• • •

(iv) Personal Cleansing

• • •

(v) Decontamination

• • •

(a) Clothing

(b) Other Materials

• • •

...

(d) Food

(vi) Periodical Examination and Rules

• • • • • •
Governing

Exposure

• • •

21.

Radiation Syndrome

• • •

(i) Acute

• • •

(ii) Chronic

# • •

• • •

22. Radioactivity Poisoning

CHAPTER IV BLAST

• • •

27.

Effects on Persons

• 19

28.

Effects on Material

• • •

t t t

29.

Effects on Public Utility Services

• • •

30.

Rescue Problems

t f «

t • •

Photo No. 18. NAGASAKI. Typical small earth-covered back yard
shelter with crude wooden frame, less than 100 yds. from the centre of damage,
which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters, but whereas
nearly all those as close as this one had their roofs forced in, only half were
damaged at 300 yds., and practically none at half a mile from the centre of

Debunking impulse blast criteria:

PRESSURE (Lb/sq in.) fC | L5 ^ J itT

Figure 2 shows a typical pressure-time curve from a medium
sized high explosive bomb at a distance at which fairly severe
structural damage would be caused. — pag0 1 1

If the impulse criterion were applied to the atomic bomb it would
be expected to demolish 9-inch brick walls to a distance of over
10 miles. However, at this distance from the atomic bomb the peak
pressure is only about 0.1 lb./sq. in. which is very much less than
the static strength of the wall, and consequently, however long this
pressure is applied, it cannot hurt the wall. It will thus be seen
that the impulse criterion breaks down for the atomic bomb.

The position is that the blast impulse is only the criterion of damage
so long as the maximum blast pressure is substantially greater than
the static strength of the target, and this is not the case at the
limits of damage to normal structures with an atomic bomb. With
the atomic bomb, therefore, blast pressure rather than impulse
tends to be the criterion of damage. If the effective blast pressure
exceeds the static strength of the structure failure must be expected,
whereas if it is less no failure can occur however long the duration

of the blast. _ page 12 (debunks American propaganda!

Photo No. 7. HIROSHIMA. Reinforced concrete building about
300 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the left of the photograph. There
was no serious structural damage, although a roof panel was depressed and some
internal party walls were deflected. Designed for earthquake resistance, this
building has a composite reinforced concrete and steel frame.

SIMPLE WALL SURVIVING CLOSE TO GROUND ZERO

Photos Nos. 1 and 2. HIROSHIMA. General views looking across the
centre of damage, the approximate position of which is marked with an arrow.

It will be seen that some of the framed buildings quite near the centre remained
standing. The tall building in Photo No. 1 is the same as that seen in Photo No. 7.

The foreground illustrates the remnants of Japanese dwellings, razed to the
ground

THE OBSOLETE WOODEN HOUSES BURNED DOWN

Protection against blast would not present an insoluble problem.
Japanese air raid shelters, even of poor construction, stood up well
and underground shelters were a complete protection. Shelters
could be constructed to resist both blast and gamma rays.

28. Effects on Material \ *•

From air burst bombs the blast wave is from above downwards
and strikes roofs first, and near the centre of the damaged area
buildings are collapsed or, with specially strong buildings, roofs are
crushed in or dished even where the walls remain standing.
Further away, where the blast wave is becoming more horizontal,
buildings are pushed over or distorted.

The type of building and the distance from ground zero are the
factors influencing reaction to blast. Unframed buildings like ordinary
dwelling houses suffer more severe damage than framed buildings,
whether of reinforced concrete or steel, and buildings of earthquake-
resisting construction remain practically undamaged at 2,000 feet
from ground zero. Bridges, which are built to withstand vertical
pressure, stand up to the blast much better than ordinary houses,
which are not so constructed, though reflection from roads, rivers,
etc., may cause displacement on the underside and is a point to be
carefully watched.

The British Mission estimated that from a high air burst bomb
such as was used in Japan, an ordinary British city with 15 houses
and 45 persons to the acre would suffer damage to dwelling houses
to a distance of 2 to 2\ miles from ground zero on the following
scale: —

Average Radius from

Nature of Damage Ground Zero and Number

of Houses Involved

Demolished or requiring demolition 1 mile

30.000 houses

Uninhabitable and requiring major repairs 1-1£ miles

35.000 houses

5. Estimates of Casualties in a British City - — > £-0 ) ^

If the people in our cities were caught, as were the Japanese,
without warning, before any evacuation had taken place, and with
no suitable shelters, the casualties caused by a high air burst bomb
would be formidable. The British Mission to Japan estimated that
under these circumstances as many as 50,000 people might lose
their lives in a typical British city with a population density of
45 persons to the acre. Much can be done, however, to mitigate
the effects of the bomb and to save life, and it is certain that with
adequate advance preparations, including the provision of suitable
shelters and with good Civil Defence services, the lives lost could
be reduced to a fraction of the number estimated by the British
Mission.

The figures set out in the preceding paragraph are those given asi
an estimate by the British Mission from the experience of the high
air burst bombs used in Japan and under similar conditions would
apply to persons in a British city. It must be stressed however
that they apply to persons caught in the open with no warning or
suitable shelter, and that even ordinary houses will give some degree
of protection by lessening the intensity of the rays that penetrate
them. pyy ££ q

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SURVIVAL IN WOODEN AND CONCRETE BUILDINGS, HIROSHIMA

TABLE 7.3

Casualties among the Groups Exposed to the Atomic Bomb inside Wooden Houses, Hiroshima

junviaow

In Hiroshima, only 0.9% (17 burns) of 1,881
burns were due to ignited clothing, and only 0.7%
(15 burns) were due to burns by firestorm flames!

TABLE 8.3A

Number of Persons with Bums from Different Causes (Tokyo Imperial University's

First Survey, October-November 1945)

Distance from
Hypocenter (km)

Secondary Bumsf
From Clothes on Fire

Secondary Bumsf
By Flame

Total Bums

0.6-1.0

(3-3)

1. 1-1.5

(U)

327

1. 6-2.0

(0.5)

(12)

717

2. 1-2.5

(0.8)

558

2.6-3.0

(0.8)

(05)

140

3. 1-3.5

(2.8)

(07)

3.6-4.0

(24)

Total

(0.9)

(0.7)

1,881

• Primary boras are boras by thermal rays from the A-bomb,
t Secondary boras are boras by Sre other than thermal rays,
j Figures in parentheses are pe r ce nt ages of in cid en c e

Source: T. Kajhani and S. Hatano, “Medical survey on acute effects of atomic bomb in Hiroshima,” in CR1ABC
voL I, p. 522.

Note: there were 5 burns cases within 0.6 km, all primary

TABLE 8.3B
Region of Bums

Head

Face

Neck

Total

Outdoors Indoors

Number of
persons

Total

179 44

(11.7)* (12.3)

223

01.8)

1,030 127

(67.4) (35.7)

1,157

(61.5)

643 78

(42.1) (21.9)

721

(38.3)

1,526 355

1,881

* Figures in parentheses are percentages of inc id ence

Source: T. Kajitani and S. Hatano, “Medical survey on acute effects of atomic bomb in Hir o s him a," in CR1ABC
voL I, p. 522.

Above: extract from "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The
Physical, Social and Medical Effects", 1981
by the Japanese Committee for the Compilation
of Materials on Damage Caused by Atomic Bombs

looking out from GZ .
e: 27 November 1945.

HIROSHIMA: Radio Broadcasting Studio, 900 m from GZ, view from GZ
Photograph date: 27 November 1945.

HIROSHIMA.: City Hall, 1200 m from GZ, view from direction of GZ.
Photograph date: 27 November 1945.

HIROSHIMA: 26 October 1945

SINGLE NON-NUCLEAR INCENDIARY AIR RAID: TOKYO, 10 MARCH 1945

Crown Copyright Reserved

AIR MINISTRY

AP 3349

RESTRICTED

The information given in this document
is not to be communicated, either directly
or indirectly, to the Press or to any person
not authorized to receive it.

Code No.

9466~

26/GS Trg Publications/2329

PRECAUTIONS

AGAINST

NUCLEAR ATTACK

1957

(Superseding Precautions Against Atomic Attack, 1952 (WO Code No.
8769))

Promulgated by Command of Promulgated by Command of

the Army Council , the Air Council ,

Protection against fall-out

101. Except in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear explosion a reasonably
accurate prediction of the area of fall-out can be made in time for a
warning to be issued to units in the areas in which it is likely to fall. Given
a reasonable warning it may be possible to evacuate the area before the
fall-out arrives. In any case simple precautionary measures can greatly
reduce the hazard to life.

102. Exposure to the radio-active radiations from fall-out can be reduced
by taking sheltei and by using simple decontamination procedures until
such time as persons can leave the area. In areas where radio-active contami-
nation is heavy it may be necessary to remain under cover for as long as
48 hours before the radiations will have fallen, by natural decay, to levels
at which it will be safe for persons to move about, either to leave the aiea,
or, in the case of rescue teams from other areas, to enter it.

103. The estimated degree of protection against the residual radiation
to be obtained from buildings, trenches, etc, in a fall-out area is shown
at Table 7 : —

Table 7. Estimated degree of protection against the residual radiation to be
obtained from various buildings, trenches, etc, in a fall-out area

Type of building or shelter

INSIDE dose expressed as a
fraction of the OUTSIDE dose

Slit trench with light board or
corrugated iron overhead
Slit trench with 1 ft of earth overhead
Slit trench with 2 ft to 3 ft of earth
overhead
Nissen hut

One storey brick house
Two storey brick house
Three storey brick house

Average two storey house in a built
up area
Basements

siu to shs

&jto£s ) dependent upon wall
A to jfo ^ thickness and shield-
to T Jn i ing afforded by neigh-
' bouring houses

sihy to b&s dependent upon shield-
ing afforded by
neighbouring houses

UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/1

— T l/53

COPY No. 15

14 PAGES

/,/:,* -" T "

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT

REPORT No. T 1/53

&. 0I3A-

DECLASSIFIED FOR PR'
BY AWE ALDER M ASTON

TOP SECRET _

jQCyMfNT IS THE PRpTERTY

1 XOVCDKJMCklT • • .

***533

only for th* personal informatiorvof

•nd of choao^off.cer* under hiiK whose duties
it mkcv/Ns u personally responsible for iu
safe custody and that iu concenu arfcsduclosed
to officers and to them only. \

document will be kept in a Jockefewsafe
yonen not in actual use.

A.W.R.E.

Aldermaston Berks.

May. 1953

3*2 Blast Damage

Outdoor peak overpressure was 51 psi at 500 yds,
25 psi at 665 yds and 1 0 psi at 1 ,000 yds
3* 2* 1 Anderso n Shelters 3 p S j extended to 2,000 yds

Standard Anderson Shelters, with sandbag covering and blast
wall construction were locat ed at 460, 5*1 0, 600, 920 and 1,130 yards
fr om ground zero* Mean blast pressures, in pounds/sq* inch) recorded
inside the shelters are shown in the following table*

Distance (yds. ) m

Presentation

Side)

Rear

460

510

27 !

; 40

600

1 920

1130

8.5

Front presentation implies blast wall, facing towards event*
p ear « »» •' M M away from event*

Side ” ” shelter side on to event.

Shelters at 460, 510 and 600 yards suffered damage including
demolition of blast walls, removal of sandbag covering and some
displacement of the corrugated iron.

At 920 and 1,130 yards the shelters suffered relatively little
damage*

Civil defence authorities consider that there might have been
nnmft survival from blast damage of personnel in shelters at
460 yards and some 90 per cent at 600 yards, fatal casualties being
mainly due to secondary blast effects (e*g* debris) and not to__ di rect.
"effects on the person of the blast pressure itself* . The front
presentation appears the most hazardous, due to the collapse of the
blast wall into the shelter* At such distances, however, the
survival from the effects*' of gamma flash would have been virtually

oven, /s /reeved fin. fa'riflTttxSj

At 920 and 1,130 yards there would have been no casualties from
blast, and incidentally, little risk from the effect of gamma flash*

UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/2

ANDERSON SHELTER TESTS AGAINST 25 KT NUCLEAR

NEAR SURFACE BURST (2.7 METRES DEPTH IN SHIP)

AWRE-T1/54, 27 Aug. 1954

SECRET -GUARD

ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT
(formerly of Ministry of Supply)

SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE
(Monte Bello Islands, Australia — October, 1952)

130x10’ 7-7xl0 6 13 5 x 10 3

p ~ R 3 + R : + R

p is the maximum excess pressure in p.s.i. and R is the distance in feet

Fig. 12.1, Andersons at 1380 ft range from bomb ship
shown in the photo, moored 400 yards off shore.

Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right:
Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 2760 ft.

12.1. Blast Damage to Anderson Shelters

At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing
towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of
the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full
protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the
explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more
or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet. Fig. 12.3.

At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were
displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet. Fig. 12.5, the
effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of
the explosion owing to intervening sandhills.

SECRET-GUARD

13. The Penetration of the Gamma Flash

13.1. Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Slit

Trenches

13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches
provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the
point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most
important results of the trial.

13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6 ft. by 2 ft. in plan and 6 ft. deep were
placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft. in
radius and 6 ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards.

The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and quartz-
fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distance,
with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection afforded
by open and covered trenches.

In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target vessel
but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 and
one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 1 1 inches of sand.

Table 13.1

Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench

Type of trench

Rectangular

broadside-on

open

Rectan-

gular

end-on

open

• ■. •

Circular open

Rectangular

broadside-on

covered

Distance (yards) ...

1,300

943

733

1,300

943

733

Surface dose

(Roentgens)

Depth below ground
level (inches)

300

3,000

14,000

300

3,000

14,000

150

1,000

—

230

214

1,200

(75)

—

430

150

120

545

47*6

—

33-3

584

54-5

188

• 25

(140)

216

31 *6

(56)

(20)

100

17-7

48-5

7-7

(31)

—

(37-5)

13*6

10*7

(33-3)

(23)

“ '

(46-7)

(8*6)

(3*5)

Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates.

isana do ihoish

ir>

■Q

Where ground range » burst height, in a modern city the first high rise building
absorbs the majority of the thermal flash energy, preventing this effect.

(Penney proves that modern buildings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki actually
ABSORBED blast energy, causing a further attenuation factor, not included above.)

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v266 (1970). dp. 357-424.

HOME OFFICE

SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE

Volume I

PAMPHLET No. 2

RADIOACTIVE

FALL-OUT

PROVISIONAL SCHEME OF
PUBLIC CONTROL

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1956

Radioactive Fall-out — Summary of Provisional Control Zones

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The initial Zone W boundary would be defined by the boundaries of a series of warning districts on the flanks of the fall-out. After 48 hrs. Zone W would for public control
purposes have disappeared: its outer boundary would have moved during the period to coincide with the outer boundary of Zone X.

The question of defining an area extending in some places beyond Zone W in which there might be an agricultural hazard is being studied.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REP CRT - AFSWP NO. 507

RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT HAZARDS FRCM SURFACE BURSTS OF
VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

D . C . Borg
L. D. Gates
T. A. Gibson, Jr.

R. W. Paine, Jr.

MAY 195^

HEADQUARTERS, ARMED FCECES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

WASHINGTON 13, D. C.

e. Passive defense measures, intelligently applied, can drasti-
cally reduce the lethally hazardous areas. A course of action
involving the seeking of optimum shelter, followed by evacuation of
the contaminated area after a week or ten days, appears to offer

the best chance of survival. At the distant downwind areas, as much
as 5 to 10 hours after detonation time may be available to take
shelter before fall-out commences.

f. Universal use of a simply constructed deep underground
shelter, a subway tunnel, or the sub -basement of a large building
could eliminate the lethal hazard due to external radiation from
fall-out completely, if followed by evacuation from the area when
ambient radiation intensities have decayed to levels which will
permit this to be done safely.

vii

Table II

Total Isodose Contour: 500r from Fall-out to H-t-50 Hours
Yield (MT) 15 1 10 60

Downwind extent (mi) 180 52 152 3^+0

Area (mi^)

5^+00 470

3880 17,900

HOME OFFICE

SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

General

Information

(All Sections)

CIVIL DEFENCE
POCKET BOOK NO. 3

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1960

Zone

Dose-rare at
H + 48 hours

Summary of permissible and
recommended action

Less than 0.3 r.p.h.

Remain in refuge until released, which can
be as soon as dose-rate falls to 0.3 r.p.h.
or when fall-out is complete if the rate has
not reached that figure.

0.3 — 3 r.p.h.

3 — 10 r.p.h.

Remain in refuge until at least H-i48
hours; then release under stringent control.
For the next 12 days time in the oper
should not exceed 2 hours per day. On
this basis essential indoor workers should
be able to get to their work, but outdoor
work would remain suspended. After the
first fortnight it would be possible to
increase the essential time spent out of
doors to 4 hours per day for the next three
weeks, increasing this to 8 hours per day
thereafter for the rest of the first year.

10 r.p.h. or more

Remain in refuge until told to leave. All
movement outside refuge in this zone
would be dangerous. People should re-
main until instructions for clearance are
given; they should then leave by the
nominated route if they have means of
transport — or wait in their refuge to be
collected if they have not. The clearance
operation might start after H4-48 hours
and removal from the Zone would be for
at least 3 months.

HOME OFFICE

SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE

Volume I

PAMPHLET No. 1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1956

Practical protection

88 Large buildings with a number of storeys, especially if they are of
heavy construction, provide much better protection than small single-
storey structures (see Figure 4). Houses in terraces likewise provide
much better protection than isolated houses because of the shielding
effect of neighbouring houses.

GOOD PROTECTION

Solidly constructed multi-storeyed building with occupants well removed from
fall-out on ground and roof. The thickness of floors and roof overhead, and the
shielding effect of other buildings, all help to cut down radiation

Figure 4

Examples of good and bad protection afforded by buildings against fall-out.

89 It is estimated that the protection factor (the factor by which the out-
side dose has to be divided to get the inside dose) of a ground floor
room in a two-storey house ranges from 10 to about 50, depending on
wall thickness and the shielding afforded by neighbouring buildings.
The corresponding figures for bungalows are about 10-20, and for
three-storey houses about 15-100. An average two-storey brick house
in a built-up area gives a factor of 40, but basements, where the radia-
tion from outside the house is attenuated by a very great thickness of
earth, have protection factors ranging up to 200-300. A slit trench
with even a light cover of boards or corrugated iron without earth
overhead gives a factor of 7, and if 1 ft. of earth cover is added the

With corrugated iron
or boards overhead

With I ft. of earth
overhead

With 3 ft. of earth
overhead

FIGURE 5

Protection factors in slit trenches (the factor by which the outside dose is divided

to get the inside dose).

Choosing a refuge room

90 In choosing a refuge room in a house one would select a room with a
minimum of outside walls and make every effort to improve the pro-
tection of such outside walls as there were. In particular the windows
would have to be blocked up, e.g. with sandbags. Where possible, boxes
of earth could be placed round an outside wall to provide additional
protection, and heavy furniture (pianos, bookcases etc.) along the in-
side of the wall would also help. A cellar would be ideal. Where the
ground floor of the house consists of boards and timber joists carried
on sleeper walls it may be possible to combine the high protection
of the slit trench with some of the comforts of the refuge room by
constructing a trench under the floor.

Once a trap door had been cut in the floor boards and joists and the
trench had been dug, there would be no further interference with the
peace-time use of the room.

Estimated under-cover doses In the fall-out area

91 Taking an average protective factor of 40 for a two-storey house in a

built-up area, the doses accumulated in 36 hours for the ranges referred
to in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Report (paragraph 84)
would have been:— * AOq c

190 miles downwind 7Jr 1^ M****°«S
160 „ „ 12*r ^o^ll 5t+

140 „ „ 20r

which are all well below the lowest figure of 25r referred to in Table 1 .
At closer ranges along the axis of the fall-out, the doses accumulated
in 36 hours would have been much higher, but over most of the con-
taminated area— with this standard of protection — the majority of
those affected would have been saved from death, and even from sick-
ness, by taking cover continuously for the first 36 hours.

5. Radiation sickness

Assume dose incurred in a single shift (3-4 hours) by the “average”
man, over the whole body: —

25 roentgens — No obvious harm.

100 „ — Some nausea and vomiting.

500 „ — Lethal to about 50 per cent, people

(death up to 6 weeks later).

800 „ or more — Lethal to all (death up to 6 weeks later).

Note: If dose spread uniformly over 2-3 days, then 60 roentgens
could be incurred with no more effect than 25 roentgens in a single
exposure of 3-4 hours.

Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to UNPROTECTED people

DISTANCE FROM G.Z. IN MILES

Figure 11

Combined effects (excluding residual radioactivity) from a 10 megaton ground
burst bomb. Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to

UNPROTECTED people.

HOME OFFICE

CIVIL DEFENCE

TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 3

The Control of Civil Defence Operations

under

Fall-out Conditions

(England and Wales)

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

1959

SIXPENCE NBT

Civil Defence Training Memorandum No. 3, “The Control of Civil Defence Operations under

Fall-out Conditions,” U.K. Home Office, 1959

. . . Some forces, e.g. ambulances, could
operate profitably where their dose was spread
out over longer periods than 8 hours by
working at lower dose rates than 10 R/hour.
Others, e.g. reconnaissance parties with special
responsibility for rapid penetration, might have
to take their wartime emergency dose without
heed to the 10 R/hour [fallout map
pattem/contour] line and reduce their working
period accordingly. . . . units would continue
with their task . . . with reference only to the
total dose accumulated on their dosimeters. . . .
The radiological limit should be taken as the
1,000 R/hour at H + 1 contour which will be
10 R/hour line at H + 48 [due to the 100 fold
decay of fallout radiation between 1 and 48
hours after a nuclear explosion] and so mark
the limit to which life-saving forces can be
expected to have penetrated by that time. . . .

‘The task will be set by the number of
casualties trapped, or seriously injured but
untrapped . . . capable of being succoured
within the first 48 hours. As soon as possible
after ground zero, weight and nature of attack
are known, the Controller should have casualty
estimates made . . . This will be done by
applying the population figures for the Sectors
casualty percentages as shown on the graph
(from Exercise ARC) attached as an appendix
to this memorandum, which sets out, on the
best evidence at present available [blast
casualties from applying Blitz casualty data as
a function of house damage to nuclear test data
showing the amount of house damage versus
distance from a nuclear explosion, which
automatically takes account of the duration of
the blast wave in nuclear explosions], the
proportions of seriously injured, trapped and
untrapped, to be expected at different distances
from ground zeroes of bombs of varying
power. ... A single Forward Medical Aid Unit
can be expected to deal with about 120
seriously injured an hour - say 1,000 in each
shift - and to continue working throughout the
operational period with only internal reliefs. . . .
At the beginning of operations a 4-berthed
ambulance can be expected to take about 1
hour on the round trip from ambulance loading
point ... A single casualty collecting party can
handle and send to ambulance loading points
about 12 seriously injured an hour, or, say, 100
per shift [8 hours]. ... A single [light] rescue
party [using slow manual methods used in
1941, without any of the tracked cranes
and rescue dogs used to rapidly clear debris off
casualties in 1944-1945, during the VI and
V2 attacks on London] can release two or three
trapped persons an hour or, say, 20 per shift.”

USNRDL-TR-IQ49
29 July 196b

■^641480

REMOVAL OF 8IMULATE0 FALLOUT FROM ASPHALT
STREETS BY FIREHQSING TECHNIQUES

L.L. Wiltshire
W.L.Owen

In general, removal effectiveness Improves with increased

particle site range and increased mass loading.

Jbr the expenditure

of an effort of 4 nozzle-minutes (12 man-minutes) per ICr ft , results

ranged as follows:

Particle Size Range

go.

Nominal Mass Loading

(a'ft 5 )

Removal Effectiveness
(Residual Fraction)

44 - 88

4.0

0.16

24.0

0.0?

350 - 700

4.0

0.005

24.0

0.003

XJ.8. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE LABORATORY

SAN FRANCISCO

CALIFORNIA

9 4 13 5

FALLOUT DECONTAMINATION, RETENTION AND UPTAKE

A number of factors make large-scale decontamination useful in urban areas. Much of the area between buildings is paved and, thus, readily cleaned using motorized
flushers and sweepers, which are usually available. If, in addition, the roofs are decontaminated by high-pressure hosing, it may be possible to make entire buildings
habitable fairly soon, even if the fallout has been very heavy.' - Dr Frederick P. Cowan and Charles B. Meinhold, Decontamination, Chapter 10, pp. 225-40 of Dr
Eugene P. Wigner (editor), Survival and the Bomb, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1969.

Measured Efficiency of Decontamination by Firehosing Dry Fallout

Deposits*

1-hour dose 300 R/hr 1,000 R/hr 3,000 R/hr

rate:

Fallout deposit: 100 g/m 2 330 g/m 2 1 ,000 g/m 2 ~

Portland 96% 98% 99.2%

cement

concrete

Tar and gravel 97% 98% 99%

roof

Galvanised 95% 98% 99.4%

steel

Smooth painted 96% 99% 99.6%

surface

* Radiological Recovery of Fixed Military Installations, U.S. Army
Chemical Corps technical manual TM-3-225, 1958. Firehosing uses 4
cm diameter hoses, each crewed by 2-4 people, and utilising 100
gallons/minute of water; each hose decontaminates 700 m 2 /hour. The
water pressure needed is 5 atmospheres. The fallout is flushed into
underground drain sewers with the water.

According to fallout decontamination studies on paved areas at
distances of 600-1600 m from the 1951 Sugar nuclear surface burst and
Uncle shallow underground burst: ‘High-pressure water hosing was
found to be the most rapid and effective procedure tested... None of the
tested procedures [which included dry sweeping and vacuum cleaning]
resulted in significant contamination of the operator’s protective
clothing.’ (J.C. Maloney, Decontamination of Paved Areas, weapon test
report WT-400, chapter 5, 1952.)

Priority firehosing of residential areas would be needed where the 1-
hour dose rate is between 500-3,000 R/hr. At lower dose rates, there
will be few casualties in any case (200 R being assumed to produce a
‘casualty’), while at higher dose rates the hazard to decontamination
crews is considered excessive, so protection would there depend on
radiation shielding or evacuation. Decontamination could begin when
the outdoor dose rate had decayed to 10 R/hr, i.e., 1-5 days after
detonation for 1-hour dose rates of 500-3,000 R/hr. People in these
zones must remain under cover indoors until decontamination is done.
(An American study by Stanford Research Institute, Systems Analysis of
Radiological Defense, in 1958 assumed that 1% of the population would
be available to staff decontamination crews, and that each crew member
is allowed a dose of 100 R.)

A study of decontamination was done by J.A. Miles of the British
Home Office Scientific Adviser’s Branch in 1965, The Value of Area
Decontamination in Reducing Casualties from Radioactive Fallout,
SA/PR-97, Secret. Miles found that firehosing roads, pavements, and
houses to reduce dose rates by a factor of 4 requires 57,000 litres of
water and 37 human-hours of effort per kilometre length of terraced
streets; but twice this water and effort is needed for streets of semi-
detached houses with front gardens. About 620 people live in each
kilometre length of terraced streets, but only about 310 people live in
each kilometre length of semi-detached housing. Terraced streets are
thus the decontamination priority.

Several tested techniques are available to decontaminate different
surfaces. Roads, paved areas, building surfaces, vehicles, aircraft and
ships can be decontaminated by water hosing. Farmland requires a
different technique. In fallout tests, single-pass deep-ploughing to a
depth of 20-25 cm reduced the above-ground gamma radiation level
from the fallout by 85%; using a 125 horse-power tractor with a 3-share
plough, 3,250 m 2 /hour was deep-ploughed. {Radiological Recovery of
Fixed Military Installations, U.S. Army Chemical Corps technical
manual TM-3-225, 1958.) Fallout is deep-ploughed to a depth below
the root length of the crops, or alternatively the long-term agricultural
uptake of strontium-90 and cesium- 137 is simply diluted by adding
chemically-similar calcium and potassium salts (respectively) to
contaminated soil.

On smooth ground, it is possible to literally sweep away surrounding
dry fallout with a broom, or to swill it down drains using an ordinary
low pressure hose pipe. For concrete, 1 m height, and 0.7 MeV fallout
gamma rays, the protection is:

Circular radius of
decontaminated area
(m)

Protection factor for
the actual removal of
fallout

Protection factor for
just sweeping fallout
to edge

1.4

1.3

1.8

1.5

2.0

1.8

2.7

2.3

4.1

3.5

There are three basic stages during radiological recovery from a
nuclear war: (1) evacuation of old people with inadequate radiation
shielding from heavy fallout areas if they are unable to improve their
shielding sufficiently with sandbags, (2) sheltering in heavy fallout areas
for a few days in the part of the house furthest from the roof and outside
walls, with as much mass shielding of the inner refuge as possible while
the intense danger falls sharply by natural radioactive decay, and (3)
outdoor decontamination to avoid long-term exposure.

It is also possible to essentially avert the entire fallout problem by
using the washdown system during fallout deposition. It is more
effective to fix up a cheap water hose spray to clean the roof, walls, and
surrounding urban paved areas while fallout is landing, than to spend
money on sheltering, which will not remove a single fallout particle!
Focus on expensive sheltering and measuring of radiation was a mistake
made by Herman Kahn of the RAND Corporation in 1958, and has
unfortunately overshadowed the more valuable discovery that if you do
not waste time, you can just wash the fallout down the drain! (Kahn
thought just in terms of an invisible radiation problem, not in terms of a
physical fallout problem.) The continuous washdown system was tested
on manned ships during the 1950s nuclear tests, having been developed
after a study of the 1946 Bikini fallout problems. If you leave the
fallout for weeks, decontamination becomes more difficult, because
particles end up firmly lodged in crevices, and you also miss the benefit
of reducing the intense early time hazard.

F.T. Underwood of the British Home Office Scientific Adviser’s
Branch, reported fallout adherence studies between 1961-5 (reports
CD/S A- 103 and CD/SA-125). Underwood glued sheets of 0.13 cm
thick PVC plastic on to Fondon house roofs. They were fully intact for
1 year and lost only 10% area coverage after another year during winter
storms. PVC covered roofs retain few fallout particles, and are smooth
enough that light rain or a small water spray will decontaminate them.
For a 45-degree roof slope, 90% of the retained fallout on PVC is
removed by just 1 litre/m 2 of water (i.e., 0.1 cm of rainfall).

Without PVC, much more water is needed to first fill up all the pits
and crevices in the roof where fallout particles are lodged, before they
can be carried away. Over 90% of fallout particles that exceeded 1 mm
in diameter rolled or bounced quickly enough to overcome friction, and
fell straight of roofs with a 45-degree slope. However, 95% of fallout
particles smaller than 0.2 mm in diameter adhered to a 45-degree
sloping ceramic tiled roof, because they slowly rolled into small pits and
crevices where they lodged. R.T. Graveson reported in 1956 that the
normal roof of a fallout-contaminated typical American house in the
Nevada desert was decontaminated by 5 cm of natural rainfall, causing
in a reduction of the gamma dose rate within the house by a factor of 1 5
{Radiation Protection within a Standard Housing Structure, Nevada
Test Site report NYO-4714). Studies of skin decontamination by E.
Neale and E. H. Fetts’s paper Radiological Decontamination: Removal
of Dry Fallout from Skin and Clothing, British Chemical Defence
Experimental Establishment, Porton Technical Paper PTP-R-16, 1958,
showed that washing removed 100% of dry fallout particles of 100
microns or more in diameter, but only 97.5% of particles with a
diameter of 20 microns. Denim overalls are decontaminated with 90%
efficiency in 5 minutes by a washing machine (100 revolutions per
minute with 1% detergent), for particle diameters exceeding 10 microns.

Research on Removing Radioactive Fallout

From Farmland

By P. E. James, agricultural engineer , Physical Control Laboratory , North-
eastern Region, and R. G. Menzel, soil scientist, Water Quality Labora-
tory, Southern Region, Agricultural Research Service

US Department of Agriculture, Agicultural
Research Service, Technical Bulletin 1464 (1973)

Table 12 . — Experiment K: Percentage of radioactivity determined

at various depths after deep plowing

Sampling depth
(inches)

Radioactivity of Radioactivity of
high-clay sandy loam

content Elkton soil

Pullman soil

Percent Percent

3 0.5 0.5

9 .3 .5

15 1.2 .7

21 . 1.7 4.2

27 6.2 29.2

33 . 27.4 62.6

39 61.4 2.0

A power-driven streetsweeper or scraper cutting 2 inches deep
removes about 90 percent of the contaminant.

Decontamination should be accomplished before rainfall washes
the radioactivity into low places where it is difficult to remove.

Decontamination can be accomplished by a scraper with a 12-
foot blade at the rate of 100,000 square feet (2.3 acres) in 3.3
hours.

Application of a concrete or asphalt coating over the radioactiv-
ity is ineffective and only makes later pickup of radioactivity more
difficult.

Burying radioactivity 3 feet deep with a large plow is costly and
ineffective in reducing the uptake of radioactivity.

Planting through a contaminated surface which is then left
untilled is an ineffective way to reduce the uptake of radioactivity.

The species of the crop is a highly significant factor in the
uptake of radioactivity.

REMOVING RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM FARMLAND 31

Table 13. — Experiment L: Uptake of strontium-85 by mature
crops grown with different tillage operations and a growth
inhibitor

Crop

Fraction of strontium-85 application
taken up with different treatments

Rotary-tilled

Deep-plowed

Deep-plowed
with Na jCOi

Sugarbeet tops

Percent X 10*
640

Percent X 10*
300

Percent X 10*
39

Sugarbeet roots

910

780

Sudangrass fodder

780

450

Soybean straw

650

540

Soybean seed

Cabbage

1,130

560

154

each sample was recorded. Table 13 summarizes the uptake of
strontium-85 by mature crops grown with different tillage opera-
tions and a growth inhibitor.

To investigate the effectiveness of a conventional-type street-
sweeper in removing fallout from contaminated land, Experiment
M was conducted during the fall (table 14). The following varia-
bles: Type of soil, sweeping procedures, type of broom material,
and use of gutter broom were considered. Several practical factors
make mechanical streetsweepers attractive. Sweepers leave the
topsoil relatively undisturbed; they are maneuverable in corners
and around objects, and are much less destructive than scrapers
to hard surfaces such as roads.

The soil type and condition were important factors in decon-
taminating. It was easier to decontaminate sandy soil than silty
loam during the initial passes. Four passes were required on silty
loam soil to achieve 90-percent decontamination, whereas, only
three were required on a sandy soil. The fields were decontami-
nated after a rain and, consequently, were wet. Other results might
occur from sweeping dry fields.

Investigations of the sweeping procedures showed that after
three passes, a point of diminishing return for the effort expended
occurs. Nevertheless, 10 passes removed 99 percent of the con-
tamination. The sweeper operated as effectively at high ground-
speed as it did when going slower. Higher speeds are preferable
since the operator receives less exposure.

A steel wire main broom was more effective than a plastic main

Table 14 . — Experiment M: Cumulative percentage of radioactivity reduced by
repeated passes of a rotating-brush, mechanical street sweeper with different brooms 1

32 TECHNICAL BULLETIN 1464, U.S. DEPT. OP AGRICULTURE

•o S

i w o
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50 50
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05 b-

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00 05

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b- 50

05 05

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05 05

CO to
00 00

^ CO
b* t>

to o

05 05

03 CO
05 05

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00 t>

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b- 50

s s

■a |

'S g

B a,
s a

S a

§ I

m «

B B E B « B

e e J3 e e e

<b w t, <e <a <e

8 S § 8 8 8

« cd d 58

ft ft g, ft cx ft

S ’oS £ 'rt S *«3
.2 s g .2 •• fl

.. g "8 05 g t5 ^ S
SfcSaSSzugSfc

W 02 S

g 2

<3 <a

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•5 o
-*» ««-< 5

5 Jj* •§
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3 5*8

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•§ c a>
jg a) .a

Q gj H

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UNCLASSIFIED

HW-40289

Health and Biology
(TID-4500, 11th Ed. )

THE ABSORPTION BY PLANTS OF BETA-EMITTING FISSION PRODUCTS

FROM THE BRAVO SOIL

A. A. Selders, J. F. Cline and J. H. Rediske

Plant Nutrition and Microbiology Unit
Biology Section

Radiological Sciences Department
December 20, 1955

HANFORD ATOMIC PRODUCTS OPERATION
RICHLAND, WASHINGTON

Work performed under Contract #W-31-109 -Eng-52 between
the Atomic Energy Commission and General Electric Company

Printed by/for the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission

Printed in USA. Price JLE[ cents. Available from the

Office of Technical Services
U. S. Department of Commerce
Washington, D. C.

UNCLASSIFIED

HW -40289

ABSTRACT

Barley and bean plants were grown to maturity (87 days) in soil
from a Pacific island which contained fallout material from the Bravo
shot. The leaves of bean and barley plants showed a concentration factor
of 0. 05 and 0. 02, respectively, for the total beta emitters absorbed.

Leaves of both bean and barley plants had a higher concentration
of fission products than did the fruit. Addition of nutrients to the soil
decreased the uptake of fission products into the bean plant but had no
effect on uptake into barley.

With the exception of those for cesium, concentration factors for
the individual elements were comparable with values previously obtained
in the laboratory using local soils. The concentration factor of 4-8 for
cesium is over 20 times higher than is obtained using local soils. All
values are determined on oven dried material.

CONCENTRATIONS OF EMITTERS FOUND IN BRAVO SOIL AND 87 -DAY-OLD
PLANTS GROWN IN THIS SOIL, EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT ADDED NUTRIEN

UNCLASSIFIED

HW -40289

Without Nutrient

■H

Heads

ZOO *0

0.4

10 *0

•

Leaves

0. 002

Z0 ’0

50*0

Bean

Pods

•

OvJ

•

Leaves

0. 03

IS *0

With Nutrient

!>s

Heads

100 *0

0. 5

•

■JT

■ M

Leaves

•

00*

TO *0

Not deter-
mined

•

Bean

Pods

0. 002

r— 1

S00 *0

PsJ

i—4

•

Leaves

CF*

•

i—4

H) *0

«— i '"TT"

•rH O'

0. 2

0.1

0. 8

Element

Rare Earths
and yttrium

c 89 and 90
Sr

C-
00
1— 1

90I-S0i na

l/l

• pH

- 4-9

•rH

cfl

ol-S

- 4-9

cti

ctf

- 1-9

UNCLASSIFIED

ug 1/ g Dry Tissue

HANFORD ATOMIC PRODUCTS OPERATION
RICHLAND, WASHINGTON

THE UPTAKE OF IODINE BY HIGHER PLANTS

HW-33681

A. A. Selders and J. H. Rediske

Plant Nutrition and Microbiology Unit
Biology Section

September 30, 1954

Nutrient pH

Survival of Food Crops
and Livestock in the Event
of Nuclear War

Proceedings of a symposium held at
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, Long Island, New York
September 15—18, 1970

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